Liberty and self in the political argument of republicanism, liberalism and postmodernism. by Ivison, Duncan Mackenzie
Liberty and Self in the political argument of republicanism, liberalism
and postmodernism
Duncan Mackenzie Ivison 
Presented for the degree of PhD 
Governm ent Departm ent 




INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U062724
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
r
70*4-0
xc2 1 1 0 6 ^ 6 0
Abstract:
This thesis examines the relationship between the concepts of liberty and self in three 
different contexts - republicanism, liberalism, and post-modernism - all of which are 
products of particular historical traditions, and which present themselves as alternative 
'languages' and practices in political argument today. I attempt to delineate the relation 
between the self and the concept of liberty within which it operates in each context, and 
more generally, questions concerning the relationship between personality and polity. The 
tendency of much recent historical and analytical scholarship when looking at these 
issues, has been to emphasize the radical differences between the traditions and their 
conceptual foundations, especially between republicanism and liberalism. Without 
minimizing the obvious differences, I have sought rather in this thesis to emphasize some 
important similarities in the way each approaches the issues of agency, liberty, and the 
role and justification of social arrangements. This entails a distinctive reading of some 
aspects in the history of the development of republican and liberal political argument, 
particularly in John Locke. An important theme here is the tension between assumptions of 
natural liberty and autonomy, and the role of the community and government in 
constructing, fostering, and disciplining the very autonomy that is presupposed. Arguing 
that the differing accounts of the relation between liberty and self are, in important ways, 
constitutive of the debate between 'communitarians' and 'proceduralists', I turn to 
contemporary Rawlsian liberal political theory to see if we can't stand back from this 
conventional way of looking at the problem and re-think the relations. [Towards this end I 
make some remarks on the relation between the history of political thought and (so- 
called) 'analytical' political theory.] I argue that liberal political theory must be 
'perfectionist', though not in the way that communitarians argue, and not in the way that 
liberals fear. Indeed it must be so if it is to have any chance for success, though 
'perfectionism' is a particularly inappropriate way of talking here, and has been taken up 
too easily and uncritically in the literature. Civic republican practices have something to 
teach us in this context, though not simply the way they respect the 'negative liberty' of 
individuals within a scheme of mutually enforcing rights and duties. This leads me in 
part, to consider how liberalism tries to make transparent elements of not only state 
coercion, but institutional, social, and non-juridical forms of power which work on, or 
through, citizens of modem democracies, and how these power relations manifest 
themselves in modem concepts of liberty, and conceptions of the self. Finally, I consider 
some aspects of the work of Michel Foucault, particularly a series of lectures and papers he 
gave on liberalism and 'neo-liberalism' to see if he offers a vantage point ( if anything) 
from which to evaluate our conventional ways of talking about, and acting on, our concepts 
of liberty and self.
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T he passage from the state of nature to the dvil state produces a truly remarkable 
change in the individual. It substitutes justice for instinct in his behaviour, and gives 
his actions a moral basis which formerly was lacking/
Jean Jacques Rousseau, (The Social Contract).
1  don't believe in the old dirges about decadence, the lack of good writers, the sterility 
of thought, the bleak and foreboding horizon ahead of us. I believe, on the contrary, 
that our problem is one of overabundance; not that we are suffering from an emptiness, 
but that we lack adequate means to think all that is happening/
Michel Foucault, (1980).
Preface
In the last paragraphs of his speech to the Athenee Royal in 1819,
Benjamin Constant, after having spent the bulk of his time carefully
distinguishing between the liberty  of the ancients' and the 'liberty of
the m oderns', a distinction which would become a horizon (if not a
spectre) hovering over the political theory of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, m oved to summarize his argument:
Therefore, Sirs, far from renouncing either of the two sorts of freedom which I have 
described to you, it is necessary, as I have shown, to learn to combine the two 
together...The work of the legislator is not complete when he has simply brought peace 
to the people. Even when the people are satisfied, there is much left to do. Institutions 
must achieve the moral education of the citizens. By respecting their individual 
rights, securing their independence, refraining from troubling their work, they must 
nevertheless consecrate their influence over public affairs, call them to contribute by 
their votes to the exercise of power, grant them a right of control and supervision by 
expressing their opinions; and by forming them through practices for these elevated 
functions, give them both the desire and the right to discharge these.1
For the most part, we have concentrated on Constant's distinctions 
when trying to understand our own concepts and conceptions of 
liberty, and this plea for the reconstruction of the two sensitivities - in 
the full glare of the m odem  condition and not in some blinkered 
'appeal to an appeal' of an ancient polis - has tended to be ignored, if 
not ruled out of the conceptual court. Isaiah Berlin's seminal re­
statement of the main thrust of Constant's speech in his distinction 
between 'negative' and 'positive' freedom has nothing of the 
sociological edge of Constant's observations, nor does it take up the 
ambiguous tension Constant established between the ancient and 
m odem  world-pictures, or even the concern for the juridical 
framework of m odem  liberty.2 Constant's plea was not for an
1 Benjamin Constant, ‘The liberty of the ancients compared with that of the modems*, in B. 
Fontana ed. Benjamin Constant: The Political Writings, Cambridge University Press, 1988, 
pp. 309-328, at p. 328.
2 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969. As is well known, it 
has been subject to a vast critical literature: see for example, John Gray, ‘On negative and 
positive liberty’, Political Studies, 28,1980, pp. 507-26; Charles Taylor, ‘What’s wrong 
with negative liberty’, in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2, 
Cambridge University Press, 1985; Gerard MacCallum, ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’,
The Philosophical Review, 76,1967,312-34. On the importance of constitutional issues for 
Constant, especially the structure of representative government, see Pasquale Pasquino, 
‘Emmanuel Sieyes, Benjamin Constant et le ‘Gouvemement des Modemes’, Revue Francaise
abjuration of government in favour of the unchallengeable primacy of 
individual right, or the endless pursuit of private interest, but rather to 
understand the nature of the times, and the need for greater respect for 
'customs...affections [and] the independence of individuals', i.e. for a 
new 'art of government' suited to the 'progress of civilization'; 
'[government's] m ust handle all these issues with a lighter and more 
prudent hand '.3 But it would be too harsh to say that, strictly speaking, 
Berlin got anything wrong in his defence of the relation between 
pluralism and negative liberty, for there is no doubt that he too caught 
a significant sense of Vesprit de Vage, though one we might sense that 
is now  beginning to pass, or at least mutate into something quite 
different.4
However it is not my goal here, nor will it be in the pages that follow, 
to pursue the debate over the concept of liberty in terms of choosing 
one concept over another, nor will I try to isolate some linguistically 
pristine formulation which answers to its 'real' value-free status.5 
Rather, my interest lies in situating the concept of liberty in three 
specific forms of political argument - republicanism, liberalism, and 
postmodernism - all of which are elements of our contemporary 
discourse as a whole, though each providing a distinct approach and 
purchase on that discourse from different historical and analytical 
vantage points.6 My other interest lies in the relation between 
conceptions of liberty and conceptions of self, which as Berlin (and
de Science Politique, 37,1987,214-22.
3 Constant 1988, pp. 324, 327; see B. Fontana’s helpful ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-42.
4 Though Berlin saw fit to make certain adjustments to his claims in different contexts; the 
1969 edition speaks of the dangers of negative liberty fostering ‘great and lasting social evils’ 
such as ‘economic individualism and unrestrained capitalist competition’, though in the end 
these dangers were always less pressing than those he identified with positive liberty (pp. xlv- 
xlvi).
5 For that, see for example, Felix Oppenheim, Political Concepts: A Reconstruction, Oxford, 
Basil Blackwell, 1981; cf. Hillel Steiner, ‘Individual Liberty’, Proceedings o f the Aristotelian 
Society, 1974/5. See the essays in David Miller ed., Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1991.
6 Cf. Donald R. Kelley, ‘The Private Life of Liberty’, in J. Klaits M. Haltzel (eds.),
LibertyILiberte: The American and French Experiences, Baltimore and London, The Woodrow 
Wilson Centre Press/ Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991,11-20: ‘true “enlightenment” 
needs memory as well as reason, and “liberty” is serious and complicated enough to deserve 
critical historical examination as well as political commemoration’ (p. 19).
others) have identified, remains a crucial component for any 
understanding of our philosophical and political uses of liberty, and 
one which renders any simple linguistic or conceptual analysis either 
wholly inappropriate, or at least severely under-developed.7 In short, I 
will argue that liberal political theory must be 'perfectionist', though 
not in the way that communitarians argue, and not in the sense that 
liberals fear. Indeed it must be so if it is to have any chance of success, 
though 'perfectionism' is a particularly inappropriate way of talking 
here, and has been taken up too easily and uncritically in the literature.
The tendency of much recent historical and analytical scholarship 
when looking at these issues has been to emphasize the radical 
differences between the traditions and their conceptual foundations, 
particularly between republicanism and liberalism. W ithout 
minimizing the obvious differences, I have sought in this thesis to 
emphasize some important similarities in the way each approaches the 
issues of agency, liberty, and the role and justification of social 
arrangements. This will entail providing a particular reading of certain 
aspects of the history of republican and liberal political argument, 
particularly in John Locke. An im portant theme throughout this 
discussion (in part 1) will be the tension between the assumptions of 
natural liberty and autonomy, and the role of the community and 
governm ent in constructing, fostering, and disciplining this very 
autonomy. It has become conventional to see the differences between 
the relation of liberty and self in republicanism and liberalism as 
embodied in a negative/positive liberty dichotomy, regardless of how 
the theorists in question themselves understood it. Thus liberals have 
complained about the teleological tendencies of classical republicanism 
and its presum ption of the essential nature of man being 'political',
7 But see Macallum 1967 far a useful attempt at setting out a minimal conceptual framework 
(i.e. his triadic relationship, i.e. that an agent is [ not] free from x to do [not do, become/not 
become] y) which any account of freedom has, whatever the content of the ideological or 
philosophical baggage which accompanies i t  Needless to say this is hardly a conception of 
freedom. Cf. Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy, Englewood, Prentice-Hall, 1973, especially 
pp. 5-14. For a general discussion of these issues, see Tim Gray, Freedom, London, 
MacMillan, 1991.
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and republicans have complained about the barren public ethos of 
liberal citizenship, beholden to only the protection of individual rights 
and property. Both are caricatures in need of an overhaul.
Recently, historians of classical republicanism, and theorists with a 
republican bent, have been claiming that their republicanism is more 
user-friendly to the late-modern world than has been thought, 
precisely because classical republican theorists like Machiavelli had a 
conception of liberty which was essentially (even 'purely7) 'negative'. 
Combined with a strong claim that this liberty was only protected by 
preserving the good of the community as a whole, they have argued 
that this provides an example of a conception of liberty we have either 
denied could exist, or have banished to (almost) ancient history. I shall 
examine this claim below, but shall say now that I think this is not 
only a misleading way of describing the concept of liberty embodied in 
classical republican theory, but that it misses the really interesting 
questions about liberal and republican accounts of the relation between 
liberty and self. Liberal political argument needs more than a 
rem inder that rights m ust be accompanied by concomitant duties; it 
needs to be rem inded of the importance of the formation and fostering 
of a specific set of capacities and dispositions necessary for the efficacy 
of its moral aspirations. In fact, early m odem  theorists thought a lot 
about these issues, and this needs to be brought out in order to dissolve 
the Kantian gloss on the presum ption of men's 'natural' liberty and 
equality which has been read back into the history of liberal political 
argum ent.
In part 2, we turn to some of the contemporary variations on the 
themes of the historical traditions we examine in part 1. One reason 
for doing so relates to my perception of the relation be i. ween (so-called) 
'analytical' political theory and the history of political thought, and I 
discuss this in the introduction to part 1 and the 'Interlude' before part 
2. In part 2 ,1 w ant to argue that the differing accounts of the relation 
between liberty and self are, in im portant ways, partly constitutive of
the debate between 'communitarians' and 'proceduralists'. In order to 
show what is at stake in these arguments, I turn to certain aspects of 
the work of Michel Foucault to bring these issues into sharper relief. I 
then turn  to the Rawlsian arguments themselves. Another reason for 
considering the contemporary arguments touches on my opening 
remarks a few pages back. Along with the overwhelming emphasis on 
separating m odem  liberty from the apparent antiquarianism of the 
'ancient' tendencies of anti-liberal communitarians, contemporary 
liberal argum ent has taken its cue from Kant in seeing autonomy as 
almost the paradigmatic ethical condition of modernity. For Kant, 
'autonomy7 denotes an ability and a responsibility to know and will 
w hat morality requires of us, and functions as a limiting condition of 
all of our subjective ends.8 The road to autonomy is through self- 
mastery, where the 'bindingness' of any principle m ust be such that 
one can bind oneself to a freely imposed norm. But Kant also realized 
that this was a difficult stage for individuals to reach, and thus a proper 
civil constitution was needed to balance out conflicts and encourage 
people to 'bring w hat they themselves are in need of'.9 Since the 
ultim ate justification of the state for Kant was based on the moral law, 
the moral rightness of any juridical coercion was unquestionable, and 
there could never be any grounds for resistance; the remedy for the 
injustice of egoism was to 'subject the private interest (of the 
individual) to the public interest...to a discipline (of civil constraint).10 
The tension between juridical coercion and autonomy remains an 
im portant one in contemporary liberal and 'post-m odern' political 
argument, especially with regard to questions of legitimacy and 
political obligation, and I will touch upon these as well in my 
consideration of the liberal self and its radical re-working in the hands 
of Michel Foucault. Thus aside from seeking to outline as best I can the
8 Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, ed, HJ. Paton, New York, 1964, pp. 69-70.
9 Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, ed Mary J. Gregor, The Hague, Niijhoff, 
1974.
10 Ibid, p. 329.
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relation between the concepts of liberty and self in these different 
forms of political argument, two general questions I return to here are: 
(i) What is the relation between the kind of self presupposed by a 
theory and the 'actual' selves amongst whom its principles and 
institutions are set? And (ii) what is the nature of the practice of the 
governing principles of a theory?
Having begun the thesis in the euphoria of the East European 
popular revolutions of 1989, and ended it amidst the misery of the 
Balkans and the palpable despair of the populations in the new 
'democracies', my sense is that the more we ponder these questions in 
both their historical and analytic complexity, the more we will learn 
about why the deep moral aspirations of our contemporary political 
argument so rarely manifest themselves in the world within which we 
actually live.
P a r ti
{Ad fontes)
The Commonwealth of learning here is taking a complete holiday; we have all become
politicians'.
John Locke to P. Von Limborch, August 7,1689.
6
P a r ti
Introduction
W hat makes a historical tradition or set of texts relevant to our 
contemporary world, to our political concerns and debates? I want to 
ask this question in a specific sense here, not just regarding a general 
relevance of history, which would be ridiculous to deny, but in 
relation to a remarkable resurgence in the history of ideas which 
claims for itself, at the behest of its self-identified practioners, not only 
a defined role within the discipline of political theory (and moral 
philosophy), but a distinctive and substantial contribution to our 
current political discourse. This process involves making both the 
methodology of historical investigation, and the content of these 
historical narratives, relevant to, and constitutive of, a set of questions 
with which we are dealing in our own current social and poltical 
context. The 'debate', or perhaps more accurately, the relation,1 
between civic republicanism and liberalism is a prominent example of 
this phenomena, and in fa c t, could be credited with re-casting the 
relationship between historical interpretation and political theory in 
general, or at least in providing a new set of now unavoidable 
questions with which it m ust deal. The 'debate' occurs on a num ber of 
different levels and in different places, though in part I of this thesis, I 
shall be concerned with only two aspects: firstly, the two 
interpretations of the historical lineage of contemporary 
understandings of liberalism, and secondly (and relatedly), the 
different claims m ade on behalf of the idea that specific historical 
narratives can serve as 'sources' or 'live options' for contemporary 
politics. Of course, the specific 'sources' I am interested in are the 
concepts of liberty and self and their relation to each other, within the 
structure of the three kinds of political argum ent I sketched in the
1 I qualify ‘debate’ because it is far from being proved that civic republicanism, especially 
as it has manifested itself in some contemporary versions of communitarianism, is a 
bona fide alternative to liberalism, or whether it might be more accurately characterized as 
some kind of internal (or immanent) critique.
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preface to this thesis.
I will be dealing with both aspects in detail in the chapters which 
follow, but I would like to pause here and consider the general 
contours of the claim that particular concepts or conceptions from the 
past can serve a function in contemporary debates beyond simply 
satisfying some antiquarian interest, or at least, in a way different from 
the conventional understanding of the role of the history of ideas held 
until, say, the late 1960's 2 
An im portant issue to deal with immediately is incommensurability. 
Originating in the philosophy of science, this claim implies that 
different scientific theories over time may be incommensurable with 
one another because they differ in the concepts they use, have different 
ways of understanding what counts as evidence, and refer to a 
completely different set of constitutive terms. It is claimed that this 
holds for meaning in general, and thus carries over into philosophical 
theories. In its most radical formulation, different cultures and historic 
epochs produce different orders of terms and paradigms, and in 
general, different kinds of 'rationality7. Thus, term Ti as used in the 
sixteenth century, cannot be equated in meaning or reference with an 
equivalent term  T2 we use today; the past is not just a foreign country, 
it is a different world. Theories do not necessarily contradict each other
2 I certainly do not want to imply that there was a single way of conceiving of the history of 
ideas until then. I am thinking mainly of the impact of the introduction of the 
methodological arguments of Quentin Skinner and John Pocock, which has since generated an 
enormous amount of interest and literature. Skinner, in particular, was attacking a 
conventional method of understanding the history of political thought, the ‘perennial 
question’ approach, for lacking historicity and for having a rather naive understanding of the 
relation between interpretation and understanding. See J.G.A. Pocock, Politics, Language, 
and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chicago and London, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1989 (new edition; originally 1971); ‘State of the Art’, in Virtue, Commerce, 
and History, Cambridge University Press, 1985; and his elegant discussion in ‘The concept of 
a language and metier d’historien: some considerations on practice’, in Anthony Pagden ed. 
The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, Cambridge University Press,
1987, pp. 19-38. For Professor Skinner’s work and a critical discussion see James Tully ed., 
Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988. I 
do not want to imply that Pocock’s and Skinner’s approach to the history of ideas is 
identical; for important differences see Skinner’s discussion of Pocockian languages in Tully
1988, p. 106. A useful discussion of the rise of historiography in political theory and civic 
humanism in particular, which also makes an acute challenge to its practioners is found in 
Don Herzog, ‘Some Questions for Republicans’, Political Theory, 14, 3,1986,473-493.
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across time, but they exclude each other, and cannot be combined since 
they do not share a general direction, or even common set of 
references from which to compare them.3
As has been pointed out by a number of distinguished 
commentators, as an account of science, the incommensurability thesis 
is either completely incoherent, or at the very least, wildly exaggerated. 
For if the thesis was true, it would have to be the case that we could 
not translate other languages or cultures (including past aspects of our 
own language and culture) at all. Thus it would be the case that if we 
could not interpret organisms' noises at all, if we were, in the strongest 
sense, excluded from their conceptual world, then we would have no 
grounds for regarding them as 'thinkers, speakers, or even persons'. 
But as Putnam argues, it just is the case ('a constitutive fact about 
hum an experience') that we are able to interpret one another's beliefs, 
desires, and utterances so that they makes some kind of sense. The 
point is not that translated beliefs come out the same as our own, but 
that they come out intelligible to us. We can for example, describe the 
'scientific' theories of Galileo at considerable length; it would be 
incoherent to do so and then declare them 'incommensurable'.4
However in ruling out strong incommensurability , this is not to say
3 See Paul K. Feyerabend, ‘On the “meaning” of scientific terms’ in Realism, rationalism and 
scientific method; Philosophical Papers, Volume 1, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 
97-103; Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago University Press, 
1962. It is interesting to note how the history of ideas has been profoundly influenced by 
theories imported from the philosophy of science, especially in the case of Pocock’s 
appropriation of Kuhn, who originally borrowed his images from political theory in 
describing the transition between scientific paradigms as ‘revolutionary’ activity. See the 
excellent article by Peter L. Janssen, ‘Political Thought as Traditionary Action: The Critical 
Response to Skinner and Pocock’, History and Theory, xxiv, 2,1985,115-146.
4 Hilary Putnam, ‘Convention: a theme in philosophy’ (see ‘Anarchism is self-refuting’ for the 
discussion about incommensurability), in Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers,
Volume 3, Cambridge University Press, 1986 (1983), pp. 191-197, especially p. 196: ‘Not 
only do we share objects and concepts with others, to the extent that the interpretative 
exercise succeeds, but also conceptions of the reasonable, of the natural, and so on. For the 
whole justification of an inteipretative scheme, remember, is that it renders the behaviour of 
others at least minimally reasonable by our lights. However different our images of 
knowledge and conceptions of rationality, we share a huge fund of assumptions and beliefs 
about what is reasonable with even the most bizarre culture that we can succeed in 
interpreting.’ See also his Reason, Truth, and History, Cambridge University Press, 1981, 
p. 114.
that there are some concepts and world views with which we cannot 
hope to identify, or admit as a possible option for our life now, as we 
know it.5 The process whereby we come to decide that the concept (or 
world view) Ti is not a live ' option or resource for us, is crucial to try 
and understand, if only vaguely. And here we might introduce a 
distinction between accounts of rival theories in science, and accounts 
of different forms of life or cultures. Without placing too much 
emphasis on the bracketing of science from the social world,6 it could 
be argued that when it comes to admitting viable conceptions of one 
type or another, especially those which involve ways of organizing or 
governing our affairs in the world, we rule out of court a number of 
arguments and concepts on the grounds that they are no longer 
suitable to this world however much they might have been to that 
world. W hat is important here is the rendering of the argum ent such 
that it does not belong to the here and now. This is in significant ways 
a political argum ent (which I shall return to below), but not in the way 
that theorists or political activists might argue about concepts of liberty 
or justice they all recognize w ithout any real trouble to be culturally 
viable in the first place. Of course there is an entire genre of argum ent 
which is defined by its distance from our world, its 'non-realism' - 
utopianism. For that reason, Utopians (or at least their arguments) 
occupy a special place in our political discourse which excuses them, 
for the m ost part, from dealing necessarily with a world that is 
obstinately there. It appears then, that we acknowledge two spaces in 
our understanding; one which deals with our 'actual existing7 social
5 The remarks over the next few paragraphs have been influenced by Bernard Williams’ ‘The 
Illusion of Saint-Just; Philosophy and the Powers of Interpretation’, London Review of 
Books, 13,16, 1992, pp. 8-10; and his ‘Left Wing Wittgenstein’, in Common Knowledge, 
1,1, 1992, 33-42.
6 Bernard Williams makes a strong distinction between ‘the scientific’ and ‘the ethical’. He 
claims that in scientific enquiry there should ideally be a convergence on an answer, where the 
best explanation of the convergence involves the idea that the answer ‘represents how things 
are’, that we are guided by the way the world is ‘in itself. In ethical enquiry though, ‘there is 
no such hope’. See Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Worcester, Fontana Press,,
1985, pp. 135,136, 137. For a strong attack on these distinction^ see Richard Rorty, 
Objectivism, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers Volume 1, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1991, especially Part I.
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and political life and the various social, political, and ethical demands 
therein, and another made up of conceptions, ideals, and world 
pictures that human beings had, or might have elsewhere, but are not 
part of our social and political space.7 Though these conceptions are 
not incommensurable in the strong sense I outlined above, they are at 
least in some sense, alien to us.
I want to emphasize that in describing these arguments as 'alien' I am 
not doing so in any absolute way. As Donald Davidson has shown, we 
are not simply given the beliefs and values of an apparently radically 
different society, we have to interpret them, and in doing so we are 
bound to build into our interpretations assumptions about the ways 
their experience and thoughts resemble ours. This process involves 
two moves. Firstly, the ability on the part of the interpreters to identify 
certain behaviour as the 'holding-true' of a sentence, that is, that we 
see they hold a sentence (or set of sentences) to be true. And secondly, 
it involves the adoption of a methodological principle - the 'principle 
of charity' - which implies that our form of life and the one with 
which we are engaged and trying to understand, overlap to such an 
extent that the discussion becomes more of an mfracultural 
phenomena rather than a infer cultural one. The values we attribute 
to them, for example, have to make sense to us as values that hum an 
beings might have. As Davidson puts it, 'disagreement and agreement 
alike are intelligible only against a background of massive agreement'.8
Yet even though these forms of life and all their concepts and values 
are not incommensurable from our own, or even radically unfamiliar, 
some are without a doubt further away than others. This brings us
7 Williams, 1992, p. 8.
8 *(T)he more sentences we conspire to accept or reject (whether or not through a medium of 
interpretation), the better we understand the rest, whether or not we agree about them’. Thus, 
‘charity’ is a condition of having a ‘workable theory’ and is ‘forced on us’. See Donald 
Davidson, ‘Radical Interpretation’ (Essay 9) and ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’ 
(Essay 13), in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986, 
pp.125-139,183- 198, at p. 137. See the interesting discussion of this principle by
Richard Rorty, 1991, pp. 93-110, pp.103-110 in particular (‘Inquiry as recontextualization: 
An anti-dualist account of interpretation’).
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back to the two spaces in our understanding which I mentioned above. 
There can be no thick line drawn between the two, and we only have 
to look in the most superficial way at history to see how concepts 
survive, get dropped, changed, recalled, and recast, to know that there 
is a certain amount of inherent fluidity. What is the process by which 
we place (or just find) a concept or form of life in the dead letter office 
of that second social space? Here I would like to adapt a useful 
distinction Bernard Williams makes between 'real' and 'notional7 
confrontations. A real confrontation between two divergent outlooks 
occurs when there is a group of people for whom each of the outlooks 
is a real option. A notional confrontation occurs when people know 
about two divergent outlooks, but at least one of the outlooks is not a 
real option. W hat makes an option 'real7 is if it is already their 
outlook, or if they could go over to it, and they could only go over to it 
if they could 'live inside it in their actual historical circumstances7.9 
This last qualification is rather vague and question begging, since what 
people can accept within their historical circumstances depends upon 
how they perceive those historical circumstances in the first place. 
What is possible can change according to various circumstances, and 
judging whether something is a real option or not is, in part, to ask 
whether circumstances can be changed. These questions can be, to a 
large extent, social and political in nature, or at least it is this aspect 
with which I am primarily interested here. W hat connects the two 
spaces is some kind of historical narrative which people have a 
definite awamess of, no matter how different or 'alien7 it seems at first 
glance. In the very self reflexive nature of our late m odern culture, we 
have the scope to recall or reemphasize a diversity of cultural 
materials, precisely because parties share, to some degree at least, a 
social space within which they can be deployed, understood, and used. 
This is not to say that 'anything goes7, but simply that the range of 
explanatory frameworks within which we can place our own and
9 Williams, 1985, pp. 160-167.
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others' cultures has been greatly expanded. Thus, philosophers and 
political theorists who call for a revival of conceptions from past 
epochs, who seek to excavate older outlooks and concepts to use as 
epistemic and linguistic 'resources' for contemporary argument 
building, or who want to expose (or articulate) 'deep' sources of 
contemporary human understanding, seek to expand the social space 
within which we meet alternative ethical and political ideals. In doing 
so they are, I believe, recognizing an important aspect of late 
modernity. This is, that we are not only able to understand conceptual 
systems from the inside, but that we are conscious of any number of 
alternatives which have existed (or still do) in different social 
circumstances, some of which may still exist 'at our own door' .10 They 
are not, for the most part, calling for a return back from reflectiveness, 
to forms of life which are not 'real options' for m odem  men and 
women. Their target is usually the colonization of our political and 
social space by a hegemonic set of terms and concepts which rule out - 
i.e. render alien - other outlooks which point to ways our ethical and 
political lives could be lived differently (usually for the better) than 
they are now.
When we turn to an examination of the work of some of these 
theorists below, what is striking is their sense of claustrophobia in the 
presence of contemporary political discourse; for them, our moral 
understanding is cramped, connections suppressed, imaginations 
restricted, concepts impoverished. In part, this is linked to not only 
their analytic critiques of conventional approaches to the history of 
ideas, but also by their interpretation of the world around them, 
replent with social fragmentation and manic self-seeking, problems 
they see as only feebly addressed by contemporary theory. As a result, 
their methodological claims are suffused with the language of 
'uncovering', of the need for archaeologies, excavations, recoveries, 
and reconstructions, to expand and enlarge our linguistic and
10 Williams, ‘Left-Wing Wittgenstein’, p. 40.
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interpretive resources, and to warn, provoke, and deepen our 
individual and collective imagination.11 In its strongest form, this 
'return ' to history is almost teleological, that we can't help but do so 
because the concepts and (especially) identities we once had remain in 
our consciousness - though always in shadowy uncertain ways - and 
thus we have a sense of loss or fragmentation which impels us to keep 
asking certain questions and to seek out certain connections.12
At its most interesting though, recent arguments in the history of 
ideas eschew any kind of historical determinism or cunning of reason, 
but rather concentrate on the complex relationship between our 
interpretation of texts in history and our deployment of argument, 
partly constituted by these texts, in the present. The methodological 
work of Quentin Skinner has been particularly influential here, and 
throughout part one, and especially in chapter three and 'Interlude', I 
will be addressing it, both implictly and explictly, at least as much as I 
can, given how much I am indebted to it.13
Skinner has been accused on one side of subverting the possibility of 
historical understanding by insisting on paying close attention to the 
lingusitic and cultural conventions to which an utterance refers, and 
yet on another of imposing his own cultural preconceptions on the 
past by his use of twentieth-century theories of meaning and intention. 
Critics have tended to reduce the possiblities inherent in any
11 This is especially true of the work of ProfessorS Skinner, Pocock, and Taylor (among 
others) as we shall see below. Cf. the discussion in D. LaCapra, ‘Rethinking Intellectual 
History and Reading Texts’, History and Theory, 19,1980, p. 26.
12 This applies particularly to discussions of the self in this literature. Pocock argues in places, 
that we have a ‘need’ to explore the road back to the idea of citizenship in ancient times, 
which he calls the ‘imperative’ of the classical idea of citizenship, since it is part of the means 
by which we affirm ourselves today as citizens. See his ‘The Ideal of Citizenship Since 
Classical Times’, Queens Quarterly, 99,1,1992,33-55. cf. 1971, pp. 101-103. More 
generally, see the work of Charles Taylor, especially his recent Sources of the Self: The 
Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge University Press, 1989, and further references 
below.
13 See Tully ed. 1988, which includes a substantial ‘Reply to my Critics’. It does not include 
all of the important articles however. See also ‘Conventions and the Understanding of 
Speech Acts’, Philosophical Quarterly, 20,1970, pp. 118-38; ‘Hermeneutics and the Role of 
History’, New Literary History, 7,1975, pp. 209-32. Janssen 1985 is another important 
discussion not included in the Tully edition.
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understanding of 'a ' history of ideas to an either/or proposition; 
historical veracity or contemporary relevance.14 As should be clear by 
now I will not be following this line of critique, nor do I think in the 
end that it is helpful, and generally agree with Skinner (and others) 
that it is a bifurcation we could do w ithout This is not the place to 
enter into a detailed exposition of Skinner's arguments, but I would 
like to draw  out some general points, which will serve discussions 
below in part one.
The basic goal of Skinner's approach is to describe what historical 
conventions (or languages') particular texts were written in, and by 
which they were, and are, interpreted. This involves, of course, 
detailed and rigorous historical work, delineating (as far as possible) 
the whole range of communications which could have been 
conventionally performed on the given occasion, and then tracing the 
relations between the given utterance and this wider linguistic context 
as a means of 'decoding7 the intention of the given writer (or 'speaker7). 
Though doing so involves engaging in a process of distanciation, the 
past is not rendered wholly alien and incommensurable with the 
present, rather, this gap is constituted more by our limited 
'imaginative grasp' and 'lack of information'.15 We can never wholly 
grasp every intention of a speaker (with absolute certainty), nor even 
hope to achieve complete translateability of every term or concept, but 
this does not mean we cannot make some plausible hypotheses about 
intentions, or make intelligible terms and concepts which we 
nevertheless cannot pair with an exact English equivalent - something 
historians have always attempted to do anyway.1^
The 'results' of this kind of approach are related to the present on two 
levels. Firstly, it is to point out that political utterances (i.e. political 
theories) are always conducted within conventional (linguistic)
14 Janssen, 1985, p. 117 and passim.
15 In Tully ed. 1988, pp. 63-4; 1970, p. 137.
16 For these points in relation to the work of Derrida, Hollis, Quine, and Davidson, see 
Skinner’s ‘Reply to my critics’, in Tully ed. 1988, pp. 280-1,250-1.
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contexts, the make- up of which includes a set of considerations and 
practices which "work on' the nature of the discursive act being 
performed. This is not to say that the conventions of a particular social 
context wholly produce what is said aymmetrically, but that 
conventions are the ground upon which the 'uptake' of a text is 
possible.17 This kind of approach has something to say about the 
practice of political theory in general; that in seeing and examining the 
relations between speech acts and the conventions within which they 
were spoken in the past, we learn something about the conditions of 
our own political discourse. This is, the process of legitimation 
between ideology and action, the way practical forms of acitivity set 
and hold ideologies in place, an^joice versa ^
Secondly, and by no means distinct from the first point, is the idea of 
an appropriate vantage point. We are inescapably committed to 
viewing history from our vantage point, and cannot, as it were, enter 
into the m inds of past writers and theorists. Yet it does not follow from 
this that we m ust interpret historical differences as being a competition 
over a universal and timeless continuum of values, the victors of 
which are the concepts and values we use today. In paying attention to 
intentions and conventions, w hat is 'revealed' is not the 'essential 
sameness' of moral assumptions and political commitments, but their 
'essential variety7. Instead of 'traditional' and 'timeless' truths, we 
discover various different concepts which go with various different 
societies, and in so doing, learn the distinction between what is
17 Quentin Skinner, ‘Hermeneutics and the Role of History’, New Literary History, 7,1975, p. 
216. See also 1988, ‘Reply to my critics’, pp. 276-7, where he admits that though he does 
not accept authors are ‘prisoners’ of a boundaried discourse, his approach does leave the 
‘traditional figure’ of the author in ‘extremely poor health’, since ‘(r)eiterating, defending, 
underpinning, commonplace insights as they do’ authors can seem ‘mere precipitates of their 
contexts’. Though ‘discourse’ becomes the focus of attention, this does not mean that relation 
between author-language is strictly one of constraint; ‘language constitutes a resource as 
well’. See the excellent discussion in Janssen 1985, p. 128-9, in relation to critics who have 
misunderstood Skinner on this point
18 See Tully ed., ‘The pen is a mighty sword: Quentin Skinner’s analysis of politics’, in Tully 
ed. 1988, pp. 23-4. He argues that on Skinner’s evidence, the foundation of this 
legitimating activity in the early modem period is warfare, whether on the battlefield, or 
recast into the descriptions of the relations between the institutions and populations of early 
modem society.
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"necessary" and what is the "product" of our own "contingent 
arrangements', and as a result, "the key to self-awareness itself". "Self 
awareness' here means the ability to gain a perspective on our beliefs 
which allows us to be less parochial (we are not the only tribe in town), 
more self critical (can we do things any differently?), and generally give 
ourselves the means to prevent our current political theories from 
"degenerating" into "uncritically accepted ideologies'.19 A similar 
concern with the idea of analysing concepts in their "sites' is found in 
the work of Michel Foucault and what he calls the "history of the 
present" - how our present conceptions were made, and how the 
conditions of their formation might constrain our present ways of 
th inking .20 Though the comparison should not be overstressed, both 
Skinner and Foucault share a concern, through history,to show 
something about our present reality.
We now have a sense of some of the explanatory force behind some 
of the more sophisticated arguments for the role of the interpretation 
of history in relation to the political debates of today. In part 1 ,1 want 
to explore a particular historical narrative concerning the two concepts 
of liberty and self, which in many ways lies at the bottom of the so- 
called "republican revival' in contemporary political theory. I begin 
with a consideration of the foundations of this revival, and especially 
the arguments we find in Cicero, the N orthern Humanists, and in 
Machiavelli. I want to sketch a relation between liberty and self which 
classical republican theory in general takes on board, and which differs 
somewhat from recent interpretations. I also w ant to compare these
19 Skinner in Tully ed. 1988, pp. 66-7. See also 1988, pp. 286-8. Skinner explicitly aligns 
himself to the ‘de-privileging’ (or ‘undoing’) potential of Rorty’s questioning of any 
distinction between the ‘merely historical’ and the ‘genuinely philosophical’. See Richard 
Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980 (1989), pp. 362- 
5, 391-2.
20 I shall be discussing Foucault’s work in relation to the themes of this introduction and the 
thesis as a whole in detail below in part 2. An excellent discussion of the relation between 
philosophy, history, and Foucault’s ‘history of the present’, can be found in Ian Hacking’s ‘ 
Two Kinds of “New Historicism” for Philosophers’, New Literary History, 21, 2,1990,343- 
364. James Tully also mentions similarities between Skinner and Foucault, see Tully ed, 
1988, pp. 24-5.
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concepts and their relations with an early modern precursor of 
liberalism, John Locke, since it has become commonplace to make a 
sharp conceptual distinction between the two. I want to try and 
undermine this tendency by looking for, and showing, connections 
between the two approaches.
Some contemporary theorists have explicitly aligned themselves 
with the dvic republican narrative (or set of narratives) for reasons 
either identical to, or very similar to the discussion above. In other 
words, as a means of either criticizing contemporary sodety and its 
entrenched conventional ideology (usually 'liberalism'), or as a means 
of suggesting conceptual resources to supplant and improve current 
political and sodal practices.21 I shall leave the consideration of how 
some of these arguments and their attendant historical narratives 
about liberty and self measure up  against conventional contemporary 
accounts, until part 2. However I want to conclude part 1 with a 
consideration of the general nature of a political language', and how, 
once we have recalled it, or deemed it to be a plausible 'resource', it 
becomes implicated in the conventional political discourse of the day,
21 Aside from Skinner and Pocock themselves (see the discussion below for references), these 
include (among many) Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Malang of the Modern 
Identity, Cambridge University Press 1989; ‘Alternative Futures’, in A. Cairns and C. 
Williams ed., Constitutionalism, Citizenship, and Society, Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press, 1985, pp. 183-229 (especially at pp. 213-14 where he distinguishes very carefully 
between communitarian and civic republican concerns, the latter of which are more relevant to 
his general arguments); and ‘Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate’, Nancy 
Rosenblum ed. Liberalism and the Moral Life, Cambridge Mass. Harvard University Press, 
1989; Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge University Press, 
1982; ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, 12,1,81-96; 
‘Introduction’ in Liberalism and its Critics, ed. Michael Sandel, New York, New York 
University Press,, 1-11; ‘Morality and the Liberal Ideal’, The New Republic, May 7,1984, 
15-17; ‘The State and the Soul’ (review article), The New Republic, June 10,1985, 37-41; 
Robert N. Bellah et. al, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American 
Life, New York, Harper and Row,, 1985; Christohper Lasch, Hope Against Hope; The Idea 
of Progress and Its Critics, New York, Norton, 1990; Chantal Mouffe, ed., Dimensions of 
Radical Democracy, London, Verso, 1*92; Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Beyond the Republican 
Revival’, The Yale Law Journal, 97, 8, July 1988,1539-1590; ‘Preference and Politics’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20,1,1991, 3-34; John Braithwaite and Philip Petit, Not 
Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990; 
Shelly Burtt, Virtue Transformed: Political Argument in England 1688-1740, Cambridge 
University Press, 1992; Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State, Cambridge 
University Press, 1992.
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and whether in the end it does any work, and whether the kinds of 
claims made on its behalf are justified. This will serve as a transition to 
part 2 of the thesis.
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Chapter 1: Ciceronian Themes
1.0 Introduction
Classical republican theory assumed a relation between liberty and 
self which I want to explore in some detail below, and firstly in the 
work of Cicero, from whom subsequent republican theorists learned so 
much. In particular, I want to argue that the structure of the relation 
between liberty and the self in Cicero is the context within which the 
'classical' theory works as a whole, and I will attempt to show that this 
is so even in the case of Machiavelli, in a way which differs from some 
current interpretations found, for example, in the work of Professor 
Skinner. To 'return ' to Cicero is to do something political activists and 
theorists have done down throughout the centuries, especially in the 
Renaissance and early m odem  periods under examination here. In 
part, I want to consider the context of these unearthings, the reasons 
why particular texts are chosen, and the arguments which began or 
were resurrected by the invocation of this past 'authority'.
The themes under examination in this chapter will, for the most part, 
be pursued throughout the whole of the rest of thesis, though of course 
set in the three general contexts of republicanism, liberalism, and post­
modernism. I w ant to examine firstly and generally, the concept of 
libertas in (early and late) Republican Rome. Secondly, the relationship 
between duty, decorum, and dignitas. Thirdly, and finally, a 
consideration of the Ciceronian self (or persona), and its relation to the 
role of rhetoric, and the framework of republican political citizenship 
in general. Though the general significance and relevance of ancient 
Greek and especially Roman thought to early m odern political theory 
has been made in a num ber of important studies - to which I am greatly 
indebted - 1 w ant to particularize these resonances in the person of 
Cicero and some of his work.1
1 See J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment; Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition, Princeton University Press, 1975; Quentin Skinner, The 
Foundations of Modern Political Thought Volume I&JI, Cambridge University Press, 1979; 
see below for references to his work on Machiavelli and classical republicanism in general.
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1.1 A System of libertas
In the latter part of 62 B.C., Cicero bought an elegant house on the 
fashionable northeast side of the Palatine, high above and in view of 
the forum.2 The house was no doubt important to Cicero, bought after 
his consulship as a sign of his arrival and acceptance into high Roman 
politics and society (the two were intimately linked), a symbol of his 
place in the order of things. However, when Clodius exiled Cicero in 
58 B.C. for executing the Catilinarian conspirators w ithout trial (which 
Cicero had justified on the grounds of preserving liberty), he also 
demolished Cicero's grand house and in its place erected a shrine to the 
goddess of libertas. More than just the petulant act of a political 
opponent, it was meant to convey a message to the people of Rome - 
that they had been 'delivered' from Cicero, freed from a tyranny.3 It 
was an attack not only on Cicero's pride but also on his kind and creed, 
and when he eventually was able to return the next year, one of the 
first things he did was to destroy the shrine and re-establish his home - 
at public expense - in order to cleanse his reputation of Clodius' 'slur'.4
This practical contestation of the concept of libertas is central to the 
period of the Late Republic and Principate, and Cicero's work as a 
whole. It has proved a difficult thing to pin down, and the academic 
literature which surrounds it often resembles the divergences and 
disagreements of the Romans themselves. Nevertheless, it is 
im portant for me here to try and sketch what Cicero meant by libertas, 
as well as what he did not mean by it.
These themes have also been prominent in the work of Richard Tuck. See his Philosophy 
and Government: 1572-1651, Cambridge University Press, 1993, especially pp. 1-64. See 
also R.D.C. Cumming, Human Nature and History: A Study of the Development of Liberal 
Political Thought Volume /<£//, University of Chicago Press, 1969 Gerhard Oestreich, Neo- 
Stoicism and the Early Modern State, (ed. Brigitta Oestreich, H.G. Koenigsbeger, transl. 
David McLintock), Cambridge University Press, 1982; Justin Champion, The Pillars of 
Preistcraft Shaken: The Church of England and its Enemies, Cambridge University Press, 
1992, especially pp. 182-222; and Shelly Burtt, Virtue Transformed: Political Argument in 
England 1688-1740, Cambridge University Press, 1992.
2 Walter Allen Jr., ’Cicero's House and Libertas’, Transactions of the American Philological 
Association, 1944, p. 1-9.
3 Ibid, p. 8.
4 Cicero responded to Clodius' charge of tyrannus in his De domo sua (94), retaliating by 
discussing Clodius' own 'dominatus'.
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Insofar as we can perceive a general Roman contour of libertas, its 
root sense derives from liber, the opposite of which was to be a slave. 
Pregnant within this negation though is also the capacity for the 
possession of rights. This is not an innate capacity or faculty (as in the 
Digest)5 for libertas, but an acquired civic right conditioned by the 
civitas. Libertas is understood relationally, not as an expression of the 
autonomy of the will, but as a right to claim what is due to oneself and 
a duty to respect what is due to others. However, it is not enough 
simply to equate libertas with the recognized membership of a civitas, 
or as simply existing under the rule of law which is equally binding for 
all, and leave it at that, since this avoids the context of its usage and the 
theoretically loaded nature of terms such as 'freedom under the lav/.
As Ste. Croix has argued, /(M)odem historians have too often suffered 
from an unfortunate tendency to see the Roman concept of libertas 
either in much the same terms as the Roman ruling class saw it, or as 
something "vague" and hardly worth taking seriously'.6 Before 
looking at the political context and usage of Cicero's libertas, I want to 
elucidate its particular character.
If Cicero's understanding of libertas is not representative of all the 
usages of the term, what are its key components? Libertas for Cicero is 
above all dependent upon a form of government, from which flows 
common citizenship and the rights inherent in that status ('qua rei 
publicae nomen universae civitatis est' De Legibus, 11.5-6)7 Writing at 
a time of severe factional infighting and civil war, the 
constitutionalism of Cicero is crucial for an understanding of his 
libertas, since the res publica embodied its concrete, political,
5 Chaim Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome During the Late Republic and Early 
Principate, Cambridge University Press, 1950, p. 2-3.
6 G.E.M. De Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World from the Archaic Age 
to the Arab Conquests, Duckworth, 1981, p. 367. R. Syme in his classic, The Roman 
Revolution, Oxford University Press, 1939, says something quite similar, (p. 155) See also 
G. Crifo, ‘Di alcuni aspetti della liberta in Roma’, Archivio Giuridico Filippo Serafini, 33, 
1958, pp. 1-72.
7 De Legibus, transl. C. W. Keyes, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1988 
(1928). Hereafter abbreviated DL.
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manifestation. The people are free when they are not subject to the 
particular will of a despot governing in his own interest, or for the 
benefit of foreign power. As Cicero defines it, liberty is The right of the 
people' against slavery and domination.8 Effective government (i.e. 
guaranteeing libertas) meant the right distribution of powers - and we 
m ust be careful here not to confuse distribution with separation . 
Political liberty exists only under the rule of law, and strictly speaking, 
the rights inherent in libertas are the same 'for all' w ithout which it did 
not 'deserve the name of liberty7. (De Re Publica, I.47)9 However, and 
this is a key problem for Cicero, libertas could not endorse strict 
egalitarian outcomes, since this would ignore the heterogeneity of 
actual Roman society, disregard the particular dignitas of its members 
(especially the ruling class), and encourage social discord: 'For the 
equality of legal rights of which free peoples are so fond cannot be 
maintained (for the people themselves, though free and unrestrained, 
give very many special powers to many individuals, and create great 
distinctions among men and the honours granted to them) and w hat is 
called equality is really most inequitable. For when equal honour is 
given to the highest and the lowest - for men of both types m ust exist 
in every nation - then this very "fairness" is most unfair7. (DRP, 1.53) I 
will examine the crucial role of dignitas in greater detail below, but 
notice how its insertion here by Cicero conditions the problematic of 
libertas; since the division of political labour is a given (i.e. not whether 
a few should govern but who should this few be, according to their 
dignitas etc.) the real question becomes the appropriate 'fit' between the 
fundam ental rights of citizens (and non-citizens) and the governing
8 Cicero clearly linked the Roman people with liberty; ‘Other nations can endure slavery, the 
assured possession of the Roman people is liberty’. 6 Phil, s.7, par. 19; tranl. Walter C.A. 
Ker, London, 1921, p. 333, in Opera Omnia, 1690, ‘Pars Quarta’, vol. 3, p. 2043 For a 
discussion of the importance of this passage for Rousseau for example, see Maurizio Viroli, 
Jean Jacques Rousseau and the “Well Ordered’ Society, transl. Derek Hanson,
Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 154-55.
9 De Re Publicat tranl. C. W. Keyes, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1988 
(1928). Hereafter abbreviated DRP. See also the Pro Cluentio Avito: ‘through the laws we 
are all made servants in order that we may be free’, Opera Omnia 1690, Pars Quarta, vol 2, 
p. 1269 (transl. W. Peterson, London, 1895, p. 84). In Viroli, 1988, p. 154.
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power of the ruling elite. It is a matter of finding the right balance - 
between rights and duties, between classes, and between constitutions.
Before moving onto a discussion of the practical manifestation of this 
'balance' in Cicero, I want to look at his understanding of law, since it 
grounds the relations between citizens and their governors, or at least, 
is supposed to. Following the Stoics, law for Cicero begins as natural 
law: 'Law is the distinction between things just and unjust, made in 
agreement with that primal and most ancient of all things Nature; and 
in conformity to Nature's standard are framed those hum an laws 
which inflict punishm ent upon the wicked but defend and protect the 
good'. (DL, H.13) The purpose of the laws is for the 'safety of citizens, 
the preservation of states, and the tranquillity and happiness of hum an 
life' (DL, n .ll) , and thus they cannot be abrogated or replaced with 
impunity. The laws that men invent - positive law - m ust conform to 
the universal and 'immutable' law, without exception, since 'true law7 
is 'right reason in agreement with nature' and one cannot be freed from 
its obligation. (DRP, IH.32-4) Now this is clearly in opposition to the 
conventional view of the origin of law found in Cameades, and which 
Cicero has Philus defend - 1 ask, if it is the duty of a just and good man 
to obey the laws, what laws is he to obey? All the different laws that 
exist?...there is no such thing as natural justice, and from this it follows 
that neither are men just by nature'. (DRP, HI. 19) - on this view the law 
is relative in relation to the people who exercise it. Cicero, living 
amidst a society tearing itself apart, cannot accept such a view, and 
seeks instead to ground the fundamental laws of a state, its 
constitution, on some kind of 'permanent validity7,10 a moral basis, so 
as to protect the libertas of the republic from the volatility of narrow 
factional m anipulation.
Now, this rule of natural law is one of justice, the highest and most 
natural of the four cardinal virtues (the others being wisdom, courage,
10 The phrase is Wirszubski’s. Cf. the discussion in Tuck 1993, pp. 6-10, who carefully points 
out how Cicero, though sceptical with regard to most philosophial matters, was less so with 
regard to moral ones, especially the pursuit of the beata vita.
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and temperance). Justice (along with beneficence) is the 'reasoning by 
which the fellowship of men with one another, and the communal 
life, are held together' (De officis, 1.20),11 it is the cement of society and 
necessary for its very preservation. Justice is fundamental to the 
sociability of man, it looks out of doors and is completely prominent 
and conspicuous'. (DRP, m .l l )  No man should harm  another unless 
provoked by injustice, and since 'we are not bom  for ourselves alone', 
we ought to 'contribute to the common stock the things that benefit 
everyone together, and by the exchange of dutiful services, by giving 
and receiving expertise and effort and means, to bind fast the 
fellowship of men with each other'. (DO, 1.22) One should respect 
common and private property, fulfil pledges, as well as be kind and 
generous to others, though always staying within your means. (DO,
1.20,1.23,1.43-44) Note that justice has nothing to do with equalizing 
outcomes or the redistribution of wealth, in fact it is dependent on 
maintaining differentials between persons according to 'worth'. (See 
DRP, I. 53 - quoted above - n. 56-7; DL, IH.38-9) Programs of agrarian 
reform, like those promoted by Populares, failed to live up to the 
criteria of justice according to Cicero, since they advocated the violation 
of the security of oaths, pledges, property and possessions.12 For Cicero, 
justice consists of two parts - justice proper (iustitia) and benevolence 
(liberalitas). In the first case, justice arises from a concern with the 
maintenance of property according to agreements (private property), 
and for example, rules of just wars or the treatment of enemies. (DO, 
1.21,1.34) 'Keeping faith' (fides) is fundamental to justice here, 
maintaining 'constancy and truth in what is said and agreed'. (DO, 1.23) 
The keeping of agreements thus generates rights, and one cannot break 
one's w ord regardless of the fact that it might be to your advantage to
11 De officiis (On duties), ed. M.T. Griffin and E.M. Atkins, Cambridge University Press,
1991. Hereafter DO.
12 For a robust (if perhaps anachronistic) account of Cicero as a Conservative individualist, see 
Neal Wood, Cicero's Social and Political Thought, University of California Press, 1989, 
especially p. 76-78. Cf. M. Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City, Cambridge University 
Press, 1991.
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do so, even towards the 'lowliest' in society (i.e. slaves) whom we must 
treat 'as if they were employees...and grant them just treatment' (DO, 
I.41).i3
How all this relates to property is slightly more complex. Agreements 
struck in relation to property generate effective rights according to 
justice, similar to the way that ownership of a theatre ticket entitles one 
to a seat in the public space of a theatre.14 Property is always spoke of in 
the context of this dual tension - 'one should consider the interests of 
individuals just as fully but in such a way that the matter benefits - or 
at least does not harm - the Republic'.(DO, n.72) Everyone must be able 
to hold onto what is his, and generally, 'private men' should never be 
deprived of their goods by public acts: T or political communities and 
citizenships were constituted especially so that men could hold onto 
what was theirs. It may be true that nature first guided men to gather 
in groups; but it was in the hope of safeguarding their possessions that 
they sought protection in dties'.(DO, n.73) Cicero’s target is quite clear - 
the Populares - who argued for agricultural reform and the 
redistribution of wealth, and for relief from the punitive conditions of 
debt relief suffered by the lower echelons of Roman society. Their 
proposals underm ined the very foundations of the political 
community, upsetting the 'concord' of orders (by taking money from a 
few to give to others) and jettisoning fairness, 'which utterly vanishes 
if everyone may not keep that which is his'. (DO, 11.78) Of course the 
opposite holds true as well - rights to private property are not in 
themselves justifiable without relation to the good of the res publica, 
that 'the benefit of each individual and the benefit of all together
13 This is a hypothetical case of course, since Roman law allowed a slave owner to abuse his 
slave (even kill him) with relative impunity, though another freeman could take the slave­
owner to court. It is a puzzling example of 'just treatment' since Cicero later says that 
'workers who are paid for their labour and not for their skill have servile and demeaning 
employment; for in their case the very wage is a contract to servitude'. (DO, 1.150)
14 The example of a theatre is used repeatedly by Cicero in DO in various different cases. It is 
important to note that in the Roman context theatres were public institutions, unlike our 
private theatres today. In relation to property he also uses it in De Finibus, 111.67. It is a 
metaphor used often by seventeenth century natural law thinkers as well.
26
should be the same'. (DO, 111.26) It is 'natural' that each man should 
w ant to secure himself however, since 'nature' does not allow us to 
increase our means, our resources and our wealth by despoiling others. 
(DO, m.22) This is where 'benevolence' enters the picture, since it is 
from this which flow the duties of our shared 'natural equality'. This 
too is in keeping with the non-egalitarian implications of Ciceronian 
justice, and is not 'inspired by a frenzied or sudden impulse of the spirit 
towards everyone, like a gust of wind', but involves careful 
consideration of one's own benefit, and the hierarchy of communal 
and personal relations. (DO, 1.46-50) We must become 'good calculators 
of our duties' in order to know how much is owed to each person in 
each particular situation. (DO, 1.59) The stress here is on the 
differentiation of duties owed according to the 'closesness' of relation: 
'none is more serious and none dearer' than that of the Republic, 
followed by our parents, our children and household, our relations and 
our friends. (DO, 1.57)15 
Cicero simply presumes that these two aspects of justice will not 
conflict, nor is iustitia said to be a means towards benevolence or vice- 
versa (at least in any clear sense).16 An example of Cicero's does not 
help clarify the relation either. He gives an example of Quintus 
Scaevola asking the price of a farm he wished to buy and when given it, 
thought it worth more and added 100,000 sesterces to the price. Now 
according to Cicero, someone like Diogenes of Hecaton would not be 
able to agree with Scaevola's action, since one's duty in such a case is to 
refrain only from doing what is not permitted by justice proper - i.e. 
from law or from a contract. According to Hecaton, whom Cicero 
reports from at DO in.63, a wise man (in the Stoic sense) would look
15 But note that at DO 1.160 the order is different, placing duties to the gods over one’s country 
and omitting a general duty to mankind. However, though the gods are the source of the 
benefits of life, they can only be repaid in piety and in observance of the fellowship of 
mankind ’established by the gods’. (DO, 111.28) See Griffin and Atkins, p. 26.
16 For an excellent discussion of the source of Cicero's ideas on this, and the confusion 
generated, see Julia Annas, 'Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy and Private Property', 
Philosophia Togata, ed. J. Barnes and M. Griffin, Oxford University Press, 1989,151-73.
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firstly after his own wealth, though always in accordance with the law 
and established practices since 'we do not wish to be rich for our own 
sake alone, but for our children, our friends, and most of all for the 
political community'. (DO, 111.63) Thus, Scaevola would not be bound 
to pay a higher price than offered, since he would not be violating any 
'right7 of the seller, and his subsequent increase in wealth would be, in 
a general way, contributing to the good of the community as a whole. 
Cicero rejects this: 'if ever that which we call beneficial seems to conflict 
with that which we understand to be honourable, a rule of procedure 
(formula) m ust be established'. (DO, 111.19) This 'rule of procedure' (in 
accordance with Stoic orthodoxy) is that where dishonourableness 
exists there can be nothing beneficial, since 'for one man to take 
advantage at the cost of another's disadvantage is more contrary to 
nature than death, than poverty, than pain and anything else that may 
happen to his body or external possessions'. (DO, 111.21) Scaevola, 
therefore, is to be praised for his action, even though the present law 
(or contract) does not call for it, since reason demands that 'nothing is 
done insidiously, deceptively, or with pretence'. That current practices 
have become corrupted and that these are reflected in civil law does not 
excuse it from the authority of the law of nature, which is the ultimate 
ground for the fellowship of man in the commonwealth. Cicero 
dissolves the conflict through the application of a 'rule of procedure' 
which collapses any distinction between what is the 'good' thing to do 
and the 'proper7 thing to do according to established practices. Unlike 
Diogenes and Hecaton, who could be said to be recognizing the 
potential for conflict between legal obligation and moral duty in a more 
realistic fashion, Cicero's main concern is to invoke the primacy of 
virtue: 'We...do not have the firm and lifelike figure of true law and 
genuine justice; we make use of shadows and sketches. I wish we could 
follow even those!' (DO, in.69) As Annas points out, this is a curiously 
crude and impractical solution, and 'we are left with a moral theory 
and little idea of how to apply it in the real world in which there are
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established institutions like those of buying and selling'.17 Whatever 
the case, Cicero's point is (if only) relatively clear.
I shall leave aside further discussion of duty and private property to 
be picked up again below, and instead move on to complete my sketch 
of Ciceronian libertas by considering how the elements discussed above 
- community, law, and justice - are both constitutive of, and 
represented by, the res publica.
Community, law, and justice for Cicero are almost wholly dependent 
on his conception of the 'state' (res publica), as is basically all that can be 
considered human. The obvious point of reference for this discussion 
is Plato's Republic, not just in the way that Cicero copies the stylistic 
form of a dialogue, but in the centrality of the res publica to political 
theory as a whole. The differences are equally important, most 
significantly that Cicero will not (in employing the same principle as 
Plato) present a 'shadowy commonwealth of the imagination but a real 
and very powerful state' (DRP, n. 52), as real and as tangible as the 
history which constitutes the community as it actually is now. From 
the opening pages of the DRP, Scipio insists on going beyond the 
'greatest and wisest men of Greece' and asks to be listened to as a 
H om an' with a liberal education-trained by experience and the 
maxims learned at home much more than by books'. (DRP, 1.36) The 
kind of knowledge we are to ascertain in relation to the res publica is 
referred to as akin to the knowledge of a craft (quasi attem), devoted, as 
are the thoughts and efforts of every craftsman, to 'no other than the 
improvement of his skill in his own craft'. (DRP, 1.35)
Usefully (and unlike Plato) Cicero has Scipio begin the discussion 
with a formal definition of the subject at hand:18 'a commonwealth is
the property of the people' (res publica res populi). The 'people' are not
A
just any group of hum an beings together in one place, but an 
assemblage of people 'associated in agreement w ith respect to justice
17 Ibid, p.173. See also the discussion in Tuck 1993, pp. 54-6.
18 Cicero is thought to be the First major Western political theorist to do so, a point made by 
Cumming, Vol. I, p. 172-3, and repeated by Wood, p. 120.
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and a partnership for the common good'. (DRP, 1.39) In Book III of DRP 
Cicero provides a further discussion of this point by having Philus and 
Laelius debate the nature of justice in relation to the commonwealth. (I 
touched briefly on this above) Philus, following Carneades, argues that 
since there exists a great variety of laws without any necessary 
commonality, their justification and force must rest solely on their 
utility rather than any 'natural' justice. Justice is nothing other than an 
agreement for self restraint, and one always made by the rulers to cater 
to their own interests and not those of over whom they govern. (DRP, 
m . 19-23) Believing in any natural justice is 'folly', since this is 
tantam ount to agreeing to be taken advantage of by others: 'wisdom 
urges us... to rule over as many subjects as possible, to enjoy pleasures, 
to become rich, to be rulers and masters...justice...instructs us to spare 
all men, to consider the interests of the whole hum an race, to give 
everyone his due, and not to touch sacred or public property, or that 
which belongs to others'. (DRP, 111.24) Against this Laelius states the 
Ciceronian case, which Scipio eventually picks up at the end of Book 
HI. T rue  law7 is right reason in agreement with nature, universal in its 
application, 'unchanging and everlasting'. (DRP, 111.40) Thus, any state 
which does not uphold the bond of justice, which is the agreement of 
partnership amongst a people, is not a commonwealth since it could 
not really be the 'property of the people'. Justice is a necessary 
condition for the existence of a commonwealth.
Let us examine this point more carefully via a consideration of the 
typology of states which Cicero has Scipio discuss in Books I and H  In 
his discussion of the development of the res publica in Book I, Scipio 
distinguishes between three types of states - kingship, aristocracy, and 
popular government. Each have had a role to play in Roman history, 
and each form has its merits, bu t equally, each has within itself a 
'slippery and precipitous path leading to a certain depraved form'. 
(DRP, I. 44) In kingships the people have too small a share in the 
'administration of justice and in deliberation', in aristocracies they do
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not have enough liberty because they are 'entirely excluded from 
deliberation for the common weal and from power7, and in 
democracies even if the people exercise power with justice and 
m oderation the resulting equality is inequitable because 'it allows no 
distinctions in rank7. (DRP, I. 43) Scipio in particular emphasizes the 
depravity of this last form, and spends a disproportionate amount of 
time rehearsing their arguments only in order to smash them.19 Por 
Scipio the best, if forced to choose, is kingship, but above them all is a 
'well regulated mixture7 of the three simple forms. (DRP, I. 45) Since 
the ruling power of the state is like a ball, 'snatched from kings by 
tyrants, from tyrants by aristocrats or the people, and from them by an 
oligarchic faction or a tyrant7, no single form of government can ever 
m aintain itself for very long. Because these primary forms degenerate 
so easily, the best constitution m ust have the structural capacities to 
counteract the corrosive effects, and hence should contain part 
'suprem e and royal element', some powers granted to 'leading citizens7, 
and 'certain m atters' left to the judgement and tastes of the masses.
This should neutralize any upheaval, since there is no reason for 
change 'w hen every citizen is firmly established in his own station, and 
there underlies it no perverted form into which it can plunge and 
sink7. (DRP, 1.69) The political division of labour is crucial not only for 
the business of state, but also for its continuity and very existence. 
Breaking with Plato, Cicero's ideal form of state is not an ideal doomed 
to remain a blueprint, but in fact (he claims) exists within grasp. Scipio 
declares that 'no other form of government is comparable, either in its 
general character, in its distribution of powers, or in the training it 
gives, with which of our ancestors...have handed down to us7. The 
break with Plato is further emphasized at the beginning of Book II of 
DRP when Laelius observes that Scipio is beginning a 'new  style of 
discussion...nowhere employed in the writing of the Greeks', and 
though the Greek's state might be an 'excellent one7, it is 'quite
19 See DRP, 1.48-49.
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unsuited to men's actual lives and habits'. (DRP, II. 21) Even Aristotle 
is criticized (as a 'successor' to Plato) for not providing a 'definite 
example or model'. Scipio, as if using a 'demonstrating rod', will point 
out a 'real' state. (DRP, H52) Cicero has replaced Plato's fictive dream of 
an ideal res publica with a specific historical example of the best 
practicable regime - the Roman Republic.20
At this point the focus shifts from the 'ideal state' to the 'ideal 
statesm an'.21 Having rejected the possibility of a Platonic 'd ty  in 
speech' because of the absence of men of 'almost divine powers' to 
foresee and control the constant changes and sequences of 
governmental forms, Scipio introduces (in opposition to the tyrant 
Tarquinius) the 'good, wise, and skilled guardian and protector...of the 
practical interests and self respect of the citizen of the state'. (DRP, 1.45; 
D.51) A philosopher-king is not realistic nor even desirable, but a 
practical pilot (and here he turns Plato's language right around) of the 
nation is a real possibility, as the history of Rome has shown. At DRP 
n.65 Tubero remarks that though Scipio has discussed his own 
commonwealth, he has not talked of the 'state in general' and has not 
indicated w hat 'training, customs, or laws' are needed to establish and 
preserve it. W ithout completely ignoring Tubero's point (he tells him 
to wait for it), Scipio insists that he is not interested in defining the 
ideal constitution, but instead by using 'our own state as a pattern' will 
show the effective reality of what 'reason and speech were striving to 
make clear'. (DRP, 11.65) The text breaks off at this point and resumes 
w ith a discussion of the 'man of good sense' (Jprudentum j) the man 
Scipio has lo n g  been seeking7. (DRP, 11.67) This statesman will embody 
that political wisdom  (civilis pruden^m^which. is an 'understanding of 
the regular curving path through which governments travel', dealing 
with the fact that often 'the essential nature of the commonwealth
20 At DL 111.37, Quintus asks, what is ’actually the best’ state, and Atticus says that he thinks 
’the best government is that which was put in force by Marcus here during his 
consulship - one that gives power to the aristocracy’.
21 This is brought out well in Walter Nicgorski, ’Cicero’s Focus; From the Best Regime to the 
Model Statesman’, Political Theory, Vol. 19, No. 2, May 1991, p. 230-251.
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defeats reason'. (DRP, 11.45; II.57)22 These 'unreasonable tendencies' are 
the recurring reality of regime instability, and hence the justification 
for the need of an even balance of rights, duties, and functions, 'so that 
the magistrates have enough power, the counsels of eminent citizens 
enough influence, and the people enough liberty'. (DRP, 11.57) 
Remember that this discussion precedes the more formal discussion 
of the state in book HI (examined above) and thus can be said to 
emphasize the importance Cicero placed on the role of the ideal 
statesman ('the man of prudence') in the just state. He is to be the 
moral exemplar of the nation, improving and examining himself 
continually, and coaxing and urging others to do the same by following 
his example. His duty and work is the preservation and 
embellishment of the harmony of the state, the agreement amongst 
dissimilar elements 'brought about by a fair and reasonable blending 
together of the upper, middle, and lower classes, just as if they were 
musical tones'. (DRP, 11.69)23 This civitate concordia is in turn, only 
ever brought about by the presence of justice, which is only possible via 
the 'well regulated mixture' of the most practicable ideal state under the 
guidance of a 'm an of prudence'. The statesman is never conceived of 
as wholly apart from society, nor is he thrust upon it as some kind of 
divine figure, it is (so to speak) his classroom, and is fundamental to 
developm ent of his personal character. He is also dependent upon 
those who preceded him and those who will follow, since (as Cato 
taught) men 'living at one time' could not possibly make 'all the 
necessary provisions for the future without the actual experience and
22 ’he should not allow his time constantly to be taken up with consultations or by reading and 
writing...for he must be able...to act as both field superintendent and household 
superintendent of the commonwealth...his knowledge...should be like the pilot's 
knowledge of the stars, or physicians knowledge of physics' (DRP, V.5).
23 The language is again borrowed from Plato, ci.The Republic [transl. F.M. Comford, Oxford 
University Press, 1945, p. 142] 443D, where he discusses the harmony of the mind of the 
'just man': 'he is indeed one who sets his house in order, by self-mastery and discipline 
coming to be at peace with himself, and bringing into tune those three parts, like the terms 
in the proportion of a musical scale, the highest and lowest notes and the mean between 
them, with all the intermediate intervals...'.
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test of time'. (DRP, II.2)24 
Ultimately for Cicero, I t  is impossible to live well except in a good 
commonwealth', and 'nothing can produce greater happiness than a 
well constituted state'. (DRP, V.7) Even this passage is linked closely to 
the ground, since it follows a discussion of how the good 
commonwealth provides for the 'practical conduct of life'. Whereas in 
Plato's Republic the virtues are evoked mainly as models exemplified 
in some 'shadowy ideal', in Cicero they are realized by 'the 
authoritative traditions and enactments' that actually do bind men 
together into society.25 Cicero is reconstructing the relation between 
the ideal and the real, between philosophy and politics, not rejecting 
one for the other but adjusting the orthodox Platonic (and Stoic) 
preoccupation with the internal culture of the individual to make 
room for a greater concern with the ordering of outw ard circumstances. 
He is one of the original theorists of what contemporary theorists today 
call 'the political'.26 
The particular character of Cicero's system of libertas should now 
hopefully be clear - how it is related to the res publica, law, and justice, 
and their proper arrangement in the 'well regulated' mixed regime.27 
To complete this section I w ant to compare this with its opposite - 
licentia - and finally, to sketch the political context of Cicero's 
argum ents and their implications for Roman society.
It is obvious that Cicero has it in for (what he calls) democratic
24 See Nicgorski, p. 244.
25 See Cumming, Vol.I p.207, for an excellent discussion of this.
26 Cumming argues that the subsequent disappearance of the bulk of the actual text of the DRP 
except for the T)ream of Scipio', resulted in the disappearance of the 'political' and the 
reemergence of the antithesis Cicero had sought to displace: 'Once "The Dream of Scipio" 
became detached in the manuscript tradition from the rest of the Republic and survived 
embedded in Macrobius' commentary, Cicero's adjustment of the relation between the 
visionary philosophical life and the active political life was thrown off balance'. (Vol.I, 
p.325) Cf. the discussion in Schofield 1991.
27 The terminology is important here. As Tuck (1993, pp. 95-6,222-240) has brilliantly 
shown, by the end of the sixteenth century the idea of a 'mixed’ constitution in republican 
theorizing had given way to the idea of a 'balanced' one; i.e. exhibiting a greater concern for 
the balancing of interests rather than a mixture of the different humours. This has important 
consequences for the emergence of the ‘reason of state’ towards the end of the sixteenth 
century.
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government, which is the 'worst form since it embodies licentia and 
not libertas. Perhaps the best example of this is his paraphrasing of 
book VIII 562c-563c of Plato's Republic:
In such a state that liberty prevails everywhere...homes one and all without a 
master...until finally the father fears his son, the son flouts his father, all sense of 
shame disappears and all is so absolutely free that there is no distinction between 
citizen and alien; the schoolmaster fears and flatters his pupils, and pupils despise 
their masters...wives have the same rights as their husbands...even the dogs, the 
horses, and the asses are so free in their running about that man must make way for 
them in the streets'. (DRP, 1.67)
This 'boundless license1 turns the minds of the citizens so 'squeamish 
and sensitive' that the merest expression of government authority is 
rejected, and they are left 'utterly without a master of any kind'. More 
problematical, out of such an excess of liberty, some 'bold and depraved' 
man presents himself as a leader and 'curries favour with the people by 
bestowing upon them the property of others as well as his own'. As a 
result, liberty gives birth to tyranny and the 'utterly unjust and cruel 
servitude' that it brings. (DRP, I. 69)28 
The implications of this argument are spelled out in DL where 
Atticus says that the best state is one which 'gives power to the 
aristocracy'. (DL, HI. 37 - see above) In the next paragraph, Marcus 
confirms that this is precisely what he is attempting to justify. Even 
before this, Cicero has argued that the entire character of a Republic is 
determined by its arrangements with regards to magistrates since 
'w ithout their prudence and watchful care a state cannot exist7. (DRP, 
m . 5) Thus the administrative centre of the state - the Senate - is 
'dom inus' over policy, and not only enforces the law but is the very 
source of it. The order which is preserved is no doubt favourable to the 
natural ruling class of Rome - the landed aristocracy - though as a 'New 
Man' Cicero had to climb the social ladder (from the equestrian to the 
senatorial- the lower strata of the aristocracy to the highest) according to 
each political success. It is a senatorial concept of libertas, that is 
justified in the DRP, DO, and DL, tailored to fit and serve senatorial
28 Cicero called the statue to libertas erected on his former grounds by Clodius a ’templum 
licentia'. (DL, n.42)
35
interests. This dilutes somewhat Cicero’s emphasis on the qualified 
nature of Senatorial libertas being within the law, since the Senate 
makes the law in the first place, though of course the Senate is 
ultimately answerable to natural law.29 I concur with Ste. Croix and 
Wood that Cicero was indeed "the most articulate of all members of the 
Roman ruling class'.30 Faced with the upheavals of his day, the decline 
of republican government and the increasing challenges to the ruling 
O ptim ates,31 Cicero’s concordia ordinum appealed to the traditions of 
Roman law and statehood as a means of dealing practicably with the 
disorder of his present: 'we must provide that ideal state with laws 
which are in harmony with its character". (DL, n.23; DRP, n.53 66)32 
Cicero'sotium cum dignitate was an ordered state in which men were 
valued according to their rank in a hierarchial social structure. The 
moral duties of keeping promises, protecting life, property, and acting 
generously (under certain conditions) were generally in the interests of 
the dom inant land holders and could not provide the grounds for any 
argum ents of reform (or revolution) on the part of the masses.33
29 For example, communal sharing of all things that are for common use is preserved only after 
those goods which have been 'assigned by statutes and civil law' remain in possession 'as 
those laws have laid down' (DO, I.S1).
30 Ste. Croix p. 344. This is a (if not the) general theme of Wood's book.
31 Cicero saw internal threats as the greatest danger to security - for example, protests from 
below or popular disturbances for social reform. Machiavelli would have a very different 
view. See Leg. Agr. 1.26; Wood p. 189.
32 Note also that Cicero had little time for the licentia of the super rich, the selfishness of 
'fishponders', which blinded them to the needs of the commonwealth, (without which their 
'fishponds' would not exist) (Cicero's Letters to Atticus, ed. D.R. Shackleton Bailey, 
Cambridge University Press, 1965-70, l.xxx.6.).
33 I think it is important to point out here the dearth of information we have concerning the 
Populares. Ste. Croix's heroic effort to squeeze something from the existing sources can 
only really show that they were not a homogeneous group, nor were they simply concerned 
with getting government off their back, as is often assumed. (Sallust reported King 
Mithridates claiming that the Romans thought 'few men desire liberty; a large proportion are 
content with just masters') Ste. Croix’s other valuable service is to disentangle the prejudices 
of Cicero towards the populares Csentina urbis' and 'misera ac ieiuna plebecula' he called 
them) and to identify the remarks of subsequent classicists who uncritically took up Cicero's 
biases (like Wirzsubski). But see a necessary corrective to Ste. Croix’s strict interpretation of 
the class based nature of Roman society by Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power 
Volume I: A History o f Power from the Beginning to AD. 1760, Cambridge University 
Press, 1986, especially p. 251-254.
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1.2 Ad exterioribus ad interiora
In this next section I want to examine in slightly more detail the 
relationship between duty, decorum, and dignitas, which are concepts 
of crucial importance to Cicero and to subsequent generations of social 
and political theorists who learned from his work. I want to approach 
them on two levels; first I will sketch the theoretical basis of each 
concept and then I will briefly consider their concrete manifestations.
W hereas the topological route of the Christian fathers and Neo- 
Platonists proceeded via 'ab exterioribus ad interioria, ab inferioribus ad 
superiora', for Cicero, the route was never as straight nor even in the 
same direction. The world of the 'exterior7 is never subsumed within a 
m etaphor for the ordering of one's interior world. Take, for example, 
Cicero's discussion of duty 6o f f i c id Duties are always spoken of in the 
context of a shared life, since no part of life 'neither public affairs nor 
private, neither in the forum nor at home, neither when acting on 
your own nor in dealings with another' can be free from duty. (DO, 1.7; 
1.4) Everything that is honourable (honestus) in life (here and now) 
depends upon their cultivation, and everything dishonourable stems 
from their neglect. In the DO, Cicero's concern is, above all, w ith the 
nature of individual hum an conduct, even more so than in the DRP, 
where the emphasis lay more on the conduct of one single individual - 
the ideal statesman. Cicero is highly sensitive to the differences 
between people and the implications of this for political theory.
Though we all share in reason which raises us above mere brute 
creatures, and from which everything that is seemly (decet) and 
honourable is derived, another aspect of ourselves is that each of us has 
specific duties: T or just as there are enormous bodily 
differences...similarly there are still greater differences in men's spirits'. 
(DO, 1.107)
Though men are different in character, each shares in reason and thus 
each can comprehend the 'course of things' and see over the whole 
course of a life and prepare for it. Reason also unites men via the
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bonds of speech (which I will discuss in more detail below) and the 
fellowship of a common life, which in turn provides sustenance and 
comfort to oneself, one's household and all those 'whom he holds dear 
and ought to protect'. (DO, 1.12) Above all, reason implants a 'search 
for truth and its investigation', which is peculiar to man, a la n d  of 
impulse towards pre-eminence'. Again, Cicero inserts a comparison 
with Plato at this point, skilfully adjusting (i.e. wilfully misquoting) an 
example to serve his own purposes. In the Phaedrus Plato talks of the 
perception of the good which inspires an immediate and absolute love 
corresponding to an internal state of mind, an ideal.34  At DO 1.15,
Cicero restates this same passage but with a twist, now referring to an 
order visible in the physical universe and in the context of the conduct 
of individuals in the course of their lives. This is because the 
'honourableness' (or ’goodness') we seek is constituted by, and 
constitutive of, our actions in relation to ourselves and others, since 
learn ing  about and reflecting upon nature is somewhat truncated and 
incomplete if it results in no action'. Duties based upon sociability are 
of the 'utm ost importance, and these 'actions' are for the 'protection of 
m en’s interests and...concerned with the fellowship of the hum an 
race'. (DO, 1.56) We act this way because we can perceive 'the beauty 
and loveliness' of the 'congruence of parts' and nature transfers 'the 
eyes to the m ind' so that 'beauty, constancy, and order' are preserved in 
our decisions and deeds. Thus Cicero tells his son, 'you are seeing...the 
very face and form...of the honourable; if it could be seen with eyes, as 
Plato says, it would inspire an amazing love of wisdom'. (DO, 1.14)
This sense of propriety and inner order visible in one’s actions is 
embodied in Cicero’s concept of decorum, which in turn is 
etymologically (and conceptually) linked to his understanding of 
dignitas. I shall discuss this in more detail below, however before 
doing so we m ust become clear as to the specific nature of these duties 
based on the fellowship of men, and their arrangem ent w ithin the
34 Phaedrus 250D.
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framework of Ciceronian virtue.
Honourableness is found in four virtues; wisdom, justice, courage, 
and propriety. (DO, I.15)35 I shall briefly examine the first two here. 
Though all are bound together, each has particular attendant duties.
The particular function of wisdom is the investigation and discovery of 
w hat is true, avoiding any hastiness of judgement and not wasting any 
time on unnecessary, difficult, or abstruse matters.36 Again, the 
emphasis is upon action: Tt is ...contrary to duty to be drawn...away 
from practical achievements; all the praise that belongs to virtue lies in 
action'. (DO, 1.19; see 1.153 as well) We can always return to our studies, 
but we m ust never be engulfed by them.
I have already discussed justice above in section 1.0, the most wide 
reaching and 'illustrious' of the three, so here I want only to generalize 
that discussion by emphasizing the other-relatedness of the concept. 
Man is a sociable creature who is not bom  for himself alone and must 
contribute to the common stock of things which benefit everyone. 
Injustice is the opposite of this - one cannot benefit oneself at the 
expense of another since this would undermine the grounds of 
fellowship amongst men. (DO, 1.19-21; see the discussion above viz the 
'rule of procedure') Of course, expanding one's personal wealth is not 
in itself bad and certainly not to be discouraged, but only if it is done 
free of unjust actions. One cannot ignore the 'fellowship of life' by 
m inding your own business either, since this contributes nothing of 
your 'devotion, effort, and means' to the commonwealth. (DO, 1.29) 
Even war m ust be fought on the basis of justice - i.e. that the goal is 
peace and that justice will prevail after the battle. Justice always 'looks 
out of doors' and is a virtue 'beyond all others...devoted and applied to 
the advantage of others'. (DRP, m.11)
All of the virtues are placed within the context of decorum, a very
35 Gri^fen and Atkins translate this as 'with order and limit in everything that is said and done; 
Higgmsbotham as 'due order and sense of propriety in all words and actions'.
36 This reminds one of Protagoras' answer to the question of whether or not the gods existed: 'I 
do not know if the gods exist or not It is a difficult question and life is too short'
39
important concept for Cicero, which as he says, is easier to grasp than 
explain - but we shall try. Decorum is inseparable from anything that is 
honourable (good), and it relates to every good action. It is 'the ordered 
beauty of life' and 'the due measure of all things', everything that is just 
or done in a 'great and manly spirit7 (which includes courage too). It is 
a recognition of our role as given by nature, just as the eye is aroused by 
the beauty of a body via the appropriate and graceful arrangement of 
the limbs, so does decorum 'shining out in one's life' generate respect 
and approval from one's 'fellows' because of the 'order...constancy and 
moderation of every word and action'. (DO, 1.113) We must become a 
sharp judge of our own qualities and faults, and aim for consistency in 
our actions and life as a whole. Impulses m ust obey reason, controlled 
and calmed so that we do nothing rashly or randomly, or without 
consideration or care, including our conduct in conversations, sport, 
and sex: 'we have not been created by nature to seem as if we were 
made for jesting and play, but rather for earnestness, for greater and 
weightier pursuits'. (DO, 1.103) The good life is one of thrift, strictness, 
and sobriety, the bad one of luxury, a 'soft and effeminate (sic) lifestyle'. 
All our duties are premised on the background of 'seemly' conduct, and 
respecting that which is owed to each person. (DO, 1.59)
This process is, of course, not an easy task, and Cicero has no illusions 
about the moral potential of his fellow hum an beings. Though we are 
characterized by shared rationality and thus a potentiality for goodness, 
we also share a capacity for evil, and our souls are tainted with 
weakness and a tendency to become easily disturbed and upset.37 We 
are all tem pted by ambition and luxury, and often our rational faculties 
are used to subvert morally correct action. The source of these 
disorders is often the pursuit of the wrong kind of pleasure - i.e. 
w ithout any reference to propriety and order. (intemperantia) The 
unnatural or 'diseased' soul is unable to control and guide the 
appetites, and instead 'kindles, confounds, and agitates' its whole
37 Leg. 1.31. Tusculan Disputations, ed. and transl. A.E. Douglas, 1985, II. 47; Wood, p.85.
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condition. (Tusc. IV.22) Impulses which 'overstep their bounds', 
whether leaping away by attraction or repulsion to something,
'transgress due measure and limit', and transform the spiritual as 
much as the corporeal body. (DO, 1.102) The government of the soul for 
Cicero, as in Plato, is exercised by a strong sense of self-control, with an 
added emphasis on its perception and visibility through actual conduct 
in the public sphere. (I will pick up on this important point again 
below)
How is it that some are able to rule themselves better than others? M
For Cicero it comes down to W d  habits' (depravatio consuetudinum) 
and 'false beliefs' (opinionum vanitas), which twist and indulge the ,A) ^
weakest minds. The 'sparks of fire' which nature has kindled in us are 
'extinguished...and the vices which are the opposite spring up and are 
established'. (DL, 1.29; 1.33) We alone are responsible for these 
'm isjudgments' and 'm isunderstandings', since nature cannot be 
blamed for our own bad habits and improper training. (Tusc. IV.65, 82- 
3, V.39)38 Reason, if properly cultivated and trained, can correct the 
disorders of the soul caused by intemperance. However at this point, 
the relatively straightforward discussion in Cicero of habits and 
conduct becomes slightly more complex, since in effect, he offers two 
different answers between the DRP and the DO.
If the change in focus in the DRP is from the ideal state to the ideal 
statesman, between the DRP and the DO it is from the ideal statesman 
to the honourable individual. In more dramatic terms we could say it 
is an emphasis on authority giving way to a belief in liberty.39
It should now be clear how Cicero in the DO turns to the importance 
of conduct on the part of individuals gathered together in a Republic.
The 'm an of good sense' whom Scipio had longed to find in the DRP to 
w ard off tyranny has all but vanished in the DO - except for the cruel 
joke of Caesar: Tlere you have a man who longed to be the king of the
38 See Wood, p. 87.
39 Cumming Vol. II, clip. 1 has a very interesting analysis of the two texts based on this 
change of emphasis.
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Roman people and master of every nation; and he achieved it! If 
anyone says that such a greed is honourable, he is out of his mind; for 
he is approving the death of laws and liberty, and courting their 
oppression - a foul and hateful thing - as something glorious'. (DO, 
m.83; see also 1.64 for derogatory remarks about Caesar) Remember that 
the ideal statesman was to make a practice of virtue by reconciling the 
inner and outward arrangement of things in the name of public peace 
and the commonwealth. He could only do this through a realization 
in fact, and 'not in words' those things which 'philosophers in their 
comers are continually whispering in our ears'. (DRP, 1.69) Yet how 
could the statesman exercise effective political control? Through terror 
and fear? Not quite (though this was one reason for Rome's great 
imperial success). It is at this point that the individual self control 
discussed above is extended via the dignitas of the statesman (in the 
DRP), and the honourable action and decorum of the individual (in the 
DO), to include the political control of the commonwealth. To 
understand this process, we need to take a closer look at the nature of 
the Ciceronian self.
1.3 W hat am I now?
Fundamental to any understanding of the Ciceronian self is its 
inherently public nature and its embodiment in the social and political 
life of the res publica. We can see this in one of Cicero's letters to 
Atticus, written whilst he was in exile: 'No man has ever lost so much 
or fallen into such a pit of misery...I m oum  the loss not only of the 
things and persons that were mine, but of my very self. W hat am I 
now?' (Att. 60).40 The self is both constitutive of, and constituted by, 
the social order within which it is implicated. In other words, Cicero is 
concerned to articulate both a sense of personhood and personality.41 
In the case of the former, it is to define persons as a class with reference
40 Sec the excellent article by Robert Hariman, ’Political Style in Cicero's letters to Atticus’, 
Rhetorica, Vol. VII, No. 2 (Spring 1989), p. 145-58.
41 Christopher Gill, ‘Personhood and Personality: The Four-Personae Theory in Cicero, De 
officiis 1’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. Julia Annas, vi, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1988, pp. 169-199.
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to some normative criteria such as rationality or self-consciousness. In 
the latter, it is to be concerned with those qualities and conditions 
which make an individual distinct and unique. As we shall see, Cicero 
seems to pay more attention to the nature of personality, but not in the 
sense of a m odem , self-sufficient or (relatively) autonomous 
individuality, but from a deep socially embedded perspective. Private 
life is never wholly extinguished - Cicero wrote from Asia that he 
yearned for 'the World, the Forum, Rome, my house, my friends' - but 
weaves itself within a complex interplay with the reality of public life 
(Att. 108).42 Let us take a closer look at this self by examining two of its 
fundam ental characteristics.
Decorum is the architectonic principle of self (persona)**, in essence, 
its organizing force. I noted above that it was 'the ordered beauty of 
life', inseparable from anything that was honourable and related to 
every good action - the recognition of our role in life as given by 
nature, but then achieved (or destroyed) by habituation and cultivation. 
We need to expand on this here. Cicero breaks down his analysis of 
decorum and personae into four parts (the 'four-personae'theory); that 
pertaining to hum an nature, individual character, circumstances, and 
career. The last is the most important, and many ways encompasses 
the other three since it addresses the im portant question - 'what men 
wish to be, what kind of life we w ant1 - which is the 'most difficult' 
deliberation of all. (DO, 1.117) Remember that it is through one's 
actions and overall conduct in the course of one's life, that one's 
decorum is demonstrated. This visibility of decorum is crucial for 
Cicero, manifested both in the 'reality' of public life and the private 
conduct of individual citizens. This is brought out in Book I of the DO, 
where he is concerned with perceiving and grasping that which is 
'seem ly' (decoro), and notes that the 'poets observe "what is seemly"
42 See Hariman p. 148.
43 ‘Persona’ suggests both the sense of ‘masks* or ‘characters’ associated with dramatic roles, as 
in the ‘character’ one sustains in the world, as well as the more abstract notion of ‘the person’ 
or individuated personality. The new OED lists this Ciceronian sense of ‘character’ - what 
one is at a particular time and place - as one of the constituent meanings of ‘self.
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when what is said and done is worthy of the role'. And at LI 14, he 
compares the importance of our being good 'judges' of our own 
qualities and faults with that of actors, 'who do not choose the best 
plays, but those that are most suited to themselves...If an actor...will 
observe this on stage, will not a wise man observe this in his life?'. 
These literary allusions are not merely stylistic enhancements of a 
political point, but indicate a moment in Cicero (of which there are 
many) where 'rhetorical' concerns overlap with political, legal, and 
moral concerns, in relation to decorum. Each of us has a role to play, 
and along with it a performance to give, the rule always being that 'in 
oratory as in life...to consider deceat', which organizes 'actions as well as 
w ords'.44 Our life is a performance for the benefit of ourselves and our 
fellow citizens.45
But w hat kind of political activity is this? It is defined in terms of 
rhetorical technique, politics and rhetoric being inseparable. The role 
we play, our place in the order of things, brings with it a particular 
performance or style. For the magistrate (playing one of the most 
im portant 'parts'), this means assuming the 'role of the city7 in order to 
preserve its decorum, its laws, and to administer justice.(DO, 1.124) The 
m agistrate is more than just a good man, he is the epitome of good 
government. Our ability in playing our role, especially as leaders of the 
d ty , enhances the reputation of the city as a whole, whilst at the same 
time ensuring our own individual dignitas in the eyes of our 
compatriots.
Rhetoric is fundamental to decorum and dignitas for Cicero, to 
political life in general, and is not something to be denigrated or 
shunned, but should be cultivated and put to use as an essential
44 Orator, transl. H,M, Hubbell, Loeb Classical Library, London, 1952, para. 71,74; See also 
the discussion in DO 1 .126^0, and Hariman p. 151.
45 Cicero, like Aristotle, see’s the importance of observing decorum and the self-scrutiny that 
goes along with it, as obligatory over the entire course of one’s life, and not just when one is 
a youth; ‘When...someone has adopted a plan of life entirely in accordance with his nature (if 
it is not a vicious one) let him then maintain constancy - for that, most of all, is seemly...’ 
(DO, 1.120).
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instrum ent for the good of the commonwealth. This runs against 
Plato's views on rhetoric, who has Socrates in the Gorgias proclaim that 
oratory is 'a spurious counterfeit of a branch of the art of 
governm ent'.46 Socrates defines it as 'pandering7, which is 'no more 
that a knack acquired by routine', devoid of any inherent subject 
matter and without access to the truth - it is to the soul 'w hat cookery is 
to the body7, (para. 463; 465)
Cicero on rhetoric is closer to Aristotle on rhetoric than Plato, though 
with im portant differences. For Aristotle, rhetoric was 'the faculty of 
observing in any given case the available means of persuasion...the 
power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject 
presented to us' (1355b).47 One must know what to say and how to say 
it, how  to adapt to the circumstances presented, and to use all the 
available means of winning over an audience. Instead of being hived 
off from philosophy, rhetoric for Aristotle is a counterpart of ^he\
dialectic, though unlike Cicero he ultimately values the latter morefso^
v )
than the former. For both, attention had to be paid to the way in 
which a speech was delivered and the particular beliefs and 
idiosyncrasies of the audience to whom it is addressed. Aristotle 
insisted on the use of language that was lucid and clear, since 'speech 
which fails to convey a plain meaning will fail to do what speech has to 
do'. (1404b) It m ust have an economy of style, paring down distraction, 
and presenting a clear, concise, and plausible case: T he right thing in 
speaking really is that we should be satisfied not to annoy our hearers, 
w ithout trying to delight them; we ought in fairness to fight our case 
with no help beyond the bare facts; nothing therefore should matter 
except the proof of those facts'. (1404a) Though not as dramatic as 
Plato's banishing of the poets (and their language)48 from the Republic,
46 Gorgias, transl. Walter Hamilton, Penguin Books, 1986,463 (p. 44).
47 ’Rhetoric* in The Complete Works of Aristotle - Volume 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes, transl. W. 
Rhys Roberts, Princeton University Press, 1984.
48 Of course the case of the banishment of the poets is not as clear cut as I seem to imply in 
this sentence, as is evident from reading the Phaedrus. See a brilliant discussion of this 
tension in Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness; Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy
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Aristotle does seek to reign them in, insisting that for any serious 
discussion of political affairs, clarity and simplicity should prevail over 
'expressiveness'. It is less a performance in the art of persuasion than it 
is a duty to lay down the facts, or at least the plausible possibilities, for 
an audience to see and decide for themselves. Cicero follows Aristotle 
quite closely here and in other ways, and his major work on rhetoric - 
De Oratore - could be said to be basically an 'Aristotelian' dialogue .49 
There are important differences though, which I want to bring out.
First of all, the sense that we find in Plato and Aristotle that rhetoric is 
somehow secondary to the real importance of philosophy (less so in 
Aristotle's case, admittedly), is utterly absent in Cicero. Rhetoric is 
implicated in all aspects of political deliberation and conduct, and is 
fundamental to the very origin of society - at least according to the story 
Cicero in the De Inventione of men being transformed them from 
'wild savages' into a 'kind and gentle folk'.50 Not only is the power of 
language affirmed in the creation of society, but it is crucial for society's 
continued existence since language itself is a form of government, a 
political style consisting of a 'repertoire of signs and rules for their 
usage that confer meaning upon the practices of governance'. Hariman 
interestingly identifies a 'republican style', a style designed to maximize 
the opportunities, inherent in republican practices of government.51 
Political utterances become performative rather than merely 
descriptive; to describe the world is to change it. W ords become the 
deeds of republican governance, arousing citizens to perform the just 
acts and duties for the good of the concordia ordinum. This kind of 
persuasion - the republican style - requires more than just clarity of 
speech, since 'nobody ever admired an orator for correct grammar...no 
one ever sang the promises of a speaker whose style succeeded in
and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1986, especially pp. 200-27.
49 For a general discussion of this and of the history of rhetoric in general, see James J.
Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages; A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine
to the Renaissance, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1974.
50 De Inventione, transl. H.M. Hubbell, Loeb Classical Library, 1949,1.2.3.
51 Hariman 1989, p. 147.
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making his meaning intelligible to his audience'. (DOR, HI.52)52 
Instead, it requires a style which is 'ornate' - an 'expressive' or 'artistic' 
style - an eloquence which people 'wildly applaud' and gives them 'a 
thrill' (DOR, ID. 53). These passages in DOR are in a way a direct 
commentary by Cicero on Aristotle. Sticking only to the facts (or 
plausible possibilities), and thinking only of speaking clearly and briefly 
are not ways of getting into people's hearts (and conduct), and 
moreover, encourages people to think that merely mastering a 
rhetorical technique is sufficient to carry the day. Eloquence, according 
to Cicero, is more than just obeying a set of rules: 'if you take my advice 
you m ust treat with derision and contempt all those persons who 
suppose that the rules laid down by rhetoricians now so called, have 
enabled them to compass the whole range of oratorical power, but who 
have not so far succeeded in understanding w hat character they are 
appearing in or what it is that they profess'. (DOR, 111.54) Eloquence is 
one of the 'supreme virtues', a faculty with a 'beauty and distinction in 
outw ard appearance'. The genuine orator does more than simply 
compass the facts, he gives expression to the 'thoughts and purposes of 
the m ind in such a m anner as to have the power of driving the 
heavens forward in any direction in which it has applied its weight7.
For Cicero (and Aristotle) rhetoric is a powerful instrument and thus 
dangerous too, and it needs to be carefully controlled, lest 'fluency of 
speech' be bestowed upon individuals bereft of integrity and wisdom; if 
it is 'we shall not have m ade orators of them but shall have put 
weapons into the hands of madmen'. (DOR, IH.55-6)
According to Cicero (above all in the De oratore) and Quintilian (in 
his Institutio oratorio), the general task of the orator was to teach, to 
please, and most importantly, to move the audience he addressed. He 
had three general kinds of speeches at his disposal. Firstly the forensic 
or judicial type used in a court of law and involving the proof or 
disproof of a particular charge or accusation. Secondly the deliberative
52 De Oratore, tranl. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library, 1942. (Bode III). Hereafter DOR.
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type, which was used mainly in political contexts, where emphasis lay 
on discussing policy or persuading an audience to pursue a particular 
course of action. Thirdly was the panegyric or demonstrative type, 
which involved an oration of praise or blame of some individual or 
action. The composition of these speeches was further subdivided into 
five constitutive parts: inventio (the discussion or discovery of 
material), dispositio (its structure and arrangement), elocutio (its 
formulation and stylization in language), memoria, and pronuntiato 
(the delivery). Each type of speech thus had a style and delivery 
appropriate to itself, all the parts of which had to be strictly observed, 
and governed by the decorum of the situation within which one was 
placed. As well, following the De oratore, eloquence was always to be 
adapted to the capacities of the common members of the audience and 
to the language of everyday life, not only in order to convey the 
message as clearly as possible, but to signal that the orator shared the 
common life of the community and accepted its standards.53
There was also the question of the content of the speech. Were these 
rules simply tools to be applied to whatever topic the orator happened 
to come across? Could the orator move beyond the mechanics of 
rhetoric to uncover the real truth of a proposition, or provide insight 
into complex philosophical issues? Here, rhetorical culture broke 
sharply with w hat had passed for 'traditional philosophy7, whose 
concern had always been to go beyond what it considered to be mere 
appearences. Accordingly, rhetoric could never be anything more than 
surface noise, gliding over subterranean truths and essences, and thus 
forever inferior to the instrinsic difficulty of real philosophy. In the 
Phaedrus, Socrates claimed that no one could speak properly about 
anything unless he had a knowledge of philosophy, and that there 
could be no kind of understanding worthy of possessing which was 
anything bu t a philosophical understanding - i.e one that went beyond
53 DOR l.iii.12; In De finibus iv. 6-7, Cicero criticizes Stoic rhetoric for not using everyday 
language. Aristotle placed a similar emphasis on adapting public speeches to the particular 
circumstances of the audience, Rhetoric, ii.13,1390a25ff.
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merely rhetoric.54
Being the good orator that he was, Cicero admitted the central claim 
of the argument against rhetoric, but then turned it around to his own 
advantage. Oratory was inexact and sometimes inconsistent, but it had 
to be so in order to be effective, and in being effective it enhanced 
liberty and promoted and protected the common good.
The broad scope of this 'moral science' meant that the orator had to be 
not only technically well equipped, but also possess a broad and 
substantial knowledge of the arguments, opinions, and maxims of the 
various schools of philosophy. In the late Republican period in Rome 
this meant a familiarity with the 'old' and 'new7 Academics, the 
Peripatetics, Epicureans, and Stoics. It was the scepticism of the new 
Academy which best suited the orator, claimed Cicero. Against Zeno, 
who argued that true perception was of the sort that disallowed the 
existence of a false version of the same sort ('F  cannot be at the same 
time 'not P'), the 'new Academics' had argued that such certainty was 
beyond man, especially with regard to moral philosophy. Similarly, 
'hard ' Stoicism which allowed only for the good of honestas to be 
param ount above all other concerns of daily life, however admirable, 
was considered so detached from the ordinary experience of the 
community that it was unlikely to convince, certainly w ouldn't please, 
and most im portantly w ouldn't move individuals to act on it. 
Peripateticsim, on the other hand, did allow for more than just the 
highest and most virtuous good, and that in addition to the knowledge 
of the good, bodily health and external circumstances also contributed 
to a 'well-lived' life.55
The centrality of rhetoric to the 'republican style' also m eant the 
denial of any separation between the rhetorical means of expression 
and the philosophical content they were designed to express. Cicero
54 Phaedrus, 261 A, 265D.
55 For an extended discussion of these issues see Jerrold Seigel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in 
Renaissance Humanism: the Union of Eloquence and Wisdom, Petrarch to Valla, Princeton 
University Press, 1968.
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notes that in 'the old days', the same system of instruction imparted 
education both 'in right conduct and in good speech; nor were the 
professors in two separate groups, but the same master gave instruction 
both in ethics and in rhetoric'. The hiving off of one from the other, 
explains Cicero, took place when some men began to devote 
themselves, 'entirely to poetry, others to mathematics, and others to 
music, and others...created a new interest and amusement as 
dialecticians, and have spent the whole of their time and their lives in 
the sciences that were invented for the purposes of moulding the 
minds of the young7. (DOR, m.59) He also blames Socrates for having 
'robbed' the general designation of the practice of the liberal sciences as 
'philosophy' and separated 'the science of wise thinking from that of 
elegant speaking, though in reality they are closely linked together7. 
(DOR, HI. 60) Plato enshrined the source from which 'has sprung 
the...absurd and unprofitable and reprehensible severance between the 
tongue and the brain' (see the genealogy of this split at DOR HI.62-9).
'Real orators' are identified by Cicero as being leaders and principals 
in civil actions and criminal trials and public debates'. They belong to 
the 'broad estates of wisdom and learning7 which have been ignored by 
'rhetoricians' supplied with too much leisure, or by those 'who write a 
few little m anuals of instruction in the art of oratory and label 
them..."Rhetoric"'. (DOR, III. 122) Heal' rhetoric goes far beyond this, 
and includes the subjects of 'justice and duty, and the constitution of 
the government of states', in fact, it includes the 'entire field of practical 
philosophy7. (DOR, III. 122-3) The orator must be free from the 
technicalities of narrow  regulae and 'roam freely7 in a measureless 
field, so that wherever he takes a step he finds himself 'on his own 
ground, the resources and expressiveness of oratory readily available'.
It is not that the rules of traditional rhetoric are useless, but rather that 
they can only serve as 'reminders' for the orator as to the standards he 
m ust keep, and to maintain him on the course which he has set. (DOR, 
m.145) The virtue of rules lies not in their production of eloquence,
but in their being deduced from the examples of men who are (or were) 
'naturally eloquent'. Eloquence is not a product of theory, but theory is 
a product of eloquence.56 Of course there is basic training which one 
must undergo to develop the skills of oratory, just like  that for the 
games'. (DOR, 1.146) The control and training of the voice, proper 
breathing, appropriate gestures, and even the tongue itself, m ust all be 
practised, and we m ust consider 'whom we are to take as patterns, 
whom we should wish to be like.' (my emphasis) And here Cicero 
introduces a literary comparison he would invoke again in Book I of 
DO (see above), claiming that one has to study 'actors as well as orators' 
so that bad practice does not lead to some 'inelegant or ugly habit'.
The fusion of eloquence and wisdom thus begins to take a more 
definite shape. Along with the limitless range of the orator, his 
technical skills are supplemented by a critical (sceptical) spirit courtesy 
of the New Academics. To paraphrase Seigel, the ideal orator (for 
Cicero), was stoic in his most philosophical moments, peripatetic in 
ordinary moments, and a sceptic at most times.57 Cicero's texts 
themselves were a source of sceptical ideas in the Renaissance, 
especially book II of his Academica, where a coherent and convincing 
sceptical argum ent is presented in full working order. ('Antiochus's 
attack on scepticism expanded and answered') Of course, the full 
impact of the revival of scepticism was not felt until the second half of 
the sixteenth century, and then mainly in Northern Europe rather than 
in Italy. With the recovery of the texts of Sextus Empiricus in mid 
century, the sceptical movement picked up real momentum, and the 
scepticism of Cicero was noted more often.ss
56 (DOR, 1.146): 'eloquence is not the offspring of the art, but the art of eloquence'.
57 Seigel, 1968, p 29. Cf. Tuck 1993, pp. 6, 9.
58 The connection between the Academica and the rise of scepticism in the late Renaissance is 
discussed by Charles B. Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus; A Study of the the Influence of the 
Academica in the Renaissance, The Hague, 1972: The Recovery and Assimilation of Ancient 
Scepticism in the Renaissance', Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia, 27,1972, pp 363- 
384: The Rediscovery of Ancient Scepticism in Modem Times', Reapprcdsels in Renaissance 
Thought, ed. Charles Webster, Variorum Reprints, London, 1989, pp 225-251. For the 
importance of ancient scepticism to the seventeenth century see Richard H. Popkin, The 
History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza, Berkeley, University of California Press,
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Rhetoric is 'so potent a force' that it embraces the origin,
development, and operation of the virtues, duties, and 'all the natural
principals governing the morals and minds and life of mankind, and
also determines their customs and laws and rights, and controls the
government of the state'. This is the 'rhetorical universe of discourse':59
Whether its subject is the nature of the heavens or of the earth, the power of the gods or 
men, whether it speaks from the well of the court or the floor of the house or from the 
bench or rostrum, whether its object is to move men to action or to instruct them or to 
deter them, to excite them or to curb them, to fire them or to calm them down, whether 
it is to be delivered to few or to many, amongst strangers or among friends or by oneself, 
the flow of language though running in different channels does not spring from different 
sources, and wherever it goes, the same supply of matter and equipment of style go with 
it....it is impossible to achieve an (ornate) style without first procuring ideas and 
putting them into shape, and at the same time...no idea can possess distinction without 
lucidity ofstyle...(DOR,III.23-4)
Eloquence and rhetoric are empowering forces in political life, which 
move men to action, display the skill and knowledge of leaders, and fix 
the conception of self in the mind's eye of the speaker and the public 
eye of the res publica. If consensus in a Republic is the grounds for 
action, then the powers of speech and political ideas m ust be embodied 
in the personality of the leadership - they m ust become epitomes of 
good government (and this is precisely w hat Cicero himself sought to 
become). Politics involves technique because successful political action 
depends upon the correct selection of the means by which one becomes 
visible before the public via virtuous conduct; to invent a public 
character is also to create a public.
The importance of rhetoric brings us back to the Ciceronian self. 
Though far from being a rejection of any notion of a 'deep self', the 
Ciceronian self becomes a matter of playing a role in order to establish a 
reality (or context) which follows from that role. As Lanham has pu t it 
in relation to the literary rhetoric of the Renaissance, 'acting establishes
1979 (revised ed); Theories of Knowledge', in Charles Schmitt et al. ed., The Cambridge 
History of Renaissance Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp 668-684.
Perhaps though, Popkin overemphasizes the importance of scepticism to seventeenth century 
philosophy and political theory, or at least ignores the rhetorical context I have been 
sketching here. Rhetorical and sceptical strategies emerge alongside each other throughout 
the Renaissance and early modem period, and in many ways are deeply connected. Tuck 1993, 
chapters 1-2 passim, especially at pp. 48-63, is now essential reading for this history.
59 Cf. Cumming Vol I. p.317.
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the self' and expression sustains it: 'Self conscious posturing attempts to 
keep faith with dramatic reality. So does language which reminds us it 
is a language, reminds us that we see only by means of a language'.60 In 
Cicero the self composes itself by composing a public reputation, and is 
a contingent self insofar as rhetorical discourse necessarily deals with 
the whole range of human action and choice. Yet one's reputation is at 
the same time a way of anchoring oneself amongst the hurly-burly of 
republican politics. It is not aspiring to be 'shallow', but to recognize 
that politics cannot be made to fit the clean lines of philosophy, a point 
Cicero makes vividly when complaining that Cato often speaks to the 
Senate 'as though he were living in Plato's Republic instead of the 
cesspool that is Rome'. (Att. 21) Cicero's letters are the marginalia of 
such a public self, 'they become an explicit meditation on the other texts 
and so a medium of understanding' M  
We m ust be careful however not to overemphasize the vacuity of the 
Ciceronian self, or the ease of its 'dance of engagement and 
disengagement' with the rhetorical universe. According to Cicero, we 
should never act out of character. Everyone m ust come to know their 
own talents and be a sharp judge of their own good qualities and faults, 
and like actors, choose only those roles best suited to themselves. (DO,
I. 114) The theory of decorum as a whole presupposes a particular 
social structure, with particular social roles correlating with distinct 
'styles of living', each of which have to be chosen, cultivated, and 
m aintained through sound instruction and habituation>2 Social roles 
have real weight and importance as bearers of determinate functions, 
and as expressions of our common rational, moral agency - our 
personhood. As Gill argues, the 'De officiis...presents officia, duties or
60 Richard A. Lanham, The Motives of Eloquence; Literary Rhetoric in the Renaissance, Yale 
University Press, 1976, p. 13,28.
61 See Hariman’s discussion (p. 147-8) of an example from a letter of Cicero’s: 1 thought I saw 
a chance to cut back license and teach the young folk a lesson. So I played fortissimo and put 
my whole heart and brain into the effort...in the hope, I won’t say of reforming our society, 
but at least of healing its wounds’.
62 Cf. GUI, 1988, p. 193.
53
obligations, as grounded in the nexus of roles, mores, and institutia 
that goes to make up the culture, and also as grounded, ultimately, in a 
theoretical conception of human nature at its best'.63 Ciceronian 
(Roman) society was above all a strictly ordered one, with a strong 
emphasis upon as little movement between ranks as possible, and 
wholly against any policies that would alter the relation between 
political labour and economic power (i.e. redistribute wealth from the 
top to the bottom). 'Human nature at its besf was clearly identified 
with the conventional social values and attitudes of the aristocratic 
class of Greco-Roman society. Though without the old money of the 
senatorial class to support him, Cicero sought to create a public persona 
which would provide him with the dignitas his family name alone 
could not, and he was representative of only a very select group in 
Roman society. The Ciceronian self was also a governing self - of itself 
and the Republic - which in the DRP is embodied in the model 
statesman whom Scipio longs to find, and in the DO in the 
magnanimity of the well educated and well trained citizen resisting the 
unjust actions of a tyrant.
Book II of DO reintroduces the issue of political control discussed in 
the DRP and the DOR, but as I have mentioned above, with a greater 
emphasis on a more innocuous individual rather than a 'model 
statesman' or the orator as 'culture-hero'.64 Book II also introduces a 
discussion about self-interest and virtue, and how 'that whatever is 
honourable is also beneficial', and how men will achieve w hat they 
want by 'honourable policies and just deeds, and not by deceit and 
wickedness'. (DO, 11.10) It is the 'special property or virtue' to 'make its 
own the hearts of m en' and to enlist them in its own service, w ith the 
wisdom and virtue of outstanding persons inspiring others to be 
'prom pt, ready, and devoted to assisting our advancement'. (DO, n.17) 
There are m any ways in which men submit themselves to the
63 Gill, 1988, p. 196.
64 This phrase is taken from Brian Vickers, Rhetoric and Poetics' in Schmitt et al, CHRP, 
Chapter 20.
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command of others - by goodwill, through admiration of their 
greatness, through fear, hope for personal gain, or simply because they 
have been paid to! (DO, 11.22) Nothing is more suited to "protecting and 
retaining influence' than to be loved on account of one’s greatness and 
glory, a position achieved (in this rhetorical universe of discourse) by 
the ability of the personality to 'make its own the hearts of other men'. 
Fear can not work consistently since influence can not withstand the 
hatred of a large number of men and 'freedom will hit back more 
fiercely when suspended than when she remains undisturbed' - the 
power of men’s hatred to destroy can never be underestimated.65 We 
achieve what we want most easily in both private and public affairs by 
embracing the course that 'extends the most widely", where 'fear is 
absent and love preserved'. (DO, n.24) For Cicero it is a moral point, 
consistent with his understanding of virtue and the decorum of 
governance, but also a practical point - it is the best way (the only way) 
to get what you want. Here is an important point of disagreement (as 
we will see) between Cicero and Machiavelli.
Cicero shifts the discussion away from individuals in general to a few 
'outstanding men', who are not quite the same as the model statesman 
of the DRP. He does this in order to introduce a discussion of glory and 
an approach to the 'masses' which enables one to 'infiltrate' their 
hearts. The goodwill of cities is secured by the 'very reputation and 
rum our' of liberality, of beneficence, of justice, and of keeping faith, 
since the very appearance of these virtues compels people to love 
them. (DO, n.32) Faith is placed in us by the perception of our having 
'good sense' and justice combined, because we have faith 'in those 
whom we judge to understand more than us, whom  we believe can 
foresee the future, able when the issue arises and the crises arrives, to 
settle the matter, adopting the counsel that suits the circumstance'. 
Justice has the greatest ability to 'win faith', since the more cunning and
65 Fear dissolves the bonds of human fellowship, leaving the city empty, ‘only [its] walls 
remain standing - and they themselves now fear the excesses of crime. The republic we have 
utterly lost1 (DO, 11.29) Machiavelli would respond directly to this in II Principe.
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clever a man, the more he is "hated and suspected if deprived of the 
reputation of integrity". (DO, 11.34) Finally, men judge worthy of their 
honour and admiration those who "excel others in virtue", resisting 
vices that others cannot, and who "look down with a great and lofty 
spirit upon prosperity and adversity alike". (DO, 1137) Above all, justice 
is most admirable to the masses because it is on account of this virtue 
alone that men are called "good". (DO, 11.38)
There is no way to achieve glory, no short cut, other than to behave in 
precisely the way that one is what one wishes to be thought as being: 
T rue  glory takes root and spreads its branches...every thing false drops 
swiftly down like blossom; and pretence can never endure". Yet we 
m ust work at it, so that we might 'as easily as is possible" be seen to be 
what we are, especially those bom  of famous stock (like young Marcus) 
whose every word and deed, and thus personality, will be bathed in "so 
brilliant a light". (DO, 11.44) A young man can achieve glory by 
remaining modest, attaching himself to a great man, and associating 
himself with the good of the political community. Speaking and 
debating have the greatest effect when glory is the object, since an 
elegant and wise speaker engenders admiration and goodwill from the 
crowd (as we saw above). He can also inspire great admiration by 
speaking in lawsuits on behalf of the community, or fulfilling the 
obligation of a patron. Defending provides the richest ’yield’ of glory 
and gratitude, especially if the man you assist, "appears to be 
overwhelmed and oppressed because of the influence of some mighty 
individual", (my emphasis) Though one should never threaten the 
civil status of an innocent man by prosecuting him, one should not 
always avoid defending guilty men (provided they are not wicked or 
"impious") - "The masses want it; custom permits it; hum anity tolerates 
it". (DO, 11.51) In other words, consider every opportunity presented as a 
means of increasing one’s yield of glory, whatever the circumstances. 
The path to glory (and thus political control and libertas) is through the 
conduct and discourse of the public man. It is not a path via the
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heavens, but taken in the 'brilliant light' of the res publica, a path 
which leads from the mind of the individual to the fora of the city.
For Socrates, to know the good is to love it and to inevitably pursue it. 
For Cicero the path is less straight. The good has to be visible in our 
conduct, private and public, and since most of us are prone to bad 
habits and poor training, our actions are always capable of being both 
good and bad. Thus, throughout his work, and especially in the DRP, 
DL, DOR, and DO, Cicero is concerned with the 'science of the art of 
government and the training of peoples ' - beginning in the DRP in the 
model statesman's ability to 'force public opinion' and inculcate 
principles by 'systematic training', and ending in the DO with a concern 
for the eloquence of individual conduct in winning the hearts of men 
for glory and the good of the republic. Education, work, even 
religion66, are all employed in the creation of consensus under the 
'republican style' of political agency and government.
1.4 To stylize a freedom
In the Aenid, Virgil wrote that it was the work of the Romans 'to rule 
the peoples with your sway - these skills shall be your arts: to impose 
the habit of peace, to spare the conquered and put down the proud'. 
Insofar as ruling was the great art of the Romans67, Cicero was one of
66 Cicero had no doubts about the social utility of religion in relation to the regulation and 
pacification of conduct and the maintenance of social order, though he had a few personal 
doubts about the nature of divination itself: ‘we must persuade our citizens that the gods are 
the lords and rulers of all things, and that what is done is done by their will and authority; 
that they are likewise great benefactors of man, observing the characters of every individual, 
what he does, of what wrong he is guilty...who will deny that such beliefs are useful when he 
remembers how often oaths are used to confirm agreements, how important to our well being 
is the sanctity of treatises, how many persons are deterred from crime by the fear of divine 
punishment, and how sacred an association of citizens becomes when the immortal gods are 
made members of it’. (DL, 11.15-16) For his doubts viz divination see Div. n. 28,43,70; 
Wood p. 173.
67 See Mann 1986, Chapter 9 passim for a discussion of the general character of the Roman 
territorial empire. He argues that its great success was in part due to its ability to 
universalize its ruling class each time a territory was gained, as well as the ability to create 
the ’conditions of cooperation’ and cooption through the ’military keynesianism’ of its 
legionary economy’.
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its great theorists. The 'influence' of Cicero for later centuries is a 
messy thing to map minutely, but we can list a number of areas within 
which he might figure - republicanism, the role of rhetoric, natural 
law, constitutionalism, private property, and discussions concerning 
the state. I would like to add another, which I have discussed above, 
and which I will re-examine in different contexts (and centuries) in the 
pages to follow. This is, the 'art of government and the training of 
peoples', to which Cicero devoted so much time and which is a critical 
element of his political thought and practice.
Libertas is never disconnected from any of these issues, never isolated 
as simply the absence of obstacles, or as occurring automatically once 
one is plugged into some harmonious whole. The tension between 
liberty and authority is never resolved in Cicero, but instead 
sublimated in the shift between the DRP and the DO, from the libertas 
provided by the model statesman to the libertas of the individual 
resisting tyranny and doing good for the benefit of his fellow man. 
Cicero's republicanism was absorbed - never simply or reductively - 
into the language of liberty as it progressed through the Renaissance 
and into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He was, of course, 
only one layer of a mille feuille of discourse, but an im portant one and 
one which was never quite extinguished. In the chapters that follow, 
we pick up  its trail in the hum anist and civic hum anist texts of both 
the republican d ty  states and post-reformation Europe, leading 
eventually to our discussion of seventeenth century political theory, 
where we delve particularly into the work of another prom inent 
theorist of political liberty (and great admirer of Cicero) - John Locke - 
to see w hat survives and w hat has not, and what new streets have been 
added to our d ty  of liberty.
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Chapter 2: Humanism 's Change of Heart
2.0 Introduction
I have laid out the Ciceronian argument in some detail in order for it 
to act as a sort of ballast to the whole of part 1. I could (and perhaps 
should) have also done the same for Aristotle, though here I am 
accepting the thrust of recent scholarship that the Ciceronian character 
of early and late Renaissance humanism is fundamental to the 
republican political theory of the Italian city-states, and the subsequent 
ideological and practical conflicts over its transformation in the face of 
the changing context in which it was applied as a governing language.1 
Aristotle is undoubtedly important to this story, and in concentrating 
on Cicero I do not want to be seen to be ignorant of their complex 
relations within the matrices of 'ancient prudence'. As a result of two 
recent remarkable books by Maurizio Viroli and Richard Tuck2, our 
knowledge of the intricate relations and seminal developments 
between Renaissance and early m odem  politcal theory has been 
enhanced and deepened as never before. The story here is of the 
emergence of a new language of politics and 'art of government', 
against and beyond the Ciceronian emphasis on the exercise of the 
classical political virtues for the good of the respublica; i.e. the 
emergence of a 'reason of state'. The enormous complexity of this 
transformation is m apped with great skill by Viroli and Tuck, and so 
here I w ant only to pause and consider the implications of some of 
their conclusions for my purposes, before moving on.
The essential point that emerges is of a split between an old and new 
humanism, based in general on the gradual repudiation of Ciceronian
1 See for example Quentin Skinner, ‘Machiavelli’s Discorsi and the pre-humanist origins of 
republican ideas*, in G. Bock, Q. Skinner, M. Viroli eds., Machiavelli and Republicanism, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 121-141. Also Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to 
Reason of State: The acquisition arid transformation of the language of politcs 1250-1600, 
Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 11-70. For an account of the essentially Aristotelian 
character of civic republicanism, seeJ.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine 
Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, Princeton University Press, 1975.
2 Viroli 1992; Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government: 1572-1651, Cambridge University 
Press, 1993.
humanism as the most appropriate governing style in the turbulent 
and war-torn context of late sixteenth and early seventeenth century 
Europe. As I mentioned, this is the story of the emergence of a "reason 
of state", that is, a rejection of the belief that ruling according to the 
universal principles of equity and justice are the best means to securing 
the wealth and honour of the respublica. Instead, the good of the "state" 
- something less than the epitome of the common good and more in 
the interests of whoever ruled - was to be pursued according to a rule 
of "right reason' constrained only by its capacity to calculate the 
appropriate means of the preservation of the stato. Viroli and Tuck 
dramatize this transformation by showing how Tacitus displaced 
Cicero as the key point of reference for the "new humanism", 
particularly as imperialist, religious, and dvil wars began to spread 
across Europe. The Ciceronian language of politics no longer suited 
the times and failed to capture the real workings of princes and their 
courts. As early as the first decades of the sixteenth century, Francesco 
Guicciardini was claiming that "self-interest" governed most men (and 
rarely honour or glory), and that all political power was rooted in 
violence.3 Moreover it was a language of politics that was not m eant 
for citizens (since the d ty  didn 't belonge to them), but for the prince 
and his entourage: the "bad habits of liberty" had to be eradicated lest the 
citizens develop an appetite to rule the state which would only result 
in its dissolution.4 This "melancholy" and sceptical attitude to political
3 On the rise of Tacitism, see Viroli 1992, pp. 258-9; Tuck 1993, pp. 39-45. On Guicciardini 
as a key figure in the rise of ‘reason of state’ - even more so than Machiavelli - see Viroli 
1992, chapter 4 passim; cf. Tuck 1993, p. 38. The key text here is the Ricordi (Maxims and 
Reflections of a Renaissance Statesman, transl. Mario Domandi, New York, 1965).
4 See Trajano Boccalini’s marvelQus Ragguagli di Parnasso (1612-13) in which he shows how 
politics is nothing but the art tfiat princes use to preserve their states, and has nothing to do 
with reforming corrupt cities or transforming their moral identities. There were some 
exceptions. ‘Venetian liberty’ was made possible through their exceptional and unusual 
constitution, the public spiritedness and modesty of their noblemen, their concern for peace 
over expansion, and most of all the impartial justice which ruled them all. But this was 
unique; liberty required a ‘genius affecting quietness in all its operations, a soul which knows 
how to submit itself to a Citizen...to prefer the public good before private interest...to 
possess the wealth of a prince, and have the mind of a simple citizen, capable of accepting the 
will of the citizenry’ (c.I, Adv. 39; Viroli 1992, p. 266). This existed nowhere else and it 
was futile to think it could be implemented, and it was better to realize the world for what it
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life was confirmed by the clipped and sparse style of Tacitus' histories, 
where politics was nothing but the realm of deceit and ambition, and 
politicians compelled to seek absolute power through whatever means 
available. For Tuck the essential developments for the emergence of 
this new hum anism  is an increasing philosophical scepticism, an 
interest in ancient Stoicism (particulary in its Senecan variants), and 
the gradual identification of 'self-interest' as a key factor in politics, and 
thus an indispensable mode for its interpretation. This is perhaps best 
articulated in the work of Justus Lipsius, who set out a neo-Stoic moral 
philosophy advocating a stem  program of self-preservation and 
'constancy7 (or 'emotional horticulture' as Tuck calls it) as a way of 
protecting one's self-interest and preserving civil peace, which in turn 
justified the prince preserving himself at all costs, including taking 
actions contrary to any set of classical moral principles.5 Justice has 
very little role in these discussions, and is almost wholly 
overwhelmed by the recognition of the the role of 'necessity7 in 
understanding and exercising political action, and the need to secure 
the state by whatever means against internal and external threat. Thus 
the old notion of politics as the art of ruling justly according to right 
reason, is replaced by an art of ruling which is nothing more than the 
skillful conduct of a ruler according to whatever is necessary to 
preserve his regime.
There is another complicated story of attempts to join the two, or to 
at least distinguish between 'good' reason of state and 'bad', but I shall 
not touch on that quite yet. Dr. Tuck has shown how the new 
humanism of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, and its 
attack on the liberty of the ancients, forms the base of not only early 
Enlightenment politics but m odem  politics tout court. I w ant to pause
was and make the best of it  The other execeptions were the city leagues of the Hanse 
(Germans), Switzerland, and the United Provinces, who all resisted imperial expansion and 
concentrated on achieving free republics amongst themselves, which was wholly in their 
interest to do so. See the discussion in Tuck 1993, pp. 102-3.
5 See Tuck 1993, pp. 45-64. Cf. Gerhard Oestreich, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State, 
Cambridge University Press, 1982.
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here and consider the scene just before the widespread ascendancy of 
the new humanism and its sceptical and anti-Ciceronian concern with 
moral conduct. I want to do so in order to come to grips with the 
background which was lost (or at least in need of recovery) by the time 
we arrive at attempts to 're-moralize' the political sphere, or at least 
move beyond explaining or justifying all political action in terms of 
reason of state and self-interest. The problem would become (to put it 
crudely) one of reconciling the need for discipline, which for the 
theorists of ragion di stato meant an external disciplining force (i.e. in 
both the sixteenth century sense of a prince's manipulative defence of 
his stato , and the later more impersonal and abstract notion of the 
state), with a belief in the natural liberty of individuals to consent in 
some way to the establishment of this regulatory force. In my 
discussion in this chapter and the next, I want to concentrate on not 
only the political theory of Machiavelli, currently the site of so much 
scholarly attention and who seems to straddle the old and new 
humanism, but also certain aspects of the rise of 'Christian 
hum anism ' in northern Europe, a 'world picture' that I believe is 
im portant for our consideration of the themes of liberty and self in the 
seventeenth century in the chapters ahead.
2.1 Forms of Ciceronianism 
The distinguishing characteristic of the hum anist movement was its 
placing of 'hum anity' at the center of philosophical and ethical life, 
resulting in not quite the 'disenchantment' of a previously mysterious 
world, but a new view of it through a different set of spectacles. As a 
fresh and flexible language it was appropriated by a variety of 
individuals and groups who sometimes pursued diametrically 
opposed ends. Yet one aspect which was shared by all of them was its 
rhetorical basis, and the huge emphasis placed on the role of eloquence 
in relation to wisdom. The hum anist movement was, above all, a
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rhetorical movement.6
The source for the rhetorical nature of humanism was primarily 
Cicero, and to a slightly lesser extent, Quintilian.7 However it is 
im portant to not simply equate Renaissance humanism with 
Ciceronian rhetoric, since a wide range of pre-humanist writers, such 
as Orfino de Lodi, Giovanni da Viterbo, and Brunetto Latini, relied on 
the moral and political lessons of Cicero from the De inventione and 
the De officiis, and the importance of the combination of eloquence 
and wisdom.8 The Ciceronian, and generally Roman, character of 
political theory in the Renaissance is thus more of a matter of 
continuity than is generally thought. However, the key issue, as we 
know from the studies by Tuck and Viroli, was the question of the
6 On humanism in general, see Eugenio Garin, Italian Humanism: Philosophy and Civic Life 
in the Renaissance, tranls. P. Munz, New York, Harper and Row, 1965; Hans Baron, The 
Crisis of the Early Renaissance, 2 volumes, Princeton University Press, 1966 (rev. ed.).
7 C. Lenient, De Ciceroniano hello apud recentiores, Paris, 1855; R. Sabbadin, Storia del 
Ciceronianisme, Turin, 1885; I. Scott, Controversies over the Imitation of Cicero, New 
Yoik, 1910; Th. Zielinski,‘Cicero im Wandel der Jahrhundente, Leipzig (third edition), 1912; 
H. Baron, 'Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance', 
Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, xxii, 1938, pp 72-97; Hunt, The Humanism of Cicero, 
1954; A. Michel, Rhetorique et Philosophic chez Ciceron, Paris, 1960; J. Seigel, Rhetoric 
and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966; N. 
Streuver, The Language of History in the Renaissance, 1970; Brian Vickers, In Defence of 
Rhetoric, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987; *Rhetoric and Politics' in CHRP (1988), pp 715- 
744; See Viroli 1992, pp. 248-9 on the relation between rhetoric and politics as the ‘reason 
of state’ language of politics begins to take over from the old Ciceronian humanism.
8 Orfino de Lodi, De sapientia potestatis (1240's); Giovanni de Viterbo, Liber de regimine 
civitatum (c. 1253); Brunetto Latini, Li Livres dou tresor (c.1260's); and the anonymous 
Occulus pastoralis (c. 1220’s). All of these were specialized treatises on city government in a 
strongly Ciceronian vein. For an extended discussion of this pre-humanist context see 
Quentin Skinner's fascinating, 'Ambrogio Lorenzetti: The Artist as Political Philosopher', 
Proceedings of the British Academy, lxiii, 1986, pp 1-56; ‘ Machiavelli’s Discorsi and the
pre- humanist origins of republican ideas’, in Machiavelli and Republicanism, ed. Gisela Bock, 
Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli, Cambridge Univeristy Press, Cambridge, 1990,121- 
141. The implication of Skinner's argument that Latini et al in the thirteenth century 
followed the Ciceronian analysis in the De inventione and the De officiis with the 'greatest of 
fidelity’ (18-19), is to deny Seigel's claim that it was only with Petrarch that 'discussion of 
ancient philosophy followed the model provided in Cicero's writing'. (1966; 39) For 
Skinner, the thirteenth century dictatores litjerature, 'embodies an ideal of citizenship and a 
vision of self governing republicanism, that predates by at least a generation the earliest 
availability of Aristotelian texts'.(1988, p. 56) Thus it was this view of citizenship which 
broadened into the 'civic humanism' of the Renaissance, and not that of the 'Aristotelian 
revolution' of later centuries. Seigel's replacement of Baron’s distinction between Petrarch 
I and Bruni with that between the thirteenth century dictatores and Petrarch, is now itself 
superseded by a clear continuum between the pre-humanist Ciceronian theories of 
republicanism, the Ciceronian humanism of Salutati and Bruni, and the 'classical 
republicanism' of Machiavelli and to a lesser extent, Guicciardini.
63
form of Ciceronianism to endorse. By the late fourteenth century, 
Petrarch's 'active leisure' was being transformed into the virtuous 
action of a dedicated citizen. Two examples are Coluccio Salutati's 
admiration for Cicero's civic personality (against Petrarch's disgust), 
and his student Pier Paolo Vergerio's imagined Ciceronian reply to 
Petrarch's lament: 'my otium, my age, position, and destiny intended 
m e for a man who was to live his life in the midst of activity7.9 Later, 
in the first decade of the fifthteenth century, Francesco Barbaro saw the 
task to be to 'bring philosophy out of the gloomy depths of the studies 
and out of scholarly leisure into the fighting line and center of 
conflict.'10 One of the key instruments in doing so was the art of 
rhetoric, and the union of eloquence and wisdom in defence of the city 
and the promotion of the public good Though Petrarch had recognized 
the rhetorical basis of classical culture, he balked at the profoundly 
political consequences of Cicero's 'orator7.11
As we know, Cicero placed enormous importance on the role of 
rhetoric in the res publica. Both thirteenth century dictatores and 
Renaissance hum anists absorbed the Ciceronian emphasis on rhetoric 
as a discipline to be learned and applied. Cicero's Topica, De partitione 
oratorica, and De oratore, attracted num erous commentaries, as well as 
the Institutio oratoria of Quintilian, and to a lesser extent, Aristotle's 
Rhetoric.. Renaissance theorists clearly identified the connection 
between rhetoric, politics, and law, not only through the study of 
Cicero's treatises, but also in the accounts and histories of the Greek 
polis and Roman republics. Ratio and oratio (as Cicero explained in 
the De oratore) not only bound hum an communities together, but 
helped define them as well.12 By the turn of the fifthteenth century 
this way of thinking had become so influential that it was even written
9 Vergerio, Epistolerio, in Baron, 1938, p 89.
10 In Baron, 1938, p 92.
11 Of course Petrarch only had limited access to Cicero's texts. A complete edition of De oratore 
was not available until 1421. R. Sabbadini, Le Scopeste dei Codici Latini e Greci ne secoli 
xiv e xv, Florence, 1905; Baron, 1938, p 95; Seigel, 1966, p 60.
12 DOR 1.8.30.
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into the statutes of the University of Florence, whereby the 'art of 
rhetoric' was recognized as being not only 'the instrument of 
persuasion for all the sciences, but also, the greatest ornament of public 
life'.13
The revival and extension of Ciceronian rhetoric brought with it a 
social persona - the orator as culture hero - and more particularly, the 
orator as great political leader. A ruler could not rule by ratio alone: 
the common good could not be protected or fulfilled without it being 
pu t forth in oratio. Rhetoric translated ideas into action, it moved the 
will of individuals to act, and thus ultimately, 'reason, virtue, and the 
social order all depended on the right use of language'.14 Though 
Renaissance theorists might have balked at the sceptical implications 
of some of the arguments in Cicero's texts, at least until later on in the 
sixteenth century, they rushed to embrace his reunification of 
eloquence and wisdom, and more generally, the social and political 
implications of the rhetorical culture. Eloquence was to be an 
indispensable aid to practical ethics, and the stress on rhetoric brought 
w ith it an intense emphasis upon the will as a philosophical problem, 
and a deep interest in voluntarist psychology.15
In Italy, the centers of humanist study, Florence and Padua/ produced 
a num ber of theorists who took up and defended this form of 
Ciceronianism against 'ancient philosophy', which claimed that 
rhetoric was at best, only a superficial tool for the pursuit of virtue, and 
at worst, utterly subversive of it. W hatever the genre of text, and in 
the Renaissance this included commentaries, literary biographies, 
princely advice books, and rhetorical textbooks, the eloquence-wisdom 
relation was a baseline from which to begin. Rhetoric was imbued 
with a coherent, general purpose: the moral and social im provement
13 Streuver, 1970, p 105; Vickers, CHRP, p 727.
14 Vickers, CHRP, pp 729-730. See also his excellent ‘The recovery of rhetoric: Petrarch, 
Erasmus, Perelman*, History of the Human Sciences, 3,3,1990,415-441, for a comparative 
survey of three historical instances of the ‘recovery* of rhetoric.
15 For the connection between rhetoric, the will, and voluntaristic psychology, see Streuver, 
1970, pp 58-74.
of the people and the Republic.
However, as the fifteenth century progressed, increasing pressure on 
republican institutions was being felt, particularly outsid^ qTFlorence 
and Venice, as the Signori expanded and consolidated their ruling 
pow er.16 Donato Gianotti's Della Repubblica fiorentina, written after 
the fall of the Florentine repbulic of 1530, marks one of the last voices 
of Florentine republican thought. In it, he champions a republican 
mixed constitution for Florence which satisfies the three 'hum ours' of 
the city: the nobles, the middle class, and the poor. The 'art of the 
republic' had to moderate the different humours (as opposed to simply 
satisfying the single one of the grandi, as in the 'art of the state'), and to 
do so, it had to steer men's love from their private affairs to those of 
public things. This is a difficult task, given the collapse of two 
previous Florentine republics due to the inability and unwillingness of 
its citizens to defend them. The reasons why, argued Gianotti, lay in 
the fact that both republics (1494-1512 and 1527-1530) had failed to 
guarantee the liberty they promised: too few citizens were actually 
sovereign, and the magistrates, instead of the laws, held sway. Even 
the grandi lost out, since the low prestige attached to public office 
m eant that they were held in contempt by their fellow citizens. The 
solution was to redraw  a better order of the city, i.e. a mixed 
constitution with a marked popular thrust, as opposed to one tilted in 
favour of the grandi. The grandi could satisfy all their desires for true 
honour and glory (which comes from services to the republic) in the 
various higher institutions of the republic, such as the Senate and 
Collegio. Giannotti's discourse is nothing less than a declaration of 
faith in the capacity of politics, organized around the relation between 
the public good and liberty, to transform the moral identity of the
16 One should remember too that republican Florentines were vulnerableto accusations of 
tyranny by their neighbours; Gregory XI in 1375 wrote that they reduced ’the liberty of their 
neighbours to serfdom' wherever they could. See Rubinstein, 1952, pp 36-41: A. Grafton, 
‘Humanism and Political Theory*, in J.H. Bums ed. (with Mark Goldie) The 
Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 
26.
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city.17 As Viroli and Skinner have shown us, this is one of the last 
fully-fledged attempts in Florentine republican thought, and by the 
second half of the sixteenth century, only Venice could boast any real 
talk of classical 'civil philosophy' and its practices. Henceforth the belief 
in virtuous citizens engaging in republican institutions to protect 
libertas became increasingly jaded and disconnected from reality. It 
even produced a kind of Platonic backlash, especially with the rise of 
the Medici, which sought practical and philosophical distance from the 
more strident republican traditions.18
Prominent hum anists were not oblivious to these changes, whatever 
their ultimate beliefs, and soon many were engaged as political 
advisors, or wrote political how-to-manuals, or both, for their new 
masters. These manuals advised on all kinds of matters to do with 
princely rule, from traditional Ciceronian emphases on upholding 
justice and ruling with liberality, to advising on the ritualistic aspects 
of power, such as how a prince should speak, dress, and act in 
particular situations.
A wedge, then, was inserted between appearance and reality in 
politics, not for the first time, but perhaps more irrevocably than ever 
before, and the implications became acutely apparent in subsequent 
theorizing. The maintenance of appearances became a skill, a virtue, 
and the loosened connection between the traditional virtues and 
princely decorum became a source of strength through an increased 
range of possible action in the name of the stato rather than the res 
publica. Political decorum and ritual came to have less to do with 
public confirmation of virtuous rule, and more w ith the 
transformation of the content of virtue itself. Machiavelli is a key 
figure in all of this, bu t I shall postpone a discussion of him until later, 
since in many ways, he is a crucial transition figure between the 
Renaissance and early m odem  worlds.
17 Viroli 1992, pp. 219-31.
18 Skinner, CHRP, p 424-28.
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2.2 'Change of heart': Christian Humanism and the self
I want now to briefly consider the translation of the themes discussed 
above - Ciceronianism, the self, and libertas - in the context of the 
developm ent of 'Christian hum anism ',i9 which is fundamental for an 
understanding of the background of the early m odem  precursors of 
liberalism to be considered in future chapters.
The emergence of Christian humanism indicates both a convergence 
of traditions and a fracture: the assimilation of classical wisdom within 
a Christian frame of reference, and a tension between corrupted man 
and the more optimistic picture of humanist man. Christian 
hum anism  was never quite a synthesis of outlooks, but at the very 
least, an uneasy alliance. In their attempt to establish the philosphia 
Christi in the daily lives of individuals, the reformers needed moral 
sources beyond the rather vague exhortations of the bible. They found 
some of this detail in the moral treatises of classical antiquity, and in 
particular, in the works of Seneca and Cicero (especially the De officiis).
One continuity between Italian and transalpine hum anism  was its 
Ciceronianism, and the emphasis upon the rhetorical nature of 
hum an understanding and political discourse. Yet it was a profoundly 
different kind of Ciceronianianism which was appealed to in the 
north. The importance of elegant stylisitics in speech and grammer 
obtained by a close imitation of key Ciceronian examples, was not so 
much eliminated, as supplanted by an emphasis upon the purpose of 
rhetoric and the content of the message being delivered. The point was 
to apply the lessons of classical ideals to the practical problems of godly 
living in the sixteenth century, the texts were to be 'servants of
19 This phrase is slightly misleading as Skinner points out, since (most; all ^ f)the humanists 
(save Machiavelli) were Christians. However, there is cause to maintairi the label when 
referring to certain northern humanists such as Erasmus, who explicitly related the texts of 
classical anitiquity to the establishment of godly living in the populace in a way that hadn't 
been done before. See Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: 
Volume 1, The Renaissance, Cambridge University Press, p 232.
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Christianity '.20 Erasmus' Dialogus Ciceronianus is a good example of 
this different approach, a 'modern Cicero who busies himself with the 
same zeal in the field of Christian religion as Cicero did in that of 
secular things'.2* Erasmus wanted to escape fromt the mere aping of 
Ciceronian language and style, and emphasized tne importance of his 
main ideas, and crucially, the need to work within the context of one's 
own societal norms: There is nothing to stop a person speaking in a 
m anner that is both Christian and Ciceronian when he speaks clearly, 
richly, forcefully, and appropriately, in keeping with the nature of his 
subject and with the circumstances of the times and of the person 
involved '.22 W hat it is to be Ciceronian is thus transformed and 
adapted to the circumstances of early sixteenth century society, whereby 
one cannot be a Christain without being also Ciceronian: 'he does not 
speak in a manner befitting his subject...he has no genuine feelings 
roused by w hat he is discussing...he doesn't elaborate and embellish 
themes provided by the faith he professes as Cicero embellished topics 
provided by his own day and age'.23 The purpose of studying 
philosophy and eloquence was to know Christ and to celebrate the 
glory of Christ; hum anist Christianity was an eloquent communication 
between god and man, and m an and man.2* Above all, the most 
distinctive thing that Cicero offered, argued Erasmus, was not that 
which lay in the 'outer layer of verbal expression', but 'substance and
20 I am greatly indebted here to Margo Todd, 'Seneca and the Protestant Mind; The influence of
Stoicism on Puritan Ethics', Archivfur Reformationsgeschichte, 74,1983, pp 182-99; and
her Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order, Cambridge University Press, 1987.
21 Izadora Scott, Controversies over the Imitation of Cicero, New York, 1910, p 79: Charles 
Bene, Erasme et Ciceron', Colloquia Erasmiana Tyronensia 77, pp 571-9: Erasmus,
'Dialogus Ciceronianus', The Collected Works of Erasmus V7, ed. A.H.T. Levi, tranl. Betty 
Knott, University of Toronto Press, p 400: Todd, 1987, p 27: Tuck 1990, pp 43-65 (60); 
and 1993, pp. 2<>5; Peter Burke, The Spread of Italian Humanism', in Grafton and Mackay 
eds., 1990, pp. 1-19: Geoffrey Elton, 'Humanism in England', Ibid: Brendan Bradshaw, 
Transalpine Humanism', Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, ed. J.H. Bums 
with the assistance of Mark Goldie, Cambridge University Press, 1991.
22 Levi ed., p 400.
23 Levi, ed., p 447.
24 John Bossy, Christianity in the West 1400-1700, Oxford Univeristy Press, Oxford, 1985, p 
98.
sentiments, in intellectual ability, in right judgement'.25 And it was 
'right judgement7 to be learned and applied by the prince, clergy, and 
laity alike, if the reconstruction of the social order, the reformation of 
Christendom, was to be had. Hence the importance of those classical 
texts which concentrated on individual and social reformation, which 
stressed an activist social ideology and civic involvement, along with 
the spiritual condition of the lay person.26 It is not suprising to find 
that Erasmus edited and annotated enormously popular editions of the 
works of Plutarch, Seneca, and Cicero's De officiis. It was from Seneca 
and Cicero that he (and others) drew their understanding of virtue, 
just like their Italian predecessors from whom they also learned, not of 
the 'chivalric nobleman' or 'religious contemplative', but the godly 
layman, 'active in forum and marketplace'.27
The nature of such conduct is explored by Erasmus in his Enchiridion 
militis christiani, T he  Handbook of the Christian Soldier7 (1503), 
where pietas is discussed in a social context, and theology is connected 
to the ministry and service of the community.28 Coming so closely on 
the heels of his 1501 edition of Cicero's De officiis, the two works can be 
seen as complementary; 'In the Enchiridion', wrote Erasmus in a
25 Levi ed., p 448. Though Erasmus was not anti-rhetoric, as is evident from his Adages, a 
source book of verbal tools to be used in order to make language 'glitter with sparkles from 
Antiquity, please us with the colours of the art of rhetoric, gleam with jewel-like words of 
wisdom, and charm us with tidbits of wit and humour'. 'Adages, [i] to lv 100', Collected 
Works o f Erasmus, 31, transl. Margaret Mann Phillips, annot. R.A.B. Mynors, University 
of Toronto Press, 1982, p 10 (LB1178).
26 For the most part though, northern humanists in the early sixteenth century neutralised the 
potentially subversive aspects of the view of right judgement and virtue being detached from 
any natural or familial inheritance. Whilst agreeing that the possession of virtue constitutes 
the only true nobility, they argued that it was simply an empirical fact that the traditional 
ruling classes happened also to be the most virtuous! It wasn't until the latter part of the 
century that the static images of the social order and political system began to be seriously 
challenged, though the seeds were certainly there in Erasmus and in even earlier anticlerical 
writings. See Skinner, FMPT, vol. i, pp 238-9: Todd, 1987, pp 176-205. See also Anthony 
Grafton and Lisa Jardine, From Humanism to the Humanities; Education and Liberal Arts in 
15th and 16th century Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1986.
27 Todd, 1987, p 28.
28 Enchridion militis christiani (The Handbook of the Christian Soldier)', The Collected Works 
of Erasmus (66), ed John W. Malley, transl. Charles Fantazzi, University of Toronto Press, 
1988.
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letter, 1 laid down quite simply the pattern of a Christian life'.29 The
point was to instruct not in 'scholastic quibbling, but in good living', to
prescribe 'a way of life, not a program of study7.30 Besides, 'who (could)
carry the Secunda secundae of Aquinas round with him ', how could a
'mass of such volumes' ever teach us to live? The good life is
'everybody’s business, and Christ wished the way to it to be accessible
to all m en'.31 The first step, as Plato taught, is to know yourself as fully
as possible, and Erasmus proposes to set before the reader, as in a
painting, 'a kind of likeness of yourself...so that you have a clear
knowledge of w hat you are on the inside and w hat you are skin
deep'.32 Faith m ust be accompanied by morals w orthy of faith, and we
find these morals not in the world around us, but in in the ancients:
Read through the annals of the ancients and compare them with contemporary 
morals...the virtue of Phocion, the poverty of Fabricius...the generosity of Camillus, 
the austerity of Brutus, the chastity of Pythagoras, the unrelenting self-control of 
Socrates, the integrity of Cato, and a thousand illustrious examples of every virtue, 
which we may read about in the annals of the Spartans, the Persians, the Athenians, 
and the Romans, to our own great shame.
One cannot, though, be influenced by big names or social rank, 
something is not right because the 'ruling class' or the majority do it, 
'the only right conduct is that which conforms to the rule of Christ7.33 
The prince m ust also take heed, since he will not escape the contempt 
of his public through violence, arms, or body guards, but by an 
'uprightness of life, personal severity, and morals untainted by the 
vices of the m ultitude'. He m ust express his sentiments in his 
conduct, and not in 'thundering utterances'.34 In the Institutio 
principis christiani, Erasmus provides even more detail for the prince. 
The young prince-to-be is to be taught to love virtue as the 'finest 
quality of all, the most felicitous', and moral turpitude as the 'foulest'
29 Ep. 337:94-5: Ibid, Introduction', p. 3. Erasmus called the De Officiis an 'enchiridion' to be 
'learnt by heart', see Todd 1987, p. 27.
30 CWE (66), p. 69, 36.
31 CWE, p. 9.
32 Ibid, p. 41.
33 CWE, pp 86-7.
34 CWE, pp 100, 104.
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thing of all.35 He should be taught to always keep the welfare of the 
community foremost in his mind, and to realize that his prestige will 
not come from 'fortune's wild display7, but through 'wisdom, solidarity 
and good deeds'.36 He should read and learn not only from the Bible, 
bu t from Plutarch, Aristotle, Plato, and Cicero's De officiis.37 All of this 
(and more) is to cultivate in the prince the 'consciousness of right', 
and to instruct in the art of good government:
Do your private emotions as a man - reproachful anger, love for your wife, hatred of an 
enemy, shame - urge you to do what is not right and what is not to the welfare of the 
state? Let the thought of honour win. Let the concern for the state completely cover 
your personal ambitions. If you cannot defend your realm without violating justice, 
without wanton loss of human life, without great loss to religion, give up and yield to 
the importunities of the age! If you cannot look out for the possessions of your subjects 
without danger to your own life, set the safety of the people before your very life! But 
while you are conducting yourself in this fashion, which befits a true Christian prince, 
there will be plenty to call you a dolt...Hold fast to your cause.38
For both the prince and the citizen, to act properly is always to act in 
all things according to the judgement of reason (the consciousness of 
right). Virtue was a practice embodied in rational conduct within the 
context of an ordered life, according to an intrinsically moralized 
hum an nature. An agent's act was good when it accorded 
harm oniously w ith the immanent principle of this world, and with 
the moral law  as embodied in the res publica.39 In a contingent world, 
the agent had to cultivate a self-sufficient stance in the face of 
unavoidable disapointments, and follow the dictates of reason, as best 
he could, w ithout interruption from the impulses of external
35 The Education of a Christian Prince (Institutio principis christiani), translated with an 
Introduction on Erasmus on Ancient and Medieval Political Thought by Lester K. Bom, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1936, p. 148 (L566).
36 Ibid, p. 149 (L566).
37 Ibid p. 200 (B455).
38 Ibid p. 155 (B439). Cf. The three books of Tullius offyce, R. Whittinton (trans.), London, 
W. de Worde, 1534 STC 5278, C.5.b, C.8.b, D.2.b, I.6.b.: ‘war [will] give place to policy 
and triumph to eloquence*. Quoted in Paul A. Fideler, ‘Poverty, Policy, and Providence’, in 
Paul A. Fideler, T.F. Mayer eds., Political Thought and The Tudor Commonwealth: Deep 
Structure, discourse, and disguise, London, Routledge, 1992. I am indebted to this fresh, 
perceptive analysis.
39 For an excellent discussion of the inherent tension between the will and virtuous action in 
the classical and Christian traditions, to which I am greatly indebted, see Ed Hundert, 
'Augustine and the Sources of the Divided Self, Political Theory, 20,1, February 1992, pp 
86-104, especially pp 88-93.
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circumstances. And yet, as Eramsus makes clear, this is never easy, and 
what Plato taught always holds true, 'that what is beautiful is also 
difficult'.40 Still, each had to try, and for those who could not rise to 
'heroic virtue', they could at least have a firm footing in 'civic virtue', 
rather than plunging 'precipitously into all manner of immorality'.41
It would only be through a reformation of manners that social 
reform and the establishment of a godly society could take place; not so 
much a promotion of virtue as an installation of virtue, so that a 
'change of heart' also meant a change of conduct.42 It is important to 
note that this was to occur on as wide a scale as possible, and not only 
for courtiers and future princes, but the whole body of citizens. This is 
especially the case in England with humanist writers and officials such 
as Thomas Starkey in his A Dialogue between Reginald Pole and 
Thomas Lupset (1529-32?), Sir Thomas Elyot’s The Boke Named 
Governour (1531),43 and of course Thomas More’s Utopia (1516),w here 
one of More’s central messages was that 'true holiness consists of
40 Augustine is of course completely pessimistic about man achieving such a state without the 
intervention of god. Reason unaided can never be a liberating self-knowledge since the mind 
in its turn inwards for the sources of misery only uncovers further impulses it then 
compulsively seeks to satisfy, the result being ’[a]n endless cycle of unfulfilled longing 
propelled by ungovernable affections'. Hundert, p. 100.
41 CWE, p 46: Republic 435C, 497D: CWE, p 105. There is some debate about the extent to 
which we should attribute English Humanism a specifically TBrasmian' character, I have for 
the most part followed Todd on this issue (cf. J.A. Guy, Tudor England, Oxford, 1988), but 
see for dissenting views, Alistair Fox, John Guy ed., Reassessing the Henrician Age; 
Humanism, Politics, and Reform 1500-50, Basil Blackwell, 1986, especially Alistair Fox's 
"Facts and Fallacies: Interpreting English Humanism" (Chapter 1); and Geoffry Elton,' 
Humanism in England' in The Impact of Humanism on Western Europe, ed. Anthony 
Goodman, Angus Mackay, Longman, London, 1990.
42 Skinner FMPT i, pp. 228-9; Todd 1987, p. 33. See also Martha C. Nussbaum's 
Introduction', The Poetics of Therapy; Hellenistic Ethics in its Rhetorical and Literary 
Context, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum, Academic Printing and Publishing, Alberta, Canada, 
1990, for some of the classical sources. Compare with Colin Davis in CHPT, Utopianism' 
pp. 333-34, where he argues that these Renaissance discussions always involved a search for 
an institutional context for virtue.
43 Starkey A Dialogue between Reginald Pole and Thomas Lupset, ed. Kathleen M. Burton, 
London, 1948. [See also the edition edited by TP. Mayer, Camden Fourth Series, 37, 
London Royal Historical Society, 1989, who claims that Burton's edition has 'no scholarly 
value' because it has modernized the spelling.] Elyot,77i£ Boke Named Governor, ed. S. E. 
Lehmberg, London, 1962.
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living a life of virtue'.44 In all of these writers, as well as in Erasmus, 
the concept of nobililty and its content began to be reconceptualized, 
whereby the previous simple equation of noble birth equaling virtuous 
character, was rejected. This was especially true with regard to political 
leadership, where power should be entrusted not on the basis of 'birth, 
wealth, or appearance', but rather, to he who 'excels in all the requisite 
of kingly qualities of wisdom, justice, moderation, foresight, and zeal 
for the public welfare'.45 Though espousing a wide potentiality for 
virtuous action amongst men, indeed necessarily so if the common 
good was to prevail, and a general claim of equality ('Nature hath 
created all men equal' said Erasmus)46, this cannot be confused with a 
commitment to democracy, or even a respect for the common people.4? 
Nevertheless, it was part of a process in the redefinition of hierarchy, 
whereby virtue alone would constitute the main claim to superior 
social status, though with the subversive implications left 
undeveloped until later in the century. Thus, among those humanists 
who agreed that the best state would be one attained only if we lived as 
active citizens in a self governing commonweatlh, there was a 
discussion concerning the necessary attributes that citizens would need 
to possess in order to fullfill their civic duties. The redefinition of vera
44 Skinner, FMPT i, p. 233; also his ’Sir Thomas More's Utopia and the language of 
Renaissance Humanism' in Athony Pagden ed., The Languages of Political Theory in Early 
Modern Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1987,123-157 (especially pp. 135-144). See 
also Brendan Bradshaw, 'More on Utopia', The Historical Journal, XXIV, 1981, pp. 1-27;
J.H. Hexter’s introduction to More's Utopia in The Complete Works of St. Thomas More, 
IV, ed. E. Surtz and J. H. Hexter, London, 1965. More’s Utopia and Erasmus’ Institutio were 
drafted in the same year and More probably saw the Institutio in draft Both emphasize the 
humanist reformer’s concern with bringing reason to bear on the judgement and governing 
practices of the prince. More’s complex and challenging account simultaneously criticized 
the injustice and wrong-headed statecraft of the day and its withering effects on the human 
personality, along with providing a sublime picture of possible reformation. See the 
interesting remarks in Fideler 1992, pp. 196-8.
45 Erasmus, Institutio, p. 140.
46 Institutio, p. 177.
47 See Skinner FMPT i, p. 240, and Todd 1987 p. 187-189 for two rather different approaches 
to contemporary sixteenth century humanist attitudes towards the 'common sort'. For 
Erasmus, the 'common sort' had less to do with social class than moral understanding and 
'uprightedness', yet it was highly doubtful that commoners could ever achieve this, and 
Erasmus certainly did not support social levelling, which according to him, could only lead 
to anarchy.
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nobilitas - of what conduct was truly worthy of honour and praise - 
involved a delineation of the precise qualities of citizenship and the 
nature of dvic officia necessary for each to serve the common good 
most effectively. This in turn required a discussion of the means of 
'locking' virtue onto the people.48
According to most of the Christian humanist theorists, the main way 
of doing so was through education (just like their quattrocento 
predecessors). This belief was fueled in part by the belief that to some 
extent, sin springs from false opinions and bad (or non existent) 
training. This was not without problems though, since the effects of 
original sin were such that noone could be so 'happily bom  that it 
cannot be corrupted by wrong training' .49 Yet for a prince about to 
assume control of a state, its 'main hope' lies in the 'proper education 
of its youth', where they learn the 'teachings of Christ and that good 
literature which is beneficial to the state'. In so doing, the people come 
'of their ow n free will' to follow the 'course of right', and there can be 
nothing more im portant for a prince 'to have the best possible 
subjects'.50 Erasmus even compares the process to pressing wax or 
modelling day, and warns parents that 'if you do not m ould your 
child’s soul to become fully human, it will of itself degenerate to a 
m onstrous bestiality '.51 We m ust distinguish two processes here which 
though similar are not identical, that is, the education of a prince and 
the education of his people. The education of a prince was critically 
im portant to the commonwealth, and was discussed in a num ber of 
spedally written educational handbooks, such as Erasm us' Institutio. 
The education of the people was discussed more in the context of the 
proper regulation of sodety, the end of virtuous training being a
48 The phrase is Davis's, Utopianism', CHPT, p. 334.
49 See, for a wider discussion of this tension especially in the context of educational schems in 
the sixteenth century, Gerald Strauss, Luther's House of Learning, Baltimore, 1978.
50 Erasmus, Institutio, p. 143,212,213. Also quoted in Todd 1987, pp. 44-45. See also 
Skinner FMPT i, pp. 241-2. In addition to Todd for the question of social order in general in 
the sixteenth century, see Fritz Caspari, Humanism and the Social Order in Tudor England, 
Chicago, 1954.
51 Quoted in Todd p. 44.
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peaceful and harmonious society. There was a strong correlation made 
by humanists in the sixteenth century between knowledge and social 
peace, something Cicero had emphasized in the De officiis.52 Christian 
hum anists of the early sixteenth century expanded their greatest efforts 
on the reform of education, and providing methodologies and 
techniques for its improvement as a basis for social regeneration.
Aside from the pedagogical bent which suffuses so much of Erasmus's 
work (including the 'user friendliness' of the Adages and their 
Epitomes), there were discussions of the need for the proper education 
of citizens in in More's Utopia, Starkey's Dialogue., Elyot's Boke., and 
the very popular works of Juan Luis Vives, who argued that in order 
for children to become good it was necessary for them to be placed into 
a well ordered state where virtuous conduct was a matter of 
instruction .55 in the end, the litterae humaniores became a part of the 
public life of N orthern Europe, a tool of public policy.54 Since good 
governm ent depended upon the virtuous conduct of the prince and 
his citizens, education became a means of governance and an intricate 
part of the 'police' of the nation. I shall be discussing the concept of 
'police' in more detail below.
It is im portant to keep in m ind that this was a moral education, 
directed towards reforming, improving, and maintaining good 
conduct, and not just for the purposes of debate. This belief was 
translated into significant curricular changes in gram m ar schools and 
universities, embodying a desire to 'educate for living' and resulting in 
the elevation of moral philosophy over theology and metaphysics, and 
rhetoric over logic. The 'art of discourse', in general, was geared more 
towards practical ends, and the medieval dialectic and rhetorical works 
were increasingly replaced with the classical works of Cicero and
52 See Paul A. Fideler, 'Christian Humanism and poor law reform in early Tudor England', 
Societas, 4,1974,269-86; Fritz Caspari, Erasmus on the Social Functions of Humanism', 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 8,1947,78-106.
53 Utopia, p. 129. Starkey, p. 144 (1948 edition). Elyot (Skinner 1979, p. 242). Vives, quoted 
in Todd, p. 44.
54 Skinner, FMPT i, p. 242.
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Quintillian, as well as later humanist dialecticians who favoured 
'persuasive types' of arguments.55 This set the ground for what 
Professor Todd calls the 'textbook revolution' of the sixteenth century, 
a revival of ancient moralists and the adoption of hum anist textbooks. 
The key classical works used in grammar schools were those which 
had both a pedagogical and moral bent, such as Quintilian's Education 
of the Orator , Cicero's De oratore, Epistolae, De officiis, De amicitia, 
and De senectute, as well as the works of Livy, Seneca, Virgil, Horace, 
and Ovid. Universities underwent equally rapid change, embracing 
this new learning, and replacing the 'scholastic approach' to biblical 
and patristic texts in favour of a humanist biblidsm .56 Erasmus, in 
response to scholastic criticism, wrote that '(t)he extraordinary 
language they are using in Paris causes me no anxiety. You will see a 
great part of this pedantry sent packing...(Cambridge) has no use for 
this frigid hairsplitting, which is more conducive to wrangling than 
religion'. The basic orientation was moral reformation via a humanist 
education, and the training of laymen for their civic responsibilities.57
The im portant point here is a Ciceronian one: the good man is also a 
good citizen (and always a Christian). Self-interest and self-indulgence 
were to be subdued to the interest of living according to the common 
good, which was the only true means of achieving social peace and 
harmony. [This is precisely what the rise of the literature and practices 
of 'reason of state' would deny, as Tuck and Viroli have so ably 
shown.] The biggest threat to the political community was when 
citizens, or a prince, ignored the common good and acted only
55 Todd, 1987, p. 47, cf. 77. See also Lisa Jardine, The Place of Dialectic Teaching in 
Sixteenth Century Cambridge’, Studies in the Renaissance, 21,1974, 31-62. Paul O. 
Kristeller, The Aristotelian Tradition1, Renaissance Thought, New York, 1961,24-47.
56 James McConica has written extensively about this ’revolution’. See his The Prosopography 
of the Tudor University’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 3,1973,543-55; ’Humanism 
and Aristotelianism in Tudor Oxford’, English Historical Review, 94,1979,291-317. Todd, 
1987, pp. 47-8.
57 Todd, 1987, p. 50-1. The socially involved nature of English humanism is dealt with in 
general by Arthur Ferguson, The Articulate Citizen and the English Renaissance, Durham 
North Carolina, 1965. Of course the offspring of the nobility soon filled the universities and 
the subversive potential of virtue by education was ’neutralized’ by the fact that the revival of 
learning fit neady into the existing class structure. See Skinner, FMPT i, p. 240.
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according to their private or factional interests. By making this 
argum ent, sixteenth century humanists such as Erasmus, More, 
Starkey, and Elyot, were providing a potent critique of the political 
reality of their time, one rife with factionalism and political self 
interest, memorably evoked, for example, in Erasmus'Jw Praise of 
Folly.58 Though humanists were opposed to the old hierarchy, they 
were not anti-hierarchial, and certainly not democratic, fearing The 
confusion of anarchy' (exemplified by the German peasant's revolt) as 
m uch as any hiearchial conservative. Hierarchy for the Christian 
Humanists (at least for Erasmus, Elyot, More, and Starkey) was based 
on behaviour, the display of wisdom and learning, moral excellence, 
and the actualization of virtue.59 Thus, good order was based on 
degree, but in the sense that each citizen, whatever their station, acted 
for the common good by fulfilling their office and its attendant duties. 
This was the calling, the vocatus, of the truly pious individual, and it 
constituted both the 'natural' and divine aspects of the Christian 
hum anist understanding of agency.60
There are two more aspects of Christian hum anist governance which 
I w ant to consider before the end of this section. First, the concept of 
'police' which is so im portant to the commonwealth theorists of the 
first half of the sixteenth century, and subsequently to the political 
theorists of the seventeenth century. And secondly, in relation to all 
that has been discussed up  until now, the conception of self which is
58 See, for a survey, Skinner, FMPT i, pp. 221-224.
59 See Erasmus' 'Adages’, Collected Works of Erasmus 31, transl. Margaret Mann Phillips, 
annot R. A. B. Mynors, University of Toronto Press, 1982, p. 359. See Todd, 1987, p. 188 
n.37,189 for some background to the debate over whether or not Erasmus was offering 
simply another kind of 'medievalism' with regard to his alternative of the basis social 
hiearchy. Elyot also expresses a profound fear of disorder by removing all degrees, see his 
Governor, p. 2. Skinner claims that Starkey and Elyot were in keeping with traditional 
defenders of hiearchy against 'ambitious upstarts'. See FMPT i, pp. 239-40. See also Mervyn 
James, Society, Politics, and Culture; Studies in early modern England, Cambridge 
University Press, 1986, pp.38l-84.
60 See Starkey's definition of the the 'true common weal', where 'the parts be knit together in 
perfect love and unity, everyone doing his office and duty after such manner that whatsoever 
state, office, or degree any man be of, the duty thereto pertaining with all diligence he busily 
fulfill, and without envy or malice to other accomplish the same’. Dialogue, p. 62, quoted in 
Skinner, FMPT i, p. 240. See also, Todd, 1987, p. 33.
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developing alongside the new emphasis on order and 'right' conduct.
We need to distinguish a number of different senses of the term 
'police' in order to identify its common usage in the sixteenth century, 
as compared to the narrow way in which we understand it today.61 
Etymologically, it derives from politeia and politia, both of which refer 
to the state and to the administration and preservation of the general 
order of society. More precisely, it refers to the regulation, discipline, 
and control of the community through the enforcement of law and the 
upholding of the structures of public order. The French equivalent 
from which sixteenth century contemporary usage came, was Tart de 
gouvem er la cite', and the Italian, 'montenere l’ordini', with the 
related sense of sorvegliare and vigilare (to watch over, to 
superintend). Policy was a matter of governance, where the 
governm ent (monarch, prince, counsel of wise men etc. ) devised 
actions - policy - to enhance the common good, or brought to bear its 
learning and expertise on problems of 'govemement'. It had other 
senses too: it was used to describe a type of knowledge (such as 
'prudence' or 'counsel'), and was used pejoratively, as in a 'policy' of a 
deceitful nature which resulted in selfish or ill-gotten gains. In 
general, though, when Christian hum anists talked of a reform in the 
basic structures of the community with regard to enhancing the 
common weal, they were referring to 'the police' of the realm, and of 
'policy' as a task of goverment towards that end. This was the art of the 
republic, the preservation of the union and concord of the 
commonwealth.. Concomitant with this was the understanding of the 
community in terms of an organic unity, a body.62 The basic idea was 
expressed paradigmatically by Aristotle, who likened the polis to a
61 The complex history of the concept is evidenced by the fact that it takes up nine single spaced 
columns in the New Oxford English Dictionary.
62 On the body metaphor in early modem Europe see Perez Zagorin, Rebels and Rulers, 1500- 
1660, i, Society, States, and Early Modern Revolution: Agrarian and Urban Rebellions, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982. A good summary of its use and relation to 
Christian writers on social reform and welfare is provided by Abel Athouguia Alves, The 
Christian Social Organism and Social Welfare: The Case of Vives, Calvin, and Loyola’, The 
Sixteenth Century Journal, xx, 1,1989, pp.3-21, especially pp. 4-7.
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biological organism in which citizens and interest groups worked 
together for the common good, just as the organs of a body worked 
together for the common health of the organism.63 Policy ruled the 
'body politic', the soul of the civil order, as reason ruled the body, a 
central m etaphor in Starkey's Dialogue, for example. For Starkey, 
policy was ultimately the instrument and dvic dimension which 
transform ed the m ultitude into a Christian polity.64 The key to the 
health of the body was a good diet, i.e. good policies: government and 
policy should fit the people like  a garment to the bodie or shoe to the 
foot'.65 Education, combined with legislation designed by wise counsel 
and the coerdve powers of the state, might not make men wholly 
virtuous, but they could at least be made to act virtuously. Starkey 
thought that even given the tyranny and corruption of officials and 
lawyers, the law could still be well ordered and efficadous, and move 
beyond self indulgent manipulation. And here we are at one of the 
limits of the uneasy alliance, the 'indpient fracture'66 in Christian 
hum anism , since plainly, Starkey (and other Christian humanists) did 
not accept the Augustinian picture of man as wholly fallen and 
w ithout chance of reform, and yet realized they could perhaps only 
hope to entice men to act well, if that. This marks a real break with the 
ideological assumptions of humanism, perhaps epitomised generally 
in Luther's radical disagreement with Erasmus over the nature of 
original sin: m an's political institutions should be governed as best as 
they could, but they could do little to bring about sodal amelioration, 
let alone perfection. And yet Luther thought proper faith could 
achieve something, and even drafted poor relief proposals in 1523 for 
Leisnech, draw ing on similar proposals made by Vives and others in 
Venice, Ypres, and Geneva. But this had little to do with the
63 Aristotle, Politics, 1.1-2 (1252a-1253a).
64 Though he changed his mind about this. See TP. Mayer, Thomas Starkey and the 
Commonweal, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 205-6. The important point here, as 
Fideler (1992, p. 204; cf. p. 207) argues (taking his cue from Pocock), is the development of 
a ‘polyvalent, humanist and providential, language of reason and policy’.
65 Sir Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum, 1583; quoted in Fideler 1992, p. 194.
69 The phrase is from Geofflry Elton, 'Humanism in England’, 1990, p. 277.
80
restorative possibilities of good policy or education, and mostly with 
accepting one's 'calling' (the structure through which God demanded 
obedience) within existing social institutions, and displaying one's 
faithfulness and Christian conscience in acting for the sake of God via 
works of kindly benevolence.67
In order to understand the nature of their calling, whether through 
the practices of education or police, the individual citizen of the mid to 
late sixteenth century had begun to establish a particular relation to 
self, at once an intensification of self-perception and a self-identificaton 
with the body politic. We need to examine both these aspects. I have 
discussed the more corporate sense of self understanding in Cicero in 
chapter 1, and will relate this to the civic humanist sense of self we 
find in Machiavelli below. Here, I want to emphasize the 
development of an increased sense of self perception and 'self 
fashioning7 which accompanied the practices of the Christian 
hum anist reformation of manners.68 One obvious point to make is 
that there was a sense of self, of inwardness, available to subjects in the 
early decades of the sixteenth century.6^  We need to clarify this point 
even further. Throughout history people have always had various 
ideas of self-consciousness, but it is another issue to establish with any
67 Fideler 1992, p. 200.
68 For a general account, see Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to 
Shakespeare, University of Chicago Press, 1980.
69 There is considerable debate as to whether or not this is so. Francis-fiarker, in her The 
Tremulous Private Body, New York, 1984, claims that the psychological category of the 
inward or private did not exist in Renaissance England. Catherine Belsey argues that those 
who seek a sense of 'inferiority' in the characters of Renaissance plays are imposing a modem 
anachronism; see her The Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in Renaissance Drama, 
New York, 1985. Other critics claim that there is a 'rhetoric' of inwardness in the 
Renaissance (particularly its English variant) but that this refers ultimately to outward, 
public factors. Patricia Fumerton argues that Renaissance writers 'can only achieve the inner 
through the outer, the private through the public, the sincere self through self-display'; 
"'Secret' Arts: Elizabethan Miniatures and Sonnets", Representations 15,1986,90. However 
these critics often combine a philosophical argument about the impossibility of any kind of 
subjectivity prior to, or exempt from, social determination tout court, with historical claims 
about the English Renaissance in particular, to misleading effect. For an excellent discussion 
(and more references), see Katherine Eisaman Maus, Proof and Consequences: Inwardness and 
Its Exposure in the English Renaissance', Representations, 34,1991, pp. 29-52. Richard 
Tuck (Tuck 1993, pp. 38-40) has made clear that by the end of the sixteenth century, and as 
early as the 1620’s, the concept of ’self-interest’ was becoming more familiar in political 
argument
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precision how these differ from our (modern) sense of self, especially 
when this is conceived as a radically inward looking stance. Recently, 
Charles Taylor has argued that one distinctive turn our subjectivity 
took was this profoundly inward turn, not to find 'impersonal lore 
about hum an nature' or 'universal nature', but an 'intensely 
individual' self-exploration, a search for 'our own being'.70 Montaigne 
is the crucial Renaissance figure here, inaugurating (at least according 
to Taylor) 'the search for self' characteristic of not only the Romantic 
'expressivist' movements of later centuries, but our m odem  age as 
well. But there is another sense of inwardness which I w ant to bring 
out here, which isn’t quite the the open ended search for self- 
knowledge within the limits of Thum aine condition', nor yet the 
already disengaged stance of the late seventeenth century. Instead, it is 
a turn inward in order to bring oneself into line with a (god given) 
disposition necessary for social concord, and ultimately, for salvation. 
Here, inwardness is always a function of a double spectatorship: the 
hum an, fallible, self-surveillance on the part of the subjects 
themselves, and the unlimited omnipotence of the divine observer, 
who sees all.71 It was linked to the Erasmian (and later Protestant) 
view that deliverance from sin lay not simply in the restitution of 
some objective external relation, but in changing the self. This process, 
following from the enormous importance Christian hum anist 
reformers placed on education and the inculcation of virtue, fell under 
the general practice of disciplina, which differed from traditional ideas 
of penance, since it was something one learnt, rather than simply 
something one did.77 However, disciplina split into two different
70 Taylor, 1989, p. 181, pp. 177-184. Augustine is the key source of our sense of inwardness 
according to Taylor, from whom it is transposed and translated into different forms during the 
Renaissance, early modem, and modem periods (see chapter 7). Taylor may well be right, 
but I shall not go as far back as he, and shall concentrate mainly on the Renaissance and early 
modem forms of inwardness. For some reservations about Taylor's interpretation of 
Augustine, see Hundert, 1992.
71 See Katherine Eisaman Maus, 1991, pp. 37-8 for this ’double spectatorship' in the context of 
Renaissance criminal trials.
72 Bossy, 1985, pp. 126-7.
82
forms corresponding to the two forms of Christianity now in play, the 
Protestant reformers and counter-reformation Catholicism. It was the 
latter for whom the emphasis was strongest to shift away from the field 
of objective social relations, and into the discipline of the interiorized 
individual via the practice of confession.73 This was part of the general 
transition between medieval Christianity and early m odem  
Catholicism, whereby the communitarian and collective aspects of the 
church and its rituals were increasingly displaced by individualized, or 
at least, privatized acts. Instead of the bearing of the sacrament being 
collective, i.e. forgiveness concluded between man and god through 
the the mediation of the church, it became individualized, a 
reconciliation of the sinner to God, and only then to the community. 
This concern with m an's interiority transformed penance into an 
incentive for the systematic inner monitoring by the individual of his 
or her own life, the penances themselves became 'medicinal' and 
reformative, instead of vindictive or 'satisfactory7. The burden was 
upon the individual Christian conscience, who along with his 
confessor, identified and corrected a whole range of transgressions of 
thought, word, and deed; nothing being too small or too insignificant 
to m erit a ttention.^  That the confession was to become an instrum ent 
for intimate self-examination, for instruction in the proper modes of 
Christian conduct, is perhaps best exemplified by its new 'technology7 - 
the confessional. Developed in the late 1560's by Charles Borromeo, 
archbishop of Milan, it set out how the priest and penitent would sit,
73 For a general discussion of disciplina and the transition between medieval chrisitianity and the 
Reformation see John Bossy, 1985, pp. 126-140. On confession see the classic study by 
Charles Lea, A History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences in the Latin Church, 3 
Vols., Philadelphia and London, 1896; John Bossy, The Counter-Reformation and the People 
of Catholic Europe, Past and Present, 47,1970, pp. 51-70; The Social History of 
Confession in the Age of Reformation’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth 
Series, 25, London, 1974, pp. 21-38; Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline o f Magic, 
London, 1971, pp. 154-59; Thomas N. Tender, Sin ana Confession on the Eve of the 
Reformation, Princeton University Press, 1977; Michel Fouca dt, The History of Sexuality: 
Volume One, An Introduction, transl. Robert Hurley, Penguin, London, 1978; Lawrence G. 
Duggan, Tear and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation, Art hiv fur 
Reformationsgeschichte, 75,1984, pp. 153-75.
74 Bossy 1974, p. 28. See the extracts from a confessional manual in Foucault 1978, p. 20. 
Tender 1977, pp. 134-62.
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secluded and apart, separated by a grille, the 'visible embodiment (of) 
the jurisdictional theory of the sacrament which had prevailed'.75 For 
Michel Foucault, it was here that the injunction to 'examine yourself' 
was laid down for the first time in the form of a general constraint, 
which has since become one of the main rituals upon which we rely 
for the 'production' of truth:
The confession has spread its effects far and wide. It plays a part in justice, medicine, 
education, family relationships, and love relations, in the most ordinary affairs of 
everyday life, and in the most solemn rites; one confesses one’s crimes, one’s sins, one’s 
thoughts and desires, one’s illnesses and troubles; one goes about telling, with the 
greatest precision, whatever is most difficult to tell. One confesses in public and in 
private, to one’s parents, one’s educators, one’s doctor, to those one loves; one admits to 
oneself, in pleasure and in pain, things it would be impossible to tell to anyone else, the 
things people write books about. One confesses - or is forced to confess.76
I shall discuss the philosophical and political implications of this for 
Foucault in another chapter, but here I want to point out the relation 
to self the confession and its practices began to establish in the course of 
the sixteenth century, a form of self-exploration linked directly to a 
system of governance, which would be enormously influential 
throughout the early m odem  period.
The other form of disciplina, as I mentioned above, worked itself out 
in a different way, and with a different relation to self, though sharing 
w ith counter-Reformation practices an intensity of concern with the 
self. The Protestant reformers, though equally concerned to locate the 
source of sin in the mind, and hence the need for there to be 
considerable self-reformation, also sought to supplant the role of 
pen^ance with extensive practices of exterior discipline. The 
protestant believer was, as we have seen, a 'citizen by calling7, and the 
upholding of proper conduct was intimately related to the good of the
75 Lea, i, pp. 54,393 ff. Bossy, 1974, p. 29. Of course all Borromeo did was issue a set of 
instructions and specifications, which were not universally or quickly taken up. Bossy 
remarks that the diffusion of the confessional was a ’fairly slow process’ and seems to have 
spread ’more rapidly in regions which had a tradition of Roman law than in those which did 
not’ - northern Europe was especially slow on the take-up compared to the south. See also 
Bossy and Foucault's discussion of the links between the emergence of the confessional and 
the practice of confession in general, and a discourse on sexuality. Bossy, 1974, pp. 32-38, 
and 1985, pp.134-5. Foucault, 1978, especially pp. 19-21,58-67.
76 Foucault, 1978, pp. 58-9.
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community. Thus, it was the public failings of the subject which 
would receive the most attention and scrutiny, joined to a close 
examination of conscience. The most obvious examples are Martin 
Bucer's De regno Christi, and of course, Jean Calvin's Institutio 
Christianae Religionis (1536), as well as the Ecclesiastical Ordinances 
(1541), his blueprint for the reformation of G en ev a .7 7  Bucer, as John 
Bossy has remarked, 'united the ethics of holiness draw n from the Ten 
Commandments and the headmasterly approach to the Christian 
community derived from the humanists', and saw Sparta as the 
appropriate dvil polity for Christians to imitate, at least in spirit. But it 
is Calvin who provides the greatest example of protestant exterior 
discipline, and Calvinism would play an absolutely central role in the 
political argum ent of the early seventeenth century. If the confessional 
was the key piece of Catholic 'technology' associated with the reform of 
the relation to self, then the consistory was the equivalent piece for 
C a lv in i s m .78 This was Calvin's innovation for controlling conduct, in 
additionto his four-fold distinction of the offices of pastor, doctor, 
elder, and deacon, all of whom played a part in the education, care, and 
surveillance of the population of Geneva. The consistory was designed 
to meet weekly, and to act as an ecclesiastical tribunal of individual 
conduct. Usually chaired by a pastor, it was made up of a number of 
elders, each of whom had responsibility for a district within the city, 
and each of whom gave a weekly report on any misconduct which had
77 De Regno Christi (2 Vols.), ed. F. Wendel, Paris/Gutersloh, 1954-5; transl. Wilhelm Pauck, 
Paul Larkin, in Library of Christian Classics, Vol. 19, Melanchton and Bucer, Philadelphia, 
1969. Institutio Christianae Religionis, in Opera Omnia Vol. 2, pp. 1-1118, ed. Wilhelm 
Baum et al., 59 volumes, Brunswick, 1863-1900; Instititutes of the Christian Religion, 
trans. Ford L. Battles, ed. John T. McNeil, 2 vols, London, 1960 (also in Library of 
Christian Classics, vols. 20-1).
78 On the consistory system see Robert M. Kingdon, The Control of Morals in Calvin’s 
Geneva', The Social History of the Reformation, ed. L. P. Buck and J.W. Zophy, Ohio State 
University Press, 1972,3-16; 'Calvin and the Family: The Work of the Consistory in 
Geneva', Pacific Theological Review, 17,1984,5-18. E. William Monter, The Consistory 
of Geneva 1559-1569', Bibliotheque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 38,1976,467-84. I am 
greatly indebted to the work of Raymond A. Mentzer Jr., who provides a fascinating account 
of a working consistory reconstructed from its records in his Disciplina nervus ecclesiae:
The Calvinist Reform of Morals at Nimes’, The Sixteenth Century Journal, xviii, 1, Spring 
1987, 89-115.
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occured . If there had been cases of misconduct, the body as a whole 
would then decide the appropriate course of action, which might 
involve summoning the transgressor, calling witnesses, or setting up 
an investigative committee. As a public body, it was ultimately 
concerned to uphold standards of conduct conducive to the good of the 
community: it was the duty of each citizen to act in such a way that it 
contributed to the 'concord' of the dty , which was to live according to 
God's ends and to his glory. The idea of 'concord' here is more 
civically rooted than that of Luther's, whose dour view of the potential 
of hum an institutions left any possibility of social dynamism largely 
undeveloped. Calvin's was partly the civic understanding of vocatus 
which Protestants inherited from Christian humanism and classical 
political thought, though, of course, he too was less willing to credit 
hum an and princely wisdom, than the monarch's role as a conduit 
through which the providential intentions of the realm were m ade 
evident.79 It also had to do with how Calvin reconstituted the 
meaning of the 'body politic'. Calvin invoked the familar m etaphor of 
organic unity, yet in his own distinct way. The Christian had to reflect 
his inner will regenerated by the grace of God through observable 
outw ard action, and as God cared for the individual, the body politic 
had to care for the souls and bodies of its subjects.80 Thus, civil 
government and ecclesiastical government differed not in kind, but 
merely in objectives. Man was a creature of these two orders, 
containing, as it were, 'two worlds, capable of being governed by 
various rulers and various laws'.81 Spiritual government was the 
means by which the conscience was 'formed to piety' and to the service 
of god, whereas the civil government instructed in the duties of 
hum anity and civility. The former was concerned with the cure of 
souls and the 'perfect virtue' of Christianity, whilst the latter was
79 Fideler 1992, p. 209.
80 Alves, 1989, p. 7.
81 Inst. Ill, xix, 15. There is a good discussion of the implications of this passage in Sheldon 
Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought, 
London, 1960, p.173, and pp. 169-185 in general.
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concerned with the habits of civility and order, the lesser civic virtue.
It is im portant to note that for Calvin the two forms of governance are 
analagous: the polity itself had an essential value not subsumable to 
the necessarily Christian foundation of a well constituted civil 
society.82 The key role of the magistrate was to preserve the basic order 
of society, which was an institutional commitment rather than a 
personal one (the church cured souls). This involved enforcing justice 
and righteousness, promoting peace and godliness, and generally 
preserving a 'temperate liberty7.83
It m ust be remembered though, that the church was the model for all 
hum an social interaction, and thus in the Ordinances, Calvin 
sanctified Genevan lay institutions in order for the church ministerial 
elite and the state administrative elite to work together in the 
regulation of conduct and the creation of a godly society.84 He used 
'church' in relation to a specific institutional setting, and in the 
communitarian sense as well. The body politic of Rome was replaced 
by the (mystical) body of Christ, and his spiritual values (not mere 
selfish drives) were to organize Christian social interaction, and society 
was to be a 'sacred totality7.85 The Christian (reconstituted via the grace 
of god by faith alone) thus dedicated his body and soul to God 
following Christ's example, replacing self love with self denial, and a 
dem onstrating his faith by doing good works for others. Calvin's 
'reborn' Christian self would always interact with other members of the 
community, and subm it himself (or herself) to the common good, and 
to the greater glory of God. In Calvin, there was a necessary unity 
between inner being and external appearances. The emphasis was 
always upon a community supervision of Christian discipline 
upholding a common morality, and less on the austere individual
82 See Inst. II, ii, 13-15. Wolin, p. 184-5.
83 See Calvin's Commentaries on the Epistle of Paid the Apostle to the Romans, in Wolin, 
pp. 186-7.
84 Robert M. Kingdon, 'Social Welfare in Calvin's Geneva', The American Historical Review, 
76, February 1971,50-69. Alves,1989, pp. 9-10,18-19.
85 Alves, 1989, pp. 9-10,18. For a different view see Elsie Anne McKee, John Calvin on the 
Diaconate and Liturgical Almsgiving, Droz, Geneva, 1984, especially p. 20.
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pursuit of self-clarification and salvation, alone in the confessional.86
And yet both approaches took part in the transition from penance to 
disciplina, and both saw discipline as an essentially interior process. I 
do not w ant to overemphasize similarities here, the differences were, 
of course, great, with the Council of Trent generally repudiating 
Erasmian hum anism  in all its forms.87 Yet both involved a relation to 
self which was intimately related to a kind of governance and a 
perception of social order, and both took a decisive turn inwards as a 
means of self understanding. Both modes involved a set of constraints 
on the self, in one case a confessional self conforming to authorized 
ritual and doctrine, and in the other, a pious, disciplined self, exhorted 
to conduct himself or herself for the benefit of the common good. 
Scholars still dispute whether it is the ideolgical framework established 
by (say) Calvin and Bucer which is more important here than that of 
Erasmus, More, or Vives, or whether that by the 1570's the 'ministry- 
magistracy' of the Puritan strongholds had taken over initiatives in 
'social policy' (especially with regard to poor relief) from the Christian- 
Hum anist-inspired national government plans of the 1530's.
W hatever the case, it is partially against this background that we need 
to understand seventeenth century discussions of the 'self' and 
'conscience', especially when we turn to the Puritan attempts at the 
reformation of conduct, and a consideration of the foundations of 
liberal conduct in the work of John Locke.
86 But see Bossy, 1985, pp.132-133.
87 Todd, 1987, pp. 208-211. But see the discussion of Catholic responses to the ‘new 
humanism* of the late sixteenth century (especially by the Jesuits) in Tuck 1993, pp. 131- 
146.
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Chapter 3: Machiavelli and Liberty
3.0 Introduction
The Christian humanist writers discussed up until now were all still 
working within the symbolic discourse of understanding 'community' 
in terms of some kind of organic unity or body. It strikes us that this is 
definitive of much of pre-m odem  and late-Renaissance political 
theory, even given the slow emergence of self-interest as a relevant 
theoretical reference point, and the gradual de-personificaton of the 
state, throughout the sixteenth century. If politics was an art of 
unification^, then today, it resembles more an art of separation and 
accomodation, the management of a bewildering degree of particular 
actions and desires arranged as a space in which atoms 'hurtle across a 
flat social plane' rather than within the taxonomy of a body.2 
However, the deconstruction of the metaphor of society as a body or 
organic unity did not occur overnight, nor was it ever completely 
eradicated. As people struggled to understand their world, they 
struggled to redescribe, in new ways, phenomena they only partially 
understood, and found old explanations wanting, and old practices 
ineffective; their conceptual tools were no longer adequate to the new 
circumstances.3 The changes affected the foundations of much of how 
we still speak and think about politics, though perhaps not fully so 
until the m ature work of seventeenth century theorists, such as 
Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke (aspects of which I shall be taking up
1 Michael Walzer, 'On the Role of Symbolism in Political Thought', Political Science 
Quarterly, LXXXI, 2, June 1967, pp. 191-204. Reprinted in Tracy Strong ed., The Self and 
the Political Order, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1992, pp. 64-76.
2 Walzer, 1992 (quoting Wolin), p. 74. On contemporary politics as an art of separation see 
Walzer, Liberalism and the Art of Separation', Political Theory, 12, 3, August 1984,315- 
330.
3 Charles Taylor puts it well I think, when he writes (Sources o f the Self, The Making of the 
Modern Identity, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp.206-7) that change in the history of 
ideas and practices is never uni-directional, rather it occurs 'through mutations and 
developments in the ideas, including new visions and insights, bringing about alterations, 
ruptures, reforms, revolutions in practices; and also through drift, change, constrictions or 
flourishings of practices, bringing about the alteration, flourishing, or decline of ideas...The 
real skein of events is interwoven with threads running in both directions'. (Cf. Walzer, 
1992, pp. 74-5) In the book itself however, Taylor takes a singular path away from a 
consideration of practical change; his web is woven almost entirely of idealistic threads.
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below). And yet it is important to see their relation to these changing 
vocabularies and practices in terms of a dialogue. For they too had 
traditions with which to reconcile themselves.
With regard to our examination of the concept of liberty, a crucial 
figure along the way (to put it breezily) is Machiavelli. He is 
im portant here for a number of reasons. Firstly, he seems to inhabit at 
one and the same time the ancient and modern worlds of political 
theory, and this perhaps explains why so many theorists and 
interpreters are unable to agree on the general character of his 
'm odernity '.4 Machiavelli had a very acute sense of the m odem  and 
the ancient himself; the former referred to contemporary events 
understood or explained in relation to Christian culture and the latter 
to pre-christian and classical times. We need to examine his use and 
understanding of various ancient and classical sources, and generally, 
his overall 'world picture'. This will provide the background from 
which we can then investigate his understanding of the concept of 
liberta, the site of so much recent attention and debate, and its relation 
to his understanding of the moral personality, what we m ight call the 
'Machiavellian self'.
3.1 A Machiavellian world picture
For m any historians of political thought, and especially purveyors of 
civic hum anist political values, Machiavelli provides the preem inent
4 The literature on this is huge, but see especially Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of 
Modern Political Thought: Volume I, The Renaissance, Cambridge University Press, pp.
113-86; Machiavelli, Oxford University Press, 1981; Isaiah Berlin, The Originality of 
Machiavelli', Against the Current, Viking Press, New York, 1980, pp. 25-79; Leo Strauss, 
History of Political Philosophy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987, pp. 296-318; 
Donald McIntosh, The Modernity of Machiavelli’, Political Theory, 12, May 1984,184-203; 
Terence Ball, The Picaresque Prince: Reflections on Machiavelli and Moral Change’,
Political Theory, 12, November 1984,521-36; Larry Perman, ’Gravity and Piety: 
Machiavelli’s Modem Turn’, Review of Politics, 52, Spring 1990, 189-214; A.J Parel, The 
Question of Machiavelli’s Modernity’, Review o f Politics, 53, Spring 1991, 320-39. Cary J. 
Nederman, The Machiavellian Mirror The Psychology of Virtu in Light of its Medieval 
Background’, Paper presented at the New York State Political Science Association, New 
York, April 1992 (On file with the author). Peter S. Donaldson, Machiavelli and the Mystery 
of State, Cambridge University Press, 1988. Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to Reason of 
State: The acquisition and transformation of the language of politics 1250-1600, Cambridge 
University Press, 1992, pp. 126-177.
90
discussion of the Republican thesis most relevant to our contemporary 
w orld, and thus is most in need of excavation and restoration. There 
are two claims being made here. The first is a particular interpretation 
of the substance and context of Machiavelli's republican arguments. 
The second refers back to the archaeological metaphors of the previous 
sentence; that is, a particular historical narrative constituting a 
substantive intervention within a contemporary debate or discourse, 
beyond the obvious (though no doubt valuable) 'sense of history7. This 
brings us back to the introduction to part 1 where we considered the 
relation between historically distinct concepts and what is meant when 
we describe something as a 'resource7 in need of recuperation or 
restoration. Our consideration of the concepts of liberty and self in 
Renaissance political theory up to now, as well as in Machiavelli, 
should provide us with a case study of this claim. I shall return to this 
below, in the concluding paragraphs to this chapter.
As we shall see, Machiavelli was no doubt an 'innovator7 in political 
theory, but he did so in the context of the Renaissance hum anism  I 
have been describing above. This involved a close reading and 
understanding of the key classical texts which exercised so much 
influence in quattrocento Florence (and elsewhere), namely, the 
Roman moralists and historians - Cicero, Seneca, Livy, Sallust, Tacitus, 
and Polybius. If we take two of Machiavelli's most famous texts - The 
Prince and The Discourses5- we find examples of both an acceptance 
and critique of contemporary and classical arguments. As we know, 
this means that Machiavelli worked w ithin both the dom inant 
languages of politics of the early sixteenth century - the classical 'civil 
philosophy7 of the vivero politico inspired by Greek and Roman civic
h —hum anism , along w ith the emerging discourse of ragionai stato (or
5 The Prince, edited by Quentin Skinner and Russell Price, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1988; Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius, in Machiavelli; The Chief 
Works and Others, translated by Allan Gilbert, I, Duke University Press, North£arolina, 
1965, pp. 175-529. Cf. this with the Penguin translation by Leslie J. WalkerTTie 
Discourses, ed. Bernard Crick, transl. Leslie J. Walker, rev. Brian Richardson, Penguin 
Bodes, Harmondsworth, 1983). I have used the Gilbert translation.
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arte dello stato). In The Prince for example, Machiavelli agrees with 
his contemporaries and their classical mentors that in order to 
maintain his power and preserve a government which benefits the 
whole body of subjects and brings glory and honour to himself, the 
prince m ust cultivate virtu in order to control (though never wholly) 
the fierce instability of fortuna. Now these two factors - virtus and 
fortuna - were staple topics for Cicero, who in the De officiis argued 
that the greatest gift of fortune was glory, and that only virtuous action 
could bring true honour and be representative of the 'real' man.6 
Livy's histories, the first ten books of which Machiavelli would discuss 
in his Discorsi, were seen as examples of Roman successes explained in 
terms of fortune 'smiling upon' demonstrated virtus. And perhaps 
most im portant of all, Machiavelli (in the Discourses and texts other 
than The Prince)7, like other republican humanists of the sixteenth 
century, accepted the fundamentally Ciceronian and Aristotelian point 
that the good of the community could only be served by the active 
participation of all of its citizens in the conduct of its affairs, whether 
in the shape of collective deliberation, or simply fulfilling the duties of 
one's proper office or station. This was the celebration of the poltical 
man, the politicus vir w ho helped establish and then m aintain the 
civitas.8 In Machiavelli the relationship and interest in the past was 
not purely antiquarian; the ancient texts were perceived and 
interpreted as providing a positive bequest for an analysis of 
contemporary political life beyond merely providing an ethical
6 Cf. Skinner, 1981, pp.26-7, and ‘Political Philosophy’, in Schmitt et al eds., The 
Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 430- 
33.
7 Arte della guerra e scritti politici minori [The Art of War, translated Gilbert 1989, Vol. II 
pp. 566-726]; Istorie Florentine [Florentine Histories, Ibid, Vol. Ill pp. 1029-1435]; 
Discursus florentinarum rerum[ A Discourse on Remodelling the Government of Florence, 
Ibid, Vol I].
8 See generally, Hans Baron, ‘Machiavelli: the republican citizen and the author of The Prince’, 
in In Search of Florentine Civic Humanism, Princeton University Press, 1988 (2 vols.), I pp. 
111-3. Cf. Nicolai Rubinstein, ‘The History of the word politicus in Early-Modern Europe’, 
in Anthony Pagden ed., The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, 
Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 41-56 (especially at pp. 52-3); and Viroli 1992, pp. 
130-1.
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terminology. This was especially true for Machiavelli in relation to 
Cicero, one which is crucial to understand in order to see what 
Machiavelli was doing when he turned to analysing concepts such as 
liberta, and discussing the nature of virtu and the moral personality of 
the ruler and the people.9
One more aspect of Machiavelli's conceptual background needs to 
brought out before moving on to a direct consideration of these issues. 
This is, his understanding of the nature of reality, or his 'world 
picture'. Much rides on this question since the arguments of theorists 
such as Professor Skinner are often dismissed on the basis of the 
incommensurability, or irrelevance, of Machiavelli's world picture 
and ours - 'we live in a different world than Machiavelli' comes the 
reply, 'his tools can't be of any use because the nature of our task has 
changed'. Historical explanation becomes a process of listing how we 
no longer are in comparison to the ancient, medieval or 'early 
m odem ’ worlds. For Skinner and others, it is precisely what emerges
9 There is overwhelming evidence of Machiavelli's familiarity with the classical heritage of 
civic humanism. See especially his letter to Francesco Vettori, 10 December, 1513, reprinted 
in Skinner and Price 1988, pp. 93-95. Cf.Viroli 1992. On Machiavelli's own education, see 
Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth Century 
Florence, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 318-22; Roberto Ridolfi, Life of 
Niccolo Machiavelli, transl. Cecil Grayson, Chicago University Press, 1963, chapter 1; 
Sebastian DeGrazia, Machiavelli in Hell, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Great Britain,1989, pp 5-30. 
An analysis of the relation between Machiavelli's political theory and classical political 
theory, especially those of Cicero, Seneca, Tacitus, Livy and Polybius, has become a staple 
topic for scholarly concern. Some of the best and most relevant accounts include Allen 
Gilbert, Machiavelli's Prince and Its Forerunners: The Prince as a Typical Book De Regimine 
Principum, Durham, 1938; J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 1975, pp. 49-218; 
Kenneth Charles Schellhase, Tacitus in the Political Thought of Machiavelli', II Pensiero 
Politico, 4,1971, 381-91; J.H. Whitfield, Machiavelli's Use of Livy’, in Livy, ed. T.A. 
Dorey, London, 1971; Neal Wood, 'Some Common Aspects of the Thought of Seneca and 
Machiavelli', Renaissance Quarterly, 21,1968,11-23; Benedettb Fontana, Tacitus and 
Machiavelli on the Art of Ruling', Paper Presented at the 46th Annual Meeting of the New 
York State Political Science Association, April 1992 (on file with the author). On the 
crucial relationship between Cicero's De officiis and Machiavelli, see the seminal article by 
Marcia L. Colish, 'Cicero's De officiis and Machiavelli's Prince, Sixteenth Century Journal, 
IX, 4,1978. The contextual and analytical relationship between De officiis and Machiavelli's 
Prince and Discourses has been a major feature of Quentin Skinner's interpretation of 
Machiavelli, see especially Skinner 1981, pp. 24-47; 1984, pp.204-217; 1988 pp. ix-xxiv; 
and in CHRP pp.430-441. Also, to a lesser extent, J.H. Whitfield, Machiavelli, Oxford 
University Press, 1947, pp.99-103; Berlin, 1979; Felix Gilbert, The Humanist Concept of 
the Prince and the Prince of Machiavelli, Journal of Modern History, 11,1939, pp. 449-83; 
Gioacchino Paperelli, 'Virtu e fortuna nel medioevo, nel rinascimento e in Machiavelli', 
Cultura e scuola, 9,1970, pp. 76-89.
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in relief to the modern world when we compare concepts and 
languages across time which is of most value, a comparative 
perspective which enables us to stand back from our entrenched 
practices and to think again. But if we (in turn) stand back from both of 
these claims we recognize something they share, that is, this activity of 
"world picturing". Neither denies the reflective value of the activity as 
such; the former only so he can reject the world picture so understood 
as 'irrelevant', the latter so he can gain critical purchase on the present 
through understanding the way the past constitutes our current 
practices. Both also presume that what lies at the centre of world 
picturing is a subject free to do so. Heidegger asked some important 
questions about these assumptions; "Does every period of history have 
its world picture, and indeed in such a way as to concern itself from 
time to time about that world picture? Or is this...only a m odem  kind 
of representing, this asking concerning a world picture?".10 Interpreters 
of Machiavelli seem to be split on this question. For some, he is a 
harbinger of the m odem  subject's sense of this activity, of asking about 
world pictures in such a way that "whatever comes into being in and 
through representedness transforms the age in which this occurs into a 
new age in contrast with the preceding one".11 Here, a particular form 
of representation secures the "newness" of the age. For others 
Machiavelli's "modernity", such as it is, is overstated, especially with 
regard to his basic world picture, which they see as still embedded 
substantially (though not wholly) in distinctly pre-m odem  forms of 
representation. In other words, that Machiavelli does not call it into 
question and does not engage in, the "activity of World picturing", or 
that if he does, he does so only in very selective and limited ways.
Both these positions have implications for an understanding of 
Machiavelli's concepts of liberty and self, and ultim ately for claims 
m ade about the nature of Machiavellian political theory - and classical
10 Martin Heidegger, The Age of the World Picture', in The Questions Concerning Technology 
and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt, Harper and Row, New York, 1977, p. 129.
11 Ibid, p. 130.
republicanism in general - as resources for our contemporary 
predicam ent.
Let us sketch the negative claim about Machiavelli's "world 
picturing" first. The essence here is that a pre-modern cosmology and 
anthropology underlies his political theory, invalidating the claim that 
his "newness" amounts to a kind of modernity.12 This cosmology 
consists of a distinction between heaven and earth, whereby all 
motions in the sublunar world, natural and human, depend on 
motions emanating from heaven, the planets, and the stars. Thus, the 
sky Machiavelli paints is "thick with aerialists".13 History is in part a 
function of the natural motion of celestial bodies, and in part a 
function of hum an causation. The movement of history is not wholly 
the outcome of autonomous hum an action, but instead dependent 
upon certain cosmic motions. The order of hum an history - its rise, 
fall, corruption and renewal - and the power of this order are received 
from the heavens and the planets. This is as true for individuals as it 
is for countries, andthe former needs the opportunity to act that only 
heaven can give. Though not espousing a hard fatalism, since 
hum ans are basically co-causes of all hum an achievements,
Machiavelli still insists they need the occasione to succeed, and this is 
provided by heaven and fortune. Moreover, individuals have a given 
"temperament" and "humour" (umori), which are the basic elements of 
our particular hum an nature (natura). Following from this, humans 
conduct themselves according to imagination (fantasia) and not 
prudence, since the hum ours, appetites, and temperaments of 
individuals are not easily subordinate to reason; "you always act as
12 This argument has been put forward recently by Anthony J. Parel, The Machiavellian 
Cosmos, Yale University Press, 1992; and The Question of Machiavelli's Modernity', The 
Review of Politics, 53,2, Spring, 1991,320-339. See also Sebastian De Grazia’s 
wonderfully readable Machiavelli in Hell, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989, pp. 58-70 
(especially at 65-70); and Cary J. Nederman, The Machiavellian Mirror, The Psychology of 
Virtu in Light of its Medieval Background', presented to the New York State Political Science 
Association, April 1992 (on file with the author).
13 De Grazia 1989, p. 68.
95
N ature inclines you'.1* Umori has a number of other uses for 
Machiavelli. It is used to refer to the 'body politic' itself, its well-being 
as is its health, the prince as its doctor, and political science as its 
'medical science'.15 It also designates the social groups of the res 
publica - the two 'hum ours’ of grandi and popolo, as well as their 
interaction.15 It is used in relation to Machiavelli’s concept of good 
and bad, the healthy or malignant humours which contribute either to 
the health or the sickness of society. And finally, umori is used to 
classify political regimes, which for Parel at least, is the most important 
(and original). This is because Machiavelli seems to have introduced a 
new criterion for classifying regimes, henceforth defined according to 
the way they satisfy the humours of their constitutive groups. 
Principalities satisfy their humours through the intervention of the 
prince and not via self-government, since their social groups are too
14 Discourses, III.9, p. 452 Machiavelli gives a series of examples of men who acted the way 
they did not because of choice but 'through nature'. See also the important Letter to Giovan 
Battista Soderini, 15 September, 1506, in Skinner, Price, 1988, pp 95-99: 'I believe that just 
as nature makes men with different faces, it also produces different kinds of mind and 
temperament. Consequently, evey man acts in accordance with the bent of his mind and 
temperament. Thus, since the times and conditions vary, some men achieve their aims 
completely, if their ways of acting are appropriate for the times. On the other hand, a man 
whose ways of acting are ill-suited to the times and circumstances will be unsuccessful.'
There is a parallel passage in The Prince, 25, p. 86. See De Grazia 1989, pp. 74-6. Parel 
1991, pp.336-8; 1992, pp.80-2.
15 Prince, n, pp.7,11; and 26, p.88-; Discourses, III. 27, p.478. De Grazia (1989, p. 182) 
notes how the ‘humours’ refer back to the old medical theory of humidity and bodily fluid 
(blood, phlegm, yellow and black bile). Cf. Parel, 1992, pp.104.
16 Discourses, 1,4, p. 203; I, 5,204-206 as well as in the Prince, 9,34-37. Machiavelli also 
talks about the three types of humours in Florence (‘tre diverse qualita di uomini’) in his 
Discursus florentinarum rerum (1520), though based the two general types mentioned above. 
‘Humours’ is rendered in a number of ways by translators, including ‘factions’ (Gilbert) and 
‘dispositions’ (Walker) See Parel, 1992 pp. 105-6, and De Grazia 1989 p. 182, for other 
uses as well. Note that popolo here does not imply a designation for 'the rest of the ', but a 
very specific group other than the grandi, usually around 3000 people. As Richard Trexler 
points out (Public Ufe in Renaissance Florence, New York, Academic Press, 1980, p. 15-6), 
the highly stratified Florentine society was split into three essenial components; the Guilds 
(both upper and lower), the cofratemities (taxpaying non-guildsmen,usually led by a member 
of the upper guilds), and rest of the vast majority - the adult salaried workers, adolescent 
youths, and women, who were all mainly excluded from both occupational groups and 
religious groups. Though Parel does not mention it, Machiavelli is obviously influenced by 
Aristotle here, who in the Politics described two constitutive elements to every city, one 
being numerically small (the ’well-to-do*) the other quite large (the poor). See The Politics, 
trans. T. A. Sinclair, revised Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin, 1986, IV, iv, 1291a33 and I, ii, 
1252b 15. Machiavelli for the most part though, drops the economic characteristics employed 
by Aristotle.
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antagonistic to cooperate. In republics, social groups are able to resolve 
their differences through the constitution and law, and be self- 
governing; the equality and freedom of the humours is ensured by the 
sharing of power. By encouraging the flourishing of citizens of 
different temperaments and humours, republics are best able to deal 
with what fortune might throw at them, they embody that cherished 
Machiavellian trait - flexibility. A diseased Republic would be one 
where the controlled management of differences broke down into 
bitter factional conflict, as happened, for example, in the Roman 
republic. Licenzia (anarchy) was the worst state of affairs, since it had 
neither the order of a principality, nor the self-government of a 
republic, but simply the one-sided dominance of one faction over 
another,with only the most powerful group able to satisfy its own 
interests to the detriment of everyone else.17 This was not to say, as we 
shall see, that the Roman Republic did not offer a salutary lesson in 
preferring larger Republics and their social 'commotion' to the quiet 
stagnancy of a small, unperturbed city-republic.
W hat are the implications of this reading of Machiavelli's world 
picture, and the role of the hum ours for his key concepts of fortuna 
and virtu , and ultimately, his understanding of liberty, self, and 
citizenship?
Machiavelli uses fortune in a number of different ways throughout 
his work. It is used to denote a kind of causal agent superior to 
humans, as referring to fortuitous events affecting the outcome of 
hum an actions, or as referring to a favourable or unfavourable 
condition of life or relationship with others. According to the first 
sense, the fortuitous was explained in terms of some ultimate cause, 
whether it be the heavenly bodies, or as in the case of Christians, that 
divine reason (providence) disposes all things in their proper place
17 Prince, 9, pp. 34-37; Discourses, HI, 9, pp.452-3: ’a republic, being able to adapt herself, by 
means of the diversity among her body of citizens to a diversity of temporal conditions better 
than a prince can, is of greater duration than a princedom and has good fortune ledger'. See 
Parel, 1992, pp. 107-8.
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and time. Though Machiavelli acknowledged these two 
explanations,18 he was inclined to reject the latter since the 
Machiavellian universe was not governed by providence but by 
natural motion and its inherent 'occult7 qualities. W ithin this order, 
fortune was supreme, 'the mistress of human destiny...(a) destiny 
subject to chance, not to reason'.19 Of course Machiavelli presents yet 
another image of fortune, this one shorn of theological imagery, his 
famous claim that 'fortune is a woman' tamed only if 'you treat her 
r o u g h ly '20 He presents this in a way to suggest that not everything is 
determined by fate, and that humans can struggle in political life to 
escape, as best they can, the unforeseen. Success can only be won by the 
exercise of virtu to its maximum degree, and even then, the nature of 
fortune as Machiavelli understands it defines the limits of virtu. It 
determines one's birth and death, one's hum our and temperament, 
and the quality of the 'times' within which one lives.21 As well, 
fortune treats individuals and countries differently, and generates a 
different set of requirements for each to contend with. Chapter 25 of 
ThePrince provides the dichotomy between 'universal and particular7 
fortune.22 The m etaphor he uses to associate fortune w ith countries is 
an 'enraged river7 flooding plains and causing destruction, and which 
'everyone flees...everyone gives way to its thrust'. However, says 
Machiavelli, if we accept that adversity will affect our country from 
time to time we can, with foresight, minimize the most adverse effects 
- 'that when the river is not in flood, men are (able) to take
18 Prince, 25 pp. 84-87: ’I am not unaware that many have thought, and many still think, that 
the affairs of the world are so ruled by fortune and by God...'. But see p. 84 n. c for doubts 
concerning this passage.
19 Men cannot 'command their nature' (Letter to Giovan Battista Soderini, c. Sept. 13-21,
1506; quoted in De Grazia 1989, p. 75; Cf. ‘Exhortation’ (1525-7) (quoted for example in 
Ibid, at pp. 75,269) for the fallen nature of man, turned away from God and transformed from 
a rational animal into a ‘brute animal'; Cf. Parel, 1992, p. 65.
20 Prince, 25, p. 87.
21 Prince, 25, pp. 84-5. Discourse, III, 9, p.452. Parel, 1992, p. 66. The notion of fortune 
controlling 'the times' is expressed in his poem 'On Fortune' (translated and included in Parel, 
1992, pp. 70-1): ..She disposes of time as suits hen she raises up,/ she puts us down 
without pity, without law or reason'.
22 See Parel, 1992, pp. 68-70 for a discussion of recent scholarship on this important 
distinction.
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precautions, by means of dykes and dams, so that when it rises next 
time, it will either not overflow its banks or, if it does, its force will not 
be so uncontrolled or damaging/ He is referring to Italy, and the 
reference to dams and dykes are to its state of diplomacy, and its 
military preparedness in relation to its neighbours and enemies.23
Individuals have a different set of problems presented by fortune. 
Aside from being responsible for chance, luck and occasione, 'she' also 
controls time, honour, riches, and health , as well as providing each 
person with his or her basic hum our.24 The kind of problems she 
generates for individuals include the fragility of success ('flourish 
today fail tomorrow1), the often irrelevance of the moral virtues in 
gaining political success, and why political actions are judged according 
to their outcomes and not their means.25 Machiavelli answers all 
these questions, Parel claims, w ith reference to the cosmological and 
astrological nature of the ’quality of the times, the hum our and 
temperament of the actor...and the fixity of particular hum an 
nature '.26 Though fortune prefers the impetuous over the calculating, 
and young men who are aggressive and bold, success can only be 
gained if one acts in accordance with the quality of the 'general time', 
which is extremely difficult to do, since no amount of hum an 
ingenuity can guarantee it, and ultimately the relation between one’s 
own time and the general time can only be harmonized by fortune. 
One’s hum our and temperament, as he makes clear in chapter 25 of 
The Prince and his letter to Soderini, are crucial to the pursuit of glory 
and riches. Different temperaments may sometimes be equally 
successful, and someone who was once successful might soon fail, or
23 ThePrince, 25, p. 85. See also Discourses, II, 1, p. 324-5 where Machiavelli ascribes Rome's 
success to the 'efficiency of her armies...the order of her procceedings and her method, which 
was her very own and discovered by her first lawgiver, caused her to keep it when conquered'.
24 See Discourses, 1,3, p. 201. Prince, IE, p.l 1. On the feminine characteristics of fortune see 
Hanna Pitkin, Fortune is a Woman, Berkely, University of California Press, 1984; and De 
Grazia 1989, pp. 211-15.
25 These are discussed in The Prince, 25, pp. 85-7, and the Letter to Giovan Battista Soderini,
15 September 1506, reprinted in Skinner and Price 1988, pp.97-99.
26 Parel, 1992, p. 75. Cf. Pocock, 1975, pp. 189-90. Skinner, 1981, p. 56. See also 
Discourses, 1,3, p. 201; '(time)...which they say is the father of all truth’.
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their temperament will not allow them to act according to the times.27 
N ot even the wisest of men can avoid their own nature and fortune. 
Parel's claim here is that Machiavelli has rejected the classical notion 
of phronesis, or 'right reason', in favour of the sovereignty of 
temperament as the guiding principle of hum an conduct. One can 
only overcome fortune with fortune's help.28 Yet how can we square 
this with Machiavelli's stated claim that he does not want to 
'eliminate hum an freedom'? Well, rather unconvincingly, he 
proposes that fortune 'is the arbiter of half our actions, but that it lets 
us control roughly the other half'.29 W hat kind of hum an autonomy 
is this? Machiavelli is difficult here, and though it appears he means 
that we are only free to act according to our hum our and 
temperament, this unchanging nature of men is one of 'variability 
within wide limits'. By acknowledging some element of choice, by 
expending so much analytical effort on providing the grounds for the 
prudent exercise of the art of the stato (in The Prince) and the art of the 
Republic (in the Discourses and elsewhere), Machiavelli m ust believe 
in at least some moral potential, something which escapes the 
tendency towards evil. Thus Parel's claim must be too strong, and that 
Machiavelli's account of political 30 action and motivation (at least in 
the texts other thanT/ie Prince) is not something profoundly different 
from acting according to the dictates of moral reason or the recta ratio 
of Cicero and other classical theorists.3i However it is true that he sees
27 The Prince, 25, p. 85: ’I believe that we are successful when our ways are suited to the times 
and circumstances, and unsuccesful when they are not’. Also, p. 86; ’if it were possible to 
change one's character to suit the times and circumstances, one would always be successful'.
28 Parel, 1991, pp. 335-7; 1992, p. 79.
29 The Prince, 25, p. 85.
30 As Viroli (1992) and Rubinstein (1987) have made clear, Machiavelli keeps to the 
convention by only using the language of politico in relation to of the art of the republic and 
the creation and preservation of vivere civile (or vivere politico).
31 Cf. The Prince, chapter 26 [Exhortation to liberate Italy from the barbarian yoke] when he 
writes that 'you must play your part, for God does not want to do everything in order not to 
deprive us of our freedom and the glory that belongs to us', (p. 89) Parel claims, not without 
plausibility, that this is used for rhetorical rather than theoretical effect, since he has 
elsewhere rejected this basically Christian stand point and he provides no real argument to 
support i t  But see also in the Art of War, where in discussing the role of the young in 
discussing military affairs he writes that those whose 'hair is white and blood cold' are the
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clearly how 'necessity' plays a crucial role in human conduct, whether 
in dealing with the unpredictability of nature or making careful 
preparations to achieve certain premeditated goals.
The question of hum an causality brings us to Machiavelli’s complex 
account of virtu . As we have seen, it remains the main weapon in the 
struggle with fortune, but one strictly limited in scope. Virtu is 
basically that disposition or ability of a group or individual to act in a 
way conducive to the good of the republic or the state, depending upon 
one's allegiances. In The Prince, though obviously writing with the 
classical sense of moral virtue in mind, and aware of the connections 
some of his readers would make, Machiavelli, in contributing to the 
hum anist genre of princely advice-books, provides a radically different 
set of claims. Here the virtues have no independent status outside(of ) 
their ability to contribute to the maintenance and glory of the state. A 
truly virtuoso prince was one who would be willing to do whatever 
was necessary for the preservation of his stato, unconstrained by the 
classical (and christain) moral virtues.32 In case of both a principality 
and the state, the needs of society were served by patriotism (however 
inculcated), the love of the 'fatherland' which claimed a complete 
adherence even to the neglect of one’s own personal good. Because 
the main goal of politics in the context of a stato was its preservation 
(i.e. 'statecraft'), all that was required was a reputation for private 
virtue, since 'men judge more by their eyes than by their 
hands...everyone can see what you appear to be, whereas few have 
direct experience of w hat you really are'.33 Here virtu is also directly 
linked to the cosmological background that I sketched above, as well as 
to Machiavelli's basic conception of hum an nature. To exercise virtu 
was to act according to one’s humour, which produced the external 
goods of riches and glory necesssary for the perpetuation of the state, or
traditional opponents of war, and are like‘those who believe that the times and not bad
customs force men to live in this way*.
32 Prince, 18, p. 62. Discourses, III, 41, pp. 519. Skinner, 1981, pp. 38-41. Viroli 1992, chp.
3 passim. Parel 1992, pp. 86-7.
33 Prince, 18, p. 63.
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in the case of the republic, the prevailing of the common good over 
that of particular individuals. And of course ultimately, efficacy (virtu) 
was dependent upon the quality of the 'times', which provided the 
occasione to behave in the appropriate manner.34
3.2 Moral personality and virtuous action 
W hat lies at the base of this exercise of virtu, the self which inhabits 
this world of celestial motions, humours, and reigning fortuna? 
Machiavelli provides no systematic discussion of the ’self, the soul, or 
even hum an nature in general, but he does have a view which we can 
deduce from various places in his work.35 The first thing to note is 
that Machiavelli denies that men are naturally endowed or driven to 
live together virtuously in political society (beyond any basic sociable 
tendencies); the notions of goodness, virtue, and justice for example, 
come only after the establishment of a form of 'state' which arises out 
of a primordial need for security.36 Men need security in order to 
pursue glory and riches, the constants Machiavelli sees as present in all 
of humanity. Furthermore, a wise legislator should assume that men 
are by nature 'evil' and that they will always 'act according to the 
wickedness of their spirits whenever they have free scope'.37 Parel 
interprets the occult reference in this passage - the 'malignity' of spirit - 
as indicative of the nonphysical but real influence of the heavens, 
stars, and planets over hum an behaviour. It is not a malignity of soul 
(anima), but of spirit (animo), which in 'natural' (astrological) 
philosophy was a capacity to form intentions, but which did not 
survive the dissolution of the body. Animo is the other quality (or 
faculty), aside from a person's humours, that enables him to perform 
virtuous actions, and like one's temperam ent and the 'tim es' within
34 For example, The Prince, chp. 25, p. 86: Tope Julius II always acted impetuously, and 
found the times and circumstances so suited to his ways that he was always successful'.
35 We might say that the concept of 'self is a modem term which denotes our disbelief in the 
transcendent qualities associated with the older concept of 'soul'. As has been noted by many 
commentators, Machiavelli gives the topic of the soul short shrift, in fact, he seems to deny 
its importance altogether.
36 Discourses, 1,2, pp. 197-8. De Grazia 1989, pp. 268-70. Parel, 1991, p. 334; 1992, p. 87.
37 Discourses, 1, 3, p. 201. Cf. the translation in Parel 1991, p. 334.
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which one lives, it is an aspect the individual has little or no control 
over: 'you always act as Nature inclines y o u ' 38 
Another im portant context for a discussion of the Machiavellian 
'self' or 'personality' is its relation to the treatment in Aristotle, and 
also, in keeping with the discussion presented in chapter 1, in Cicero.39 
Two key components of Aristotle's discusion of virtue and its 
inculcation in hum an conduct are important here; a consideration of 
'character' (ethos) and 'disposition' (hexis), especially as presented in 
the Nicomachean Ethics A® For Aristotle virtue is em bedded within 
the foundation of character, a particular condition of the soul and 
m ind w rapped up in complex ways with nature, habit and instruction. 
He distinguishes between intellectual virtue, which owes its inception 
and growth primarily to 'instruction', and moral goodness, which is 
more the result of habit: T he moral virtues, then, are engendered in 
us neither by nor contrary to nature; we are constituted by nature to 
receive them, but their full development in us is due to habit'.41 In 
developing proper liabits ' and 'dispositions' (hexeis)A1 we develop, 
and then adhere to a well-formed moral character, one capable of 
anchoring virtuous conduct in such a way as to ensure a certain 
constancy of action in the face of the vicissitudes of every day life.
Thus, morally significant actions are rooted in good character, but here 
character is not a wholly natural or given state, it m ust be developed
38 Discourses, III, 9, p. 452.
39 And of course those aspects of the Aristotelian and (especially) Ciceronian arguments 
represented and reworked in fifteenth and sixteenth century humanist texts. Parel almost 
completely ignores this context, though perhaps understandably given his overall aims. The 
best discussions of these texts are now found in Skinner 1978, Viroli 1992, and Tuck 1993. 
Cf. Baron 1988, vol II., pp. 111-112 (quoted also in Viroli 1992, n.71, p. 154): ‘the 
institutions and laws [viz. the wisdom of ancient politics] are [in Machiavelli’s republican 
works] the matrix of a people’s political health and ethos’.
40 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J.A.K. Thomson, rev. Hugh Tredennick, intro. 
Jonathan Barnes, Penguin, 1986.
41 Ethics, 1103al4-bl, p. 91.
42 Ethics, 1106a: ‘what faculties we have, we have by nature; but it is not nature that makes us 
good or bad. So if the virtues are neither feelings nor faculties, it remains that they are 
dispositions. We have now stated what virtue is generically.’ p. 99.
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and actualized.43 This occurs by way of moral education, or more 
accurately, by moral habituation. Throughout the course of one's life 
(and not just when one is young), one must undergo proper training 
and instruction, and live under good laws, which are 'the products of 
the art of politics'.44 These habits form a kind of second nature, since 
habits are often as difficult to change as nature (because they have 
taken so long to become so), and thus produce a relative longevity and 
constancy of moral character expressed in good conduct and virtuous 
action.45 We acquire the virtues by exercising them, and we come to 
exercise them through the development of our overall character and 
hexeis, through being habituated to noble and just conduct. It is not 
just that one becomes virtuous through practice, but that this is how 
one learns w hat is noble and just, and thus practice enlists certain 
cognitive powers;4^  'virtuous acts are not done in a just or temperate 
way merely because they have a certain quality, but only if the agent 
also acts in a certain state'. The ultimate aim of practice is to produce a 
person who acts virtuously in the full knowledge that he is doing so 
'from a fixed and permanent disposition'.47 Of course the questions;/zy 
moral virtue has to be acquired by habituation is not as straightforward
43 Ethics, 1179b29: ‘feeling seems to yield not to argument but only to force. Therefore we 
must have a character to work on that has some affinity to virtue: one that appreciates what is 
noble and objects to what is base* (p. 336-7) The last part of bode ten is a discussion of how 
to bring about this ‘education in goodness’(1179b29 -1 181b23).
44 Ethics, 1181al2-bl0. Also, 1103b: ‘Legislators make their citizens good by habituation; this 
is the intention of every legislator’(p.92).
45 On habit as a second nature, see Ethics, 1115a20-b4. See also 1147a21-22, though 
Thompson substitutes ‘assimilated* for ‘second nature*. I emphasize ‘relative’ longevity and 
stability of character because Aristotle certainly does not believe he can lay a foundation for 
virtuous conduct wholly impermeable to fluctuations in fortune or divorced from external 
conditions (as Nederman, 1992, pp. 2-3 seems to imply). See especially Ethics, 1099a32-b20 
(pp. 79-80), and Magna Mor alia, 1206b30-5. For a superb discusssion of the issues of luck 
in Greek philosophy and tragedy see Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and 
Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, 1986, especially pp. 318-372.
46 For an excellent discussion, see M. F. Bumyeat, ‘Aristotle on Learning to Be Good’, in 
Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amelie Okensberg Rorty, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1980, pp. 69-92.
47 Ethics, 1105a28-33 (p. 97). This obviously raises the question of to what extent Aristotle’s 
concept of practical reasoning (phronesis) relies on or presupposes a seeminly non-rational 
cognitive state of non-rational moral virtue. I won’t pursue this here. For a useful 
discussion see Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Aristotle’s Theory of Moral Insight, Oxford 
University Press, 1983, especially chapter 7.
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as I have presented it here, but for my purposes I shall assume that it is 
enough to show that it does have to be so, at least according to 
Aristotle.48 He addresses the practical task of doing so towards the end 
of the Ethics. It is no easy task because most people have barely ever 
had a 'taste' of what is 'truly pleasurable': 'What discourse could ever 
reform people like that?' asks Aristotle. At most, we m ust be content 
with attaining only 'some portion of goodness'.49 Everyone though, 
regardless of whether or not arguments will sway them, m ust be given 
the means to a good life, such as food, clean water, security, and an 
education. It is one of the tasks of politics to provide the material and 
institutional basis for the development of a good character and the 
exercise of rationality; ethical lapses for Aristotle are due to 'bad 
politics', not original sin .50 Now the best means for an education in 
goodness is one undertaken by the state, where laws which 'cover the 
whole of life', from upbringing to occupation and to old age, are 
enacted to help foster and maintain the good hexeis of (certain) 
members of the population. One makes others better by supervision by 
acquiring the art of legislation, which involves a mixture of 
knowledge and experience grounded in a 'formed habit of m ind' 
enabling one to judge what 'is rightly enacted and w hat is the opposite, 
and what sort of legislation is suitable for different circumstances'. 
Failing 'a proper system of public supervision', it is up to the 
individual to help his own children and friends 'on the way to 
goodness' especially in the case of a father, whose authority has as 
'much force in the household as laws and customs have in the state, 
and even more'.
Another influential classical account of moral character is provided 
by Cicero in the De officiis. I have discussed this above in some detail,
48 On the intricate question of why moral virtue has to be acquired by habituation, see Bumyeat, 
1980, pp. 69-92; Engberg-Pedersen, 1983; and the excellent review of Engberg-Pedersen by 
Rosalind Hursthouse, ‘Moral Habituation’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. Julia 
Annas, vi, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, pp. 201-219.
49 Ethics, 1179b7-29 (p. 336).
50 See Martha Nussbaum, ‘Recoiling from Reason’ ( A review of Alasdair MacIntyre’s Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality?), New York Review of Books, December 7,1989, p. 41.
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so I shall move directly to the point. Remember there we saw Cicero
presenting a four-personae schema in the context of a general theory of
decorum, which presupposed a particular social structure, within
which are situated specific social roles and correlative styles of living.
One had to know oneself well in order to choose the appropriate role,
like an actor choosing the part to which he or she is best suited
according to their voice or build. And like Aristotle, our ability to
conduct ourselves appropriately was dependent on not only the
realization and acceptance of our nature, but our being instructed and
habituated to doing so, in such a way that we knew what the good
dem anded of us and how to act upon it over the course of our entire
lives. Moreover, and this is a point I want to make here, Cicero
emphasized that our nature - meaning our personal 'inclinations',
attitudes, and natural talent's1 - was basically given, and not subject to
modification. This is expressed in numerous places in the De officiis,
but perhaps no where more clearly than when he wrote;
In such deliberation (over which course of life a man should follow) all counsel ought to 
be referred to the individual's own nature. For just as in each specific thing that we do 
we seek what is seemly according to and how each of us has been bom...we must exercise 
much more care when establishing our whole way of life, so that we can be constant to 
ourselves for the whole length of our life, not wavering in any of our duties. Nature 
carries the greatest weight in such reasoning, and after that fortune. (DO, 1.119-120)
If I discover I have m ade a mistake in my choice of way of life (and
Cicero admits this can happen), I m ust change my behaviour and plans
to suit my true nature, and not vice versa. It is im portant to note the
emphasis Cicero places on the apprehension and cultivation of our
nature as a duty (officio) of the citizen A person bom  to rank who
does not justify it through his social and (especially) political conduct is
not w orthy of it, since he takes advantage of his rights w ithout
acknowledging his duties.
We know Machiavelli was familiar with these argum ents, and not 
just in some general way, for in fact, if we compare some of the 
elements of his conception of moral pychology (particularly in The 
Prince) with the classical ones mentioned above, there are striking
51 See the different examples Cicero provides in DO, 1 .109- 111.
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similarities. His famous letter to Soderini mentions the core of what 
he would deal with at length in Chapter 25 of The Prince, that "just as 
nature makes men with different faces, it also produces different kinds 
of m ind and temperament...(and) every man acts in accordance with 
the bent of his mind and temperament'.52 In chapters 19 and 25 he 
notes that a determining factor of a number of emperors who ruled in 
different ways (whether 'humane' or 'rapacious') was the nature of 
their conduct according to their various, fixed, qualita.: 'we are 
successful when our ways are suited to the times and circumstances, 
and unsuccessful when they are not'.53 Machiavelli also accepted the 
importance of instruction and habituation in the formation of 
character that we found in Aristotle and Cicero, not only in the way he 
uses the educative mirror-for-princes genre (however subversive he is 
of it), but in his explicit emphasis on the role of good education and 
good laws, about which I shall say more below.54 He also accepts the 
Ciceronian emphasis on the responsibility of the ruling class to live 
up to their nature and the duties therein; 'if he is a m an whose 
position makes him noteworthy...(I)t is not enought to say "I do not 
care about anything, I do not desire either honours or profits, I wish to 
live in retirem ent and without trouble"...Men of rank cannot decide to 
sit quietly even when they decide truly and without any ambition'.55 
Of course the tw ist Machiavelli puts on this classical perception of 
moral character is to reverse its significance; it was precisely the fixity 
of conduct which was the problem in the face of the slings and arrows 
of external circumstances and fortune.56 The truly virtuous prince
52 The Prince p. 98.
53 Prince, 25, p. 85-6; 19, p. 67. See also Discourses, III, 9, p. 452.
54 See Discourses, 1.4 (p. 114) Also, II.2 (p. 277 of Walker 1983 translation, missing in 
Gilbert 1965, see Quentin Skinner, 'Machiavelli on the Maintenance of Liberty’, Politics 
(Australian Political Studies Association), 18,2,1983, pp. 3-15, at p. 7 and n.35): ‘If one 
asks oneself how it comes about that peoples of old were more fond of liberty than they are 
today, I think the answer is that it is due to the same cause that makes men today less bold 
than they used to be; and this is due...to the difference between our education and that of 
bygone times’. Also Pocock, 1975,195-6.
55 Discourses, III. 2, p. 424.
56 Cf. Nederman, 1992, p. 12-13.
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needed a flexibility of action, and thus a flexible disposition and 
character. The 'new prince' had to be prepared to vary his conduct, to 
deviate from 'the right' when circumstances demanded it. It is this 
flexibility - 'considering everything carefully7 (as Machiavelli 
constantly asks his readers to do) - which as Nederman points out, is 
the 'core of Machiavelli's "practical" advice' in the Prince. And yet this 
sits uneasily with his belief in the 'giveness' of hum an character (that 
at least half of all our actions are beyond our effective control) and his 
general pessimism about hum an nature.57 It was indeed a 'volatile 
paste',55 and it is difficult for any modem reader to ever fully resolve 
this tension; it is an ambiguity which rests in the very center of 
Machiavelli's m ature political philosophy.
3.3 M achiavelli and m odernity 
Yet one recent powerful and influential reading of Machiavelli's 
political theory, and especially his concept of liberty, has taken a very 
different route than the one I have pursued up to now. In a series of 
articles,59 Professor Skinner has proposed an interpretation of
57 See the Discourses, 1.3 (p. 112). Also the discussion of how to establish ‘free government’ in 
corrupt cities at 1.18, where if called upon to create or maintain a republic in these conditions, 
one should strengthen the authoratative-monarchial elements within the constitution rather 
than democratic ones: ‘To try to make them become good in any other way would be either a 
most brutal or an impossible undertaking’, (p. 164) On this chapter and the complex 
relationship between The Prince and the Discourses in general, see the classic article by Hans 
Baron, ‘Machiavelli: Republican citizen and the Author of “The Prince’” , in Baron 1988. 
Pocock even suggests that at its height, cinquecento civic realism was *a kind of negative 
capability of the Aristotelian mind’ in showing just how difficult the maintenance of a 
republican order really was. Of course where there had already been a republic (as in Florence) 
the problems of a new regime trying to establish itself were of a different kind; Machiavelli 
addressed these in his Discursus florentinarum rerum and Istorie Fiorentine, both 
contributions to the constitutional debates in Florence following the death of Lorenzo de’ 
Medici in 1519.
58 De Grazia 1989, p. 77.
59 I shall list the relevant articles in full: Quentin Skinner, ‘Machiavelli on the Maintenance of 
Liberty’, Politics (Australasian Political Studies Association), 18,2, November 1983, pp. 3- 
15; ‘The idea of negative liberty: philosophical and historical perspectives’, Philosophy in 
History, ed. Richard Rorty, J.B. Schneewind, Quentin Skinner, Cambridge University Press, 
1984, pp. 193-221; ‘The Paradoxes of Political Liberty’, The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values, VII, ed. S.M. McMurrin, University of Utah Press, Cambridge, 1986. pp.227-50 
(reprinted in Liberty, ed. David Miller, Oxford University Press, 1991,183-205.); ‘The 
republican ideal of political liberty’, Machiavelli and Republicanism, ed. Gisela Bock, 
Quentin Skinner, Maurizio Viroli, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 293-309; ‘On 
Justice, the Common Good and the Priority of Liberty’, Dimensions of Radical Democracy: 
Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, ed. Chantal Mouffe, Verso, London, 1992, pp. 211
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Machiavelli's republican political theory which, he argues, is not only 
more historically accurate, but as a result can serve as a resource (or at 
least a 'moral') for our contemporary political discourse. There are two 
components to this kind of argument, as I noted above. Firstly a claim 
about a particular historical narrative, and secondly about how this 
narrative has meaning for us today.
Let us turn to the historical argument.60 I want to list a number of key 
points and then isolate those which I think are the most important, 
and which throw into relief the arguments I have sketched above - 
especially with regard to Machiavelli's understanding of hum an 
nature and hum an action, and his conception of liberty.
To begin with, there is a substantive connection between the freedom 
of the city and the individual liberty of the individual (or 'negative 
liberty7 as Skinner insists). This is because free states govern 
themselves according to their own will (l^y their own judgement7), 
which is the general will of the body politic, the citizens.61 This 
connection is not monist in nature argues Skinner, since different 
individuals value the liberty they derive from the existence of the state 
for different reasons, and pu t it to use for different purposes. If the 
prince looks carefully at w hat 'the reasons are that make them wish to 
be free', he will find that a small number wants to be free in order to 
rule, but that all the others ('who are countless') 'wish freedom in 
order to live in security7.62 Thus to be free is to be unconstrained from 
pursuing whatever goals one has, and the security to be able to do so 
can only be provided by a self governing community, a republican
224; and ‘The Italian City-Republics’, in John Dunn ed., Democracy: The Unfinished 
Journey 508 BC to 1993 AD, Oxford University Press, 1992,57-69 (especially at 65-69) 
Aspects of the historical argument are also discussed in Skinner, 1981, especially chapter 3; 
and in ‘Political Philosophy*, CHRP, pp. 430-452.
60 To keep the narrative moving, I shall refrain from citing each article from which the points 
come, and refer the reader to n.59 above for the complete list. There is a fair amount of 
repetition of the basic historical argument in all the articles.
61 Discourses, 1.2, p. 195.
62 Discourses 1.16 (p.237). This concept of security is crucial for Machiavelli (and for Skinner) 
both in relation to the state and the individual. I shall say more about it below.
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government.63 Now if a self governing republic is the only type of 
regime under which a community can obtain greatness and preserve 
the individual liberty of its citizens, how can it be brought about and 
maintained? By its citizens possessing civic virtue. W hat are these 
qualities? Firstly, there is the courage needed to defend one's 
community against external aggression and conquest, a task best 
carried out by those who have the most to lose - the citizens of that 
community. Individuals m ust cultivate the 'martial virtues' and place 
them at the disposal of the republic.64 We also need a dvic prudence - 
a knowledge of the art of the republic - which allows us to play an 
effective role in the dedsion making processess of the d ty , and to carry 
out our duties of public service. This can be displayed at two levels; by 
the prudent experienced statesmen and through the prudente 
ordinatore on the part of all (or at least many of) the dtizens.65 This is
63 See Discourses 2.2, p. 329. (Note that this is not the argument of The Prince) There is 
considerable debate over whether Machiavelli means that liberty can only be achieved in a 
republican regime, or if it could also be had in a principality or in a ‘kingdom’ such as 
France, about which he comments in a number of places in The Prince (chp. 19, p. 66 and 
chps. 4 & 5) and The Discourses (for example, L 16, p. 237-8, and 1.58, p. 31, where 
he says it is ‘a kingdom more tempered by the laws than any other kingdom of which we 
have notice in our times'). See Colish, 1971, and Skinner, ‘Reply...’, 1988, pp. 258-9. 
Viroli (1992, p. 131) insists that the vivere politico is a specific form of political 
organization which precludes tyrannies or despotic rulers, since it can never be a state of 
'somebody' but of everybody. Hence Machiavelli refers to ‘lo stato’ di France or del Turco in 
The Prince, and never in the language of politico or the vivere civile. Note that neither of 
these ways of describing either the ‘stato' ex the vivere politico (the respublica) ascribed the 
impersonal characteristics of the fully modem understanding of the state we see in Hobbes for 
example; see Quentin Skinner, ‘The State’, in Terence Ball, James Farr, Russell L. Hanson 
eds., Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, Cambridge University Press, 1989,90- 
131, especially at 102-112.
64 See Discourses 2.2, p. 332; 2.12, p.356,2.20, pp. 381-2; and passim. The Prince, chapters 
12, 13, pp. 42-51. On the centrality of the martial virtues to the civic humansit tradition as a 
whole, see Pockock, 1975, pp. 183-218, especially pp. 212-214 where he claims the popular 
republic is based on virtu of the armed citizen: ‘Virtuous republics were at war with one 
another. For this reason the Christian virtues and the civic could never coincide;
humility and the forgiveness of injuries could have no place in the relations between 
republics, where a prime imperative was to one’s city and beat down her enemies’. Cf. the 
discussion in De Grazia 1989, pp. 164-75 (showing a certain sensitivity on the part of 
Machiavelli to the awfulness of war); and Viroli 1992, pp. 162-4 (emphasizing that though 
indispensable to the growth and maintenance of the res publica, war should never be pursued 
simply for its own sake and only for the peace and security of the citizens).
65 On the prudence of the great statesman, see Discourses III. 25, and passim. On that of the 
wider public, see especially 1.9, p. 218: ‘though one alone is suited for organizing, the 
government organized is not going to last long if resting on the shoulders of only one; but it 
is going to last long if it is left to the care of many, and when its maintenance rests upon
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a commitment to the dvic equality (aequa libertas; cf. Cicero DO, 1.124) 
of the republic, ensuring that each humour has its place, those 
posessing the greatest virtue obtain the highest office, and that holding 
public office and acting effectively is indeed the way to demonstrate 
one's virtuous character. Every citizen must also cultive the 
willingness to avoid 'disordered' behaviour, and ensure that dvic 
affairs are carried out in a well ordered (ordinariamente) and well- 
tempered style.66 [As we shall see, this does not mean that there should 
not be a certain amount of dvic 'commotion'] Failing the presence of 
men of prudence who understand 'the andent forms of society7 and 
the art of the republic, and a population displaying the qualities of 
courage, civil prudence, and orderliness, communities cannot be 
expected to maintain their liberty.67 The catch is, as we have seen, that 
Machiavelli does not place great faith in the people ever coming close 
to cultivating these virtues, or maintaining any kind of constancy in 
appropriate conduct. Though there are good reasons in acting for the 
public good, political leaders and the people become blinded to the 
nature of their own best interests. This is because men's natures are
many*.
66 I think De Grazia (1989, p. 182) puts this well when he writes: ‘Dedication to the ideal of the 
common good and the equality it implies leads Niccolo to make a most intensive study of 
factions, of “the divisions”, “parts” or “sects” that arise within a state and work against the 
common good*.
67 As Machiavelli claims occured in the Tuscan republics of Florence, Siena, and Lucca. See 
Discourses, 1.55, p. 309. These capacities add up to a kind of ’mutuality’, where noone 
serves umilmente nor dominates superbamente. Compare the ’mutuality’ of Machiavelli to 
Cicero's emphasis on the centrality of justice to the human experience, which enhances the 
'communality' of humankind and reinforces their associative instinct (De Officiis, 1.20-41). 
Justice and temperance link 'the degree of concern for one's fellows to an appropriately 
sociable level*. Machiavelli’s discussion of republican order in his Istorie Fiorentine (1520- 
5), though emphasizing stability more prominently than liberty (as a way of convincing the 
Medici that there best strategy for ruling Florence was by way of a republican constitution 
rather than some veiled principality), is an excellent example of how it could ensure that 
every component of the city could find its place within its institutional framework. The 
Discursus expresses similar views with regard to ensuring that all three types of men in the 
city have their place. See Viroli 1992, pp. 166-73 for an excellent discussion of the whole 
context of this debate. Cf. CJ. Nederman, 'Nature, Justice and Duty in the Defensor Pacis: 
Marsiglio of Padua's Ciceronian Impulse', Political Theory, Vol. 18, no.4, November 1990, 
p. 625; Cf. Neal Wood, ‘The value of Asocial Sociability: Contributions of Machiavelli, 
Sidney and Montesquieu*, in Machiavelli and the Nature c f Political Thought ed. Martin 
Fleisher, Atheneum, New York, 1972,282-307.
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basically corrupt, and if left alone, will always place their own self 
interest above the interests of the community.68 Ordinary people are 
lazy and ignore their civic duties, and leading citizens are too often 
moved by personal ambition (ambizione) which corrupts the free 
institutions by warping them to favour a particular faction or social 
g r o u p s  Machiavelli neatly summarizes this towards the end of Book 
I of the Discourses: 'the people, deceived by a false image of good, many 
times desire their own ruin. And if somebody in whom they have 
faith does not convince them that what they want is bad and explain 
w hat is good, countless dangers and losses come upon the republic'.70 
This is the central paradox of Machiavelli's political theory, at least for 
Skinner; individuals think that their own interests lie in evading dvic 
duties and reshaping public institutions to suit their own ends, when 
in fact by doing so they undermine the free institutions and basis of the 
community upon which their individual liberty rests.
The 'deepest' and 'most troubling' question for republican writers 
then is 'how can naturally self-interested citizens be persuaded to act 
virtuously '?7! For Machiavelli the answer is quite straightforward
68 Discourses, 1.18, p. 242; 2.15, p. 361; 2. 22, p. 385-6.
69 On the laziness of the people, see the Discourses 1.30, p. 260; see also his argument at 2.2, 
p. 330-2, where Machiavelli accuses contemporary religion of glorifying ‘humble and 
contemplative men rather than active ones’, whereas ancient religion put the greatest good in 
the ‘grandeur of mind...strength of body, and in all the other things apt to make men 
exceedingly vigorous.’ On the ambition of the ruling class, see 1.8, p.216; 1.29-30, p. 257- 
60; I. 33, p. 265; and especially 1. 37, p. 272: ‘Whenever men cease fighting, through 
necessity, they go to fighting through ambition, which is so powerful in human breasts
that, whatever high rank men climb to, never does ambition abandon them’.
70 I. 53, p. 302. It is important to note that people habitually do so (as we have discussed 
above) as a result of bad training and education. Machiavelli is explict about this at 
Discourses 3.30, p. 496: ‘when they are men used to living in a corrupt city, where 
education has not produced any goodness in them, they cannot because of any 
emergency reverse themselves; but to gain their desire and to satisfy their perversity of mind, 
they are content to see the ruin of their country.’
71 Skinner, 1990, p. 304-5. On the self-interestedness of men see The Prince, chp 17, p. 59: 
‘men are excessively self-interested [and break the bonds of grattitude] whenever they see a 
chance to benefit themselves’. See the examples of such behaviour in chaps. 9 (p. 36), 22 (p. 
80), and 23 (p. 82). The key term here is ‘utility*, which remains a positive term only so 
long as it has no ill effect on the common good; in the Istorie one of the citizens accuses the 
opposition of being moved by the love of faction (loro propia ambizione) rather than by the 
common interest (utilita publica). See De Grazia 1989, p. 177. Cf. Tuck 1993, p. 39 for a 
different view; he suggests that the term self-interest ‘seldom’ occurs in Machiavelli.
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(though he considers a number of potential solutions before rejecting 
them); it is the laws that make men good, since 'by fear of punishment 
men are kept better and less ambitious'.72 Republican government 
(and government by princes) only lasts when regulated by good laws, 
because 'a prince who can do what he wants to is crazy; a people that 
can do what it wants is not wise'. Ideally, all citizens ought to be 
'chained' to the laws.73 Laws should prevent concentrations of power, 
bribery, and corruption, and a special magistracy should be established 
with the duty of guarding the liberty of the d ty  against any who seek to 
underm ine it. In essence, Machiavelli is making a (now) familiar 
argument that we must be forced to be free, based on two key 
assumptions; his pessimistic view of hum an nature, and the fact that 
since virtu is indispensable for the maintenance of public as well as 
personal liberty, our corrupt behaviour m ust somehow be neutralized. 
The law operates to channel the individual's behaviour in such a way 
that his reasons for action remain unchanged (self-interest), but their 
consquences do, namely, they promote the public interest and as a 
result, paradoxically, his own individual liberty. The 'channeling' of 
conduct occurs through the installation of a republican constitution 
founded on the proper mixing of the two hum ours we discussed 
above.74 This rivalry is exploited to the benefit of the community, 
since by the force of law the people are 'liberated' from the 
consequences of their natural corruption and transformed, so to speak, 
into virtuous citizens - as Machiavelli claims occurred in republican
72 Discourses, 1.29, p. 259; I. 3, p. 201. Machiavelli considers three other possibilities in the 
course of the Discourses - transcending selfishness by the inculcation of virtue by education 
(3.27, p. 490), via truly virtuoso leadership (3.1, p. 423 and Book III generally), and 
finally by manipulating the religious beliefs of the people (1.11, p. 225). He is pessmistic 
though, about their ability to overcome human nature, and moves to work with men ‘as they 
are’, and in general, that they exhibit a strong tendency to be corrupt. (1.17, p. 239-40) He 
returns however, to the potential of religion as an instrument of the public good, at 1.11, 
pp. 224-226.
73 Discourses, I. 58, p. 316.
74 As Tuck points out (1993 pp. 95-6) the idea of a mixed constitution as opposed to a balanced 
once becomes common by the end of the sixteenth century, as the language of self-interest 
begins to dominate political argument. Machiavelli, with all his concern for the proper 
mixing of humours in a vivere politico, is still very much within the language of mixed 
constitutions.
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Rome.75 There are two aspects of the application of law to the 
opposing humours which need to pointed out. The effectiveness of 
law derives in part from the fact that it is applied as impartially as 
possible, and seen to be so.76 Machiavelli provides a number of 
examples from Roman history to illustrate this point, including that of 
Coriolanus, who attempted to take back the rightful authority of the 
people and who was dealt with in a lawful and orderly fashion by the 
tribune acting in the interest of 'liberty' and the republic as a whole, 
rather than for the mob or for the benefit of a particular faction.77 The 
second point is that the law should be executed within a context of 
severity, fear, and terror, a point Skinner does not discuss (except for 
the 'fear of god', see below). To maintain newly gained liberty, 'Brutus' 
sons' must 'suffer some striking prosecution' - i.e. be killed - if a free 
state is to maintain itself. There will always be 'sons of Brutus', and 
indeed there m ust be, so that such exemplary acts can take place in 
order to refresh the memory of the population for the need to act 
virtuously and to obey the law.78
Machiavelli also proposes that religion be enlisted in the same 
process, since Roman history shows 'how helpful religion was in 
controlling the armies, in inspiring the people, in keeping m en good, 
in making the wicked ashamed'. Yet we know he was no fan of
75 Discourses, 1.4-5, pp. 202-206: 'those who condemn the dissensions between the nobility 
and the people seem to me to be finding fault with what as a first cause kept Rome free, and 
to be considering the quarrels and the noise that resulted from those dissensions rather than 
the good effects they brought about’ As Viroli points out (1992, pp. 160-2), Machiavelli is 
hare going against the prevailing Ciceronian conventions of other humanist writers and their 
overiding concern with concord as a means of stability. He thinks that social conflict is 
unavoidable and probably beneficial (as it was in Rome) if the constitution of society (the 
vivere politico) was such that it did not degenerate into civil war.
76 In his 'Allocation to a Magistrate’ ( transl. AJ. Parel, Political Theory, 18,4,1990,525-7), 
Machiavelli provides a definition of justice which includes the need to 'defend the poor and the 
weak...restrains the rich and powerful...It produces equality which being the mainstay of 
states is desirable in every state*. He exhorts citizens to ‘close your eyes, plug your ears, and 
bind your hands’ when called upon to judge in the context of the law. Cf. De Grazi, 1989, p. 
177 (who provides translated excerpts from the same text).
77 Discourses, 1.7, pp. 212-213. Machiavelli considers in turn, ‘calumny’ (1.8), the 
establishment of the Decemvirate (1.35,40-46), and the position of Dictator (1.33-34).
78 Discourses, HI. 3, pp. 424-25. Machiavelli even recommends that these executions should 
take place every ten years, to help guard against corruption (III. 1).
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'm odem ' religion, but that of the ancients, which kept men down to 
earth, and was more conducive to underlining, rather than 
undermining, support for the common good. Practically this meant 
enacting laws concerning religion which insisted on the absolute 
sanctity of oaths, thus presenting the political leadership with the 
option of imposing oaths of virtuous behaviour upon the 
population.79 Again it is claimed, as in the case of the general use of 
law, that this will not change people's actual dispositions, but will 
coerce them into not evading their public duties, since if they are 
religious they will want to keep their promises and avoid the w rath of 
god.
I want to isolate two key points upon which Skinner places a great 
deal of emphasis in his interpretation of the 'Machiavellian self' and 
liberty. The first is his insistence that Machiavelli, and the 'classical 
republican theory of liberty' in general, 'never' argue that individuals 
are moral beings with determinate purposes, and it is not therefore a 
condition of the realizaton of our liberty that certain purposes be 
f u l f i l le d .80 Thus for Skinner, they defend a 'purely7 negative view of 
liberty as the 'absence of impediments to the realisation of their chosen 
ends'.81 On this view, liberty is reduced from being some kind of 
exalted end of hum an fulfillment, to simply the instrum ental means
79 Discourses, 1.11, p. 224. On the Machiavelli’s disdain for ‘contemporary’ religion, and 
respect for ancient pagan theology, see, aside from die Discourses, the Art of War, where his 
insistence on military oaths being binding on both the body and the soul (i.e. that breaking 
them was a sin) was taken up (and implemented) by his protege Giannotti in his proposals for 
the militia (Dicorso di armare la citta di Firenze,1529). There is an excellent discussion of 
the role of oaths and ritual in this period along with fascinating historical detail of the events 
of the Late Republic in Trexler 1980, pp. 535-9. On oaths and political control, especially in 
the context of the late sixteenth and seventeenth century, see Harry M. Bracken, ‘Minds and 
Oaths’, in his Mind and Language; Essays on Descartes and Chomsky, Foris Publications, 
Holland, 1984,67-82. See also Parel, 1992, pp. 52-4, 61-2.
80 Skinner, 1990, pp. 306-7. In Skinner, 1983, pp. 5,10, he talks of how the individual in 
Machiavelli is not being asked to bring his desires in line with a ‘higher self in living 
according to the laws.
81 Skinner, 1990, p. 307. In another article in the same volume, Skinner claims that even 
amongst the pre-humanist republican writers (to whom Skinner shows Machiavelli to be 
closely related), there was a sense of each being left to pursue their own interests, and to live 
‘unconstrained’ in a ‘free way of life’. See Skinner, ‘Machiavelli’s Discorsi and the pie- 
humanist origins of republican ideas’, in Bock, Skinner, Viroli eds.,1990, especially pp. 131, 
134.
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for the satisfaction of particular desires.82 The reason no determinant 
ends can be given is that republican writers accept that there is a wide 
variety of hum an aspirations and goals in the community, and the 
liberty to pursue these ends can only be protected by preserving a 
constitution whose laws do not allow us to interfere with others, and 
whose duties ensure the community survives.83 The common benefit 
of a Tree community7 is for some, the power of enjoying freely one's 
possessions 'w ithout any anxiety...feeling no fear for the honour of his 
wom en and his children, of not being afraid for himself', in other 
words, 'to live in security'. Others want to be free in order to rule, and 
to gain the honour, glory, and power that accompanies it.84 Moreover, 
cities that are organized to acconiodate and protect the different 
aspirations and goals of its population, and thus the regime itself - i.e. 
which are liv ing  in freedom' - enjoy huge material gains. Their 
populations are larger since men are able to take advantage of marriage 
and produce children who will be T)om free and not slaves' and 'by 
means of their abilities' could eventually rise up through the ranks 
and become leaders in the community. Free cities are more 
prosperous too, since each man 'gladly seeks to gain such goods as he 
believes, when gained, he can enjoy7, without fear of them being taken
82 For a similar view aimed at debunking Pocock’s argument that Machiavelli sees the 
experience of citizenship as essential to the fulfillment of human nature, see Vickie B. 
Sullivan, ‘Machiavelli’s Momentary “Machiavellian Moment”; A Reconsideration of 
Pocock’s Treatment of the Discourses’, Political Theory, 20,2, May 1992,309-318, 
especially pp. 312-313.
83 Ibid. Skinner makes the same point in all the articles mentioned above. Cf. Pocock, 1975, 
pp. 193-213 (and chapter 7 passim): ‘in the last analysis all depended on virtu as a quality of 
the individual personality, a devotion to the respublica which rested on political, moral, and 
economic autonomy ...success was a function of virtu and virtu was a matter of the autonomy 
of personalities mobilized for the public good’. (212-213) Pitkin, 1984, pp. 92-95,246-
7:’The fraternity of Citizens implies genuine conflict...(but) there is no mere selfish or 
lupine factionalism here, nor any fantasy of automatic, painless unity... Such a city offers 
each Citizen, each class of Citizens, the genuine possiblity of fulfilling individual needs, 
pursuing separate interest, expressing real passions’. (92-3) And De Grazia, 1989, pp. 186- 
190.
84 Discourses, 1 .16, pp. 236-7. Also, I. 5, p. 204; I. 6, p. 208.
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by the state or his neighbour.85 And yet this too was always under 
threat by the natural ambitiousness of both the ruling class and the 
plebs. W herever established legal methods did not suit their 
burgeoning ambitions the two 'classes' used 'extraordinary7 methods to 
further their desires. This was particularly true in the case of the greed 
of the ruling class, but was also true of the plebians, who for example 
in the Reman republic, sought to revive the Gracchi agrarian laws and 
in so doing destroyed it. Thus a well-ordered republic ought to 'keep 
their treasuries rich and their citizens poor7.86 The habits of civic 
virtue were perpetually under threat, even when evoked by the 
coercive apparatus of the law.87
But can we really describe Machiavelli's concept of liberty as one that 
is 'purely negative', with the degree of hum an autonomy and variety 
in the choice of way of life that this m odem  concept implies? Is it a 
kind of freedom devoid of 'determinate purpose', or the presence of 
some objective will other than the desire to safeguard one's own 
personal liberty? Skinner's argum ent is compelling and presented 
with considerable skill, bu t I think he makes at least three major 
claims with regard to Machiavelli's concept of liberty which are, at the 
very least, questionable. The first is the enormous emphasis Skinner 
places on the individual nature of republican liberty,88 which he sees 
as flowing from the consequences of recognizing how Machiavelli 
(and other republican writers including Cicero) recognized the 
diversity of different perceptions of liberta in the community. And 
flowing from this, how republican liberty secures the prosperity and
85 Discourses, II. 2, pp. 332-3. Also, I. 10, p. 222: ‘In those (kingdoms) governed by good 
emperors, he will see a prince secure in the midst of his secure citizens, the world full of 
peace and justice; he will see the Senate with its authority, the magistrates with their 
honours, the rich citizens enjoying their riches, nobility and virtue exalted; he will see the 
utmost tranquility and the utmost good*.
86 Discourses, I. 37, p. 272.
87 This is what Machiavelli means when he speaks of ‘corruption* - the rise of factions, 
overmighty citizens, lazy nobility and citizenry etc. See Discourses 1. 55, pp. 306-310. See 
the discussion in Pocock 1975, pp. 208-10.
88 To wit, Skinner, 1990, p. 134; ‘only under elective regimes are individuals able to live a free 
way of life, unconstrained by any unjust dependence or servitude* (emphasis added). See also 
pp. 303, 305,307.
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enjoyment of the property and possessions of the citizens without fear 
of it being lost. Yet, as we have seen in the discussion preceeding the 
presentation of Skinner's argument, the crucial passage from 1.16 of 
the Discourses (upon which much seems to rest), where Machiavelli 
identifies the two 'hum ours' of the community is not as clear-cut as 
implied. N ot only do individuals have less scope to follow whatever 
goals they might have due to a combination of the intransigence of 
their basic natures, the quality of the 'times' and fortuna, but when 
Machiavelli talks about different ways in which the people want to be 
free, he is talking primarily of two humours - two social groups - and 
only then individuals as members of these groups. It is a sociological 
observation (gleaned from Aristotle) rather than a juridical definition 
of the relationship between the governed and the governors. Political 
society is composed firstly of the two humours, and then the 
individuals in these humours; it is not an amalgamation of 'free 
individuals', each pursuing his own vision of the good. Individual 
security derives from the political structure of the republic being such 
that the two hum ours are able to 'vent7 themselves within the context 
of the rule of law, preserving a (fragile) social balance and the two ways 
of 'being free'. Liberty can only be sustained through virtue, and the 
arts of the republic, whether civil or military, m ust be ordered for the 
sake of the common good of all the citizens Thus the relation between 
liberty and the consitutional and institutional order of government is 
certainly not external and contingent.89 Politics and the vivere 
politico m ust shape and educate the passions and lifeplans of its 
citizens, it m ust represent and foster the republican ethos. There is 
undoubtedly a sense in Machiavelli, though mainly implicit in his 
discussion of justice and 'm utuality ' for example, that people can be in
89 John Dunn comes to the opposite conclusion, and makes a link between Machiavelli’s 
concept of liberty (based entirely on Skinner's account) and what he calls ‘modem liberty’ - 
defined as 'tenaciously defended rights of private enjoyment and self-expression’. See his 
‘Liberty as a Substantive Political Value’, in Interpreting Political Responsibility; Essays 
1981-1989, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990,61-84, especially p. 78. Nevertheless, I am 
greatly indebted to it.
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part transformed into citizens. This occurs when they bring their 
partial and selfish needs into the political structure to meet those of 
other citizens, and in the process have them redefined collectively in 
relation to the common good. Here conflict is not merely resolved 
through the coercion of law, but mediated by it, and through these 
political struggles, citizens discover the value of the rules and 
principles through which they channel their desires.90 This is nothing 
like a total transformation of self, but it does involve taking a 
particular stance toward oneself, a mode of self-cultivation where one 
attempts to match one's nature with the laws, helped along by the 
institutional matrix and reinforcing ethos of the community.91
That republican theory explicitly recognized the importance of 
property rights and the security of enjoying one's private possessions 
(including the security to dominate one's family w ithout hindrance) is 
an im portant point, and Skinner is right to emphasize it. It is always 
discussed though, at least in Machiavelli and in Cicero, in the context 
of one's responsibility to the state and to others. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, Cicero always spoke of property and the enjoyment 
of private possessions in relation to the fact that 'm an was not bom  for
90 See the Discourses 1.28, p. 256, where Machiavelli discusses how Roman citizens trusted 
each other more than the Athenians since ‘her liberty was never taken away by any of her 
citizens’ and thus ’she had no strong reason for suspecting them and...for injuring them 
inconsiderably’. See 1.58, especially p. 314-15, and 3.1, p. 420, for a discussion of the 
difficult but necessary actions taken by citizens, for example, in the case of the Ten Citizens’ 
and Maelius the corn merchant Pitkin, 1984, chapter 4 passim, is very suggestive on the 
issue of transformation, especially, pp. 92-3. Pocock, 1975, pp. 193-4, suggests that the 
most subversive message of the Discourses is that men do not need the superhuman in order 
to become citizens, ’but achieve citizenship in the world of time and fortune’, and thus 
Machiavelli was looking for the social means whereby men’s natures might be transformed. 
The legislator’s virtu becomes less important than the social and educational processes he sets 
in motion. Cf. Viroli 1992, pp. 164-5. And See Pocock’s discussion of Giannotti’s use of 
militia service in the riformazione of men into citizens (pp. 292-4), and Trexler’s too (1980, 
p. 529), who argues that his belief in the role of ’formal structures’ in fostering virtue (learnt 
from Machiavelli) pervaded his military, religious, and political thought as a whole. The 
importance of discipline and training is a consistent theme of The Art of War.
91 Peter Donaldson makes a similar point: ‘When one begins to see that Machiavelli sometimes 
writes of self-transformation, of the preparation of of the spirit for difficult choices, one soon 
realizes that he always writes this way, and in fact never discusses technique in isolation from 
moral and psychological questions (Machiavelli and the Mystery of State, Cambridge
University Press, 1988, p. 184).
119
himself alone', and must therefore consider the interests of 
individuals in such a way that it 'benefits - or at least does not harm - 
the Republic'. Machiavelli is equally explicit that it is the 'common 
good' and not the 'individual good' which makes cities great, and that 
its benefits and importance to the many far outweigh the few who 
might be hurt by it.92 Moreover, Machiavelli bitterly criticizes any 
retreat into the particulare, citizens should
love one another...decline faction...prefer the good of the public to any private 
interest...how much better would those princes have done...if they had endeavoured to 
imitate the ancients in bearing hardships and inconveniences, in performing such 
exploits as were done in the sunshine and not in the shade.93 
The possession and enjoyment of 'things' in classical republican theory
does not play the role in the relation between personality and liberty
that it does in natural law theory, where we really do see the
emergence of 'the subject'. It is an important corrective to a simplistic
interpretation of republicanism that implies it denies individuals the
right to possess anything other than a shared use of public things, but it
is certainly not the case that republican citizens defined each other
primarily as individuals who possess and administer 'things' in the
course of pursuing their own life plans and enjoyments. Machiavelli is
inbetween the classical and m odern age when it comes to conceiving
the object of sovereign power within the principality. By this I mean
the way in which the 'body politic' is still very much a body,94 and less
a complex of men and things. Though an 'art of government' is
involved in both, and Machiavelli can be said to have contributed to
the emergence of w hat James Harrington would call 'm odem
prudence' more than a century later, when talking about the vivere
politico Machiavelli was still very much in the realm of the ancient
republican 'arts of government'. The two cannot be reduced to each
other (at least not yet). At the risk of oversimplification, in one
92 Discourses, 2.2, p. 329.
93 The Art of War, I, 10,12. See Fontana, 1992, p. 32-33, for a discussion of this in relation 
to Tacitus.
94 As Skinner notes, Machiavelli’s use of the body metaphor is ‘pervasive’. Skinner, 1984, p. 
209.
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instance (to be schematic, up to the early decades of the sixteenth 
century) sovereignty was exercised on a territory, and only secondly on 
the inhabitants in it. In the other instance (say, from the late sixteenth 
century onwards), what 'government' has to do with is not only 
territory but men in their relations and activities, and with the 
'inventory7 of that territory - wealth creation, resource development, 
the means of subsistence, and issues of climate, fertility, famine, and 
public health. In other words, Machiavelli is still some way from 
addressing himself to the problematics of 'population' in the way it 
would begun to be understood in the late seventeenth and m id­
eighteenth centuries, and thus he still relies mainly on a vision of 
social order which has a compressed view of a private realm of 
enjoyments, separate from the organic structure of the political body.
The line between enjoying private goods within the context of the 
public good, and a corrupt privatization into the particulare, was 
draw n according to the nature of the current threat to the collective 
interests of the citizens. Civic virtue (or prudence) - the cognitive 
source of duties - thus took priority over private enjoyments 
whenever the future viability of the republic was threatened. Given 
w hat we know of Machiavelli's sense of the fragility of public 
institutions in the face of external and internal threat, the 
intransigence of hum an character, and the ravages of fortuna, this is 
not an inconsiderable task for the practice of civic virtue. At the very 
least, it implies that the possession of virtue, of some kind of account 
of the qualities necessary to live a good life, is a precondition for the 
maximization of liberty.95
The republican personality was conceived in the realm of public 
action, within a set of given parameters (defined by cultural 
convention and law) within which one found one's place according to 
the knowledge of one's own nature, hum our, and character, and to
95 Cf. Dunn, 1990, pp. 74-78. Also, see Pocock, 1975, pp. 316-7.
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which one was led by eduation, habituation, and law.96 We should not 
confuse the recognition of difference on the part of classical republican 
theory with the recognition of the uniqueness of each individual. One 
cultivated oneself in the sun, in the bright light of the public space, not 
under some private shade.97 It seems strange then, at least here, to 
describe Machiavelli's concept of liberty as falling into either the 
negative or positive variant of m odem  characterizations of liberty. If 
there is a sense of 'freedom from' or 'freedom to', it is being free from 
the oppressiveness of a corrupt and greedy ruling class (or an 
ambitious and unruly popolo), to act in accordance with the 
personality we recognize as our 'own'; but only in its interaction with, 
and recognition from, our family, friends, patrons, and fellow citizens 
in the context of specific cultural and political forms.
But Skinner is making more than a point about the particulars of 
Machiavelli's concept of liberty (and the classical republican theory in 
general), he is arguing that in presenting the theory in the m anner that 
he has (as an 'act of excavation')98, he is able to provide a concept of 
liberty which transcends the apparent limitations of our conventional 
conceptual tools and can serve to remind us to think again in ways we 
thought we couldn't. It is, on his account, to unravel a m odern 
paradox; how can it be rational, if we wish to ensure our own 
individual liberty, to assign the common good a priority over and 
above our individual desires and aspirations? The claim is rendered 
paradoxical by historical blinders put in place by the hegemony of a 
series of conceptual assumptions contemporary contractarian liberal 
theory has inherited from the seventeenth century, namely, the 
language and param ountcy of rights. The paradox is resolved, claims 
Skinner, in the way the retrieval of the classical republican case
96 See the wealth of detail and information in Trexler 1980; he shows how much Florentine 
‘civic equality’ was essentially governed according to a complex, hiaerchial, patronal network 
(which Machiavelli was, to a certain extent, reacting against in hisTate republican writings).
97 Skinner, 1990, p. 306, cf. p. 134.
98 Skinner, 1992, p. 223.
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(submerged ever since Hobbes' infamous put dow n)" enables us to 
'perceive some unfamiliar yet plausible connections between the ideals 
of justice, liberty, and the common good', and offers us a way of 
'connecting these concepts' which though decidedly non-liberal in 
orientation, are not in the least 'anti-liberal in its values'.100
The mechanics and goals of this methodological strategy have been 
outlined above in the introduction to part 1, so we are now in a 
position after examining the historical claims made on its behalf, to 
consider its fruit. Remember that the point of it all is to enlarge our 
present understanding of the concepts we employ in social and 
political argument and to overcome the 'unrecognized constraints' on 
our imaginations. The moral value of this is to provide a richer 
picking of conceptual possiblities from which we can begin to construct 
our own response to the present. In the case of our understanding of 
liberty, contemporary liberalism - and here Skinner means Rawls, 
Rawls' 'enthusiastic followers', Ronald Dworkin, and libertarians101 - 
is in danger of 'sweeping the public arena bare of any concepts save 
those of self-interest and individual rights'.102 Hence the need to
99 In Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, e& C. B. Macpherson, Penguin, 1988, Chapter 21, p. 
266-268.
100 Skinner, 1992, p. 217.
101 A rather imprecise list since libertarians hardly have much in common with Rawls or 
Dworkin, and are only ‘liberals’ as we currently understand it in the sense that they have more 
in common with nineteenth century laissez-faire liberalism. The most blatant disjunctive 
between the two camps lies in their understanding of the value of equality; the former consider 
it fundamental to contemporary liberalism, the latter do as well, but only in identifying 
precisely what is wrong with it  In the article where Skinner identifies these targets (1992, 
pp. 215,222; compare Skinner, 1983, passim.) he begins by considering Rawls but ends by 
rounding on the libertarians. It is unclear whether (a) he considers them to be espousing 
relatively the same position but to different degrees, or (b) the last paragraphs of his article 
deals separately with the implications of the libertarian position and contemporary responses 
to it. The distinction is important because if he holds to (a), I think his argument is based on 
a rather one-sided reading of Rawls (how Skinner thinks the social demands of the difference 
principle, for example, square with Rawls’ supposed assumption of a ‘maximum degree of 
non-interference compatible with the minimum demands of social life’, we are not told), and if 
it is (b) he is flogging a dead horse (at least in my view).
102 Skinner, 1992, p. 222. There is a certain tension here between Skinner’s claim that 
contemporary liberalism is too concerned with self-interest (which I share) and his claim that 
Machiavelli’s republican account of ‘pure negative libeity’ is relevant to us because it 
recognizes the importance of self-interest in human relations and incorporates it into its 
theory.
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'engage with the limitations' of current liberal thinking on liberty (this 
is what Skinner is doing) by excavating classical republican theories of 
citizenship. Far from providing blueprints for the construction of our 
political culture ('we must learn to do our own thinking for 
ourselves'), they serve mainly as a 'warning' (or a 'lesson') that unless 
we prioritize our civic duties over individual rights, we will find our 
individual rights themselves underm ined.103 The contingency of 
arrangements deconstructed here is the assumption that liberty is 
always and only maintained by protecting ourselves from the 
constraints and interference of social duty, imposed by some 
overarching idea of the common good.104
But is it only that a theory of rights m ust have a complementary 
structure of duties that Skinner wants to point out in making the 
connections he does between the two tradition's conceptions of liberty 
and the common good? He seems to want an alternative to the choice 
between an 'Aristotelian' assumption that a healthy public life m ust be 
founded on an objective idea of the good, and liberalism 's' emphasis 
on the priority of personal liberty. The key surely lies in the nature of 
our understanding of the common good, and not simply in the way 
every system of equal rights presupposes a set of correlative duties, 
which most liberal theories do anyway.103 Skinner is implying that by
103 Skinner, 1969 (1988), p. 66; 1991, p. 205; 1992, p. 223.
104 Skinner associates the priority of liberty over social duty with Rawls’ own priority of 
liberty principle in his theory of justice. This is entirely plausible though he does not 
(in any of his articles comparing Machiavelli and Rawls) take into account the 
modifications Rawls makes to his principle in his 1982 Tanner Lectures, including the 
point that we are not to think that ’priority is assigned to liberty as such, as if the 
exercise of something called “liberty” has a preeminent value and is the main if not the 
sole end of political and social justice’. See John Rawls, ‘ The Basic Liberties and Their 
Priorities’, in S.M. McMurrin, ed. The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Vol. 3. 
University of Utah Press, Utah City, (pp. 5-6). I take up these issues in greater detail 
below.
105 Even Dworkin, who seems to be Skinner’s real target here, notes that rights based theories 
rely on particular codes of conduct which prescribe duties, (though only instrumentally so as 
a means to protect the rights of others); ’The man at their center is the man who benefits 
from others’ compliance, not the man who leads the life of virtue by complying himself. 
See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Mass., 1977, especially pp. 172 - 177 (p. 172). It is important to note that the context of 
Dworkin’s discussion of rights is in relation to utilitarian political theory, which he saw as
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positing an idea of the common good which includes the 
unconstrained personal liberty of individuals to pursue their own 
aspirations and goals without an attentendant conception of 
'interference' which rules out the need to perform a wide range of 
public duties, Machiavelli is able to connect personal liberty and the 
common good in a way modem liberalism cannot. In other words, he 
implies that given that any kind of monism is untenable, and that 
different conceptions of the good are incommensurable, a pluralist 
theory (one that respects the personal liberty of individuals to pursue 
their own aspirations and interests) legitimates a system of negative 
liberty which imposes duties to preserve the system as a whole (and 
thus the liberty of each). At this point, some m odem  theories invoke a 
principle of neutrality to evade the charge that they are simply 
replacing one theory of the good with another. Machiavelli, of course, 
does nothing of the sort. For him there is a common good - the 
m aintenance of the vivere politico (which is the best way of life) and 
the glory of the republic - and everything else is subordinate to this.
Nor does he speak about negative liberty as such, or at least so I w ant to 
argue, bu t instead, the freedom and recognition gained by acting 
within a realm determined by the inculcation of virtu via a proper 
education and the coercion of good laws in the context of one's persona 
or rank to which one is best suited according to one's nature. It is 
assumed by m any liberal theorists and their interpreters that given the 
'fact of pluralism ', any substantive connections between liberty, the 
self, and the common good are dissassembled, especially in its 
Rawlsian variant. Of course classical republican theory, at least as I 
have presented it here, does not do so. The danger however, is to 
think that as a result there is a conceptual chasm between classical 
republican theory and contemporary liberalism - at least with regard to 
liberty, agency, and the common good - when in fact, it could be
the dominant tradition in need of critical attention. As it has faded from the intellectual 
scene, it is interesting to note how Dworkin’s attentions have increasingly turned towards 
discussions of 'community' and ‘liberal foundations’.
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argued, that both types of theories make a number of similar demands, 
though differing in all sorts of other ways (for example, as languages).
I want to try and demonstrate some of these connections when I turn 
to an examination of liberty and self in Locke in the next chapter, and 
some contemporary liberal theorists later on.
Of course one of the great advantages of Skinner's work is to show 
the 'chasms' between our political languages and the past whilst at the 
same time insisting on their relevance. He wants to show how 
classical republican theory was able to connect 'purely negative' 
personal liberty with a rigorous system of public duties. I also want to 
point ou t the way in which classical republican theory maintained a 
connection between liberty, personality, and the common good which 
we find strange according to our liberal dispositions. We cannot afford 
to simply leave the opposition between 'republicanism' and 
liberalism ' as it is, because in doing so we run the risk of obscuring the 
kind of objectification that is occurring in our contemporary world, in 
the way we interpret and institutionalize the relations between liberty, 
the self, and the common good. We are shaped by our free acts in a 
world exploded not only in its organizational complexity, but in our 
relation w ith 'things' mediated through the increasingly anonymous 
and fragm entary forces of international 'high-technology' 
capitalism.^06 There is a need to see the connections between liberty 
and self that goes beyond simply assuming (or hoping) that the 
relation is one of an autonomous pursuit of of our chosen ends, or a 
rigid identification with some objective will. The architecture of 
classical republican theories provide a comparative advantage. It is the 
strangeness of a concept of liberty neither strictly negative or positive 
that is of interest here: an opportunity to re-think the relations all 
together.
106 These new conditions are being identified and addressed increasingly by theorists outside the 
usual Marxist, structuralist, and post-structuralist genres. See in particular, J.G.A. Pocock, 
‘The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times’, Queen’s Quarterly, 99,1, Spring 1992,33- 
55; and Dunn, 1990, chapters 4 ,5 ,11 ,12 .1 address some of these claims in detail in part II 
of this thesis.
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Chapter 4: Liberty and virtue
4.0 Introduction
It is perhaps not suprising that one consequence of the enormous 
scholarly attention paid to the political theory and history of classical 
republicanism has been the claim of its radical separateness from other 
traditions, especially that of natural law (jus naturale), or the 
'discipline of dvil law (jus civile)', as Samuel Pufendorf called it.1 The 
rise of republicanism has been linked to challenging the supposed 
Lockean hegemony in the development of m odem  political theory, 
and particularly in the history of the founding of the United States and 
its attendant legitimating set of ideas, or ideology.2 Secondly, and 
relatedly, it is linked to the methodological developments in the 
history of ideas (mentioned above in the Introduction to Part 1), with 
the emphasis shifting to the study of linguistic and practical 
conventions (or paradigms), and a rigorous approach to establishing, as 
closely as possible, the context and structure of political arguments. 
Two of the key theorists of this change have also been two of the most
jr
prom inent 'republican revisionists' - Professor^/ Pocock and Skinner. 
Applying their methodological principles to this period in general, and 
above all, to the poltical theory of Machiavelli (and its transmission 
and development in Northern Europe and the United States), they 
have excavated and made available a vivid language of classical 
republican theory. A third reason is connected to the peculiarly 
American context of this revisionism, where 'the return ' of civic 
republicanism is linked to a specific perception of the politics and 
culture of late m odern American society: a valueless, amoral 
population bound together by little more than self-interest and the
1 Perhaps the clearest expression of this difference is found in Pocock’s “Virtues, rights, 
manners’ in Virtue, Commerce, History, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985,37- 
50, especially p. 39: ‘the two vocabularies (civic humanist and jurisprudential) were 
outstandingly discontinuous...because they premise different values, encounter different 
problems, and employ different strategies of speech and argument’.
2 In particular, attacking the thesis of Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An 
Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution, New York, Harcourt 
Brace, 1955.
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desire to be left alone, living on an impoverished understanding of the 
public good. This perception is not limited to the United States, of 
course, bu t a number of key studies have investigated the nature of the 
American revolution with an eye towards identifying nutritive 
lineages from which the heirs of that revolution could draw  - whether 
they be Americans, British, Canadians, whatever - to revitalize 
contemporary political argument and practices.3 Finally, it is connected 
to a critique of specific aspects of contemporary normative political 
theory, and in particular, that stemming from its Rawlsian and 'post- 
Rawlsian' variants. Here, theorists see civic republicanism as either an 
alternative tradition and framework to neo-Kantian liberalism (or at 
least a supplement to it), and as a buttress to communitarian 
arguments against the (supposed) atomism and proceduralism of 
Rawlsian liberalism. The tradition provides them with a viable 
vision: a vision constitutive of ideologies and practices from the past.4
3 Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment (1975) could be said to be directly aimed at the 
American context, though he never explicity says so. But see the new introduction to the 
reissue of Politics, Language and Time, University of Chicago, 1989.lt has served as a key 
point of reference for a number of American theorists though, see Bernard Bailyn, The 
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, Cambridge M.A., Harvard University Press, 
1967; “Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of Revolutionary Thinking”, in 
Conceptual Change and the Constitution, ed. Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock, Lawrence, 
University of Kansas Press, 1988; Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth Century 
Commonwealthmen: Studies in the Transmission, Development and Circumstance of English 
Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II to the War with the Thirteen Colonies, 
Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1959; Gordon Wood, The Creation of the 
American Republic, 1776-1787, New York, Norton, 1972. Also Robert Shalhope, “Toward a 
Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American 
Historiography”,William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., 29,1972,49-80; “Republicanism and 
Early American Historiography, William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., 39,1982,334-
56...For a consideration of the relationship between gender and civic republican virtues, see 
Pitkin, 1984, and Ruth H. Bloch, “The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary 
America”, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 13,1987,37-58.]. Though used 
by left-leaning critics, it is certainly not exclusively so. Aside from Pocock, see Senator 
Orrin Hatch, “Civic Virtue: Wellspring of Liberty, National Forum, 64,1984,34-38., as 
well as the civic republican overtones of public service and civic responsibility in the work of 
Lawrence Mead and Charles Murray. Of course a number of the most influential scholars 
working in this tradition are not American - Pocock himself, Skinner, Charles Taylor, 
Maurizio Viroli, etc.
4 The connection between communitarian ism and civic republicanism is made explict in the 
work of Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor. See Sandel, ‘Morality and the Liberal Ideal’, The 
New Republic, May 7 1984, pp. 15-17; ‘The State and the Soul’, The New Republic, June 5 
1985, pp. 37-41; ‘Democrats and Community, The New Republic, February 22 1988, pp. 20- 
3; ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, 12,1,1984,81
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These are all plausible reasons (and the list is not meant to be 
exhaustive) for pursuing civic republicanism in opposition to 
liberalism (or a history of liberalism), but there might also be reasons 
for seeing some connections where previously we only saw 
differences. In the two chapters that follow I want to relate the classical 
republican framework sketched in chapters 1-3 to its 'rival' tradition of 
natural law, especially as it manifested itself in the seventeenth 
century, and particularly in the work of John Locke. However instead 
of setting out to demarcate a strict boundary between the two traditions 
and languages, I w ant to concentrate on certain connections between 
them, especially with regard to the structure of the relation between 
the concepts of liberty and self. I do not want to underestimate their 
numerous substantial differences, and I am not proposing to argue that 
we wholly collapse any distinction between them in an act of 
conceptual alchemy. Rather, in concentrating on the concepts of 
liberty and self and their relation to each other, I want to stand back 
and look to see if there are not similarities or at least structural 
resemblances where it is claimed that one tradition is doing something 
the other is not, or more strongly, cannot. In general, this will require 
making an argum ent that certain claims of civic republican theorists
96; and [1990]. For Taylor, sec Sources of the Self, The Making of the Modern Identity, 
Cambridge University Press, 1989; ‘Cross-Purposes: The Liberal - Communitarian Debate’, 
in Nancy Rosenblum ed. Liberalism and the Moral Life, Cambridge Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1989; and ‘Alternative Futures’, in A. Cairns and C. Williams eds., 
Constitutionalism, Citizenship, and Society, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1985 
(where Taylor distinguishes between communitariansim and civic republicanism). See also 
Cass Sunstein, ‘Beyond the Republican Revival’, The Yale Law Journal, 97,8, July 1988, 
pp. 1539-1590 (part of a symposium on republicanism; this article is one of the best 
contemporary applications of republican principles to liberal political theory and jurisprudence 
and I am greatly indebted to it). Cf. Philip Petit, ‘The Freedom of the City: A Republican 
Idea*, in Alan Hamlin and Philip Petit eds., The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the 
State, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1989, pp. 141-168; and Philip Petit and John Braithwaite,
Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, 
pp. 54-85. Similar views have been put forward by a wide range of legal scholars connected 
to 'Critical Legal Studies’, see for example, Mark Tushnet, ‘Following the Rules Laid Down: 
A Critique of Interperetivism and Neutral Principles’, Harvard Law Review, 96,1983 (but see 
Don Herzog's nifty debunking of CLS' crude interpretation of liberalism - 'As Many as Six 
Things Before Breakfast’California Law Review, 75,2,1987,609-630). See also the 
discussion in Ian Shapiro, Political Criticism, Berkeley, University of California Press,1990, 
especially part 3. I will be returning to the issue of the relation between liberal political 
theory and civic republicanism and communitarianism below.
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(and their exponents) against liberalism are rendered less potent, or at 
least transformed, given a particular interpretation of the history of 
liberalism ', and the grounds of particular theories and concepts 
therein.5
The other point I want to explore over the next two chapters has to 
do with w hat I see as an inherent tension within many liberal theories, 
and certainly in the texts and arguments of those theorists emerging 
out of the natural law and social contract traditions of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. This is, the relationship between an 
assum ption of an individual's 'natural' liberty and autonomy upon 
which the act of contract is founded (and thus the legitimacy and scope 
of government), and the very basis of that autonomy itself being a 
product of a particular kind of regime of government; i.e. autonomy 
itself as an 'artefact7 of government. If classical republican theory 
assumed a particularly tight relation between the moral personality 
and a form of government embodied in the promotion of the 
common good through virtuous conduct, then early proto-liberalism, 
far from completely disassembling the connection, changed the 
contours and inserted new relations. This is evident from the way a 
num ber of natural law theorists concerned themselves with the very 
nature of the autonom y of the individual - the internal obstacles they 
faced as a result of deficiencies of 'natural design', character, training 
and habit, or externally by the insecurity engendered by social disorder, 
war, and poverty. Thus we find highly theoretical discussions 
concurrent with, or followed by, extensive discussions on the nature of
5 Pocock has invited such a reading in identifying that it might be more useful to adopt a 
pluralist picture of the formation of modem political thought - hence the need to destroy the 
‘myth of Locke and the obsession with liberalism* (‘The myth of Locke and the obsession 
with liberalism’, in J.G.A. Pocock and Richard Ashcraft eds., John Locke, Los Angeles, 
William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, University of California,1980,1-24), and 
secondly, by leaving open the possiblity that these two ‘rival* languages have in fact, in 
various contexts, been used interchangeably by writers in both traditions. (1980, p. 12).
James Tully has addressed Pocock’s contribution to our late modem understanding of Locke in 
his excellent “Placing the Two Treatises”, in Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain: 
Essays in Honour of John Pocock, ed. N. Philipson, and Quentin Skinner, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993. I am very grateful to Professor Tully for providing me 
with an advance copy of his article in the course of writing this chapter.
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the self and human conduct, sometimes along with a series of 
theoretical and practical suggestions for the inculcation of a particular 
set of dispositions.
It is also important to try and understand the nature of 'duty ' within 
this tradition in comparison with classical republican theory, since it is 
often argued - as we saw above - that liberalism prioritizes rights over 
duties to such an extent as to threaten the very plausibility of the 
concept. Duty is a key mediating concept between liberty and self, since 
it sets the limits of possible actions and identifies the nature of certain 
purposive ones, for example, in the name of some common or public 
good. Is liberalism's understanding of duty radically different from 
that of classical republican theory? One must be careful here to specify 
particular historical arguments and avoid painting traditions as 
complex as those of 'natural jurisprudence' and liberalism with too 
wide a brush - hence my concentration on Locke, and just a few other 
relevant theorists.
W ithin this overall context, I am interested in delineating the 
possiblity of their being a 'civic liberalism' with attendant liberal 
virtues' and 'liberal conduct7. Is this outside of w hat we currently 
understand to be constitutive of our m odem  understanding of 
liberalism and its history, or has it been submerged in the attem pt to 
distinguish two radically different traditions utterly critical of each 
other and thus ontologically incompatible? Is there a relationship 
between these two traditions beyond the fact that they are constantly 
opposed to each other? W hat is Locke's relationship w ith the values, 
doctrines, and texts of classical republicanism? In chapter five I will 
concentrate more on the other side of the tension I have mentioned 
above, and look at Locke's concern for establishing a proper 'relation to 
self', and the epistemological, psychological, and practical grounds for 
the establishment of an 'art of governing men right in society'.
4.1 Virtuous structures: Rome, Athens, or Jersualem?
I want to be clear about setting the limits to m y consideration of these
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aspects of civic republicanism and liberalism by attempting to provide 
a sketch of seventeenth century English republican theory, distinct 
from its other 'rival' theories and languages.
The most systematic exploration of republican ideas took place in 
England in the course of three general political crises; the Interregnum 
1649-60 where writers struggled to provide an alternative to kingship 
following the execution of Charles I, the tensions of 1675-83 provoked 
by a threat of absolute monarchy and Catholic succession, and finally 
the post 1688-89 constitutional discussions concerning the expansion of 
executive power, corruption, and the persistence of a standing army in 
peactime.6 In each case, sophisticated arguments were pu t forward 
which were invoked, added to, and developed from a body of 
republican thought based on the ancient commonwealth of Rome (and 
to a lesser extent Sparta), and as reworked into the classical vision of 
the republican theories of Renaissance Italy in both of its 'new7 and 
'old' hum anist variants. This background was not only limited to self­
identified republicans. As Professor Todd has demonstrated, a 
considerable part of the Turitan m ind' and social ideology was 
informed by a classical, albeit Christian, hum anist background, 
providing a bridge of sorts, a basic mentalitef between  two seemingly 
different world pictures. At a very basic level, both were fighting 
against the perceived growth of conservatism and authoritarianism, 
and both believed in the possiblity of social and moral reform, though 
it was here that the real fault lines began to appear - for example 
between the pessimism, millenarianism, and elite exclusivity of high 
puritanism, and the mildly optimistic beliefs concerning m an's reason,
6 See Blair Worden, "English Republicanism", in The Cambridge History of Political Thought 
1450-1700, ed. J.H. Bums with the assistance of Mark Goldie,Cambridge University Press, 
1991,443-475,443-4; "Classical Republicanism and the Puritan Revolution”, History and
Imagination: Essays in honour of H. R. Trevor-Roper, ed. Hugh Lloyd-Jones, Valerie Pearl, 
Blair Worden, Holmes and Meier Press, New York, 1980,182-200 for a discussion of the 
first of these phases. Cf. Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government: 1572-1651, Cambridge 
University Press, 1993, pp. 221-53 and chapter 6 passim. Also, J.A.I. Champion, The 
Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken: The Church of England and its Enemies, 1660-1730, Cambridge 
University Press, 1992.
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sociability, and 'natural' liberty of the republicans.7 Republicans were 
also passionately critical of 'priestcraft' (a phrase coined by James 
Harrington8) for all sorts of reasons; they blamed them for Europe's 
wars of religion, for the erosion of civic virtue, thought them 
responsible (in part) for the development of Tory authoritarian 
political theory, and generally criticized them for meddling in political 
affairs to the detriment of good government. And they had little time 
for the rigors of Calvinist doctrine either, showing general affinities 
with both Arminian and Socinian critiques of Calvinism.9
Yet republicans were not wholly opposed to the idea of religion, just 
the way in which it was taught and used by their contemporaries, 
similar to the way Machiavelli was harshly critical of the 'wrong kind' 
of religion he saw responsible for weakening the republican fibre of the 
Italian city states.10 Indeed there is much in the work of Harrington for 
example, that portrays political activity as a kind of religious activity; 
the commonwealth 'a minister of God upon earth', a monarchy where
7 Worden 1991, p. 471-75; 1980, p. 193-5, passim. Todd 1987, pp. 1-17,53-95. This tension 
is perhaps best exemplified by Henry Nevile, great friend of James Harrington and author of 
the classic Machiavellian treatise Plato Redivivus, who was accused of ‘atheism’ (in 1659) in 
Parliament when he was reported to have said - in the accompaniment of three clergymen - 
that ‘he was more affected by reading Cicero than the Bible’.
8 As Champion (1992) has discovered.
9 For example, Pocock argues that there is a Socinian streak in Harrington, see Pocock 1977, p. 
109. For a general discussion and more references, see Worden 1981, pp. 193-5.
Arminianism is a complex designation in the context of mid seventeenth century religious 
debates, and was often used pejoratively, especially in the early 1640’s. Arminian theology 
sought to reconcile the ideas of God’s providence and freedom of the will, and to tranform ‘the 
elect’ into those who used their restored freedom of the will (pace the Atonement) to obey 
God’s will and ‘persist in righteousness’. See Warren L. Chemaik, ‘Christian liberty in 
Marvell and Milton’, in Freedom and the English Revolution; Essays in History and 
Utterature, R.C. Richardson, G.M. Ridden, eds., Manchester University Press, 1986, pp. 70- 
1.
10 Champion 1992 passim is a brilliant attempt at proving this; see in particular pp. 171-3 
where he sets out his case against the ‘secularist analysis’ of English republicanism: ‘The 
emphasis upon the political is, I suspect, a legacy of Victorian scholarship. It is easy for the 
“modem” mind to grasp the “realities”, the “public” nature of politics with its creeds, 
programmes, dogma and mundane character. “Religion” for the rational mind, has become 
marginalized into the internal tabernacle of private belief, without the implications of a public 
profile*, (see n.5, p. 172 also) But Cf. Tuck 1993 (pp. 221-3), who claims that even by the 
1640’s and 1650*s, English revolutionaries and republicans were using all the key words of 
the new humanism - such as ‘interest’ and ‘necessity’ - in very much a ‘modem’ way. And see 
also Shelly Burtt, Virtue Transformed: Political Argument in England 1688-1790, Cambridge 
University Press, 1992, pp. 39-86, who reinstates a distinction between a ‘religious politics 
of virtue’ and a ‘republican politics of virtue’.
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'God is King, in as much as reason, his dictate her sovereign power'.11 
In part, the appeal to a theocracy was one way of attacking the 
independent position of the clergy, since all citizens are equally free 
under God in his kingdom. This was to attack priestcraft's monopoly 
of the mediation between god and mankind, which rested more on 
ideological and economic power, according to Harrington, than it did 
on divine or scriptural authority. Though not going as far as the 
Puritans in believing in the transparency of the meaning of scripture 
to everyone (Harrington thought a proper analysis of scripture was 
necessarily philological one and thus required the right kind of 
university education), a spiritual republic in principle was a priesthood 
of all believers, where the keys were left to all.12 But there is also a 
stronger sense, especially in Oceana (1656), that the restored republic is 
'both Israel and Rome redivivus...Christ's kingdom returned ', an 
'im m ortal com m onwealth'.13 The point, following Tertullian, was to 
build both Rome (or Athens) and Jerusalem.14 Generally, in keeping 
with Machiavelli, religion remained the business of the state, where 
national religion and private conscience were not exclusive spheres, 
but stood together. The reformed civil state was the last bastion of 
uncorrupt religion, and though a certain plurality of sects and 
accompanying consciences could be allowed, a highly centralized 
apparatus of civil religion was needed to temper anarchic private
11 J.G.A. Pocock, The political works of James Harrington, Cambridge University Press, 1977, 
pp. 323, 338; see also pp. 329-30, 332-3,572,574.
12 On the issue of ordination and scriptural interpretation see Harrington 1977,217-18,251, 
306-7 (Oceana), 679 (The Art of Lawgiving). See Mark Goldie, ‘The civil religion of James 
Harrington*, in Anthony Pagden ed., The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern 
Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 197-222.
13 This aspect of Harrington is discussed in Pocock 1975, chapter XI passim, and especially at 
pp. 396-400,399. But note that Pocock immediately qualifies this by saying that ‘only a few 
of the types and shadows attending the serene edifice of Oceana are millenial (p. 399). See also 
Worden 1991, p. 472. Generally on millenarian thought see Firth, The Apocalyptic Tradition 
in Reformation Britain 1530-1645, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979. But Cf. 
Champion 1992, pp. 197-8,201-208, who rejects this millenarianist account
14 Harrington 1977, p. 161,421,545. On the relationship between seventeenth century 
republicanism and reforming religion, and especially radical puritanism, see Goldie 1987, 
especially at pp. 203-209 on Harrington’s “breathtaking” syncretism of the Graeco-Roman 
polis and the Hebraic-Christian apocalyptic. I am deeply indebted to this fine article.
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'enthusiasms' and the corrupt self-interest of the clergy; T hat there 
may be liberty of conscience, there must be a national r e lig io n '.is For 
Harrington the 'popish clergy7 were deeply ingratiated into the 
authoritarian structures of the monarchy. Through their 'lands' and 
positions as great counsellors of kings, they had offered the 'divine 
right of kings' as a quid pro quo for a defence of their economic and 
political power, which was the 'secret of that antipathy which is 
between a clergy and a popular government, and of that sympathy 
which is between the mitre and the crown'.i6 This deep distrust of the 
structures of papal religion and the machinations of the clergy, along 
with a desire to get the relationship between religion and the 
commonwealth right, was also present, of course, in Hobbes, and to a 
different extent, in Locke.
There was a strong equation between the corrupt state of current 
monarchies and the corrupt state of the contemporary church, and 
between the restoration of a true commonwealth with the return of a 
truly Christian republic. Harrington constantly makes this analogy, 
perhaps most dramatically when he notes that just when Tiberius was 
m urdering the (Ciceronian) liberty of Rome, Pilate was m urdering 
Christ.17 Thus Oceana, the restoration of Athens and Jerusalem, was 
also the restoration of liberty, delivered from the imperium of the 
monarchy, nobility, and bishops. For Harrington a free republic was 
necessarily Christian and its civil liberty identical to Christian liberty;
15 Harrington 1977, p. 767 (Aphorisms Poltical). For the details of the proposed national church 
of Oceana, see Harrington 1977, pp. 214-26, and especiall p. 251 where Harrington outlines 
the duties of the ‘council of religion’, the ‘arbiter* of the commonwealth in cases of 
conscience, and having in its care ‘the national religion and the protection of the liberty of 
conscience’.
16 Harrington 1977, p. 563 (The Prerogative of Popular Government, Bode II). On the 
harmonization of national religion and private conscience, pp. 185,204,251,681. Goldie 
1987, pp. 207,219-20. See also Jonathan Scott, ‘England’s troubles: exhuming the popish 
plot’, in Tim Harris, Paul Seaward, Marie Goldie eds., The politics of religion in restoration 
England, Oxford, 1990,107-31; and ‘The rapture of motion: James Harrington’s 
republicanism’, in Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner (eds.) Political Discourse in 
Early Modern Britain, Cambridge University Press, 1993.
17 Harrington 1977, p. 186: ‘Not was the liberty of conscience infringed by this government till 
the civil liberty of the same was lost, as under Herod, Pilate, and Tiberius, a three-piled 
tyranny’. Goldie 1987, pp. 210-11.
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the freedom of the polis was the freedom promised by the Gospel, and 
as Goldie writes, Tauline Christianity (taught) the reconstruction of 
the the Athenian polity'.18 But it also presents two potentially 
conflicting accounts of freedom; the perfect freedom of service (to 
God), free from oppressive and 'inappropriate' authorities and free to 
respond to God's providence and to labour in his service, and a more 
pluralistic and individual kind of freedom, a liberation 'to be' wholly 
free from any warping authority. This is a crucial break point between 
English republicanism and the discourse of radical puritan theorists, 
though we m ust resist the urge to paint too stark a difference. It is 
im portant to recognize that very few writers in the seventeenth 
century spoke of freedom in the second sense, but there were various 
degrees of emphasis with regard to the first which opened the way for 
the eventual propagation of the second. Taken in the first way, liberty 
and authority are not polar opposities but instead related to the 
question of the reconstitution of authority in order that the 
'appropriate' and 'well directed' authorities had the liberty to act.
To be chronologically schematic, we might say that this was the case 
for the language of liberty in the 1640's and 1650's. In the pamphlets, 
treatises, and 'discourses' of this period we do find shared assumptions 
concerning dvil and religious freedom (this is not to say these two 
freedoms are equivalent or m utually exchangeable), even amongst the 
complex doctrinal and scriptural squabbles of the various sects. Firstly, 
to talk of dv il liberty was to talk of living under known rules, and to 
be free from the arbitrary will of men or authority, in short, to live 
under law. This was to set the stage for making a distinction between 
liberty and 'license', though of course, there were no universally
18 Harrington 1977, p. 332 (Oceana): “Now if you add unto the propogation of civil liberty, 
what is so natural unto this commonwealth that it cannot be omitted, the propogation of the 
liberty of conscience, this empire, this patronage of the world, is the kingdom of Christ. For 
as the kindgom of God the Father was a commonwealth, so shall be the kingdom of God the 
Son*. See also pp.186-7,764-7 (Aphorisms Political), especially XXIII, XXIV, XXXVII, 
XLV. Goldie 1987, pp. 209, 211.
136
agreed upon characteristics defining the former against the latter.19 
Secondly, to talk of religious liberty inevitably meant to talk of the 
inherent sinfulness of man, and not to talk about self managment or 
personal autonomy. As Issac Pennington Jr. wrote, 'Man is so selfish, 
blind and corrupt to his very root...he cannot be just either to his 
neighbour or himself' and thus he 'cannot be free in himself, nor free 
from himself (while self is in him, it will make him selfish) and while 
it is so, others under or within his reach cannot be free' . 20 William 
Penn claimed that 'the government of conscience belongs to God, and 
cannot be delegated to another', or even to oneself.21 The main 
arguments for liberty of conscience, as Professor Davis has ably shown, 
related more to m an's incapacity for self-government than to claims 
for self management; 'every man', warned Richard Vines in 1644, 
'm ade now a shibboleth of his own private conscience to the end that 
liberty of all sorts was promised including liberty of sensuall lusts, and 
fleshly looseness' . 22 As the tone of the quote implies (and there are 
many m ore one could cite)23, private conscience and personal liberty 
were closely associated with the depravity of the 'fleshy will', and the 
pyschological and spiritual confusion of 'license'. The point was to 
submit oneself to God not 'Self', and to play a disciplined role in the 
'economy of God', with (Godly) discipline as the concomitant
19 John Milton provides a good example of this: ‘this is got by casting pearl to hogs;
That bawl for freedom in their senseless mood, 
And still revolt when truth would set them 
free.
Licence they mean when they cry liberty;’ 
Sonnet XII, J. Carey and A. Fowler eds. The Poems of John Milton, London, 1968. See also 
Warren L. Chemaik, ‘Christian liberty in Marvell and Milton’, and Roger Howell Jr., 
‘Cromwell and English liberty’ in Richardson and Riddle 1986, pp. 45-71.
20 Issac Pennington Jr., Divine Essays, 1654, pp. 22,63-5; The fundamental right, safety and 
liberty o f the people, 1651, A3. In J. C. Davis, ‘Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in 
the English Revolution’, Historical Journal, 35,3, 507-30, at p. 514-15.
21 William Penn, The great case of liberty of conscience once more briefly debated and defended, 
1671.
22 Richard Vines, The impostures of seducing teachers discovered, 1644. Davis 1992, p. 515, 
516. Haller 1955, p. 125. As Davis puts it; ‘Conscience is the fax machine which, well 
serviced, keeps us in the closest communication with the Divine Will* (p. 519).
23 See for example those in Davis 1992 and Lamont 1986.
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condition of 'liberty' - the unimpeded submission to 'His' will.24 It is 
claimed by a number of historians that this was so even for the 
Levellers, who though less prone to millenial speculation and 
absorption in providential observation, still saw liberty of conscience 
as the liberty not to submit to any other authority but God.25 At root 
this was also linked to a concern for social regulation and the 
maintenance of order, something Catholics, Anglicans, and Puritans 
all agreed was necessary whatever their disagreements about w hat the 
means and content of that regulation were. Generally, the difference in 
approach to methodologies of social control lay on the one hand 
between a belief in the reformation of behaviour as dictated by the 
individual conscience, and on the other, an unquestioning obedience
24 The concept of the ‘economy of God’ is found in Jeremy Taylor, The liberty of prophesying, 
1647. William Lamont has been one of the key historians of the role of discipline in puritan 
theology in the seventeenth century, as well as his ‘Pamphleteering’ (1986, especially pp.
76- 80), see Godly rule: politics and religion 1603-1660, London, 1969, and his commentary on 
C.H. George in Past and Present, XLIV, 1969,133-46. Puritan social theory is a vast topic; 
see classically Christopher Hill, Puritanism and Revolution, 1972; and The Intellectual 
Origins of the English Revolution, Oxford, 1965. Cf. with Margo Todd, Christian 
Humanism and the Puritan Social Order, Cambridge University Press, 1987.
25 See for example John Lilbume, (Strength out of weakness, 1649, pp. 21-2) where he says 
that ‘no power on earth is absolute but God alone*, and that it is a ‘obnoxious Tyranny, to be 
resisted by all’ when a power or magistracy degenerates from the power dependent on him and 
‘betakes it selfe to its crooked and innovating will’. Also, in his An Impeachment o f High 
Treason against Oliver Cromwell (1649), where he declares that ‘The great end wherefore God 
sent man into the world was that he should do good in his generation, and thereby glorify 
God in his generation’ [in Haller and Davies eds., The Leveller Tracts 1647-53, New York, 
1944, pp. 405-7] I am glossing an enormously complex and difficult issue here. See Davis 
1992, pp. 526-29; also his “The levellers and Christianity”, in B.S. Manning (ed.), Politics, 
religion, and the civil War, London, 1973. Also Brian Manning, “The Levellers and 
religion”, in J.F. McGregor, B. Reay eds., Radical religion in the English Revolution, 
Oxford, 1984. Lamont 1986, pp. 85-89, does see somewhat of a break occurring at 1649, 
with ‘two different world views in collision’, and the gradual emergence in the 1650’s of 
what C.H. George called ‘humanistic and secular perceptions”’.(George 1968). Also the 
“Introduction” by Richardson and Ridden 1986, who argued that the Levellers (‘Arminians of 
the Left*) were able to harmonise their belief in God’s grace, with their secular belief in the 
universal natural rights of man, by conceiving of grace as ‘freely available’ (pp. 10-12). For 
a different view which argues that the Levellers woe ‘modems’ in important ways, and whose 
ideas were ‘democratic’, ‘strikingly secular’, and marked ‘the birth of modem political 
theory’, see David Wootton, ‘The Levellers’, in John Dunn ed., Democracy; The Unfinished 
Journey 508 BC to 1993 AD, Oxford University Press, 1992, 71-89, especially pp. 76-81; 
also, his ‘Leveller Democracy and the Puritan Revolution’, in J.H. Bums ed. (with the 
assistance of Marie Goldie), The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, 
Cambridge University Press, 412-42. Cf. the modem emphasis in Tuck 1993, pp. 240-251. 
Of course, even the Levellers saw the need for individual freedom to be curtailed by the civil 
power in the public interest, and weren’t anarchists in the least, hence the more radical 
Diggers insisting that they were ‘true’ Levellers.
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to constituted authority. As we saw above (in chapter 3), it was the 
social criticism and 'right conduct' of Christian humanist writings that 
laid the foundation for many of the protestant reformers of the 
seventeenth century. Their emphasis upon reform 'from the ground 
up ', and the inculcation of virtue as a means of grounding and 
preserving the godly commonwealth corresponded to the religious 
accountability of the protestant 'saint'.26
One of the most important texts in the development of a distinctly 
protestant casuistry was William Perkins' A Discourse of Conscience 
(1596), which, along with the rest of Perkins' works, became an 
influential part of the education of young Puritans at university 
(especially at Cambridge and the Inns of Court), and in the sermons of 
leading preachers, for most of the seventeenth century.27 Perkins (a 
Calvinist) defines conscience as being 'of a divine nature...placed by 
God in the m idst between him and man':
we leam that God doth watch over all men by a special providence. The master of a 
prison is known by this to have care over his prisoners, if he sends keepers with them 
to watch them and to bring them home again in time convenient (-?) and so God's care to 
man is manifest in this, that when he created man and placed him in the world he 
gave him conscience to be his keeper to follow him always at the heels and to dog him 
(as we say) and to pry into his actions, and to bear witness of them all.28 
The only power capable of binding conscience was god's - 'inferior
authority cannot bind the superior' - any other was a 'popish opinion'.
This served to underm ine not only the obvious sense of medieval
hiaerchy and 'great chain of being', but the jurisdiction of protestant
hiaerchy as well, who were replaced in their 'judgement-seat' by the
'tribunal seat' of conscience, 'the highest judge that is or can be under
G od'.29 Thus, social reform was an intensely individualistic affair, in
26 Todd 1987, p. 176.
27 William Perkins, A Discourse of Conscience: wherein is set down the nature, properties, and 
differences (?) therecf: as also the way to get and keep good conscience, 1596, Cambridge, 
John Legate Printer. See also William Perkins, Workes, Volume I, London, 1616. William 
Haller, The Rise of Puritanism, New York, 1938. Christopher Hill, The Century of 
Revolution 1603-1714, London, Sphere Books, 1969, pp. 78-79; Puritanism and Revolution, 
London, 1958, pp. 235-7; Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England, Panther, 
1969, passim (but particularly pp. 136, 304-5,368-9). Todd 1987, chapter 6 passim.
28 Perkins 1596, p. 8 (Spelling modernized).
29 Perkins 1616,1 p. 528-30; 1596, p. 51. Hill 1964, p. 304. Todd 1987, pp. 176-7.
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the sense that the work of reform began with the conscience and the 
need to reform one's conduct in light of a direct relationship with god. 
However much this took place within the individual though, it was 
directed outwards towards the carrying out of god's will for the benefit 
of the community. Here is another important aspect of Perkins' 
writings, that is, his discussion of the concept of 'calling', particularly 
in his A Treatise of the Vocations, or Callings of Men..30 A  calling was 
a 'certain kind of life' ordained and imposed on man by God, 'for the 
common good'. Men had to 'employ themselves in service for the 
Church and commonwealth', their every action geared to the 
edification of a godly commonwealth. The only distinction that 
m attered when it came to the type of work one did, whether 'the 
wipings of shoes and such like', was that one did it 'renewed in spirit 
and born again in in Christ's flesh', so that 'however gross they appear 
outwardly, yet are they sanctified'.31 Again, the emphasis upon self- 
reform is similar to what we find in Christian hum anist writings of 
the early decades of the sixteenth century, including an exhortation to 
'examine thyself, and to arrange one's life and actions, however 
(seemingly) unim portant and minute, to harmonize with the will of 
god and his sanctified community. As Samuel W ard wrote, conscience 
was 'God's lieutenant, and under him the principal commander and 
chief controller of m an's life'.32 Professor Todd (and others) have 
shown that this was a conscience aware of its duties to its god, its 
calling, its family and its neighbours, in short, to the viability of the 
social order as a whole. Hence the Puritans' 'endless tracts, treatises
30 In Workes 1616, Volume I.
31 See George and George p. 128,139. Perkins 1616, vol I, pp. 758,773. Todd 1987, p. 194, 
n. 53 for references to other similar points made by William Ames, Conscience With the 
Power and Cases Thereof, 1639; Richard Baxter, Practical Works, Volume I. See John 
Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke; A Historical Account of the Argument of the 
Two Treatises of Government, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969, chapter 18 et 
passim, for a discussion of the concept of the puritan ‘calling* and Locke’s “chilling” version 
of it. See also Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, chapter 13 et passim.
32 Samuel Ward, A Balme from Gilead to Recover Conscience, London, 1612, pp. 17-18. See 
Todd 1987, p. 201.
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and sermons on family government, education, recreation, vocation, 
economic behaviour, poverty, drunkeness, idleness etc...aimed 
precisely at the goal of a well ordered commonwealth'.33 The 
connection between rigorous personal discipline and constructive 
social reorganization is an important theme running from the old and 
new hum anism  of the sixteenth century throughout the seventeenth 
century up to Locke, and was linked to an appreciation and revival of 
classical stoicism and an intensification of concern for the care of the 
self.
But is this Puritan social theory, especially in the miilenarianist 
context of the Interregnum, conceptually compatible with the classical 
republican language and values I have been discussing above? Might 
the closeness of the two languages, both in terms of shared influences 
(classical and hum anist)34, and political concern (to reconstitute the 
polity), be one way of showing the complex interplay between 
traditions that we miss when we separate them as analytically and 
conceptually distinct? As much as it seems that in Harrington, for 
example, the m oment of republican recreation was either a 'neo-pagan 
marvel' or a work of 'apocalyptic grace which acted in history', there
33 Todd 1987, p. 202. See also Paul A. Fideler, ‘Poverty, Policy, and Providence: The Tudors 
and the poor’, in Pauli A. Fideler and T.F. Mayer eds., Political Thought and the Tudor 
Commonwealth: Deep Structure, discourse, and disguise, London, Routledge, 1992, pp. 212- 
13. Micheal Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints, New York, 1972, (see for example, p. 
213).
34 Humanism was pervasive in college curriculums at both puritan and non-puritan colleges of 
Oxford and Cambridge throughout the civil war and Interregnum. Professor Todd’s study 
(1987, chapter 3 et passim) of library listings, commonplace books, and notebooks of puritan 
as well as Anglican students of the 1640*s and 1650’s, shows the persistence of Greek and 
Roman classics (especially Cicero and particularly his De Officiis, Seneca, Xenophon, 
Aristotle, among the most popular), as well as sixteenth century humanists such as Erasmus, 
More, and Vives. General publishing trends in the period also show this. Erasmus’ Adages, 
Enchiridion, and various versions of his Colloquies, along with works by Vives and More, 
were all very popular and published in multiple editions. This broadness of learning survived 
both conservative challenges (defenders of traditional scholastic techniques) as well as the 
desire of some radical reformers to narrow the study of ‘humane letters’ considerably.
The relationship between seventeenth century protestant political theory and the classical 
tradition is crucial to understand, which often it isn’t, since it is assumed puritan theorists are 
doing something entirely new (from the end of the sixteenth century onwards), and thus to be 
distant from Greco-Roman theory in a way the classical republicans were not. The work of 
Pocock, Oestreich, Skinner, Tuck, Goldie, and especially Todd has begun to change this 
perception, and Worden 1980 is seminal in this regard.
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are im portant differences which need to be brought out, and in so 
doing, limit any comparison of 'classical republican' and Interregnum 
puritan languages.35
Before continuing it is important to try and indicate the general 
character of republican theory beginning to emerge in the early and 
mid - seventeenth century. 'M odem ' republicanism, as distinct from a 
more pure 'classical republicanism', emerged out of both the old and 
new hum anism  of the sixteenth century, that is, an attem pt to 
accomodate at least some of the values and themes of the earlier 
republican humanism which had been swamped by the rise of 'reason 
of state'. However both variants displayed the two fundamental 
characteristics of the new form of political argument; the prevalency of 
the language of interest (public and private) and a general sympathy 
for a balanced aristocratic constitutionalism.36 Whereas the language 
of interest and necessity had been used in Europe to defend autocratic 
and absolutist regimes (and to a certain extent, continued to be; Charles 
I used it to argue his case with Parliam ent), 'm odem ' republicans in 
the early and mid-seventeenth century (especially in the United 
Provinces and England) turned it against princes (or entrenched 
constitutional orders) when they insisted on the public or common 
interests of 'the people'.37 The beau ideal in mid-seventeenth century 
England for example, was an 'Elective Aristocracie' , where legitimate
35 On Harrington’s millenarianism see Pocock 1975, pp. 396-8; and J.G.A. Pocock, The 
Political Works of James Harrington, Cambridge University Press, 1977, see the “Historical 
Introduction**, p. 17. C f.. Champion 1992, pp. 201-2. I agree with Dr. Champion’s 
argument that John Toland’s edition of Harrington’s Works (1700) is an indispensable source 
for understanding its Stoic and pantheistic context, as opposed to Pocock’s emphasis on its 
millenarianist tones. However Pocock’s views on this are highly complex and ambivalent, 
see for an excellent discussion, J.C. Davis, ‘Pocock’s Harrington: Grace, Nature and Art in 
the Classical Republicanism of James Harrington’, Historical Journal, 24,3,1981,683-697; 
and similarly, Scott 1993.
36 See the lucid discussion of the development of early seventeenth century Dutch and English 
modem republicanism (as opposed to ‘classical* republican theory) in Tuck 1993, pp. 157- 
169, 202-259.
37 Thus in voting to formally establish England as a Republic, the Commons declared that the 
king and the power of his office had been ‘unnecessary, burdensome, and dangerous to the 
liberty, safety, and public interest of the people of this nation’. S.R. Gardiner, History of the 
Commonwealth and Protectorate, London, 1894,1 p. 3; in Tuck 1993, p. 250.
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governing authority rested in a council of elected wise men (though 
not democratically via any 'mass politics' or universal franchise) and 
the precise constitutional form - i.e. whether a prince existed alongside 
this elected council of primores or not - was left mainly to pragmatic 
concerns. Harrington's republican vision was somewhat different, as 
we shall see, but he too unhesitatingly uses the language of 'interests'.
My concern here is to highlight the renewed concentration in 
republican theory between politics, psychology, and ethics in relation 
to the 'ancient prudence', or republican arts of government, which 
theorists such as Harrington distinguished against 'm odem  prudence', 
or the arts of private interest. Even more generally, a major fault line 
existed between republican (whether old or new) and Puritan 
sensitivities in their respective perceptions of the degree to which 
m en's depravity prevented them from accomplishing or even 
attem pting any kind of political change in secular time. How was a 
man to become free - through Christ or through the 'orders' of a 
commonwealth? By the late 1650's grace hardly seemed to be acting as a 
stabilizing factor in English politics and society, and the return of the 
Anti-Christ seemed as good a bet as the return of the Son himself.38
For Harrington the depravity of m en did not mean that there was 
not work for them to do, nor did it cancel out the possiblity of erecting 
an effective commonwealth. The creation of a commonwealth was an 
'art of m an', which created out of the 'chaos and confusion...the 
architecture of a well-ordered commonwealth'.39 Thus, aside from 
being a religious and philosophical creature, m an was also rational and 
'political' and just as 'form of a man is the image of God, so the form of 
government is the image of m an' and the formation of governm ent is 
'the creation of a political creature after the image of a philosophical 
creature...the infusion of the soul or faculties of a m an into the body of
38 Pocock 1992, ‘Introduction’ et passim; 1977, chapter 6 (pp. 100-127) et passim. See 
especially the introductory Epistles to The Art Of Lawgiving, p. 500 andValerius and 
Publicola; p. 782; 1975, pp. 398-400; Davis 1992, pp 527, 530. Cf. Tuck 1993, chp. 6 
passim.
39 Harrington 1977, p. 341 (Oceana).
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a m ultitude'. Whether or not it is 'quasi-divine', this art is a process of 
infusing form into matter, which in the case of the commonwealth 
consisted in its lands, goods, and (or) money, and subsequently, power 
over m en's bodies.40 'Policy' is an art, and since 'art is the observation 
or imitation of nature', and politics is to be erected not according to 
'fancy7 but according to nature, then to know what form of 
government is most natural, 'we must consider what piece of art 
cometh nearest unto nature', and thus all governments are in some 
sense 'artificial'.4! God created the world but he also created 'hum an 
prudence', the rules of which, arising from the rules of nature, he is 
willing to let stand.42 Harrington attempted to argue that such 
prudence did exist and was justified, as well as to put it to work and 
provide the basis and means for the establishment of a proper English 
commonwealth. The commonwealth of Oceana, a fictionalized but 
recognizable England, which at least in his 1656 text is presented as a 
model to be grasped in a moment of revolutionary opportunity - an 
occasione in the Machiavellian sense - is based on Harrington's 
account of developments in English History. It is both an historical 
account and a proposal for the organization of government on classical 
republican terms. This involved a stance towards history similar to 
Machiavelli; that w hat was needed was a radical departure from the 
present in order to 'return ' to the wisdom of classical antiquity. 
Harrington was calling very much for a return to the 'art of the 
republic' as compared with the 'm odem  prudence' of the state, which 
was the art of ruling according to some private interest rather than 'the
40 Harrington 1977, pp. 837-8 (A System of Politics, Chapter IV, ‘Of the Form of 
Government’). See also Pocock’s ‘Introduction’, pp. 120-1; and Champion 1992, pp. 202-3.
41 Harrington 1977, pp. 390,564,565 {The Prerogative of Popular Government), 723
(Politicaster). Cf. Toland’s prefatory ‘The Life of James Harrington’, in Works, 1700. See 
Davis 1981, pp. 691-3.
42 The epigraph on the front page of The Art of Lawgiving in Three Books (1659) is from 
Psalms 115,116: “The heaven, even the heavens are the Lord’s; but the earth hath he given 
unto the sons of men.”
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common right and interest'.43 This entailed abandoning the 'gothic 
constitution' of medieval liberties and establishing a republic along 
classical lines but specifically adapted to English circumstances. His key 
premise was that political power always followed economic power, 
which in the seventeenth century was landed power.44 Political 
stability occured only when political power reflected the balance of 
economic power. According to Harrington, this was precisely not the 
case in England, since it was clear that economic developments, 
namely the break up of concentrated landwealth and its distribution 
on a w ider basis, necessitated a form of 'popular government' or 
commonwealth. Putting it crudely, the monarchy had become 
dependent on the feudal lords for social order and the defence of the 
realm, and in seeking to avoid the constant quarrelling of the nobility 
by abolishing the feudal system, it had in fact destroyed itself. When 
Henry V m  legislated against the nobility and dissolved the 
monasteries, he was in effect invoking a massive redistribution of land 
in favour of the 'commons', who as a result had a claim on political 
power proportionate to their prosperity. Property m ade men 
independent in terms of citizenship, that is to say, in terms of arms 
and dvic participation in general. The post-feudal order was the story 
of the liberation of the individual from military dependence and 
economic depravity. As in Aristotle, one left the sway of 'goods of 
fortune' for the 'goods of the m ind', and thus the opportunity to 
exercise one's governing capadty and be recognized as such by others.45 
This process was neatly summarized by Harrington in Book I of The 
Art of Lawgiving:
43 Pocock 1977, p. 161 (‘Preliminaries’, Oceana). Scott 1993 sees this ‘exit’ from modem 
prudence as one which also leaves behind any semblance of classical republicanism (at pp. 
159-60.
44 For extensive commentary on Harrington’s general theory see Pocock 1975, pp. 383-400; 
1977, chapter 4 et passim; 1992, ‘Introduction’; “Contexts for the Study of James 
Harrington”, II Pensiero Politico, 1978. See also Blair Woidem 1991, pp. 443-475, for an 
admirably lucid discussion of Harrington and English republicanism in general, to which I 
am greatly indebted.
45 There is a helpful discussion in Pocock, ‘Introduction’, Harrington 1977, pp. 63-5.
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if the balance or state of property in a nation be the efficient cause of government, and, 
the balance being not fixed, the government (as by the present narrative is evinced) 
must remain inconstant or floating, then the process in formation of a government must 
be first by fixation of the balance, and next by erecting such superstructures as to the 
nature thereof are necessary.46
For Harrington these 'superstructures' would be 'agrarian law' and 
'ro tation '.47 in the first case, extremes of wealth and poverty would be 
outlawed, and in the second there would be regular elections of office­
holders and people's representatives. There would also be two 
assemblies, one with the power to debate and propose but not legislate, 
and the other with precisely the opposite powers. The split was 
justified on the basis of two predominant fears of Harrington's; that 
'the m any7 left to a single all-powerful sovereign assembly would tend 
to corruption, and similarly, that 'the few7 if left unchecked would not 
be prevented from legislating in their own interests (their natural 
tendency), which were rarely those of the commonwealth as a whole.48 
I t  was also justified according to a particular account of the capacities of 
self, or personality. Political decisions, which are often complex in 
nature, require appropriate capacities and qualities of personality not 
found in every citizen. Thus the activity of proposing choices (what 
Harrington calls debate) requires a 'personality structure' different 
from the activity of choosing from amongst those proposed (to 
'resolve').49 As in the case with Cicero, the republic rests upon a 
relation of equality between persons who are unequal in their 
capacities and it was only upon this basis that there could be virtue: Tf 
the frame of your commonwealth be not such as causeth everyone to 
perform his certain function...it is not right.50 For one to encroach
46 Harrington 1977, p. 609.
47 Harrington 1977, p. 180 (Oceana). Worden 1991, p. 452.
48 Harrington 1977, p. 173; see also pp. 204, (Oceana), 731 (Pour Enclouer le Canon), 736, 
744-5 (A Discourse upon this saying...).
49 Harrington 1977, p. 170 (pace Pocock’s n.I).
50 Harrington 1977, p. 744 (A Discourse upon this Saying...). This comes at the end of a 
remarkable passage where he describes a carnival performance he saw in Italy involving a 
perfectly arranged kitchen with cats and kitlings ‘so tied and so ordered’ to perform particular 
functions in the making of a meal. This is discussed in Davis 1981, p. 696; Scott 1993, pp. 
159-60; and Champion 1992, p. 209 (who draws a different point from it than Davis or 
Scott, see below). Pocock, 1992 ‘Introduction’, Harrington 1977, p. 66. Also p. 51: ‘a 
popular government or republic must include both a Few and a Many, related to one another
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upon the other only resulted in confusion and injustice, since the
latter would be excluded from authority and subjected to power. Nor
was this a strictly democratic regime, as few republican schemes were.
Harrington believed there was a god-given aristocracy who were
naturally better suited to governing, which in England's case were the
propertied gentry, and the point was to ensure their participation
through electoral property qualifications but at the same time to
circumscribe their power in the name of the common good. But
political activity also had a value independent of protecting the
various classes from sectional interest, it was also the means by which
m en were raised out of 'the mire of private interest7 into the
'contemplation of virtue', which is a state 'nearer heaven, or to the
image of God, which is the soul of man'.51 With a proper distribution
of property and power, citizens were 'restored' to the order of nature,
insofar that man was kata phusin zoon politikon, and used his own
intelligence to define himself: 'those actions of a man that are virtue,
acquire unto himself honour, and upon others authority7.
Government is nothing less than the 'soul' of the nation, and
as much as the soul of a d ty  or nation is the sovereign power, her virtue must be 
law...(and)if the liberty of man consisteth in the empire of his reason, the absence 
whereof would betray him unto the bondage of his passions; then the liberty of a 
commonwealth consisteth in the empire of her laws, the absence whereof would betray 
her unto the lusts of tyrants.52
Harrington placed enormous faith in the coercive power of law to 
structure and maintain the commonwealth in a way very similar to 
w hat we see in Machiavelli. Like Machiavelli, he was pessimistic about 
m en's natures but believed good laws could make them at least act in 
the interest of the common good, providing an institutionalized 
structure of action which almost guaranteed virtue.53 Interestingly,
on the basis of a differentiation of function’.
51 Harrington 1977, p. 169 (Oceana).
52 Harrington 1977, p. 170. (Oceana). See also Pocock’s discussion in his ‘Introduction*, p. 64.
53 Pocock, ‘Introduction’, Harrington 1977, p. 67. See Harrington 1977, p. 320 (Oceana): ‘for 
as man is sinful and yet the world be perfect, so may the citizen be sinful and yet the 
commonwealth be perfect And as man, seeing the world is perfect, can never commit any 
such sin as can render it imperfect or bring it into a natural dissolution, so the citizen, where
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despite this pessimism Harrington had a very inclusive sense of 
citizenship, which some historians argue was even wider than that of 
the Levellers.54 Whatever the scope of his idea of citizenship, it 
certainly placed him far beyond those in the arguments of royalists and 
monarchists, as well as differentiating himself from Machiavelli in 
important ways, and this has implications for our understanding of 
Harrington's use of the law. 'Give us good orders and they will make 
us good men' was the maxim of a legislator (rather than a demagogue) 
claimed Harrington, and 'the most infalllible in politics'. This was in 
part provoked by his distrust of relying on good men in some 'standing 
senate' or 'rule by saints', which was too oligarchic,55 but also by his 
belief that popular government and the rule of law was the one thing 
necessary to ensure virtue in the people. For Harrington, corruption 
was caused by a failure of 'the balance' to reflect the true distribution of 
property, which in the case of Oceana (and England), necessitated 
popular government: Tor the balance, swaying from monarchial into 
popular, abateth the luxury of the nobility and, enriching the people, 
bringeth the government from a more private unto a more public 
interest.'. It is from within the structural matrices of 'the balance' that 
lies the source of citizenship, since in getting it right and thus moving 
closer to right reason and justice, 'the people upon a like alteration is 
so far from corruption of manners as should render them incapable of 
of a commonwealth, that of necessity they m ust thereby contract such 
reformation of m anners as will bear no other kind of government'. 
The opposite also holds true; when the balance goes from popular to 
oligarchical the public interest becomes privatized, 'which causeth
the commonwealth is perfect, can never commit any such crime as can render it imperfect or 
bring it unto a natural dissolution”. See Davis 1981, p. 694.
54 Davis 1981, p. 694-5 makes this claim. See Wootton 1992, pp. 80-83, for an opposite 
view, and for the claim that the Levellers were speaking about both ‘masterless’ men as well 
as men with masters. Pocock introduction’, Harrington 1977, p. 67, argues that Harrington 
extended the franchise to all in Oceana except for servants (Harrington 1977, p. 212, Oceana), 
and that Harrington is with Rainborough rather than Ireton on this.
55 Harrington 1977, Pocock Introduction, pp. 118,110; p. 796 (Valerius and Publicola) Also 
for his distrust of ‘good men’, see p. 753 (A Discourse Showing That the Spirit of 
Parliaments...1659).
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such a corruption of manners both in the nobility and the people7. He 
is certainly not denying the kind of corruption of which Machiavelli 
writes - 7I am not ignorant that the corruption which he meaneth is in 
manners7 - but that 7this also is from the balance7 (my emphasis).56
The connection between structure and personality is thus explicit, 
not only in terms of the arrangement of different 'personalities7 
according to capabilities and functions, but also in their development 
as individual moral beings through their participation in the 
governing of the republic. Indeed Professor Pocock insists that the 
'release7 of personal virtue through civic participation is the 'dom inant 
purpose' of Harrington's political architecture.57 But there is a deep 
ambiguity in Harrington with regard to the relation between self and 
government which is difficult to see if we accept this crisp summary of 
Harrington's intentions. On the one hand, his interpretation of 
history and his theory of government based on establishing a proper 
balance and elaborate system of orders suggested an attem pt to ground 
freedom in the systematic organization of hum an personalities and 
capabilities. In other words, that the republic represents the means of 
not only governmental perfection, but to the extent that 'good orders 
make good m en', a kind of hum an perfection, or at least an 
opportunity to live the best kind of life a man can live. And yet on the 
other hand, there is a strong sense that politics at best can only serve to 
contain the inevitable pursuit of self-interest on the part of its citizens, 
and that knowledge of some 'ultimate reality7 or state of perfection is 
impossible. Thus laws and institutions (the orders) serve only to 
manipulate us into appropriate action, and to convince us only of the
56 Harrington 1977, p. 202. See also p. 751-2 (A Discourse Showing...) with regard to the 
changing of ‘form’ and ‘by this change’ the people come to have their liberty, know how to 
hold it, and thus never want to part with it: ‘and in this consisteth the strongest security 
against monarchy’. Cf.Worden 1991, pp. 455-6.1 cannot agree with Professor Worden when 
he implies that Harrington was not interested in any kind of ‘reformation of manners'.
57 Pocock 1975, p. 394. See also Pocock 1985, pp. 42-3.
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fact that it is not in our interest to act contrary to the public interest.58 
The orders of the commonwealth give the people 'a form that must 
preserve their liberty', and thus the 'security7 of liberty lies not strictly 
in the people but in the form of their government. It is a 'form' 
supported by an 'interest7 on the part of the people, an interest which 
in turn, can only be secured by this form (a commonwealth).59 This 
was, however, a rigorous and strict kind of civic self-fulfilment, akin to 
a m artial ethic, a community bound together by oaths, treason laws, 
and severe punishments for breaches of civic responsibility.60 
Education (the 'plastic art of government7) also played a central role, 
inculcating the proper tools of interpretation so as to reduce the risk of 
being hoodwinked by devious clergy, and imparting the right set of 
civic values.61 Davis and Scott have argued that this element in 
Harrington is so strong that it cancels out any development of the 
political personality gained through participation. Citizens are limited 
to 'transient roles', and participate in 'a set of rituals designed to reduce 
(their) moral responsibility rather than enhance it7. In short, for Davis, 
it is a freedom purchased at the expense of civic virtue, a citizenship 
with no element of choice, 'a dead society, a hum an machine 
program m ed for ever for the repetitious performance of the same
58 This is most vividly expressed in Harrington 1977, p. 753 (A Discourse Showing That the 
Spirit o f Parliaments. ..1659): ‘Evil men that can do no other than make just laws are safer 
than good men that must either make unjust laws or ruin themselves’. Pocock discusses this 
passage in 1985 p. 43, where he unequivocally says that the laws of a republic (pace 
Harrington) were not regulae juris or ‘modes of conflict resolution’, and that Harrington 
generally thought that men were by nature ‘good and political*. See also, for a more 
qualified comment on this passage, Pocock 1992, ‘Introduction*, p. xxiii.
59 Harrington 1977, p. 797 (Valerius and Publicola)
60 On the martial ethos of Harrington’s republicanism, see 1977, pp. 684-5 (The Art of 
Lawgiving), and especially p. 738 (A Discourse upon this Saying...). Worden 1991, p. 469, 
discusses Andrew Fletcher’s ‘training camps* in this context
61 See Harrington 1977, pp. 306-7 (Oceana) on the “proper use of universities”. Also pp. 679- 
81 (The Art of Lawgiving): “interest and ignorance - the one deriving from evil laws, the 
other from the want of good education - are not in the right or power of a clergy, but of a 
magistracy...These therefore are a necessary step towards the prevention of such ignorance or 
interest as, through the infirmities or bias of translators, interpreters and preachers”. See also 
Champion 1992, p. 206.
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function'.62 The tension between classical republican political ideals 
and the presumption of the wickedness of all men is not sublimated 
but eliminated, but only by reducing the scope for for corruption to 
zero, by eliminating the possibility of individual choice.
Whatever the extent of the realm of 'real' free action inherent in
Harrington's theory (and I think Davis and Scott present aiy^overly 
one-sided picture),63 there is no doubt as to the connection he sees
between personality and the institutional structure of government, 
and generally that m an's nature is expressed in terms of him being a 
citizen - a zoori politikon and possessor of property - and not as a 
subject. The issue between Machiavelli and Harrington then is not a 
question of which is more 'liberal', a particularly inapposite application 
of the term in this case, but on the nature of their projects as a whole. 
Harrington, unlike Machiavelli, was a utopian; as Valerius says to 
Publicola (Harrington's mouthpiece) in a 1659 dialogue; 'Verily...this 
model of yours is a most entire thing'.6* Though the danger in
62 Davis 1981, pp. 695-6; Scott 1993 passim (but especially at pp. 159-63) See also Worden 
1991, pp. 465-6. A key passage for consideration in this context is at Harrington 1977, p. 
737 (A Discourse upon this saying: The Spirit of the Nation is not yet to be trusted with 
Liberty...): ‘a people under orders of popular government are of the most prudent and serene 
spirit, and the voidest of intestine discord or sedition...The spirit of the people is no wise to 
be trusted with their liberty, but by stated laws or orders; so the trust is not in the spirit of 
the people, but in the frame of those orders, which, as they are tight or leaky, are the ship 
out of which the people, being once embarked, cannot stir, and without which they can have 
no motion’. See also p. 763, XIII (Aphorisms Political): ‘Where the security is in the 
persons, the government maketh good men evil; where the security is in the form, the 
government maketh evil men good.*
63 Indeed Davis (1981, p. 696) even wants to separate Harrington from the civic humanist 
tradition in general, or at least what he calls the ‘liberal’ part of that tradition, (i.e. 
Machiavelli) which sought to provide institutional balances to enable men to face moral 
actions, even given the dangers of corruption. Pocock on the other hand has no hesitation in 
calling Harrington a civic humanist, and does so throughout his 1977 ‘Introduction’(see p. 
91). See his response to Davis and Scott in Phillipson and Skinner (eds.) 1993, ‘A discourse 
of sovereignty; observations on the work in progress’, pp. 402-7, where in insisting that 
Harrington’s project is a utopian one, he argues that ‘It is the function of utopia to depict 
men as other than they aie...(and) the aim of revolution to make them so. Harrington and 
Milton were to share the entirely correct conviction that if the political habits of Englishmen 
could not be transformed, they would choose them a captain back to the Egypt of the ancient 
constitution; and this is why Harrington’s utopia is to be read as an attempt to change 
history and not stop it’ (Pocock discusses the relevance of the ‘kitten passage’ mentioned by 
Davis, Scott, and Champion, at p. 406.).
64 Harrington 1977, p. 794 (Valerius and Pubicola or the true Form o f a Popular 
Commonwealth). See also Davis 1981, pp. 696-7; cf. Pocock 1993, p. 40
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Harrington is always that the desire to fix the republic against fortune 
might significantly reduce the scope for the development of the civic 
personalities of citizens through its participatory institutions, he saw 
no contradiction between liberty and the 'formation of the citizen in 
the womb of the commonwealth'. Education was the main policy 
towards this end, but disconnected from the influence of the 'purple 
hosts' and squabbling clerics. Instead, a national church embodying a 
civic theology informed by the 'ancient prudence', and under firm 
civic control, would serve as the teachers and scholars of reason and 
virtue; 'the role of the state was to evangelize the claims of reason'.
The state and its dvic theology had to teach dtizens to use their 
capacity for reason, and since Harrington believed in the liberty of 
conscience65, he had to believe that his religion was effective whilst 
being non-coercive. This search for a non-coercive means of 
inculcating the capacities necessary for the preservation of the good life 
of the good sodety remains definitive of the republican project as a 
whole, whether old or new.
It m ight be useful here to summarize a general picture of the 
republicanism we have been discussing up to now. There are I believe, 
seven essential points to note, (i) A presumption of a basic civic 
equality, though not to be confused with a 'thick' egalitarianism since 
it was constituted in part on the basis of a differentiation of sodal roles, 
including a division of political labour according to personal capadties. 
But at its core was the idea that in sharing the acts of ruling and being 
ruled there was equality, and the shared possession of a public 
personality, (ii) The presumption of a particular self or disposition, 
which is connected in significant ways to the maintenance of the 
public good, in other words, that particular qualities of one's 
personality as manifested in the public activities of the state contribute 
to its furtherance and renewal. Thus, flowing from the recognition of 
equality in the partidpating in the exercise of public authority was the
65 See above, and The Art of Lawgiving, in Harrington 1977, Book III, chapter n  (at pp. 678-9).
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development of a 'nature' attuned to citizenship through the 'orders' 
and institutions of the commonwealth (which in turn placed 
'extremely stem ' demands on the individual).66 (iii) A strong patriotic 
identification with the political association itself, beyond any simple 
self-interest or desire for personal security, a quality less obvious in 
Harrington though particularly evident in the writings of Machiavelli. 
(iv) Some account of men's sociable tendencies, whether a fully blown 
Aristotelian picture of man being a political animal by nature, or the 
Ciceronian belief in the overridingness of the common good. And this 
is also often accompanied to ambiguous effect by a general 
presum ption concerning m an's depravity and unwillingness (or 
incapacity) to act positively and knowingly in his own interest, let 
alone in the public interest, (v) A presumption that citizenship is an 
active practice, that is to say, it is embodied in the interaction of the 
individual or social class with the state, and is not simply a condition 
or status satisfied passively, such as in the possession of legal rights 
(though this too could be part - though not a sufficient part - of 
republican citizenship), (vi) A particular account of liberty beyond 
simply the securing of one's private interests, which Pocock has called 
a 'positive' conception of liberty, where man is only free when his 
nature is 'completed' in a vita activa practiced in a vivere civile [ 
though I w ant to be careful in using Berlin's language here and below], 
(vii) An invocation of a relatively homogeneous picture of the 
community to which their theory is to be applied (though perhaps 
Machiavelli is unique in appreciating the benefits of a certain amount 
of civic 'commotion'; however this is not to say he embraces the tenets 
of m odern pluralism) The invocation of the fiction of a community 
against which a theory of government is placed provides it with the 
task of either containing observed social and cultural heteronomy, or 
transform ing it so as to live up  to the 'fiction'. This is an im portant 
point to which I will return below.
66 Pocock 1985, p. 43.
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As we turn to an examination of arguments from the natural law 
tradition and ultimately to contemporary liberalism, I want to keep 
this (too cursory) list in mind in order to map out certain relations 
between the traditions. If, as Pocock has argued, classical 
republicanism defined the person in terms of a capability for 
participation in self-rule (in terms of virtue), then it would seem at 
first glance that the rise of neostoicism 67, scepticism, and raison d'etat, 
and as we shall see, natural law, refuted this in insisting on the politics 
of strong princely rule, unquestioning obedience, and the limited vita 
civilis of the politics of self-preservation. Yet this would be too quick, 
since the importance of the 'moral' personality is hardly left alone, 
however much the actual participation of the citizen in government is 
limited, and instead becomes the focus of all sorts of new projects of 
reconstruction This aspect of the humanist heritage is of crucial 
importance for our understanding of seventeenth century political 
theory, and in particular, that of John Locke. I will say immediately 
that it is certainly true that we are dealing with two different languages 
which often use different strategies of speech and argument, and 
sometimes address and encounter different problems. But with regard 
to the issues at hand - the relations between the concepts of liberty and
67 The ur-text of our understanding of neo-stoicisim is Gerhard Oesteriech, Neo-Stoicism and the 
Early Modern State, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, though it should be 
remembered that it is an unfinished woric. See also Marc Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police 
State, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1983; Jill Kraye, "Moral Philosophy”, CHRP, pp. 
370-4, also includes a useful discussion of its diffusion across Europe; Martin Van Gelderen, 
“The Machiavellian moment and the Dutch Revolt: the rise of Neostoicism and Dutch 
republicanism”, in Bock, Skinner, Viroli, ed. Machiavelli and Republicanism, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990,205-223; James Tully, ‘Governing Conduct’, in An 
Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts, Cambridge University Press, 1993, 
pp. 179-241; Taylor 1989, pp. 159-176; For a background to Dutch republican thought in 
general see, Eco Haitsma Mulier, “The language of seventeenth century republicanism in the 
United Provinces: Dutch or European?”, in Anthony Pagden ed., The Languages of Political 
Theory in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987. For an 
excellent discussion of Dutch military reforms in this context, see William H. McNeill, The 
Pursuit of Power; Technology, Armed Force, and Society since AD. 1000, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1982, especially chapter 4 et passim. Many of these issues are 
now woven together in the comprehensive survey of Tuck 1993, passim. For a useful 
discussion in the context of a consideration of the development of governmental rationality in 
contempory political theory, see Colin Gorden, ‘Governmental Rationality; An Introduction’ 
in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, Peter Miller eds, The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.
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self - how deep does this difference reach? If the vocabularies are 
'outstandingly discontinuous'68, are there relations at other levels? 
W hat is the nature of these relations?
4.2 The juridical
One thing to note immediately in any comparison of the schools of 
natural law and classical republicanism, is the strong claim made by 
key theorists of the former to its uniqueness, not only in relation to the 
latter, but more immediately with regard to 'moral theology7 and the 
discipline of 'dv il law7 (id est the laws of individual states). This is set 
out paradigmatically by Samuel Pufendorf in his De jure naturae et 
gentium libri octo (1672), and his wonderfully concise compendium De 
offico hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem libri duo (1673). 
Pufendorf provides an essential foundation to the establishment of the 
'discipline7 of natural law, and I want to briefly consider his arguments 
here, and especially his emphasis on duty and the way in which one 
ought to conduct oneself in order to become a 'useful7 member of 
hum an society.69
What was Pufendorf7 s intention in presenting his argum ent in the 
form of a compendium so soon after publishing the considerably larger 
and extended DJN? One clue that suggests itself immediately is the
68 Pocock 1985, p. 39. It is a matter of some complexity as to whether or not neostoicism, and 
especially its manifestation in the seventeenth century in the United Provinces belongs to 
either *the language of law’ or the language of classical republicanism. I cannot answer that 
question here, only to note that various Dutch theorists made use of both vocabularies 
without obvious contradiction, notably in their defence of ‘privileges’, which far from being 
simply a matter of ‘right*, were, in light of contemporary power relations, a way of securing 
the means to political participation. See van Gelderen pp. 221-3 for this interesting 
argument, and the necessary historical references.
69 On the law of nature and nations in eight books, edited and with the notes and ‘Historical and 
critical account of the science of morality’(intro), by Jean Barbeyrac, transl. Basil Kennet, 
London, 1729. See also the interesting translation by Thomas Gordon (the Scottish co­
author with John Trenchard of the now-famous Cato’s Letters (1720-3) and the Independent 
Whig (1720-1)) of Barbeyrac’s history in The Spirit of Ecclesiasticks of all Sects and Ages, 
1722. On the Duty o f Man and Citizen According to Natural Law, ed. James Tully, transl. 
Michael Silverthome, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991. Hereinafter DJN and 
DOH respectively. These were very popular books in their day, with the DOH a bestseller of 
sorts, going through some sixty editions. I do not mean to imply that the natural law school 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth century was in any way homogeneous. There were, of 
course, a number of significant divisions and outlooks within the general natural law 
framework.
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title - De officio hominis et civis - which reminds us of Cicero, a 
connection Pufendorf's readers made easily enough. It is clear from 
the preface that Pufendorf meant it as a compendium compatible with 
being taught in schools and universities, where 'it is in the public 
interest to steep (student's) minds in a moral doctrine whose 
usefulness in dvil life is accepted as obvious', particularly if it is done 
from early childhood so as to avoid the eruption of socially disruptive 
d o g m a .7 0  it was, like Cicero's De officiis, a 'practical, politico-moral 
m anual', which would soon be coopted into Protestant university 
cum culum s across Europe (particularly in Scotland) and helping to 
develop a genre that eventually resulted in the proliferation of 
'conduct books' and 'popular ' lecture series on instruction in the 
'moral sciences'.71 One important reason for clearly delineating the 
boundaries of the discipline was so it could be effectively inculcated 
into citizens' conduct.
Perhaps most importantly though, the demarcation of natural law 
from other disciplines allowed Pufendorf to concentrate wholly on the 
nature of the state and the establishment of the autonomy of the sodo- 
moral world, or what we might call today 'the social'. In this, as a 
number of commentators have m ade clear, Pufendorf is unique 
amongst his contemporaries and near contemporaries, as well as 
having a foundational role in terms of the development of the 
juridical form of m odem  political and social theory. He does so in part 
by taking advantage of the methodology of the physical and
70 Pufendorf DOH, p. 6 (Preface), p. 141 (II.7.8), p. 176 (II. 18.9).
71 Tully 1991, ‘Introduction’, p. xxi. On the rise of the teaching of civil jurisprudence, and 
particularly the ‘Scottish connection’, see J.G.A. Pocok, “Cambridge Paradigms and Scotch 
Philosophers; a study of the relations between the civic humanist and civil jurisprudential 
interpretation of Eighteenth century social thought’, in Istvan Hont, Michael Ignatieff ed., 
Wealth and Virtue; Cambridge University Press, 1983, especially pp. 244-6. Also, Knud 
Haakkonssen, ‘Natural Law and Moral Realism’, in M.A. Stewart ed., Studies in the 
Philosophy o f the Scottish Enlightenment Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 61- 
85; and R.B. Sher’s fascinating ‘Professor’s of Virtue: The Social History of the Edinburgh 
Moral Philosophy Chair in the Eighteenth Century’, Ibid, pp. 87-126. Also Haakonssen, 
‘From natural law to the rights of man; a European perpective on American debates’, in 
Michael J. Lacey, Knud Haakonssen ed., A Culture of Rights; The Bill of Rights in 
philosophy, politics, and law 1791-1991, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 
and Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 19-61.
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mathematical sciences, as Grotius had tried to do in the De Indis and 
De iure belli ac pads, though he attempts to take the analogy much 
further in relation to the precision of "moral science'.72 Hum an beings 
are unique from other beings not only in possessing the faculties of 
knowing and willing, but also in being able to invent the means 
directing their wills and providing for their needs. These means are 
'ideas', which clarify understanding, and 'moral entities' which are the 
rules for acts of the will. Orderly natural reality is possible either 
through the creation of god, or by the imposition of hum an will (DJN 
1.1.4), and moral entities are those that are 'im pos'd on Things, and 
their Natural Motions, whence there springs up a peculiar Agreement 
and Conveniency in the Actions of Mankind'(such as the concepts of 
'right' or 'property7; DJN 1.1.3). The moral theorist dealt in moral 
concepts that were imposed on hum an action rather than derived 
from them, and he dealt with exact hypothetical universals and 
demonstrated their moral properties.73 The point was to apply 
universal deductions to practice, not to draw  conclusions within 
practice. The certainty of moral science is premised upon this 
'im position theory7.
The resolute nominalism of Pufendorf's theory, which breaks with 
Thomist Aristotelian metaphysics, is crucial to his establishing the 
autonom y of the 'social' and to the development of an ostensibly 
'm odem ' account of natural law. His voluntarist theory of moral 
entities renders the 'naturalness' of natural law as a m atter of culture, 
rather than an essential nature common to all living things, or an 
original nature of man in the Garden of Eden.74 We can, using our 
reason, clearly demonstrate the need to live according to the precepts
72 See Hugo Grotius, De lure praedae (as De indis came to be called in the nineteenth century), 
tranls. G.L. Williams, Oxford, 1950; in Tuck 1993, pp. 170-1. (But Cf. The Laws of War 
and Peace, tr. Basil Kennett, with the notes of Jean Barbeyrac, London, 1738,1.1.10.1) 
Pufendorf DJN, book 1, chapter 2. I am indebted to the lucid discussion of this argument in 
James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his adversaries, Cambridge 
University Press, 1980, pp. 27-34, and Dufour 1991, pp. 563-567.
73 Pufendorf, DJN, 1.2.5-6, 1.2.4,9. Tully 1981, pp. 31-2. Dufour 1991, pp. 564-5.
74 Cf. Dufour 1991, p. 568.
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of natural law. At base lay the fundamental law of nature, the law of 
'sociability7 (socialitas), which was not a natural disposition of man but 
a principle of social behaviour:
in order to be safe, it is necessary for (man) to be sociable; that is to join forces with men 
like himself and so conduct himself towards them that they are not given even a 
plausible excuse for harming him, but rather become willing to preserve and promote 
his advantages...On this basis it is evident that the fundamental natural law is: every 
man ought to do as much as he can to cultivate and preserve sociality.75
This is an 'unsocial sociability7, linking individual self-preservation 
(the key moral right which Grotius had identified as grounding the 
'm odem 7 theory of natural law against the sceptical challenge7^ ) and 
the peaceful preservation of society, without invoking any innate 
social appetite on the part of man, but rather on the basis of a fact about 
men. Pufendorf fills out this fundamental law with a num ber of other 
duties flowing from it; there are duties to God, to oneself, and to 
others, as well as duties not to injure others, to recognize and respect 
the equal dignity of fellow citizens, and to act benevolently in order to 
encourage and recognize the sociable dispositions of trust, gratitude, 
and reciprocity.77 All of these duties are geared towards cementing 
society and preventing a social fragmentation that Pufendorf knew 
only to well would lead to war. Since men refused to see the earthly 
benefits of performing their duties, and 'divine vengeance (tended) to 
proceed at a slow pace7, Pufendorf7s system of sociality required an 
'effective remedy for suppressing evil desires' - i.e. the state.78
In the state of nature (discussed at DOH n .l et passim) man lived in 
'relative sociability7, possessing both a natural freedom and equality, 
and ruled by sense impressions as well as by reason. This was not a
75 Pufendorf, DOH 1.3.7,9. DJN 2.3.15.
76 See for example De indis, pp. 13-21; and Rights of War and Peace, 1.4.2,1.4.7.
77 Pufendorf, DOH 1.4-8 (On man’s duty to God, On duty to oneself, On the duty of every man 
to every man, first of not harming others, on the common duties of humanity, On the duties 
of parties to agreements). These duties are meticulously laid out and discussed by Tully 
1991, pp. xxvi-ii.
78 Pufendorf, DOH 2.3.9. As Tully points out (1991, p. xx, xxix), for Grotius and Hobbes the 
goal was to establish political society and and obedience to it in the context of the instability 
and destruction of the wars of the early and mid-seventeenth century. For Pufendorf, given the 
basic stability of the Westphalian settlement in his own lifetime, the theoretical goals of 
moral theory had changed somewhat
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thoroughgoing individualist account of the state of nature, which 
Pufendorf thought as pure fiction (something we see in an 
'imaginative effort7- II. 1.4), since it was obvious that men could not be 
found outside of any society.(H 1.7) However, in this state man was 
ultimately insecure because he was protected only 'by his own 
strength', and thus 'if a dispute arises...there is no one who can by 
authority compel the offender to perform his part of the agreement or 
make restitution'.79 It was primarily this awareness of insecurity, as 
well as a kind of natural propensity for political order, which leads 
m en to set up political societies. Though rejecting the Hobbesian 
account, he does not explain this 'natural propensity' in Aristotelian 
terms either, just as Grotius had attacked Aristotle's theory of the 
virtues (Prolegomena 44-5, Laws of War and Peace), or a picture of the 
'good life' based on religious dogma. Indeed given the nature of man, 
prone both to malicious aggresiveness towards others as well as 
having a 'congenital tendency to want to be subject to no one', self- 
governm ent inevitably fails.80 The state then is arrived at in a three 
stage process. Firstly, by an agreement amongst individuals to enter 
into a 'single and perpetual union' to administer the means of their 
safety and security. Secondly, since this initial contract is not sufficient 
to establish it (it is only the 'rudiments and beginnings of a state'), the 
people m ust agree to a 'decree' regarding the form of government to be 
introduced, and until this is determined, 'no measures of public safety 
will be able to be effectively instituted'. The third and final stage, 
following the establishment of the form of government, is an 
agreement concerning the man (or men) to be appointed to provide for 
the common security of the state, and for the rest to 'bind themselves
79 Pufendorf DOH, 2.1.9-10. See also DJN 2.2.2: man is ‘able to master nothing but an 
inarticulate sound, a stranger to all institution and discipline...even his own being’. On 
sociablitiy and and the natural liberty of man (liberty implying ‘a[n] internal Faculty of doing 
and omitting things according to the direction of our judgement)*, see DJN 2.1.2,2.1.8.
80 Pufendorf DOH 1.3.7,2.5.4. See also DJN IV.4.7, where in clear reference to the 
communitarian utopia’s of More and Campanella, he rejects any simple optimistic 
assessment of human nature, since ‘it being much more easie to fancie perfect Men than to 
find them’.
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in obedience to him or them'. It is this second agreement which 
finally establishes the civitas (defined as 'a corporate body stronger 
than any other b o d /) ,  the bearer of government as a monarch (or 
senate or free people etc.), and the rest as subjects or citizens.81 As 
Dufour and Tully point out, for Pufendorf the state is not merely a 
legal fiction but a specific and autonomous reality, an entia moralia 
with its c »vn life, tasks, attributes, will, and power; i.e. its own 
sovereignty.8* Pufendorf's theory of sovereignty meant that the state 
was absolutely indivisibile, the two agreements and one decree having 
created a suprem e authority which denied any legitimate 'excuse for 
rebellion'.88 Citizens (or subjects, Pufendorf uses the two 
interchangeably) cannot resist the legitimate commands of the state 
and m ust endure the shortcomings of a prince, just as 'good children 
m ust bear the ill temper of their parents', even in the worst of 
circumstances, which should be avoided (i.e. fled) rather than rectified 
through any kind of violent resistance.8* It is not even beyond 
consideration that a people might consent to outright slavery, a 'civil 
servitude...not so foreign to nature as some fancy'.85 It is within this
81 Pufendorf DOH 2.6.7. DJN II.6.5-6, VII.2.7. DOH 2.6.8. DJN VIII.2.8. DOH 2.6.9,2.6.6. 
Of course, this process presupposes a basic right of liberty (libertas) on the part of the 
individual which encompasses the absence of subjection in one's command of one’s physical 
and moral personality, including one’s actions, body, and reputation, and is not dependent on 
the agreement of others, i.e. it is an innate or natural right (or cluster of rights). See 
Haakonssen 1991, pp. 28-9.
82 Pufendorf DOH 2.6.10. Dufour 1991, p. 574. Tully 1991, p. xxii. who also notes the 
particularly masculine sense to Pufendorf s understanding of state power and sovereignty.
83 On the absoluteness of state power, see DJN VII.6.7; on the right to resistance DJN VII.8.2, 
3 ,6. On the general presumption of justice concerning the acts of a sovereign, see DJN 
VII.8.3.
84 Pufendorf DOH 2.6.13. DJN VII.2.20. On bearing the shortcomings of the prince, DOH 
2.9.4, DJN Vn.8.5. See the discussion in Richard Tuck Natural Rights Theories: Their 
Origin and Development, Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 00-00; and Tully 1991, p. 
xxxiv.
85 Pufendorf DJN VH.8.6. The extent of Pufendorf’s absolutism and theory of non-resistance 
has attracted considerable academic attention. See Dufour 1991, pp. 577-9; Horst Denzer, 
Moralphilosophie und Naturrecht bei Samuel Pufendorf , Munich, 1972, pp. 194,205; Tuck 
1979, pp. 00-00; Tully 1991, pp. xxxiii-xxxv. Pufendorf does allow for one exception - in 
the case of tyranny - but only on the grounds of self-defence and not on the assertion of any 
political authority or popular sovereignty (DJN VII.8.7). Equally, rulers should not assume 
that their citizens/subjects will always tolerate whatever they force them to endure. In his 
notes to this passage in the DJN, Barberyrac links this passage to the martyred English 
radical Algernon Sidney as well as to Locke. Interestingly, as Tully points out, this passage
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context that we should read Pufendorf's definition of what was a 'true' 
political animal or good citizen (rare as they are); 'one who promptly 
obeys the orders of those in power; one who strives with all his 
strength for the public good, and gladly puts his own private good 
second - one, in fact, who believes nothing to be good for him unless it 
is also good for the state; one, finally, who is well disposed to his 
fello w-citizen' .86
Duty (officium) then, is param ount in Pufendorf's theory, both for 
citizens in relation to the government and the government in relation 
to its citizens. The use of 'officium' is an important linguistic 
convention to note here. Rather than the narrow sense which we 
attach to its literal translation (office), officium is used by Pufendorf in 
the wider Ciceronian sense, that is, referring to the role or station we 
occupy in life as individuals in a community and our attendant 
responsiblities and rights therein.87 The basic range of offices included 
being a hum an being under natural law, being a member of a family, 
and being a member of a political society - the latter two of course, 
further subdividing into any number of distinct categories. Rights and 
duties are thus to be understood as a package, with one hardly 
separable from the other, and both attached in distinct ways to one's 
station. A right was not simply a granted power tout court, but a 
power granted for a purpose and in conjunction with matching duties; 
i.e. to use it properly, for others to respect your proper use, and 
generally for the 'package' to contribute to the overall moral order. 
Rights and duties were derivative of explicit and tacit contracts, but 
they could also arise from 'implicit contracts', which were inferred
is not in the DOH (1991, pp. xxxiv-v).
86 Pufendorf DOH, 2.5.5.
87 In Cicero, officium was closely related to beneficiumy that is, the network of social 
relationships that made up society (families, friends, patrons, political allies, etc.) and which 
were in part maintained by the exchange of services which engendered mutual obligations all 
round. There were duties specific to one's role (offlcia) which Cicero saw as the closest 
equivalent to the Stoic term kathekon, or 'appropriate action’. See above, chapter 1. Also, 
‘Notes on Translation’, in M.T. Griffin, E.M. Atkins ed., On Duties, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1991, p. xlv.
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from a relation between two or more parties in such a way as if it were 
based on a contract.88 In other words, the idea here of the contract is a 
complete fiction, and the nature of the rights and obligations which 
arise is inferred simply from the situation they find themselves in (i.e. 
their respective offices), rather than according to what actual 
contracting parties willed. Children, for example, have obligations to 
parents even if they did not choose them, and citizens have obligations 
according to their various stations just as a matter of what they are.
One can choose to what extent one wants to play one's role, but (in an 
almost Ciceronian way), 'the performance is judged in terms of the 
obligations that generally pertain to that role'. We only know what 
'pertains' to the role through experience, that is, history tells us the 
pattern of expected behaviour attached to the office.89 Governments 
and rulers have duties too, including providing for the safety of the 
people and ensuring a secure, well administered, and prosperous 
society, by putting the good of the state above their own and by 
respecting the dignity of their citizens.90 Pufendorf especially 
emphasized the need for protection from external attack, through 
diplomacy and war-preparation (and war fighting), and the fostering of 
a strong miliatry spirit via compulsory martial training and a distinct, 
financially supported military establishment.91
88 On offices, contractarianism, and the role of ’implicit contracts’, see Haakonssen 1991, pp. 
36-41. I am greatly indebted to this fine analysis.
89 Haakonssen 1991, p. 37. Thus is natural law contractarianism made compatible with the 
prescriptive use of history. Blackstone did so in his Commentaries (1:47-8), which in turn 
was noted by the eighteenth century American Professor of Law James Wilson: ‘ Must our 
rights be removed from the stable foundation of nature, and placed on the precarious and 
fluctuating dais of human institutions?...If this view be a just view of things then under civil 
society, man is not only made for but by the government: he is nothing but what the society 
provides. His natural state and his natural rights are withdrawn altogether from notice...”. 
The Works of Jams Wilson [Public Lectures on Jurisprudence and Political Science] Volume 
II, ed. James Dewitt Andrews, Chicago, 1896, chapter XII, ’Of the Natural Rights of 
Individuals’, pp. 296-336, pp. 302-3.
90 See DOH II.7,11.11,11.14 et passim.
91 Pufendorf DOH 11.11,11.16,11.17,11.18 et passim. Tully 1991, p. xxxvii notes Pufendorfs 
inherent militarism and its legacy for our modem state system. Cf his ’’The Pen is a Mighty 
Sword”, in James Tully ed. Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988, pp. 7-25, and especially pp. 22-25 for his claim that war 
preparation and war fighting (’practical conflict’) are foundational practices in the 
development of the early modem political theory, and subsequently that it remains so for
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Another aspect of the relation between state and citizen in 
Pufendorf's theory that I want to note before concluding this section is 
the kind of 'self' it presupposes, and the extent to which it grounds its 
practices in a particular account of this self. We know that the 
founding of the state (civitas) presupposes a natural liberty on the part 
of m an guided by his reason, which leads him to agree to the 
establishment of a power capable of punishing those resisting the 
common interest of security. As we have seen, this is a considerable 
power, concentrated in one subject and originating from one will, 
which 'pervades all the parts and affairs of the state'.92 its ubiquity is 
justified on the grounds of maintaining the 'internal peace' of the 
state, which requires that 'the wills of the citizens be governed and 
directed as the safety of the state requires'. This required not only 
'appropriate' laws (clear, straightforward civil laws focused only on 
regulating as much as is necessary for the good of the state and citizens) 
and a credible threat of dvil punishment, but also the authority of 
'public discipline' and 'pure and sincere Christian doctrine', so that the 
citizens conform to the precepts of these laws 'not so much through 
fear of punishm ent as by habituation'.93 Common opinion and m en's 
education are crucial components of this process, since it is usually 
according to these that men's conduct is governed. Hence the state 
m ust avoid the propagation of dogmas that 'disturb dvil sodety ', and 
instead 'resound' with doctrines which are consistent with the 'right 
purpose and usage of states', and control the educational process such 
that its dtizens are 'steeped' in them from childhood.94 But perhaps 
the most powerful force of sodalization is the entire edifice of m utual 
security through the laws of sodability themselves. That is, having 
abandoned their natural liberty and constituted a state for mutual 
protection, men are 'brought into order' and as a 'natural consequence'
contemporary political theory too.
92 Pufendorf DOH II.8.2.
93 DOH 11.11.4,5.
94 DOH II.9.4, II. 18.9.
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come to enjoy the benefits of interaction with their fellows. Real 
advantage comes when men are steeped in such a system from their 
early years, and come to follow the 'more suitable habits of behaviour' 
and develop the 'various skills by which human life has been 
improved and enriched'.95
In part, this relates to a complex theory of modernization which 
Pufendorf develops in detail in the DJN, but which I can only touch 
upon here. This theory is driven by an historical account of 
fundam ental changes in the cultura vitae, that is, the changes 
engendered by m an's ever pressing needs (indigentia). These 
developments are roughly plotted onto a four point continuum 
between primeval hunterer-gatherer communities up to a proto­
m odern 'age of commerce'. Early primeval communities, though 
ignorant of the 'delicacies' of wealth, existed in a state of abundance 
and observed an 'enough as necessary' appropriation proviso. They 
also presupposed a relatively holistic portrayal of m en's nature and 
labour; they remained undifferentiated according to their capabilities 
and duties, as well as sovereign over their labouring activity both in its 
conception and execution.96 However as populations grew, scarcities 
arose and self-preservation becomes increasingly a matter of 
consuming things of 'the fruits of Industry' rather than from 'bare 
inassisted Nature'. This greatly increased the possibility of social 
conflict (since envy, covetousness, and ambition are perm anent 
features of men), indeed communitarian arrangements always did so, 
and necessitated the introduction of a series of compacts protecting 
property and the products of men's labour 9? In doing so, sociability
95 d o h  n.5.7.
96 DJN V.2.9,6.1. For comparisons between Pufendorf, Locke and Marxist accounts of pre­
capitalist modes of production, see Tully 1980, p. 140-1. On PufendorFs theory of 
modernization in general, see Istvan Hont, ‘The Language of sociability and commerce: 
Samuel Pufendorf and the theoretical foundations of the “four stages’* theory, in The 
Languages of political theory in early modern Europe, ed. Anthony Pagden, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. I am greatly indebted to this fine analysis.
97 DJN IV.4.6-7, IV.4.3. For a full discussion of this in the context of the seventeenth century 
as a whole see Tully 1980, p. 89.
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was enhanced since with a 'separate Share of Good things to ourselves' 
m en could practice 'liberality and Beneficence' through the mutual 
sociability of self-interested agents. Each property owner was still 
linked by each other's mutual needs but in order to exchange their 
goods, they now had to form themselves into a 'commercial society'; 
that is, a society dominated by the secondary acquisition of goods 
which allowed everybody, and not just land owners, the ability and 
means to subsist.98 With a commercial society came a diversification 
and specialization of labour ('the various skills by which hum an life 
has been improved and enriched' quoted above), which brought 
'divers Arts and Inventions' unlike anything that had occured in the 
p a s t ."  Along with it though came the diversification of the human 
personality. If the citizen of the Renaissance republic was an 
undifferentiated self, both judge and warrior, which he needed to 
remain if he was to help in the governing and preservation of his 
liberta and his community, in Pufendorf's theory he was reduced to an 
episode in history, the victim of a ruthless modernism assigning each 
preceding stage to an irrevocable past. Though cognizant of the dangers 
of commerce and its potential to encourage men into 'prodigious 
Corruption and Degeneracy', it was a risk that had to be taken if men 
were to rise above the 'barbarous' conditions of past ages.100 Sociability 
taught (in neostoic terms) that men were to pursue things of this 
world with a just measure of sobriety, to 'rest satisfied' with one's 
share, and to not covet things one was unable to obtain, things 'not 
worthy of our grief or our Anger'.101 Underlying the theory of 
sociability then was an account of ruthless commercial expansion, but 
also potentially one of a developing refinement of the personality, a
98 DJN IV.4.7, V.1.11. Barbeyrac’s footnote to V.1.1 notes that any growth of vice or 
corruption with the rise of commerce is not relevant because 'this respects another Question, 
which rather relates to Divinity than the Civil law...Commerce is necessary among men, in 
the condition they are...the settlement of Commerce in General is very conformable to the 
most pure reason, and the Law of Nations’ See also Hont 1987, pp. 275-6.
99 DJN VII.1.6.
100 cf. DJN n.2.2 and Barbeyrac’s footnote to V.1.1 quoted above.
101 DJN n.4.9.
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process whereby one became a 'useful member of human society7.102
We might want to say that along with redefining what it is to be a
'political animal', Pufendorf has reworked the concept of self-
government, if not effaced it. Being a 'useful' member of society does
not seem to include sharing in the administration of its imperium,
nor seemingly are those capacities for self-governance recognized and
fostered by the state through any 'structures of virtue'. It appears that
natural law concerns itself solely with ordering the external actions of
men through a range of social duties (and rights) which manipulate
them into acting in the interest of the state, the guarantor of common
security. This was certainly the verdict of Leibniz, who argued
vigorously against this 'cutting off of the end of natural law7 and the
restriction of its object, 'which not only Christian philosophers
treated...but also the ancient pagans'.1Q3 How could the topics of law,
duty, good actions, and sin, asked Leibniz, which are all located 'in the
interior7 and pertain to law and natural justice, be considered if not in
the science of natural law? Countering in an Aristotelian vein (pace
the Nicomachean Ethics, X, II80bI-26, II81b23, Leibniz answered:
he who has control of the education or instruction of others, is obligated, by natural 
law, to form minds with eminent precepts, and take care that the practice of virtue, 
almost like a second nature, guides the will toward the good.. (Pufendorf's) hypothesis 
about a soul which is internally corrupt and outwardly innocent is not very safe and not 
very probable. (69)
This is a defining moment in the history of the discipline of natural 
law, as one of its first great historians knew - Barbeyrac translated 
Leibniz's 'Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf' and appended it to 
his 1718 translation of the DOH. It showed the extent to which the 
demarcation argum ent had come to be accepted, and how  successful 
Pufendorf had been in connecting natural law to the realm of the 
'social', understood narrowly as the frame within which the external 
actions of men w ould be ordered so as to guarantee dv il peace,
102 DOH 1.3.8. See also DJN n.l.V, where Pufendorf talks of the need to live a life of ‘society 
and civility’, and II.4.4 where he argues against certain Epicurean notions as being destructive 
of ‘good manners’ and ‘human society*.
103 Leibniz, ‘Opinions on the Principles of Pufendorf, in Patrick Riley ed., Leibniz: Political 
Writings, Cambridge University Press, 1988 (1972), p. 68.
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security, and prosperity.
We can, I believe, abstract from Leibniz's gloss on Pufendorf a 
general perception about the nature of the relationship between the 
state and its power, its citizens and their power, and the juridical form 
of m odem  thought - a dominant mode of understanding persisting 
even until today. Ever since the state building ideology of the mid 
seventeenth century (and here one must introduce Thomas Hobbes 
and Jean Bodin, whom I have not examined but who have an equal, 
maybe even greater claim to the establishment of the ideology of the 
m odem  state than Pufendorf 104), the capacity and right of a given 
population to act purposively as a genuine political agent - whether in 
making a claim to rule or calling a govenment to account - has been 
underm ined, partially as a response to the problem of endemic 
national and civil warfare, perhaps the central problem of seventeenth 
century political theory. These capacities, which in complex ways help 
to ground the constitution of those actions later called 'rights', were 
also underm ined or at least re-arranged, by the emergence of a highly 
diversified and fluid 'commercial society' which made new demands 
on an analagously fragmented personality. Alongside this account, as 
Leibniz pointed out, came the belief that in doing so, political theory 
was moving from an inclusive concern with political agency to a 
purely exclusive one, that is to say, moving from being concerned with 
the overall nature of persona to being concerned merely with the 
'external actions' of persons. This also generated, as we shall see, a 
particular account of liberty almost wholly concerned with a realm of 
free action in the context of an exercise of essentially 'exclusive' rights. 
However in im portant ways this is simply a fiction of the juridical 
mode of government, though a central one at that. It is clear, as we 
have seen above, that in a theory like Pufendorf's - despite Leibniz's 
complaints - it is far from true that it is merely the external actions of
104 Sec Quentin Skinner, 'The State’, in Terence Ball, Janies Farr, Russell L. Hanson eds., 
Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 90-131.
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men that are acted upon, or understood simply as a matter for 
containment or conflict management. Citizens (or subjects) are the 
target of enormous efforts of socialization precisely because in reality 
they do not live up to the fiction generated by the theory. There is also 
a vigorous system of mutually obliging duties in order to preserve the 
common (and individual) good of 'security', it could not be a matter 
for each alone. Natural law theory is never univocally 
individualistic, or 'atomized'. The relations constituting civil society 
were not a simple aggregation of rationally organized indidividual 
wills , nor were they 'negotiated deals abridging the potentially open- 
ended claims of individuals', but rather 'specifications of the 
relationship among the offices imposed upon individuals by natural 
law7.105 Pufendorf did not ignore a concern for self, but reworked the 
relationship between the self and the political order and brought upon 
it all sorts of techniques and practices (including particular accounts of 
historical development). In the context of a near - absolutist theory like 
Pufendorf's, the political agency of the population is severely curtailed, 
if not obliterated, and subjects are reduced to becoming 'useful' as a
105 Haakonssen 1991, p. 36. One implication of seeing the natural law tradition in this way, 
made up of at least a number of different accounts of the relation between natural law-right- 
duty, is, I believe, to begin to undermine the monochromatic tag of ‘atomism’ applied to 
seventeenth century social contract theory made so influentially by Charles Taylor. See his 
‘Atomism’ and ‘Social Theory as Practice’, in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: 
Philosophical Papers II, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 187-210,91-115; Sources 
of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1989. Though it is true that people are conceived as beginning as ‘political atoms’ (193), it 
does not follow that as a result, at least in the theories of Pufendorf, Grotius, and Locke 
(Taylor’s list, p. 193), the human agent is ‘no longer to be understood as an element in a 
larger, meaningful order’, or that ‘he is on his own’. (193) Nor is it the case that all 
contractarian theories emerging out of the natural law school (such as Pufendorf s, Grotius’, 
and Locke’s) assert a ‘primacy of rights’ which denies the same status to ‘principle of 
belonging or obligation’, and ascribes rights to men as ‘binding unconditionally’. (Atomism, 
p. 188) This should be obvious given the account of Pufendorf I have provided here, and will 
hopefully be true also of the account of Locke below. Taylor builds the individualism of the . 
founding contract into an all embracing ontological argument about the ‘hard’ subjectivism of 
contractarianism - which is only really found in Hobbes (whom Taylor curiously does not 
include on his list). Though at first glance it might seem that Taylor is only attacking 
particular contemporary accounts of this tradition (particularly those who have made historical 
and normative connections between social contract theory, individualism, rights, and modem 
liberalism) rather than the tradition itself, in his most recent work he seems to lay the blame 
at the feet of the original theorists themselves (see 1989, Part II, ‘Inwardness’, pp. 111-207 et 
passim.).
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means of ensuring civil peace, social order, and economic prosperity.
This brings us to the larger fiction constitutive of the modern state in 
general; the assumed 'intimacy' of the ruled and rulers where the 
former are implicated in the sovereign acts of the latter (as citizens). 
This presupposes that the state has assumed an essentially impersonal 
character beyond personal or charismatic terms, which we see 
paradigmatically in Hobbes, though also to a slightly different extent in 
P u fe n d o r f .106 This assumed intimacy itself is predicated on a double 
fiction. Firstly, it presumes a certain kind of persona or self on the part 
of its citizens; that is, an ability to act and conduct oneself in a certain 
way which underpins the normative and applicative force of the 
theory. Where there is a tension between this homogeneity of action 
and the recognition of practical heteronomy, the project becomes to 
fashion people to fit into these fictional communities. This is true of 
near-absolutist theories such as Pufendorf's, and unapologetic 
absolutist theories such as Hobbes. On top of this fiction lies another, 
that the citizens (so constituted) are said to participate in the governing 
of the state, whether through actual participation or representation, 
and that the state is therefore directed in some (significant) way by the 
political agency of 'the people'over whom and for whom it acts. The 
practical reality of state power usually tells a different story, the 
character of which is generally to work against the assertion of the 
political agency of 'the people' upon which its very legitimacy is 
predicated. It might be that '[i]f a fiction is necessary enough it is not a 
lie'; but it is im portant to understand the nature of this fiction and 
equally to try and see how it is used and in what drcum stances it is 
invoked, and the causal relations between it and a practical political 
reality.io?
106 See Skinner 1989 passim.
107 See the discussion in John Dunn, Interpreting Political Responsibility; Essays 1981-1989, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990, especially the Introduction, pp. 1-8. Also, a lucid series of 
articles by Barry Hindess; "Power and Rationality: The Western Concept of Political 
Community*’, Alternatives, 17,1992,149-163; ‘Taking socialism seriously”, Economy and 
Society, 20,4, November 1991,363-379; “Liberalism, Socialism and Democracy: variations 
on a governmental theme”, presented at Foucault and Politics Conference, Goldsmith’s
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But this is not a simple or clear cut story, nor is it a relation free from 
tension and counter-practices. Pufendorf represents an extreme limit 
of both the demarcation of natural law and a theory of the state/citizen 
relationship which settles civil peace by creating a civil society with a 
severely restricted scope for meaningful political agency. We seem a 
long way from the self-governing agency and the 'structures of virtue' 
of classical republicanism, though I have argued that another kind of 
structure has inserted itself between the imperium of government and 
the 'rights' of citizens. And yet there is another aspect of the natural 
law tradition which might bring us closer to what we examined above 
in chapter 3, and which begins to work away at the margins of its strict 
demarcation from the concerns of classical political theory. The 
ground between the two languages and practices begins to close with 
the development of radical arguments of popular sovereignty, and the 
concepts and practices of liberty and self which underpin these 
theories.
4.3 John Locke, republicanism , and the juridical mode of governm ent 
This brings us to a consideration of some of the work of John Locke. 
There are at least four reasons for doing so here, (i) Locke, like 
Pufendorf, is a key theorist of the juridical mode of government, and 
occupies an im portant position in the la^ryrujii of early m odern 
'oppositional' political theory, (ii) Locke provides a radical, complex, 
yet cogent account of the nature of political power and government 
which answers directly to various absolutist and near-absolutist 
theories of sovereignty (such as Pufendorf's, which Locke read and 
studied closely), (iii) In doing so he articulated a powerful conception 
of political liberty which has subsequently been taken to be 
foundational to aspects of contemporary liberalism. However this 
historical 'lum ping' can be problematic and needs to be considered 
carefully, taking into account the actual historical argum ents in 
relation to the intentions of their future glossators. Fourthly, Locke
College, London, September 1992 (on file with the author).
170
accompanied all of this with a sustained, complex, and hugely 
influential consideration of the nature of human understanding and 
'self', (iv) Locke was at times deeply implicated in the practical arts and 
affairs of governing and active opposition, and thus provides us with a 
unique opportunity to chart the murky relationship between theory 
and practice; the way theories and concepts constitute and hold 
particular practices (here, of governm ent) in place. In sum, an attempt 
to account for all four of these reasons should enable us to deal with 
the three overarching goals of this chapter; (i) the relationship between 
classical republicanism and natural law social contractarianism, (ii) the 
nature of the citizen/state- righ t/du ty  complex in early m odern 
political theory, (iii) and the implications of a particular reading of the 
history of liberalism for claims made on behalf of its defenders and 
critics in our contemporary debates.
As I mentioned at 4 .1 ,1 will be concerned here with Locke's political 
theory, especially as it is expressed in the Two Treatises of Government 
and A Letter Concerning Toleration, and with sketching those 
arguments about political power, the nature of government, and 
liberty, which we find m odem  theorists identifying as either proto­
liberal, or in some sense foundational for m odem  liberalism. In 
chapter five I turn to a more particular account of Locke's account of 
the self and moral conduct which I believe has implications for the 
arguments I am about to sketch. A short conclusion at the end of 
chapter five will hopefully bring these points together before moving 
on to the contemporary arguments themselves.
One obvious w ay of radically differentiating Locke from the classical 
republican tradition is to claim bluntly that he did not share any of the 
background language, mentalite, or ethos of Renaissance civic 
humanism (or any kind of humanism for that matter) as it was 
reworked in the seventeenth century, and this is precisely what 
Professor Pocock has done in the process of rejecting a num ber of
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'myths' about Locke,108 Of course it has been as a result of recent 
scholarship that this tradition has come to be identified at all, which 
gives us the opportunity to reconsider Locke in this new comparative 
context. At first glance this seems obviously true; Locke did not call for 
a new Jerusalem or Athens, and his language and tone seem far 
distanced from the republican mellifluousness of a Milton or 
Harrington. More to the point, in the Second Treatise Locke locates 
virtue in some distant 'Golden AgeQoefore vain Ambition, and amor 
sceleratus habendi)', which became impossible to m aintain with 
expanding populations and the rise of 'Ambition and Luxury'.1^  Here 
Locke was using an account of modernization similar to what we saw 
in Pufendorf (the 'four stage theory7),and what Adam Smith and 
others would use in the eighteenth century to justify the development 
of commercial society.110 And yet this is not quite a complete 
indifference to virtue, nor even was he wholly indifferent to the ethos 
of Renaissance civic humanism. In his educational writings, though 
attacking the renaissance cult of virtue and especially its glorification 
of war, he also set out the basis for socialising children (of the gentry)
108 J.G.A. Pocock, “The myth of John Locke and the obsession with liberalism”, in Pocock, 
Richard Ashcraft ed. John Locke, Los Angeles, William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, 
University of California, 1980,1-24, pp. 13-18,18-20; “The Machiavellian Moment 
Revisited: A Study in History and Ideology”, Journal of Modern History, 53, March 1981, 
49-72, pp. 66,65-7 . The key moment in the displacement of Locke for Pocock is what he 
calls the 'Financial Revolution’ - the rise of public credit, its threat to government stability, 
the opposition of *new’ property versus the old, and the threat to public virtue as a result of 
the incessant rise of commerce. Pocock claims that a neo-Harrington critique of the effects 
of the rise of commerce on the differentiation of 'the personality' rose up against these 
developments, and the opposition of 'real’ property (ie. real independence) versus the more 
ephemeral gains of modem commerce. Though an early investor in the Bank of England, 
Locke played no role in supplying the language of its defence, and the attack was carried out 
in one to which 'he was so utterly indifferent’. Hence what I refer to as Pocock’s 
‘Indifferency Thesis’. More recently Pocock has argued that; 'Political theorists at this day 
see the enterprise of political thinking as a juristic enterprise, couped with a debate over its 
philosophical possibility; it was John Locke who laid down that political literature was 
concerned either with the origin and rights of government, or else with the “government of 
men”, about which he did not say very much’ (Pocock 1993, p. 394). The rest of this 
chapter and the next are in a way meant to test this last claim.
109 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. with Introduction and notes by Peter Laslett, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989 (Student Edition). References to the Two 
Treatieses shall hereafter be provided in the body of the text in paranthesis (book, section) 
foHowing any quotation. All italics in the quotations are Locke's.
110 See Hont 1987, and Tully 1992.
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into the kind of behaviour suitable for civilized living in the early 
m odem  world; i.e. providing the grounds for virtuous conduct. 
Moreover, as we shall see in chapter five, Locke was very concerned to 
articulate the basis of 'right conduct7 and describe the conditions and 
structures within which it was fostered and enacted. It is important not 
to confuse Locke's apparently non-classical redescription of what 
constitutes virtue with the claim that he (and the traditions of natural 
law, social contractarianism, or liberalism  in general') rejected virtue 
altogether, or wholly subordinateed it to law s and rules'.111 Locke too 
is interested in grounding certain capacities in relation to the social 
and institutional structures within which they act; the idea of liberal 
virtues is not paradoxical in the least. Though his earliest significant 
writings do not betray any republican tendency whatsoever112, this is 
not to say Locke was not (at least) exposed to the basic literature of the 
old and new humanism. His time at Westminister School would 
have familarized him with classical literature, though in later life he 
remained dubious as to its linguistic benefits, commenting in his 
Some Thoughts Concerning Education that it was hardly worth the 
trouble of sending one's son to such an institution 'for a little Latin 
and Greek'.113 As well, as mentioned above, by the mid-seventeenth 
century, hum anism  was pervasive in college curricula and remained 
so at least until the Interregnum. Purtian reformers attacked the 
universities in ways similar to Erasmus - too much emphasis on 
scholastic techniques, too narrow academic exercises, and an
111 Cf. J.B, Schneewind, “The Misfortunes of Virtue”, Ethics, 101, October 1990,42-63, who 
argues Locke does precisely this (p. 45).
112 John Locke, Two Tracts on Government, ed. P. Abrams, Cambridge University Press, 1967. 
See the discussion of Locke’s early Essays on the Law of Nature, in John Dunn, The 
Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Arguments of the Two 
Treatises o f Government, Cambridge University Press, 1969, noting their ‘enclosed and 
insulated character...their sustained exposition of a single theme, a theme effortlessly located 
in the most rigid cadre of theological and social convention’, (p. 20-1) Cf. Wolfgang Von 
Leyden, John Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1954.
113 John Locke, ‘Some Thoughts Concerning Education* in J.L. Axtell, The Educational 
Writings o f John Locke, Cambridge University Press, para. 70, cf. 147. See Maurice 
Cranston, John Locke, A Biography, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985 (1957), p. 22 for 
the classical requirements of a King’s Scholar, which Locke was whilst at Westminister 
school.
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overemphasis on metaphysics. In 1653, Oxford 'Visitors'
(commissioned by the Saints Parliament) criticized the 'monkish 
aloofness' of much of the curriculum and teaching, and encouraged 
the combination of 'godliness and learning' harnessed to the public 
concerns of the commonwealth.11* Locke, (who arrived at Christ 
Church in 1652) would share this frustration with medieval 
disputation, though as a Tutor, Lecturer in Rhetoric, and eventually 
Censor of Moral Philosophy, his interests led him mainly to the study 
of natural law, medicine and science.115
However towards the end of his life Locke made a series of 
interesting recommendations in the course of responding to Richard 
King7s request for the 'surest way7 to educate and train a young 
gentleman in 'the Practice of Human Offices', which are worth 
glimpsing at here.116 'As to Morality7 writes Locke, Tf you have a mind 
to see how far Hum an Reason advanc'd in the Discovery of Morality, 
you will have a good Specimen of it in T u ll/s  Offices; unless you have 
a m ind to look farther back into the Source, from whence He drew  his 
Rules; and then you m ust consult Aristotle, and the other Greek 
Philosophers'. The business of morality is 'the avoiding of crimes', 
and of prudence ('reckon'd among the Cardinal Virtues'), 
inconveniences, 'the foundation whereof lies in knowing Men and 
Manners'. For the rules of prudence Locke is unable to provide a 
source other than history and experience, since too many writers on it 
'have their Eyes so fix'd on Convenience, that they sometimes lose the 
Sight of Virtue...while they are tracing out w hat they take to be, 
sometimes, the securest way to Success'. [Here is our first hint that
114 Sec Margo Todd, Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order, Cambridge University 
Press, 1987, p. 91.
115 See the comments of Lady Masham on Locke’s perception of Oxford teaching, Cranston p. 
38, but cf. Axtell pp. 42-3.
116 Locke to Richard King, 25 August 1703, no. 3328, in E.S. de Beer, The Correspondence of 
John Locke VIII, Oxford, Clarendon at Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 56-59. I demur at 
De Beer’s suggestion at n.4 p. 57 however that ‘Offices’ as Locke uses it is a rare usage 
restricted to Cicero’s De officiis. Given what we know of its usage by the Christian 
Humanists and Pufendorf for example, though always related to Cicero in important ways, it 
was far from being a rare usage in the context of the seventeenth century.
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Locke is not wholly given over to the "reason of state' tendencies of the 
new humanism] A final element in such an education is "Good- 
breeding" - learned from conversation with the well-bred themselves - 
which is closely allied with "Virtue and Prudence", such that "he will 
scarce keep himself from Slips in both, who is without it'.117 As to 
books, Locke provides a list which includes Aristotle's Politics (an 
'allow 'd Master" in the science of civil society), Cicero's De Officiis, 
Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, his own Two Treatises, and Pufendorf's 
De officio hominis et civis. Finally, knowledge of "Administration of 
the Publick', following from his distinction between general and 
particular knowledge (ie. political theory and empirical political 
science, or the 'art of government"), is variable as a result of the 
"mutable State of Men and Things in this World", and as a result, 'a 
very small part of this consists in Book-Learning" (I will discuss Locke's 
conception of the "art of government" in greater detail below).118 It is a 
rarely asked question in the Locke academic industry precisely what, 
for example, did Aristotle's Politics and Cicero's De officiis mean to 
Locke?119 Were they simply the conventional icons of any reading list 
of any don, or for that matter, any well educated person of the 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries? No doubt this is partially 
true. And yet, there just might be something more, especially with 
regard to Cicero and Aristotle, of whom Locke owned m any works, 
including two sets of Cicero's complete works, seven editions of De
117 de Beer 1989, pp. 57-8.
118 De Beer 1989, p. 59.
119 But see Richard Ashcraft, “John Locke's Library: Portrait of an Intellectual” in Richard 
Ashcraft ed. John Locke: Critical Assessments I (of IV), London, Routledge, 1991, pp. 17- 
49. Also, William Arthur Bruneau’s neglected ‘Towards a History of Moral Education: Some 
Fundamental Considerations and a Case Study”, Paedagogica Historica, XV, 3,1975,356- 
378, and M.G. Mason, “The Literary Sources of John Locke’s Educational Thoughts”, 
Paedagogica Historica, V, 1965,65-108. Neither are included in Ashcraft’s great 
compendium of Locke articles, though Ashcraft has recently lamented that Locke scholars 
seem uninterested in the relationship between Locke and classical authors. Cf. the suggestive 
remarks by John Marshall (querying the relationship between Locke's political theory and 
Cicero’s De officiis), ‘John Locke’s Religious, Educational, and Moral Thought’, Historical 
Journal, 33,4, 1990, 993-1001, especially at p. 1001. Though brought to my attention 
only recently, this discussion articulates many of my intentions here (no doubt more clearly 
and succinctly!)
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officiis, and numerous editions and translations of the letters and 
speeches.120 Nor was his recommendation to King concerning Cicero 
and Aristotle an isolated affair; he recommended them to his students 
and friends when he was a tutor at Oxford, and to numerous 
correspondents, not only for the study of morality, but (particularly in 
the case of Cicero) for learning an appropriate latin style, the skill of 
letter writing, and eloquence - though not the practice of classical 
rhetoric (of which he was a fierce critic).121 Locke was heir to the 
general Christian hum anist tradition of education and moral 
development as it was unfolding in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries in England and on the continent. Like Aristotle and Cicero, 
he was concerned with the education and character formation of man 
both as an individual and a member of a community, hence the 
emphasis upon providing the means to live, and not just the mere 
accumulation of knowledge or skill.122 This can also be seen in the
120 See Peter Laslett and John Harrison, The Library of John Locke, Oxford Bibliographical 
Society, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 18,108. Classical litterature constituted roughly 
ten percent of Locke’s collection, almost equivalent to the number of books on politics and 
law, slightly less than his collecion of medical books, and considerably less than those on 
theology (which constituted 23.8% of the library available). Cf. Axtell p. 294. Along with 
numerous works of Cicero, Aristotle, Seneca and Quintilian, Locke possessed selected works 
of Comenius, Erasmus and Lipsius {De constantia), as well as the complete works of 
Machiavelli.
121 See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited with a foreward by 
Peter H. Nidditch, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975 (1988), Book in, Chapter 10, Paragraph 
34 [hereinafter references to the Essay shall follow quotations in paranthesis in the body of 
the text according to book, chapter, and paragraph]. It might be fine for ‘Pleasure and 
Delight’, but it is not suitable where we seek ‘Information and Improvement*. See MSS. 
Locke, f. 11, folios 43-44 where Locke makes recommendations (in 1667) to a student for 
the study of virtue, religion, breeding, wisdom, and study (as we shall see this ordering is 
significant) and that following graduation he should look after his estates with prudence and 
review and improve upon his ‘university notions’. Mason (1965, p.75) links this with his 
claim that Locke is following a generally Aristotelian approach to the development of moral 
character through education. On Locke's recommendation of Cicero for eloquence, the letter 
to Edward Clarke, 15 March 1686, no. //, pp. //-//. Cf. STCE, para. 188-9 and “Some 
Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman”, 1703, in Axtell ed., p. 399, 
where he goes so far as to recommend the proper edition of Cicero’s De officiis one should 
buy.
122 See STCE, para. 94: ‘prudence and good breeding are in all the stations and occurences of life 
necessary; and most young men suffer in the want of them and come rawer and more awkward 
into the world than they should for this very reason, because these qualities, which are of all 
other the most necesary to be taught and stand most in need of the assistance and help of a 
teacher, are generally neglected and thought but a slight or no part of a tutor’s business.
Latin and learning make all the noise, and the main stress is laid upon his proficiency in
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main goals of his educational progran^(which cannot be treated in 
isolation from his larger philosophical and political works) - the 
inculcation of proper virtue, religion, wisdom, 'breeding7, and 
learning. Virtue was 'the power of denying ourselves the satisfaction 
of our own desires where reason does not authorize them', a power of 
self-government achieved and improved through 'custom' and 
'practice' (note that virtue must be 'aim 'd at7 in Education - STCE, 70.); 
it was the endowment that made him 'valued and beloved by others' 
and 'acceptable or tolerable to himself.'123 The virtues were (aside 
from the architectonic quality of self-denial): civility, industry, 
liberality, justice, courage, and honesty. The foundation of virtue 
rested partially on the love of one's reputation , but was mainly having 
a true notion of God, which meant understanding his moral laws, the 
process of which Locke spent most of his life working out, and 
especially in the Essay. (See also STCE 138-139). It was from studying 
the New Testament, along with Cicero's De officiis, Pufendorf s De 
officiis, and Aristotle's Ethics and Politics, that 'a  man may learn how 
to live, which is the business of ethics, and not how to define and 
distinguish and dispute about the names of virtues and vices'.124 I do 
not think Mr. Laslett wholly captures this aspect in his account of 
what he calls Locke's doctrine of 'natural virtue', defined as 'some 
tendency' which allows for 'the existence, the desires, actions, and
things a great part whereof belong not to a gentleman's calling - which is to have the 
knowledge of a man of business, a carriage suitable to his rank, and to be eminent and useful 
in his country according to his station’. Cf. Mason 1965, p. 75, and Bruneau p. 371 (who 
quotes from the same passage).
123 STCE p. 36, 38,107,135; the self-mastery discussion takes place generally between 33-39. 
Cf. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditeh, Oxford 
University Press, 1975,4.12.11.
124 ‘A draft letter to the Countess of Peterborough’ (1697), in Axtell ed., p. 395. See ‘Some 
Thoughts” 1703, in Axtell ed., p. 400 where Locke comments that for the study of morality 
one need only send the New Testament, though if one ‘had a mind to see how far the heathen 
world carried that science, and whereas they bottomed their ethics, he will be delightfully and 
profitably entertained inTully’s treatises De officiis’. Cf. the interesting discussion in Nathan 
Tarcov, Locke's Education for Liberty, University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 59-63 on 
‘positive revelation', and generally, the relationship between scripture and political theory in 
Locke. The issue of Locke’s ‘moral theology’ is fast emerging as the latest wave of 
scholarship (rightfully so), and I shall be touching on aspects of this below.
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needs of other men' and 'what is to be expected if each is to be trusted 
with the means of maintaining the humanity of all'. The 'naturalness' 
of the doctrine of virtue, suggests Laslett, has to do with the 'symmetry 
in reason' between all men. 125 Yet with self-preservation closest to 
their hearts, men are often partial, short-sighted beings126 and need to 
be convinced not only of the rationality of right conduct, but helped in 
putting it into practice: There be two parts of Ethics, the one is the rule 
which men are generally in the right in though perhaps they have not 
deduced them as they should from their true principles. The other is 
the true motives to practice them and the ways to observe them and 
these are generally either not well known or not rightly applied'.
These two parts are analogous to the distinctions Locke makes between 
the two parts of knowledge and the two parts of poltics; moral 
discourse is incomplete if it does not encompass both of these aspects.
(I shall have much more to say about this in chapter five.) To practice 
virtue, men m ust be made 'alive' to it so that they can 'taste' it, and to 
do this one m ust consider 'w hat is each m an's particular disease, what 
is the pleasure that posesses him '. Far from being something that is 
natural, it is something one m ust be brought to 'practice in particular 
instances and so by habits establish a contrary pleasure', and only then, 
'when Conscience, Reason, and pleasure go together' can reason 
prevail.122 This does entail the total transformation of man, only that 
he 'may perhaps be a little m ended', the best means of which are those 
practices in relation to men's habits.128 Hence Locke's general concern 
with education, and more specifically with replacing the 'old
125 Peter Laslett, “Introduction” to Two Treatises 1989, pp. 110-111.
126 See TT 1.88, II. 123, for the reasons men enter into political society. Cf. n.125, where Locke 
notes that everyone in the state of nature is too ‘partial to themselves’.
127 John Locke, ‘Of Ethick in General’, MS Locke c 28, pp. 146-52, ‘Ethica’; usefully reprinted 
in Peter King, Life of John Locke, London, 1830, II 122-33, and more recently in Dunn 
1969, p. 192, n.l.
128 On the limited possibilities for the transformation of man’s character, see STCE 101-2,66, 
and examples of such transformation in the case of ‘timorousness’ and ‘carelessness’ at STCE 
115,123-27. See the discussion in Tarcov 1984, p. 129, but cf. Peter A. Schouls, Reasoned 
Freedom: John Locke and Enlightenment, New York, Cornell University Press, 1992, 
passim, which is probably the most careful philosophical reading of the STCE to date.
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education' of rule following (which usually makes men 'insincere or 
worse' - STCE 65) with that which works on those elements of human 
agency which enable 'right conduct7 to come easily and 'naturally'.
This also explains the importance for Locke of the concepts of 
'breeding' and 'civility7, mentioned above in his letter to King and 
implicit in his definition of virtue in the STCE. This is, w hat he means 
when he talks of young gentlemen learning from interaction with the 
already 'well-bred'; the cultivation of social virtues such as good 
manners and civility that make a person 'acceptable' to his fellow men. 
Civility was 'that Beauty which shines through some Men's Actions, 
sets off all they do, and takes all they come near7, something very 
similar to Cicero's concept of decorum.129 Locke followed his 
description of how the works of Cicero, Aristotle, Pufendorf, and the 
New Testament, 'completed' men in the Tractices of Hum an Offices' 
and taught them 'how to live', with a claim that 'true politics' 
consisted in 'the art of conducting men right in society and supporting 
a community amongst its neighbours'.130 Thus part of the process of 
'conducting men right7 and supporting the community was learning 
the ways of virtue, which m eant subordinating one's inclinations to 
self indulgence and acting for the common good - ie. following the 
dictates of natural law according to the light of reason. This is in part a 
divine 'calling7, but Locke - just as the Christian humanists did 
(following Cicero) also linked it to the 'natural' calling (the vocatus ) of 
the good man, who is ipso facto a good citizen. Though influential 
accounts of Locke's conception of 'calling' have been given linking it 
to an essentially Calvinist world picture, I have tried to present an 
alternative picture which places it in the context of a more civil 
character, such as we find in certain Christian hum anist writings, as 
well as the emphasis placed on the imposition of civil and political
129 Cf. Cicero, DO 1.97-103,129-137. See STCE 66-7,93,109,117; on the importance of 
one’s outward demeanour, 143,146. Locke recommends Pierre Nicole’s Essais de morale 
(which he had translated in 1676) as a good source for the study of civility.
130 ‘A Draft...’ 1697, in Axtell ed., pp. 395-6.
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'offices' through natural law that we find in Pufendorf, for example.131 
I do not want to overstate Locke's bibliographical and theoretical
connection with humanist 1 'ature, but it must be pointed out that
there is a relationship, at least beyond the confines of Locke's days as a 
W estminister school boy. This is not purely a trivial interest; in part it 
chips away at Pocock's Tndifferency Thesis' and thus at the supposed 
chasm between the languages of virtue and rights. It also helps us 
account for the obviously practical and civic elements of Locke's social 
theory which seem at odds with the pessimism of a rabidly theocentric 
interpretation.132 Furthermore, it points out that the relationship 
between early modern political theory and that of the sixteenth century 
(and before) is more complex and intertwined than has been 
previously thought (at least in the 'hobbeslocke' industry, to use 
William Connolly's wonderful neologism).133 However it is only
131 For a brilliant attempt at portraying Locke’s conception of ‘the calling’ as part of a 
rigorously Calvinist world picture, see Dunn 1969, pp. 222-228 and Chapter 18 et passim.
Cf. Tarcov 1984, pp. 127-8,136-7.
132 This is an issue of considerable dispute (as might be expected) in the Locke industry. See W. 
Spellman, John Locke and the Problem of Depravity, Oxford University Press, 1988, takes a 
more pessimistic view of Locke on sin, such that men could never attain salvation by their 
own efforts, or even improve themselves through education, except by the grace of God.
Dunn (1969 and 1989) takes a generally similar stance. For differing views see Schouls 
1992, pp. 193-203, and Marshall 1990, pp. 995-1001. One thing that is certain is that his 
views changed gradually over the course of his life, culminating in the two large religious 
works (the Paraphrases and the Reasonableness) he completed just before he died. See further 
below.
133 This has even extended itself to scholarsly/work on Hobbes, which until recently almost 
exclusively concentrated on the seemingmodemity of his ‘rationalism’ and individualism. In 
particular, some scholars have begun to read some of Hobbes’ central works, like De cive, 
Behemoth, and Leviathan, as addressing not only standard sixteenth century humanist 
concerns such as rhetoric and liberty (critically of course), but also as explorations of the 
dispositions necessary to citizenship; ie. as a theorist of civic virtue. Like Pufendorf (and to 
some extent Locke), Hobbes didn’t articulate an entire panopoly of moral virtues, but mainly 
those (not inconsiderable) ones which teach men their duty to public ends, rather than matters 
of ‘spiritual conscience’. The laws of nature paradigmatically ground this ‘civic personality’ - 
submission equals allegiance and obedience equals ‘duty to the public’ - and thus civil law, 
the rights of the sovereign, and the commonwealth as a whole, are only secured when duty 
seems to spring ‘naturally’. Of course, this isn’t a republican love of civic virtue, since few 
of the attributes Hobbes delineates equip ‘his’ citizens for a life of participatory government. 
And yet again, this is not an indifference to virtue, in fact it becomes a ‘science of virtue and 
vice’, where rather than resting exclusively on the efficacy of fear and containment, the 
sovereign attempts to put his ‘Theorems’ to practice, and reconstitute his subjects as citizens 
(see Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson, Penguin, 1988, II, chap. 25, pp. 307-8; cf. and chp 
31, pp. 407-8) faithfully committed to the terms of the social contract On this ?ee Mary G. 
Deitz, ‘Hobbes’s Subject as Citizen’ in Mary G. Deitz ed. Thomas Hobbes and Political
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really the prelude to a much deeper comparison at the conceptual 
level, and in particular between Locke's conception of self and political 
agency, his concept of liberty, and those of republican (and ancient 
constitutional) writings.134
There are two accounts of liberty in Locke's political theory, not 
unconnected but distinct; the 'natural liberty' of man and the liberty of 
m an 'in society'. Natural liberty is the freedom of man from any 
superior power on earth, and to live only according to the law  of 
nature'. Civil liberty (the liberty of man in society) is to be under no 
other legislative power other than that established by consent, or 
under any 'dominion' of any will or law except that which has been 
enacted by a legislature to which one has entrusted one's natural 
liberty (TT.n.22, 57). There are a number of key concepts here which 
need to be disassembled. First, let us examine the basis for Locke's 
'strange doctrine'(II.9) of natural liberty, involving an original freedom 
on the part of the people to exercise politial power, which grounds any 
subsequent institutionalized forms of government. Locke insists 
(against Filmer and Royalist arguments in the context of the Exclusion
Theory, University Press of Kansas, 1990,91-119; in the same volume, Stephen Holmes, 
“Political Psychology in Hobbes’s Behemoth”, 120-152. For a slightly different emphasis 
on inner transformation being a pre-condition of the possibility of authority (from a defiantly 
Oakeshottian perspective), see Timothy Fuller, ‘Elements of Spiritedness in Hobbes’, in 
Catherine H. Zuckert, Understanding the Political Spirit: Philosophical Investigation from 
Socrates to Nietzsche, Yale University Press, 1988,111-125. On the relation between 
Hobbes’ moral theory and classical rhetoric, see Quentin Skinner’s ‘Thomas Hobbes:
Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality’, in the Proceedings of the British Academy, 76,1- 
61,1990, published by Oxford University Press, 1991; and ‘Scientia Civilis in classical 
rhetoric and in the early Hobbes’, in Phillipson, Skinner (eds.) 1993, pp. 67-93 (cf. Pocock’s 
comments at pp. 396-400). See also David Johnson, The Rhetoric of Leviathan, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1986. More generally, see S.A. Lloyd, Ideals as Interests in 
Hobbes’s Leviathan, Cambridge University Press, 1992 For a discussion of Hobbes’ concept 
of political liberty that includes its relation to the classical republican conception he 
attempted so hard to efface, see Skinner’s, “Thomas Hobbes on the Proper Signification of 
Liberty”, the Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th Series, 10, London, 1990, 
121-151; and Tuck 1993, pp. 310-335.
134 Given the gargantuan proportions of late modem Locke scholarship I shall note only those 
secondary works which touch upon the issues at hand. What follows below is in no way 
meant to be a general survey of Locke’s political theory, though wherever the discussion 
seems to warrant some wider elaboration I shall do so as concisely as possible.
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crisis)135 that this natural liberty is not some unrestrained freedom 'for 
every Man to do what he lists', but is the state of being under one's 
own will and natural law (11.57). According to their nature, men's 
proper function is to act according to their reason, which is both the 
actual faculty of reason and the principles so discovered, which is 
natural law (II.6). Since man is the 'workmanship' of God, by acting in 
accordance with reason (which God has placed in him) and 
discovering the 'Law he is to govern himself by7, he is fulfilling his 
moral obligation to God. (H.6, 63) Natural law for Locke is supposed to 
be an objective set of moral principles, and thus morality is not 
grounded in intersubjective customs (as most hum anists argued; this 
is a horizon which is impenetrable between natural law and 
humanism), since God and not man was the author of moral values. 
According to the convention of seventeenth century natural law 
theory (particularly according to Grotius), the fundamental law of 
nature was self-preservation, since God's design for the world gives us 
duties and tasks to fulfill; the fundamental point here is that natural 
law theory always begins with duties and then moves to rights - ie. the 
rights that are necessary in order to fulfill our duty. Locke is consistent 
w ith other natural law writers in insisting that rights are not to be 
understood as trumps, but as being granted purposively.136 Locke is no 
different except to highlight as well as the fundamental natural law 
being self-preservation, the preservation of mankind; 'sharing all in 
one Community of Nature, there cannot be supposed any such 
Subordination among us, that may Authorize us to destroy one 
another, as if we were made for one anothers uses, as the inferior 
ranks of Creatures are for ours. Every one as he is bound to preserve
135 On the practical context of Locke’s concept of natural liberty, see Richard Ashcraft, 
Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, Princeton University 
Press, 1986, pp. 181-285; and Janies Tully ‘Liberty and natural law’, and ‘Political Freedom’ 
in An approach to political philosophy: Locke in contexts, Cambridge University Press, 
1993, pp. 281-323.
136 On the seventeenth century rights context and especially Grotius, see Tuck 1979, pp. 58-82 
and 1983, chp. 5 passim; Tully 1993, pp. 305-7 627. On rights as ‘trumps’ see Ronald 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1977.
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himself, and not to quit his Station willfully; so by the like reason 
when his own Preservation comes not into competition, ought he, as 
much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind'XU.6) Following from 
this duty is the right to preserve one's life by exercising political power 
individually through the execution of the law of nature in punishing 
(natural) law-breakers (11.4,6,7) and protecting oneself and others from 
starvation, (see Il.chapter V et passim; but especially section 27 for the 
famous 'enough and as good left in common for others' proviso which 
regulates the exercise of labour power and possession in the state of 
nature). Concomitant with this right is the presupposition that people 
are capable of exercising this kind of political power; this includes 
knowing and interpreting natural law, judging controversies 
concerning oneself and others, and executing these judgements via the 
proportionate punishm ent of any transgression so judged (n.7-12). 
Three further presuppositions flow from this; that people appear to be 
naturally self-governing (cf. the discussion in Pufendorf), naturally 
free (because they are not subject to the will of others), and naturally 
equal (in that they each have the duty and right to exercise poltical 
power (n.4, 7). I will discuss the nature of these presuppositions in 
more detail below, especially with regard to capabilities.
Prior to and independent of any governmental institutions people 
are able to (somewhat) govern themselves, and it is upon this fact that 
institutionalized forms of government derive their original powers (II. 
87-9).137 These forms of government arise because of the problems 
encountered in the state of nature, where 'though the Law of Nature 
be plain and intelligible to all rational Creatures', men are 'biassed' by 
their own interest, and 'ignorant for want of study of i f ,  and thus have 
a tendency to exempt themselves from the application of the Law 
(11.124). In general, the state of nature 'wants' of three key elements: an 
established, settled, and known law, a known and 'indifferent Judge',
137 This element of Locke’s theory informs much of Tully’s interpretation of Locke’s political 
theory; see 1993 passim, and particularly at pp. 319-23.
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and a 'Power to back and support the Sentence when right, and to give 
it due Execution' (IL124-6). Combined with the historical and 
sociological phenonomena of disputes over property rights caused by 
increasing population, the increased appropriation of land, the 
introduction of money, the division of labour, and the intensification 
of commercial activity (II. 36-8,40,48), men are 'driven' to set up 
institutionalized forms of government:
because no Political Society can be, nor subsist without having in it self the Power to 
preserve the Property, and in order thereunto punish the Offences of all those of that 
Society; there, and there only is Political Society, where every one of the Members 
hath quitted this natural Power, resign'd it up into the hands of the Community...And 
thus all private judgement of every particular Member being excluded, the Community 
comes to be Umpire, by standing Rules, indifferent, and the same to all Parties (II. 87).
However, unlike the near-absolutist theories (such as Pufendorf's and 
Locke's own early work the Two Tracts) this 'resignation of power' did 
not entail the effacement of those capabilities of citizens presupposed 
in the state of nature, that is, to act and judge politically. This is because 
the people do not wholly alienate their natural 'power7, but entrust it 
to the monarch or parliament. There are a number of good reasons for 
doing this (see II. 90, 93,106) but the main one is just that it is a matter 
of fact that people do not alienate their natural political power; T he  
people generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon 
any occasion to ease themselves of a burden (ie. the lousy tyrant - D.I.) 
that sits heavy upon them' (11.224).
The key to this process are the complex concepts of trust and 
consent.138 The two natural powers of man - the right to property and 
labour for his preservation and the power of punishing transgressors 
of natural law - are consented to be entrusted to government. Both 
powers are thus regulated in accordance with the common good of
138 John Dunn has provided the most illuminating and sophisticated analysis of these concepts, 
to which I am greatly indebted. See John Dunn “Consent in the Political Theory of John 
Locke”, The Historical Journal, X, 2, July 1967.Dunn 1969, chapter 10,13, et passim',
1984, chapter 2 et passim; “The concept of ‘trust* in the politics of John Locke”, in Richard 
Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, Quentin Skinner, Philosophy in History: Essays on the 
historiography of philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 279-301. See also 
J.W, Gough, John Locke's Political Philosophy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1950, chapter 7.
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individual and collective preservation, the latter taking priority if and 
w hen the two ever come into conflict: 'the first and fundamental 
positive Law of all Commonwealths, is the establishing of the 
Legislative Power; as the first and fundamental natural law, which is 
to govern even the Legislative it self, is the preservation of the Society, 
and  (as far as will consist with the publick good) of every person in 
it'OL 134).i39 Here, to put it in m odem  terms, the good is before the 
right with regard to the basis upon which political power is both 
exercised and judged. Ultimately all legitimate authority is in some 
sense conferred by God since the legislative power of the law of nature 
rests with him. On top of this is placed a theory of consent which also 
helps explain both the setting up and legitimation of political societies 
and  their governments (II. 95-9).140 Locke identifies two kinds of 
consent; tacit and explicit ('express'). The latter is most important to 
the process of legitimation since it is only by the making of some overt 
sign of agreement - a 'positive Engagement and express Promise' - that 
the citizen becomes bound to the determination of the majority, (n.95- 
9; cf.119,121) The majority then places the authority into specific 
hands, whether a democracy or whatever, and thus it becomes the 
suprem e power of the commonwealth grounded upon the natural 
powers of its citizens. This power is further transferred to the 
executive and 'Federative', the former comprehending the 'Execution 
of the Municipal Laws of the Society within its self', and the latter the 
'm anagem ent of the security and interest of the publick without'. Here 
again we find Locke relying on the important distinction between 
theory and 'prudence'. The Tederative' power, since it is much less 
capable of being directed by 'antecedent or standing positive law - in its 
dealings w ith 'Foreigners' for example - m ust necessarily be left to
139 Cf. n. 171:’the end and measure of this Power, when in eve»v Man’s hands in the state of 
Nature, being the preservation of all of his Society, that is, ai Mankind in general, it can 
have no other end or measure, when in the hands of the Magistrate, but to preserve the 
Members of that Society in their Lives, Liberties, and Possessions; and so cannot be an 
Absolute, Arbitrary Power over their Lives and Fortunes, which are as much as possible to 
be preserved’.
140 Dunn 1967 et passim; 1969 129-143; 1984 49-52.
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prudence and the 'Wisdom of those whose hands it is in, to be 
managed for the publick good'(II. 147; cf. 144,145,146,148). Tacit 
consent, as it implies, was less direct than this, being based mainly on 
the mere presence of someone in an established state taking advantage 
of its resources (11.122,119). This simply adds to the scope of the 
legitimate exercise of executive power to include just about everyone 
inside a state's borders (including any 'itinerant aliens') and provide a 
rationale for everyone to obey the law of the land. W hat distinguishes 
the two is the unequivocal nature of the commitment to obey the 
legitimate political authority expressed in the 'explicit compact. Of 
course, as Professor Dunn has shown, the whole discussion of when 
and where this actual express consent took place is rather murky, as is 
the general plausibility of there being such a thing as 'tacit7 consent.141 
However the im portant claim is that only the agreement of adult 
(male) hum an beings can give another person, or group of persons, 
political authority over them; this is the only means whereby rulers of 
civil society have rights to political authority. Locke's consent 
argum ent establishes the principle of why governments are subject to 
resistance if they abuse their power; the centrality of the notion of trust 
provides the ground upon which power is exercised properly for the 
public good, or betrayed.
It is im portant to emphasize the contours of the relation between 
political authority and the public good in Locke. Political power is 
exercised on the grounds of people's delegation of their original 
natural powers and liberty in order to protect their l iv e s ,  liberties and 
estates'. It is also grounded in a relationship of trust between the 
governed and their governors, that is, the laws m ade and executed are 
in accordance with the common good (natural law), that no one is 
exempt from these laws (including the governors), and that any 
change in the laws cannot be made w ithout the consent of the majority
141 John Dunn, “Consent in the Political Theory of John Locke”, The Historical Journal, X, 2, 
July 1967, 153-82; 1969, pp. 131-142; 1984, pp. 49-50.
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through their representatives: Their (the Legislative power - D.I) in 
the utmost Bounds of it, is limited to the publick good of the Society. It 
is a power that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can 
never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the 
Subjects' (n.135; see 140 on changing laws; 'what property have I in that 
which another may by right take, when he pleases to himself?'). We 
m ust not however, forget the other contour of political authority that 
permeates all of Locke's political theory, which is that pow er which the 
government has beyond the letter of the law to protect and enhance 
the public good. This is in part what Locke calls the 'art of 
government', which I shall turn to below. But here I w ant to mention 
one aspect of this power, which is the role of the 'prerogative', 
discussed at chapter XIV of the Two Treatises. In it he defines this 
power as the Tow er to act according to discretion, for the publick good, 
w ithout the prescription of the Law, and sometimes even against 
it ...Prerogative is nothing but the Power of doing publick good without 
a Rule' (H.160, 166). In a real sense, men and women were entrusting 
their fate to a power that could not be strictly regulated - w ithout a 
specific institutional locus (except that it was in the hands of the 
sovereign) and with its formal legitimacy based only on the criteria 
that it be used for the public good. Locke allows for a fair amount of 
leeway; 'Great mistakes' and 'many wrong and inconvenient laws' will 
be tolerated by the people, and only a long  train of abuses, 
prevarications, and artifices, all tending the same way7 and easily 
visible will lead to a 'state of war7 between the people and their 
governors. ( TT, n. 20,230, 225) Public authority exercised according to 
constitutional limits was indispensable for the protection and 
enhancement of the public good, but it was potentially equally so 
beyond these limits. And this is because in the end, Locke was 
steadfastly insistent that government could not be a set of practices 
resting on frame of abstraction, but rather, on men; 'Allegiance is 
neither due nor paid to Right or Government which are abstract
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notions but only to persons having right or government'.142 In this 
sense, the Two Treatises is far from being a strictly constitutionalist 
tract, and Locke's political theory far from being one wholly concerned 
with nailing down the limits of government power.
The ambiguity of Locke's constitutionalism is embodied in the 
concept of trust we have examined above in relation to the express 
laws of the commonwealth, as well as the prerogative of the sovereign. 
However it comes into sharp relief when we turn to Locke's 
justification of revolution. The measure of the use of this delegated 
(entrusted) power rests in its accordance with the public good, the 
contravention of which provides the content of the term 'abuse' 
applied to any such action. People trust their leaders to do the right 
thing, and even go so far as to tolerate all sorts of inconveniences and 
mistakes towards that end (implied at n.168; explict at 223, 225), but in 
the last instance they retain as individuals, their duty and right to 
judge whether or not the sovereign has lived up to their trust in him: 
'the Legislative being only a Fiduciary Power to act for certain ends, 
there rem ains still in the People a Supreme Power to remove or alter 
the Legislative, when they find the Legislative act contrary to the trust 
reposed in them...And thus the Community perpetually retains a 
Supream Power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs 
of any Body, even of their Legislators, whenever they shall be so 
foolish, or so wicked, as to lay and carry on designs against the Liberties 
and Properties of the Subject7 (11.149). Locke often speaks about such 
abuses as 'invasions' of the liberties and properties of the people 
contrary to their trust, and as such, the people are absolved from 
obedience and may resist and even kill these 'noxious creatures'(n. 123, 
131, 231; cf. 222) W hether the invasion of one's liberties and the
141 MS Locke c 28, fo. 85v; Dunn 1969, p. 122 n.2; 1984, p. 52. Pocock points out that ‘the 
subject-matter of humanism* is the ‘government of men’, but that for the most part, modem 
theorists are perturbed when the history of a political discourse ‘wanders from the high road of 
right and authority* and constantly seek to bring it back under a ‘juristic paradigm*. It strikes 
me that Pocock has done exactly this whenever he encounters aspects of Locke which do not 
fit into his own paradigm of early modem political discourse. See Phillipson and Skinner 
1993, pp. 394, 398.
common good is by an external force or by a corrupt magistrate is no 
matter, the two are analogous instances of oppression and should be, 
indeed m ust be, resisted.143 It is important to recognize the radically 
individualistic tenor of this claim, for it is the people, that is 'every 
M an', who are judges of whether or not this trust has been forfeited.
(II. 240-2) T he people' as a whole should execute this judgement in 
removing unjust rulers and reconstituting the government, though if 
this fails each individual must judge as best he can, 'wherein the 
Appeal lies only to Heaven', (n.242)144 Upon the forfeiture of this 
power by the deposed governors, it reverts back to society, 'And the 
People have a Right to act as Supreme, and continue the Legislative in 
themselves, or erect a new Form, or under the old form place it in new 
hands, as they see good'. These are the last words of the Treatises.
Yet is this not a recipe for an anarchy of partial individual 
judgements, as absolutists and conservatives asked throughout the 
Restoration, and oppponents of popular sovereignty continue to ask 
today?145 Locke's answer to this is complex and, one could argue, 
startlingly insightful. There are two main reasons w hy a theory of 
popular sovereignty will not lead to frequent revolution. The first has 
to do w ith the inherent conservatism of the people, which Locke knew 
only too well, that is, since they were hardly bothered to 'am end the 
acknowledg'd Faults, in the Frame they have been accustom 'd to' they 
were also (alas), loathe to quit their 'old Forms' of government at all 
(11.223; the question is considered explicitly by Locke at n. 203-10 and 
224-30). The other main reason has to do w ith their ow n partiality and 
self-interest. This is, that people will not revolt until either oppression 
affects the majority, or it touches an individual or a minority bu t it is 
perceived to threaten everyone (this is in part a calculation that a 
revolt on this basis would win). (II. 208-10, 230) Locke turns round the
143 On this argument’s affinity with the context of radical whig political theory see Ashcraft 
1986, pp. 395-406.
144 But cf. Ashcraft 1986, pp. 576-7 who says the returned power is essentially corporative.
145 Cf. the works of Hayek, Oakeshott, and most recently, Ferdinand Mount, The British 
Constitution Now, London, Heinemann, 1992.
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traditionally conservative emphasis on habit and partiality to restrain 
his right of revolt and to suit his own theoretical needs. Moreover, the 
threat and practice of revolution is the best way of restraining rebellion 
because it acts as a constant reminder to rulers to keep their interests 
and duty in line with the public good (n. 226, cf.210). Revolution, as 
Professor Dunn has pointed out, is not fundamentally an act of 
revenge but an act restoration and revival; Tor when Men by entering 
into Society and Civil Government, have excluded force, and 
introduced Laws for the preservation of Property, Peace, and Unity 
amongst themselves; those who set up force again in opposition to the 
Laws...bring back again the state of war' (II. 226).146
Locke's key insight here has to do with the nature of civil society.
We examined its fundamental basis above; it arises as a result of the 
inconveniences of the state of nature and sets the ground for the 
execution of impartial judgement - by known laws and the 
establishment of a Legislative power. Following from the purely 
analytical construct of the state of nature147, civil society appears as a 
historical rem edy for precisely these problems. This is how hum an 
beings find themselves subject to to the additional coercive powers of 
political authorities. However it can only ever be a partial remedy 
since governments are made of men and not abstractions and thus 
cannot wholly purify themselves of their own partiality, which tends 
to intensify when close to power ('by the pretence they have to 
Authority, the temptation of force they have in their hands, and the 
Flattery of those about them' n.226). Every where Locke looked and 
travelled (especially in France148) seemed to confirm this, since most
146 Dunn 1984, pp. 55-6.
147 See TT, II. 103: ‘at best an Argument from what has been, to what should of right be, has no 
great force’. On whether or not the state of nature is simply an analytical tool or a 
proposition based on historical evidence and anthropology, see Richard Ashcraft, ‘Locke’s 
State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction?, in John Locke: Critical Assessments Vol 
III, ed. Richard Ashcraft, Routledge, 1991, pp. 212-241; and the interesting discussion by 
Ruth W. Grant, ‘Locke’s Political Anthropology and Individualism’, The Journal of Politics, 
50,1988, pp. 42-63, especially at 48-50.
148 See the discussion in Ashcraft 1986, pp. 204-206.
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were absolute monarchies and thus were not legitimate in any sense a 
propos the law of nature. Though trust was essential to Locke's politics, 
he insisted that it could never be given irrevocably because it was 
inevitably broken and abused. It is was the duty and right of 
individuals and the community to judge whether or not and when 
such abuse occurred; the perpetual possibility of rebellion and the 
actual practice of revolution grounds freedom and can never be wholly 
excluded as a possible means of collective and individual political 
agency, given the inherent partiality of men and the institutions they 
set up. Thus paradoxically, in order for political power to serve the 
purposes for which men need it, and in order to make possible the 
benefits of peace ('Safety, Ease, and Plenty'), it must necessarily be open 
to abuse, (n. 101)149 Ultimately this is grounded upon the deep 
structures of Locke's Christian belief, and accounts for the unique way 
in which through the apparatus of the law of nature Locke seems to 
occupy simultaneously vantage points grounded in both faith and 
scepticism. Men were dependent upon God, and the law  of nature, 
enforced via the avenging power of god and the belief in the 
immortality of the soul, enabled the maintenance of a society. But 
God's laws and sanctions could not be simply inferred from the 
properties of the natural world, or deduced from the existent traditions 
of society, or be based on some kind of universal agreement - of which 
it was laughably obvious there could never be.150 W hat is striking 
about Locke is that he came to doubt even the ability to demonstrate 
the immortality of the soul and the existence of heaven of hell, which 
underm ined further the motivation and obligation of people to live 
according to the moral code since they could never be certain that the 
rew ards or punishm nents of heaven and hell were attached to it.151
Perhaps not suprisingly Locke has no straightforward answer to the
149 Cf. Dunn 1984b, p. 296.
150 John Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, ed. W. Von Leyden, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1954, pp. 128-9,166-7. See the helpful discussion in Michael Ayers, Locke: Volume II: 
Ontology, London, Routledge, 1991, pp. 184-202.
151 See Ayers 1991, pp. 191-2; and Tully 1993, pp. 312-314 for further discussion.
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question of how far men can be trusted, it is basically left as a matter for 
"the people'. However we know at least one important aspect of 
Locke's theory which can help us here. Locke presumes that there is a 
general set of capacities or dispositions on the part of the individuals of 
a community to act politically, given his theory of popular sovereignty. 
This is partially a theoretical presumption - or a fiction, as I mentioned 
above - bu t for Locke it is also in important ways a practical possiblity, 
though one he is never overly sanguine about. The grounds for these 
capacities lie in a (roughly) shared set of practices; be they institutions, 
the practical structures of material interests, or some form of political 
interaction or cooperation. For Locke, the English people even had an 
historic source for such a political capacity - the ancient constitution. 
Like m any other seventeenth century theorists, Locke insisted that 
natural rights were also historical rights, ie. those guaranteed in the 
ancient constitution. These rights preceded the Norm an conquest and 
its imposition of a feudal law by the right of conquest, which according 
to Locke's theory in the Two Treatises, was always (without the 
consent of the people) an illegitimate form of political power (II. 175-6, 
vide Chapter XVI et passim). The ancient constitution was the 
political birthright of the English people, encompassing the common 
law, parliament, local government, and particular forms of property 
rights and rights of the person.^52 The precise nature of the kind of 
disposition for political participation this bequest entailed varied 
amongst radical theorists in the seventeenth century, bu t Locke is 
conceptually similar to republicans such as Algernon Sidney and John 
Milton (and publicly so after his death) by making the connection 
explicit. Though a burden more often than not, political participation 
is a duty  and a right, and political virtue requires a genuine 
commitment to the public good in fulfilling the role of impartial
152 See Laslett’s informative note to n.175 in Two Treatises, pp. 384-5. On the ancient 
constitution as it was perceived by writers such as Locke, Sidney, and Milton, see J. G. A. 
Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1957, pp. 53-4,148-50. I am very grateful to Professor Tully for helpful 
correspondence on this point, as well as to Professor Dunn for a very useful discussion.
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adjudication as best one can.153 This commitment is usually brought 
into sharp focus as events come to involve a confrontation of matters 
of direct personal concern, which in principle does not restrict its 
exercise to any one class or 'hum our'. This includes judging political 
power not only as it is known according to established law and 
conventions, but also with regard to the nature of prerogative and the 
scope of legislative and executive prudence according to the 'art of 
government'; both aspects of political power are present in the 
theoretical and practical structure of dvil society. This is not an 
inconsiderable task, given the fact that the practices and institutions 
engendered by one's trust in turn act upon and influence the very 
capacities that according to one's duty one uses to judge their abiding 
fidelity to the public good. It is a significant implication of Locke's 
theory that where such capacities do not exist as a result of either the 
lack of some shared practices of political cooperation, or general 
cognitive underdevelopm ent, the presum ption of capabilities is 
entirely gratutitous. This is a very important implication which I shall 
pick up  on again in chapter 5, along with the nature of the practices 
Locke thinks grounds these political capacities of judgem ent and 
action.
The acceptance of the ineluctability of conflicts of judgem ent and the 
need for legitimate political authority to be structured in accordance
153 See Locke's letter to Edward Clarke 17 October 1690: ‘I hope they [political affairs in 
general] continue on in the same course since my comeing away, and the zeale and 
forwardness of you your selves makes it needless for us without dores soe much as to thinke 
of the publique which is the happyest state a country can be in, when those whose businesse 
it is, take such care of affairs that all others quietly and with resignation acquisce and thinke it 
superfluous and impertinent to medle or beat their heads about them...However I will be sure 
to come to town either to prevent or prepare for the jouny whenever I am sent for’. The 
Correspondence of John Locke IV, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 148. Referred to in 
Dunn 1984b, p. 297. Cf. Hobbes on the value of political engagement: ‘some will say, That 
a Popular State is much to be preferr’d before a Monarchiall; because that, where all men 
have a hand in publique businesses, ther all have an opportunity to shew their wisedom, 
knowledge, and eloquence...[But]...To see his opinion whom we scome, preferr’d before ours; 
to have our wisedom undervalued before our own faces...to hate and to be hated, by reason of 
the disagreement of opinions; to lay open our secret Counsells, and advises to all, to no 
purpose, and without any benefit; to neglect the affaires of our own Family: These, I say, are 
greivances’. (De Cive, The English version, ed. Howard Warrender, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
p. 136.
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with this fact, is also evident in Locke's argument for toleration.154 
There are two levels to Locke's influential theory which I can only 
touch upon here. Firstly, given the truth of Christian religion and the 
central duties of man being a condition of his relationship with the 
deity, individuals cannot, even if they wanted to, alienate their 
sovereignty over their religious beliefs, nor can a particular set of 
beliefs be coercively grafted onto them by some sovereign power (see 
the summary of reasons at LoT 26-8). The attempt to do so only 
generates civil unrest and oppression, which in fact it had throughout 
the seventeenth century. Locke makes a strong claim that religious 
uniformity had mainly been a means of domination for church and 
political elites (the 'insatiable desire of Dominion' over a 'giddy 
M ultitude' LoT, p. 55). Though the magistrate can have no authority 
over the care of m an's soul, he does have authority for the protection 
o f 'Civil Interests' - life, liberty, health, the indolency of body, as well as 
m en's 'outw ard things' such as lands, houses, and money. But as in 
the case of Pufendorf, this juridic bracketing of government from being 
concerned with m en's souls does not mean it is unconcerned with 
their general disposition or moral capacities. Indeed he implies in the 
Letter (and subsequent replies) that it is the duty of every Christian 
(whether magistrates, churchmen, or layman) to be concerned to 
uphold right conduct and root out 'immoralities' (such as fornication, 
undeanness etc; see LoT 24-5).155 Religious beliefs and practices cannot
154 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. James H. Tully, Hackett, 1983. References 
to this work shall hereinafter be placed in parenthesis (LoT, page number) in the text 
following the quotation.
155 This is even more pronounced in the Third Letter on Toleration (1692) where Locke writes 
that ‘corrupt manners’ and debauchery are properly a concern for magistrates, and who should 
act on them via ‘punishments to restrain and repress them’, in The Works of John Locke II, 
London, 1768 (8th ed.). Cf. p. 635: ‘if lawmakers, in making laws, did not direct them 
against the irregular humours, prejudices, and passions of men, which are apt to mislead 
them; if they did not endeavour, with their best judgement, to bring men from their humours 
and passions, to the obedience and practice of right reason; the society could not subsist...But 
in matters of religion it is quite otherwise’. Cf. his original memoranda on toleration 
written for Shaftesbury in 1667: ‘however strange it may seem...the law-maker hath nothing 
to do with moral virtues and vices...any otherwise than barely they are subservient to the 
good and preservation of mankind under government’; cited in H.R. Fox Bourne, The Life of 
John Locke, 2 volumes, London, 1876, i, p. 181. For an interesting disucussion on the
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fundamentally contravene the public good, and if they do, they should 
be proscribed; hence Lockp's unequivocal rejection of tolerance for 
Catholics and atheists, who in the first instance owed allegiance to a 
foreign power and could not be bound to dvil society, and in the 
second, owed allegiance to noone and thus were equally 
untrustworthy and subversive of the public good (LoT, p. 50-1) The 
argum ent went the other way as well; the public good could be 
disrupted by policies of uniformity that stripped dissenters of their 
'properties', ie. their legal, political, and religious rights (LoT 50). If an 
individual judged a law to be both injurious to the public good as well 
as to his conscience, he had a right to revolt (as laid out in the Two 
Treatises): W hat else can be expected, but that these men, growing 
weary of the Evils under which they labour, should in the end think it 
lawful for them to resist Force with Force and to defend their Natural 
Rights?" (LoT 49, 55 cf. 46,49,52,55). In the end, the only thing that can 
guarantee the natural right to Tiberty of Conscience' against religious 
persecution is the counter-threat and practice of r e v o l u t i o n .  156 if an 
individual judges a law to be in the public interest but contrary to his 
own conscience, i.e. within the 'Verge of the Magistrate's authority7, he 
m ust either obey that law or abstain from it and accept any subsequent 
punishm ent (LoT 48). This is not an inconsiderable point. An 
effective political order is a precondition of there being liberty  of 
conscience', and thus no 'opinions' or actions contrary to the moral 
rules necessary for the 'safety and security7 (46) of civil society (which 
secures the 'things of this world7 - LoT 48) are to be tolerated (cf. LoT 49, 
46). Indeed, anyone or any 'sect7 that even considers doing so is literally 
m ad (49; cf. 54 for what kind of things this might include).157 Thus
development of Locke’s ideas on toleration see Richard Tuck, “Hobbes and Locke on 
Toleration”, in Deitz ed.. 1990, pp. 153-171.
156 Tully 1993, pp. 61-2.
157 Compare a contemporary version of this sense of incommensurability in Richard Rorty, ‘The 
Priority of Democracy to Philosophy’, in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth Philosophical 
Papers I, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 175-196, at pp. 187-8; *’we heirs of the 
Enlightenment think of enemies of liberal democracy like Nietzsche or Loyola as, to use 
Rawls’ word, “mad”. We do so because there is no way to see them as fellow citizens of our
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contrary to what Locke says - that the 'business' of laws (of dvil society) 
does not concern the truth of 'Opinions' (46) - there are a set of 
opinions concerning the nature of civil society and the regulation of 
'things of this world' that are embodied in the existence and practices 
of government. Locke avoids the whole issue by saying that if 
goverment is 'faithfully administered...and...directed to the publick 
good' it will seldom happen that there is ever a conflict between 
particular value and the 'objective value' of the m agistrate's authority 
(48). This implies that despite Locke's seeming insistence on a strict 
demarcation between the 'governments' of religion and civil 
authority, there are moments in the process of political government 
when it acts both as a 'Civil and Domestick Governor' of the 'outward 
and inward Court' (LoT 46). In other words, that there is a particular 
account of the person and relation to 'self' which is presupposed in the 
theory, capable of making the epistemological and practical distinctions 
which Locke presses home so forcefully.
constitutional democracy, people whose life plans might, given ingenuity and good will, be 
fitted in with those of other citizens. They are not crazy because they have mistaken the 
ahistorical nature of human beings. They are crazy because the limits of sanity are set by 
what we can take seriously. This, in turn, is determined by our upbringing, our historical 
situation*. Cf. the discussion of Locke’s views on madness in relation to the molding of 
individuality in his theory as a whole in Uday Singh Mehta, The Anxiety of Freedom: 
Imagination and Individuality in Locke’s Political Thought, Ithaca and London, Cornell 
University Press, 1992, chp. 3 passim (although he seems to have missed this rather obvious 
instance of it).
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Chapter 5: John Locke and the government of men
5.0 Juris-prudence
Earlier on I noted that for Locke, there are two necessary components 
to moral discourse: what morality consists in, and how to get men to 
practice it. This duality operates on two other levels I want to mention 
here as a way of introducing the main concerns of this chapter. In his 
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke, following Bacon 
and Aristotle, lays out the division of the sciences by making a 
distinction between general theoretical knowledge, and particular 
practical knowledge (though not isomorphic with Theory ' versus 
'Non-theory'). The end of the first kind of knowledge is the 'bare 
speculative Truth', i.e. the knowledge of things as they are in their 
own 'proper Beings, their Constitutions, Properties, and Operations' 
(EHU 4.21.2). The end of the other kind of knowledge relates to what
m an as a 'rational and voluntary Agent' ought to do to achieve
/
whatever end, but especially 'for the attainment of Things good and 
useful'. This includes 'Ethicks', which is the 'seeking out those Rules, 
and Measures of hum ane Actions, which lead to Happiness, and the 
Means to practice them ', not a process of discovering T ru th ' but 
'Right, and a Conduct suitable to it'. (EHU 4.21.3) Thus in the natural 
sciences, man seeks to understand things as they really are through 
deep contemplation, and in the 'practical' sciences, he is to try and live 
a certain way, and to make certain things, where understanding is only 
in relation to acting.* Politics is a practical knowledge which is further 
subdivided between its own theoretical and empirical-prudential 
elements. Political theory, like geometry, is a kind of general
1 But note that in the context of moral reasoning, the idea of ‘Man* is constructed and employed 
in a way different than for <naturalists’, namely that the the natural species of a ‘moral Man’ 
is irrelevant to his moral obligations (see 3.11.16). Thus, as Ayers (and others) points out, 
Locke is less concerned with an Aristotelian conception of ethics as a quasi-biological study 
of man’s nature as a ‘rational, social species of animal’, and more one of an ethics derived 
from an a priori law for all rational beings (though with a hefty hedonistic account of moral 
motivation to boot). See the helpful discussions in Michael Ayers, Locke: Volume II: 
Ontology, London, Routledge, 1991, pp. 188-9; and James Tully, A Discourse on Property: 
John Locke and his Adversaries, Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 11.
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knowledge, since it involves 'a demonstrative certainty^ via a true idea 
of God and his relations with his creation, though this 'certainty' 
would, in the end, prove elusive to Locke. Political prudence is 
something else, being based on matters of fact and history and 
therefore, of a particular nature: T he well management of public or 
private affairs depending upon the various and unknown humours, 
interests, and capacities of men we have to do with in the world, and 
not upon any settled ideas of things physical, polity and prudence are 
not capable of demonstration'.2 By definition, this type of knowledge 
cannot be known a priori, since m en's actions, though subject to all 
sorts of determinations, are not wholly so, and are in large part 
contingent and 'free'.3 Thus predictive knowledge of hum an 
behaviour - just as the knowledge of whether or not 'rhubarb will 
purge or quinquina cure an ague' - rests on history, experience, and 
probability. In chapter four we examined the grounds of Locke's 
political theory in the Two Treatises and the Letter Concerning 
Toleration, which as works of political theory set out the general 
moral framework within which lawmakers frame law according to the 
circumstances, and citizens judge the extent of their duties and rights 
in relation to these laws and the law of nature. In this chapter, I want 
to turn to that other part of moral discourse and politics: what Locke 
called 'the art of governing men right in society'.4 I think the nature of 
this 'art' was well described by Michel Foucault, and is worth quoting 
at length:
2 MS. Locke, f.5 fols 77-83.
3 The question of whether or not Locke holds a ‘determinist’ or ‘compatibilist’ or 'libertarian’ 
position with regard to the issue of 'free will’ is a complex one, about which there seems to 
be little agreement. The crucial discussion takes place in the EHU at 2.21 ‘Of Power’, which 
I shall touch upon below; I take it generally that Locke is not a determinist. Cf. Isaiah Berlin, 
Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 64-5,104; John Passmore, ‘The 
Malleability of Man in Eighteenth-Century Thought’, in Aspects of the Eighteenth Century, 
ed. Earl R. Wasserman, Baltimore 1965. especially pp. 23-6 (both of whom hold Locke to be 
a determinist). See the careful discussion by Peter Schouls, Reasoned Freedom: John Locke 
and Enlightenment, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press 1992, pp. 126-144 (who 
argues that Locke is not a determinist).
4 John Locke, “Draft of a letter to the Countess of Peterborough” 1697, in James L. Axtell,
The Educational Writings o f John Locke, Cambridge University Press, 1968, p. 395. See 
also “Some thoughts concerning reading and study for a gentleman” 1703, p. 400.
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Government is defined as a right manner of disposing things so as to lead not to the 
form of the common good, as the jurists' texts would have said, but an end which is 
'convenient' for each of the things that are to be governed. This implies a plurality of 
specific aims: for instance, government will have to ensure that the greatest possible 
quantity of wealth is produced, that the people are provided with sufficient means of 
subsistence, that the population is enabled to multiply, etc. There is a whole series of 
specific finalities, then, which become the objective of government as such. In order to 
achieve these various finalities, things must be disposed - and this term, dispose, is 
important because with sovereignty the instrument that allowed it to achieve its aim - 
that is to say, obedience to the laws - was the law itself; law and sovereignty were 
absolutely inseparable. On the contrary, with government it is a question not of 
imposing law on men, but disposing things: that is to say, of employing tactics rather 
than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics - to arrange things in such a 
way that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved .5 
For the moment, let us leave aside the different nuances and
subtleties that Foucault is stressing over and above the texts he is
actually examining, since I will turn to a more detailed examination of
this in a later chapter. Here I want simply to note the elision of law in
relation to the (political) power of 'disposition' that Foucault (typically)
identifies. The direction and focus of the kind of power implicit in this
'artf, operating at times beyond the exact letter of the law, and thus
connected in rather shadowy ways to the maintenance of the public
good, appears in part to be 'working on' the very abilities (the
'hum ours, interests, and capacities of men') Locke assumes to be
fundam ental to the political judgement of the citizens of civil society,
the capacities they m ust use to judge the legitimacy of that very art
itself.
Because the art of governing is linked to hum an history and the 
particular knowledge of how m en's capacities and hum ours actually 
work, it is linked to questions of how men 'govern' themselves, and 
thus there is a deep connection between the principles of political 
action and personal conduct. Though it m ight be a 'platitudinous 
axiom of contemporary moral conciousness' that this relation is one 
of incessant asymmetry, it is indispensable as a framework for 
understanding early m odem  attempts to ground theoretical axioms in
5 Michel Foucault, “Govemmentality”, Lecture given at the College de France, February 1978, 
in The Foucault Effect. Studies in Govemmentality, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, 
Peter Miller, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, pp. 87-104.
199
practical conduct.6 Thus, we need to examine how Locke's two kinds 
of political knowledge interact, if they do at all. Does this 'art of 
government' and its relation to political theory tell us any thing 
im portant about Locke's concept of liberty and his conception of self? 
To do this I will turn from the political writings which set out the 
formal political prerequisites of Lockean civil society - which was the 
means to ground the fundamental liberty of undistorted choice7 - to 
their more subterranean underpinnings in the Essay on Human 
Understanding, and then leap to their specific particularity evident in 
his description of the 'art of government' and especially in his writings 
on the 'reformation' of the poor.
5.1 Foundations
To begin, allow me to skech a basic picture of Locke's (now famous) 
conception of self. 'Self, he argues, is 'that conscious thinking 
thing...which is sensible, or conscious of Pleasure and Pain, capable of 
Happiness and Misery, and so is concern'd for it self, as far as that 
consciousness extends' (EHU 2.26.17). Terson' is a Torensick Term' 
which 'appropriates' actions and belongs only to 'intelligent agents 
capable of a Law, and Happiness and M iser/ (2.26.17). This is to say, a 
'person' is constituted by consciousness of voluntary actions actually 
performed, hence the rather bizarre (and unconvincing) example that 
'Socrates Sleeping7 is not the same person as 'Socrates W aking', since 
the self is located wholly in consciousness and not in substance of any 
kind (2.26.19). The self extends out from a core region which is capable 
of uniting an existence and actions past and present, and at its most 
coherent and unified moments it is a condition of awareness
6 The groan is Dunn’s (The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the 
Argument of the Two Treatises of Government, Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 157) 
the emphasis is mine.
7 EHU 2.21.50: ‘That in this state of Ignorance we short-sighted Creatures might not mistake 
true felicity, we are endowed with a power to suspend any particular desire, and keep it from 
determining the will, and engaging us in action. This is standing still, where we are not 
sufficiently assured of the way: Examination is consulting a guide. The determination of the 
will upon enquiry is following the direction of that Guide: And he that has a power to act, or 
not to act according as such determination directs, is a free Agent\
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concerning (above all) pleasure and pain and "that that self, that is 
conscious, should be happy7 (2.27.16, 26). The Lockean self has to 
'gather' itself against fragmentation amongst competing passions and 
influences, moved to do so by the presence of an 'uneasiness' for 
happiness, which seems at times to be no more than a concern to 
avoid pain, and yet something more than merely the means to self- 
preservation. The key seems to lie in the nature of mail's liberty.
The account of liberty in the Two Treatises which we have examined
above is analogous to a more detailed argument presented in the
Essay. Locke tells us that the business of the Essay is 'not to know all
things, but those which concern our Conduct.' that
if we can find out the Measures, whereby a rational creature put in that State, which 
man is in this World, may, and ought to govern his Opinions, and Actions depending 
thereon, we need not be troubled that some other things escape our knowledge.. (1.1.16) 
Two themes are im portant here; the general limitation of certain
knowledge capable of being ascertained, and that the knowledge we
should and can obtain is that which deals with our actions and general
conduct. It is however, a claim that is shrouded in ambivalence, as so
m any commentators have pointed out. The main problem was that
though hum an beings could probably know when they were not
behaving as they should, what they could never really know, at least
by their own reason, were the 'real' overpowering reasons for not
acting badly - that is, an omniscient deity with the capacity to
adm inster extra-terrestrial punishments and rewards. W ithout the
positive law of God people could not know the 'rate God taxed their
trespasses against'.8 We might come to know this eventually, but only
through divine revelation, perhaps the least 'natural' of all cognitive
8 John Locke, A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul 2 Vols, ed. A Wainwright, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, vol. 2, p. 524 n. 13; in John Dunn, ‘Bright 
enough for all our purposes; John Locke’s conception of a civilized society’, Notes and 
Records of the Royal Society, 43, 1989, pp. 133-53, at p. 139. The power to punish arises 
from God’s omnipotence, though his right to command derives from the indebtedness of the 
creature to its creator (Tully’s ‘workmanship model’); these two elements of God’s authority 
are outlined at EHU 2.28.8:’He has Goodness and Wisdom to direct our Actions to that 
which is best: and he has Power to enforce it by Rewards and Punishments, of infinite 
weight and duration, in another Life...’.
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processes.9 This is difficult to reconcile with the belief in the 
possibilities of human cognitive powers, indeed it is a huge lacunae in 
Locke's work as a whole10, but it remains true that Locke was one of 
the most sensitive investigators of the distortions preying on hum an 
understanding, and one of the original architects of the project to set 
conduct right. We can never lose sight of its theocentric ballast; but 
equally nor can we its role in the legacy of the Enlightenment as a 
project.
Given Locke's belief in the importance of individuals to take 
responsibility for 'the care of our selves' and not to mistake 'imaginary 
for real happiness', the whole process of belief formation must be 
carefully attended to. He begins, as we know, with an assault on 
innate ideas, attacking the requirement that subjects m ust trust 
religious or other authorities as to the validity and legitimacy of so-
9 See The Reasonableness of Christianity, in The Works of John Locke, Volume 3, London, 
(8th ed.), 1777: ‘it is too hard a task for unassisted Reason, to establish Morality in all its 
parts upon true foundations; with a clear and convincing light’. But cf. EHU 4.28.5-6 on the 
compatibility between revelation and reason. The divergence between pessimism of The 
Reasonableness and the more optimistic tone of The Essay is all the more confusing given he 
was working on or revising both at roughly the same time. See the careful discussion of this 
tension in Ayers 1991, chp. 15 passim, to which I am greatly indebted.
10 But see Professor Tully’s interesting discussion that Locke turned to a theory of probability 
(see Locke EHU 4.15.2-4) as a means of providing a rational ground for morality and 
Bibilical hermeneutics; An approach to political philosophy: Locke in contexts, Cambridge 
University Press, 1993, pp. 192-201,226, 312-314; similarly Barbara Shapiro, Probability 
and certainty in 17th century England, Princeton University Press, 1983. For an excellent 
overview of the fundamental inconsistency between reason and revelation in Locke see David 
Wootten, ’John Locke: Socinian or natural law theorist?’, in James E. Crimmins ed., 
Religion, Secularization and Political Thought: Thomas Hobbes to J.S. Mill, London, 
Routledge, 1989, pp. 39-67. Wootten concludes that Locke’s TT and EHU are fundamentally 
inconsistent with The Reasonableness of Christianity, (1695) and that he probably saw this 
to be the case in the course of re-working them towards the end of his life. Wootten is 
unconvinced that the solution Locke endorses in the end has anything to do with substituting 
probability for the sure demonstrability of the moral attributes of god, the immortality of the 
soul, or even the moral law of nature. The whole issue of Locke’s moral theology seems no 
clearer today amongst his readers than it was in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries; 
see J. Marshall, ‘John Locke and Socianism’, in M.A. Stewart ed., Oxford Studies in the 
History of Philosophy, vol. 2, Oxford University Press; in the same volume Ian Harris, 
‘Locke on Justice’; Arthur Wainright, ‘Introduction’, John Locke, A Paraphrase and Notes on 
the Epistles o f St. Paul, 2 vols, Oxford University Press, 1987; D.D. Wallace, ‘Socianism, 
Justification by Faith, and the Sources of John Locke's The Reasonableness of Christianity, 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 1984,45,1984. For the background to the radical Deist 
arguments to which Locke was being associated and from which he sought to distance 
himself, see J. A.I. Champion, The Pillars of Prietcraft Shaken: The Church c f England and 
its Enemies, 1660-1730, Cambridge University Press, 1992, especially pp. 109-114.
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called ’innate principles’. No man should have the power to be 
'Dictator of Principles and teacher of Unquestionable Truths' (1.4.24).
He provides a genealogy of such belief formation at 1.3.22-26 , where 
he considers the
ways and steps by which it is brought about..that Doctrines..have been derived from 
no better original, than the Superstitions of a Nurse, or the Authority of an Old 
Woman..grow up to the dignity of Principles in Religion or Morality...
Locke wants to not only defeat the arguments of these ’druids’, but
also provide an alternative form of assent governing hum an action
and conduct. At the base of Locke's alternative proposal is the practice
of suspension and examination, which he discusses most fully in Book
2 chapter 21, and which underpins the discussion of liberty in theTwo
Treatises (II. 57-63). It strikes the modem reader as straightforward and
almost commonsensical. One has to suspend one’s judgement and
carefully examine the grounds of each proposition that demands
assent. This is fundamentally what it means to be 'free' according to
Locke, having the power to suspend the execution of desires, to
Tiinder blind Precipitancy' and be 'at liberty to consider the object of
them; examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others.. In this
lies the liberty Man has...' (2.21.67,47). This is why the question of
'w hether man’s will be free' is 'unintelligible' for Locke, the more
im portant one being w hat determines the will - which is the mind
itself moved by ’uneasiness'.(2.21.14)n Men by their very nature are
moved by pleasures, pains, and desires, which are the bases of all
feelings of 'uneasiness'. We have a capacity to reason, and also have
some control over our desires, but this alone is not quite enough to
motivate action. Reasoning, to be effective, i.e. to determine action,
m ust form expectations of pleasure and pain in order to determine the
preferences of the will, which ultimately involve the rewards of
heaven and the punishm ents of hell. Pain is a resonant sensation for
11 But as Ayers points out (1991, p. 194), Locke has completely side-stepped the question of 
why, if everyone has the power to ‘stand still, (pen the eyes (and) look about’, some people 
do and some do not? This is part of Lock’s general failure to explain how what is rationally 
or speculatively compelling is psychologically or practically so; i.e. how to match motive 
with perceived obligation (cf. 2.21.52).
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Locke, since "present pain' makes an immediate and necessary part of 
our misery, whereas 'absent good' does not make a similar necessary 
part of our happiness. The 'uneasiness' of hunger motivates us to seek 
preservation, the pain of sexual lust to marry ("better to marry than to 
burn ' quotes Locke from the Gospel of Paul, 2.21.34). These and others 
are implanted by God, but still others are acquired and absorbed from 
all around us; uneasiness for honour, power, riches, all of which are 
provoked by custom and poor education.12 "Suspension and 
Examination' is the means to overcome these artificial uneasiness's 
and allow for the exercise of our judgement, which for Locke is 'the 
source of all our liberty" (2.21.47). Read in tandem with his declaration 
at H.57 of the Two Treatises, that "where there is no law there is no 
freedom", we can achieve a richer understanding of what the concept 
means to Locke. The key is in his characterization of "law" which is 'not 
so m uch the Limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent Agent 
to his proper Interest", and thus its end is "not to abolish or restrain, but 
to preserve and enlarge Freedom'(11.57). Liberty seems to mean more 
than simply the means to preservation. I will return to this below.
However, men, in all their stubbomess and weakness, are not easily 
convinced of this way of regulating their assent and so they m ust be 
educated and trained towards it, since the "Understanding Faculties' 
are not merely for idle speculation, but "for the Conduct of his Life".
The "pleasantness' and "unpleasantness' which accompanies hum an 
action has to be understood and changed. Defacto desires must be 
suspended, their consequences examined, and one's actions 
'reasonably' determined. Since most of our "concernment' are of 
matters not "in broad day light.', the greatest part of it is of a 
probabilistic nature. Locke's use of probabilistic reasoning, which was 
influenced by Boyle and Gassendi, permeates all of the Essay as well as 
the Two TreatisesJ 3 Throughout them, Locke is laying dow n the
12 It is ‘uneasiness* which drives man to want more than he justly needs, and accounts for 
economic activity beyond subsistence (Locke TT; 11.37).
13 See Tully 1993, pp. 203-7; Shapiro 1983, passim.
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grounds for judging all beliefs and desires in relation to human 
conduct, relative to evidence or 'grounding7. In the Essay, Locke listed 
the criteria (in lexical order) against which a proposition m ust be 
judged, and according to which the proportional degree of assent was 
to be given (4.15.4). In this way, judgement appears to be external and 
impartial to the nature of the proposition being examined. As happy 
as he probably was to have identified a rigorous method of attacking 
superstition and coerced belief, Locke was pessimistic as to who would 
be capable of using it (4.20.1-7). He struggled with this in a number of 
drafts of the Essay, until he finally settled on the fact that men would 
have to be conditioned to 'covet7 the answers he wanted them to.14 
The project henceforth is clear; to develop a practice that would form 
the necessary 'inclination7 to examine and assent in the way outlined 
at 4.15:
...the pleasure of the action itself is best acquir'd or increased by use and 
practice..Trials often reconcile us to that, which at a distance we looked on with 
aversion; and by repetition wears us into a liking, of what possibly, in the first essay, 
displeased us...Habits have powerful charm, and put so strong attractions of easiness 
and pleasure into what we accustom ourselves to, that we cannot foibear to do, or at 
least be easy in the omission of actions, which habitual practices have suited, and 
thereby recommends to us (2.21.69).
Our conduct is governed by the formation of mental and physical 
habits, implanted by God, custom, and education, which recommend 
actions and beliefs to us:
... custom settles habits of thinking in the Understanding as well as of Determinancy in 
the Will, and of motions in the body..all which seem to be but Trains of Motion..once 
set going continue on the same steps they have been used to which by often treading are 
worn into a smooth path and the motion itself becomes easy as it were 
Natural...(2.33.6).
In the very next section Locke points out that reason is often powerless 
versus these habits, and thus introduces not only a philosophic 
justification for the use of the counter-practice of probabilistic 
reasoning, but we sense, a political urgency as well. (2.33.7)
Probabilistic reasoning informed not only the means by which 
people came to acquire knowledge and decide upon a course of action,
14 John Locke, ‘Study’, MS. Locke, f.2, beginning 26 March 1677; printed in King 1830, vol.
1, pp. 171-203. This was added to the fourth edition of the Essay at 4.19.
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but their overall political judgement as well. For example, it lies at 
the base of Locke's conception of popular sovereignty. Individuals 
gave up the political power to execute the law of nature to 
institutionalized forms of government when they entered political 
society.(2.7) However this surrendering of political power is 
conditional upon the governors governing in accordance with the 
public good, and if they are judged not to be doing so, (acting 'contrary 
to the trust reposed in them'), the bond of obligation is forfeited and 
political power devolves back to those who gave it up in the first place 
(2.149). Thus, political communities and governments not only derive 
from, but perpetually rest on the abilities of its members to judge and 
act accordingly; 'The People shall be the judge...every man is Judge for 
himself..' (2.240-1) The nature of this judgement is necessarily 
probabilistic.15
These general themes can also be found in Locke's Of the Conduct of 
the Understanding (1697), m eant as a final additional chapter to the 
fourth edition of the Essay. It contains, in a clear and lucid fashion, 
arguments we have already encountered in the Essay w ith regard to 
m an's actions being governed by his understanding, and the need to 
overcome bad habits, partialities, and prejudices. Its 1890 editor called 
it 'a  sort of practical appendix' that enquires into 'the constitution and 
history of the H um an m ind' and suggests the 'rules and cautions for 
guiding or controlling its operations in the search for knowledge'.16 
The m ind did not not need to be filled with possessions, but trained to 
increase its activities and powers.
In Conduct Locke also provided a glimpse of the nature of the kinds 
of knowledge we saw in the distinction discussed above. At section XII 
('Observation') Locke wrote that 'particular matters of fact are the 
undoubted foundation over w h;ch civil and natural knowledge is 
built'. From these matters of fact, mediated through our faculty of
15 I am grateful to Professor Ashcraft and Professor Tully for discussions on this point
16 Thomas Fowler 1890, in Axtell ed. 1968, p. 57.
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judgement, we can draw  conclusions which are "the Standing rules of 
knowledge and consequently of practice' (p.36). What are particular 
matters of fact? For Locke they are related to private, individual 
sensations or experience. The experience of pain, as we saw, is a fact 
which directly guides and govern's one's action (EHU 4:11:8). This is 
also the case in the Second Treatise. Since men are to judge the extent 
to which the sovereign is acting in accordance with the common good, 
they m ust have a basis upon which to judge. Even though this 
judgment is ultimately probabilistic i.e. based on the practices of 
suspension and examination, those 'abuses' and 'prevarications' are 
identified and known by their being felt, thus 'rouzing' the people to 
reclaim their political power. What is felt by the individual in being 
'rouzed' is said by Locke to be an experience of the violation of one’s 
'self-propriety'; i.e one's 'real' property, one's property in oneself, one's 
liberties, as well as any possessions gained from the 'fruit of industry7. 
As we have seen, in order to justify resistance, this violation of 
'propriety' m ust either be felt by the majority of the population, or, 
though only touching a few, judged as threatening to all. (H 208 -210). 
W hat is seen or felt is of a two-fold nature; an attack upon personal 
propriety, and an attack upon the laws and constitution of the 
community within which one’s propriety is guaranteed and made 
real. In privileging 'factual' civil discourse, Locke attempts to 
overcome dogmatically framed theological discourse, and discredit 
their particularly constructed understanding of what counts as 
requiring dv il redress.17
Locke sets his own particular boundary as to w hat constitutes harm. 
In privileging a particular understanding of social facticity, Locke is 
determining the space w ithin which hum an action, particularly in 
political society, will be possible. The state can intervene, for example, 
in religious practices if the empirical necessity of the case satisfies
17 There is an excellent discussion of the issue of Locke’s ‘social facticity’ in relation to 
contemporary political argument by Kirstie McClure, ‘Difference, Diversity, and the Limits 
of Toleration*, Political Theory, 18,3,1990, pp. 361-91. I am indebted to this fine article.
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Locke's conditions, and thus demands some kind of action. Thus, in 
his Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke mentions that civil authority 
could stop the practice of animal sacrifice if the interest of the 
commonwealth was better served by building up  the stock of cattle. 
(LoT, p. 42)18 Locke is not only talking about the justified intervention 
of the state in matters of indifferency relating to food or water. Subjects 
of the civil authority mediate and interpret their understanding of 
benefit or harm, pain or pleasure, through the conceptual gauze of 
their perception of social reality. And since no law can escape 
inconveniencing someone, the magistrate m ust govern w ith the 
public good in mind, and not according to a few private opinions 
complaining of being hard done by. Locke is not making an argument 
against coercion as such; it might be wholly unsuitable for religious 
ends (it is irrational to use it there) but certainly not in the case of 
preserving public order, even if the effects of that coercion incidentally 
harm  a particular sect. Thus the effect of an economically justified ban 
on animal slaughter might indeed have the same effect as a ban on a 
particular religious practice, which m ight cause that sect to wither and 
die if animal sacrifice was central enough to the religious practices 
constitutive of their faith. Toleration gets no grip if the justification 
for coercion is non-religious. This is an extremely narrow  form of state 
neutrality, if it exists at all; the state m ust be 'neutral' only in regard to 
the promotion of religious objectives - beyond that it is not relevant.19 
Locke's magistrate does not merely restrict the grounds for assent, but 
positively moulds that which it is in the interest of the community for 
people to assent to, and upon which kind of information (social 
facticity) they can hope to base their claims. It is precisely this adtivity 
which consitutes one aspect of the 'art of government'.
18 Locke writes; The part of the Magistrate is only to take care that the Commonwealth 
receives no prejudice, and that there be no Injury done to any man, either in Life or Estate*.
19 For an excellent discussion of Locke’s arguments for toleration in relation to contemporary 
arguments, see Jeremy Waldron, “Locke: toleration and the rationality of persecution” in 
Susan Mendus ed. Justifying Toleration, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988,61- 
86, especially pp. 77-9; and William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and 
Diversity in the Liberal State, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 259-263.
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It is important to place this art in the context of the three general 
practices of government, or kinds of moral rules and enforcements, 
which Locke identifies.20 The first was the rational understanding (via 
divine revelation) of god's requirements for his creatures reinforced by 
the 'prudential sanctions' of this life, but mainly by the overwhelming 
threat of sanctions in the next, the 'Rewards and Punishments of 
another Life, which the Almighty has established, as the Enforcement 
of his Law7 (EHU 2.21.70). The importance of God's punishments to 
Locke's understanding of obligation cannot be underestimated (it 
partially explains why he so tenaciously held onto his theistic 
framework long after he could of dispatched it on philosophical 
grounds), and it provides the grounds for the strong motivation to 
obey the dictates of morality in a way that the pagan philosophers 
could not; that is, they lacked the 'true' (i.e. binding) force of law.2*
20 EHU, 2.28.6-13.1 am indebted for my understanding of what follows to Tully 1993, pp. 
225-241; Dunn 1984b 290-2; and Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: the
moral vision o f the American founders and the Philosophy of Locke, University of Chicago 
Press, 1988, pp. 193-204. Despite some rather silly Straussian-inspired moments, this is a 
work to which I am indebted.
21 Locke discusses this providential apparatus of government in relation to classical accounts 
of virtue and vice in The Reasonableness of Christianity, See Tully 1993, p. 227; Pangle 
1988. This represents perhaps the limit of the relationship between Locke and classical 
theorists;'So much virtue as was necessary to hold societies together, and to contribute to 
the quiet of governments, the civil laws of commonwealths taught, and forced upon men that 
lived under magistrates. But these laws being for the most part made by such, who had no 
other aims but their own power, reached no further than those things that would serve to tie 
men together in subjection; or at most were directly to conduce to the prosperity and 
temporal happiness of any people...we see how unsuccessful in this (i.e in perceiving their 
duties) the attempts of (pagan) philosophers were before our saviour’s time’ (p. 87; see also 
pp. 88-94) Professor Dunn (‘Justice and Locke’s Political Theory’, Political Studies, 16, 
1968,68-87) takes this the furthest; ‘when [Locke] turned away from the exigencies of 
political tactics and the puzzlements of intellectual polemic to lay out the sole possible way 
for a man to live well [in The Reasonableness of Christianity], he made no attempt to 
elaborate on the adequacies of contemporary moral insight and approbation... [he was] not 
concerned with social morality but with individual salvation, not with how a man ought to 
act, with virtue and vice, but with what he must do to be saved’. Cf. Wootten 1989 
(especially pp. 60-1), who argues (convincingly) that even before the Reasonableness Locke 
had realized he had undermined the possibility of there being a universal natural law from 
which all men could deduce a set of moral duties, but that this did not seem to stop him 
continuing to work on the radical (natural law based) claims of the TT and the EHU. As a 
result, Locke’s epistemology, political philosophy, and theology all have different 
implications for his moral philosophy; Locke simply insisted that even though moral 
principles originated in revelation this did not mean that at some point they might also be 
shown to be rational. For Wootten this simply magnifies our collective inability to show 
how reason adequately establishes our moral aspirations and principles. Cf. Ayers 1991, pp.
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This voluntarism is fundamental to the juridical apparatus as a whole 
- the sovereign civil power declares and enforces the laws of civil 
society and thus what is and is not a crime, and the community as a 
whole plays an im portant part in determining and enforcing virtue 
and vice. These are the other two forms of government Locke 
identifies. The public law of particular communities (the "Civil Law" 
EHU 2.28.8) was backed by the coercive sanctions of its rulers, which 
for Locke were based in the developing apparatus of the early modern 
mercantile state. Here the citizen must trust the government to a large 
extent beyond the letter of the law since he is dependent upon effective 
governmental power for the development and prosperity of his 
community. Yet ultimately this power could not command total or 
passive obedience in the face of a breach of the law of nature so judged, 
at which time even a legitimate political power lost its authority.22 An 
important question to ask (which will be examined below) is the 
relationship between the application of this legal/practical apparatus, 
and the personal and political agency of the individual members of 
that society. The third practice is T he Law of Opinion or Reputation", 
which is the force of the moral traditions and processes of socialization 
of particular communities on men's conduct. The terms virtue and 
vice are "Names pretended' to stand for actions in their own nature, 
when in fact they are 'in the particular instance of their application' 
only attributable to those actions which are considered "in reputation 
or discredit" in whatever society or country therein. In any society, the 
law of reputaton (or 'fashion') attaches various rewards and 
punishm ents, honours and dishonours, to the conduct of its members
196-202 (‘Reflections of Locke's Ethics’).
22 In some of his earlier writings Locke went so far as to argue that there was a distinction 
between between the mode of obligation to human laws and divine laws. The two frequently 
come into conflict, and in the matter of conscience (subject to divine law) viz indifferent 
things man is obliged to active or passive obediance, since the law of God ‘forbids 
disturbance or dissolution of governments', so that the citizen ‘under what form of 
government soever he lives, fulfills all the law of God concerning the government i.e. obeys 
to the utmost that the magistrate or society can oblige his conscience’. Ms Locke fi, pp. 
123-6; re-printed in King 18301, pp. 114-7; and Dunn 1969,49 n.I.
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since men still retain the power of thinking 'well or ill; appraising or 
disapproving of the actions of those whom they live amongst, and 
converse with: And by their approbation and dislike they establish 
amongst themselves, what they call vertue and vice' . Locke 
recognizes that it is an extremely effective 'governor'; 'he who 
imagines commendation and Disgrace not to be strong motives on 
Man...seems little skill'd in the Nature or History of Mankind...[no 
one] in ten thousand (can) bear up under the...condemnation of his 
own Club' (EHU 2.28.10-12). Men are dependent on this power of 
socialization both in terms of its effects on their motivation to do 'the 
right thing7 in the context of their interpersonal relations, as well as to 
gauge their own sense of self-worth against the judgement of their 
fellow relations and citizens. Insofar as it matches closely the 
injunctions of the law of nature it is notoriously unreliable (though 
there is some overlap often enough), and thus requires the added 
support and guidance of the other practices of civil law and divine 
revelation.23 As it happened, the concern for dignity and honour 
seemed not to be strong enough to be effective in the vast majority of 
the population, however much it was amongst the elites, and required
23 But as Woottenj Tully, and Harris have all pointed out, in the Two Treatises (and the EHU; 
see 1.3.6 and-2:28.11), Locke relies on a collective self-interest in collective security as 
almost matching the obligations of natural law. This is consistent with Grotius’ claims in 
The Rights of War and Peace (1625),where the law of nature resembled very closely the 
collective interests of mankind; 'All we have now said would take place, though we should 
even grant, what without the greatest Wickedness cannot be granted, that there is no God, or 
that he takes no Care of human affairs’ (Prolegomena, 11). As Tuck (1993, pp. 197-9) 
points out, it was only in the second edition of the book that Grotius added to the 
characterization of the ins belli ac pads as arising from’Divine Commands’ (as opposed to 
simply ‘Nature’ or ‘Custom and tacit Consent’). It is also interesting to note Locke’s draft 
‘Morality* (MS.c. 28, fols. 139-40, in T. Sargentich, ‘Locke and ethical theory’, Locke 
Newletter, 5,1974,24-31; Wootten interestingly (p. 54) calls this a manuscript of ‘self­
interrogation’) where he attempts to show how from the principle of worldly self-interest, one 
could deduce the principle that all men should obey the golden rule, and have good reason to 
invent a system of justice, even without knowledge of a divinely ordained moral order. The 
dating of this manuscript would seem to be essential then, in order to place it in relation to 
the EHU and the TT; unfortunately there is little agreement about this, though Wootten (and 
Tuck 1979) offer good reasons to think it is pre-1681. But cf. another Locke MS, ‘Ethica B’, 
MS Locke c28, fol. 141: ‘ A dependent intelligent being is under the power and direction and 
dominion of him on whom he depends and must be for the ends appointed him by that 
superior being. If man were independent he could have no law but his own will, no end but 
himself. He would be a god to himself...’.
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some kind of corrective action. These last two practices of government 
were informed by the tenets of a basic Christianity which rendered 
casuistical authority unnecessary, but nevertheless required the 
inculcation of a relation to self which included the practices of 
suspension and examination, probabilistic reasoning, and a range of 
'virtuous' behaviour. Not everyone could be fully inculcated, and 
Locke meant his educational tracts for the most part to be directed at 
the elites, but overall, his ethic of discipline, sobriety, industry, and 
honesty, was one applicable to as wide a community as possible. It is 
im portant to recognize them in the context of a project of reform, to 
root out old prejudices and deconstruct settled ways of acting, and the 
attem pt to secure as much as possible that men could be responsible 
for their actions.24
The two laws of 'politick society7 and 'reputation' are the areas most 
closely connected with the reformation of specifically hum an 
capabilities, and as such, are also related to Locke's understanding of 
political power examined above and in chapter four. If both of these 
laws relate to the 'disposing7 of subjects in a certain matter to act as 
disciplined, self regulating beings, then this too involves more than 
just the delineation and application of Law (of duties and rights on the 
part of the citizens), but an engagement with, and knowledge of, the 
'hum ours, interests, and capacities' of men - i.e. an art of goverment. 
An examination of one aspect of this reforming project m ight yield 
more light on w hat Foucault described above, and w hat I have been 
describing up  to now.
24 ‘Who is there almost, that dare shake the foundations of all his past Thoughts and Actions, 
and endure to bring upon himself, the shame of having been a long time wholly in mistake 
and error? Who is there, hardy enough to contend with the reproach, which is every where 
prepared for those, who dare venture to dissent from the received Opinions of their Country or 
Party? And where is the Man to be found, that can patiently prepare himself to bear the name 
of the Whimsical, Sceptical, Atheist, which he is sure to meet with, who does in the least 
scruple any of the common Opinions?* (1.3.25).
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5.2 "BE NOT CONFORMED TO THIS WORLD BUT BE TRANSFORMED BY THE 
RENEWING OF YOUR MIND"
Professor Dunn has argued that Locke's conception of the 
substantive irrationality of most human beings and absence of good 
judgement did not theoretically preclude the formation of a more 
enlightened and self-disciplined population, but that it was beyond the 
'causal reach' of the most 'imaginative statecraft7, even the 'skill and 
insight7 of an 'omnipotent legislator7. 25 Nevertheless it is clearly the 
case that Locke did address himself to some concrete issues concerning 
the reformation of men, and not just in a 'moral panic', but in the 
cool light of administrative government, an environm ent in which 
he was perfectly at home (if not always physically so). In doing so, he 
was fulfilling w hat he saw to be that other part of moral discourse - 
how to get m en to practice what they came to know.
The context w ithin which Locke's writings on the reformation of the 
poor and his participation in the activities of the Board of Trade and 
mercantile oeconomical policy in general, is within the slow 
development of the practices of m odem  juridical government.
Between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the 
beginnings of 'political economy7, the activities of government became 
not only more complex but diverse, as the relationship between state 
and society becomes less one of identity and more one of opacity. The 
sixteenth and seventeeh century usage of the word 'police' suggests the 
beginnings of a sense of the powers exercised by government over a 
'population' - an ensemble of functions (not synonym ous with 
bureaucracy) which together constitute the 'police' of the social body. It 
is the idea of population which comes into play here, constituted by 
individuals 'w here previously...there had been only groups, Stande, 
orders or estates, inviolable in their eternal h ie r a r c h y 7.26 It is 
population, constituted by individuals, which is the object of police
25 Dunn 1989, pp. 145-6.
26 Pasquale Pasquino, “Theatrum Politic urn: The Genealogy of Capital - Police and the State of 
Prosperity”, in Burchell, Gordon, Miller eds. 1991, pp. 105-118., pp. 110,112.
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administration. The very agenda (and non-agenda) of the state is 
problematized, this is to say, the monolithic entity of state is 
relativized within the context of a series of 'problems of government'. 
Though of course there is a break with the visible grid of police 
regulation between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the 
rise of political economy and Smith's 'system of natural liberty7, there 
still remains a profound interdependence between economic and 
public order. For by the end of the eighteenth century, liberal 
governance set up a relation between not only government and the 
citizen, but w ithin the citizen itself; the more it economized its own 
actions the more it sought to secure the optimal functioning of the 
various 'natural processes' - which involved changing individual's 
relation to themselves. Locke, I want to say, is at the base of any 
excavation of this liberal conduct.
Beginning in the late seventeenth century, relations of political 
power began to constitute a community whereby subjects were 
induced to acquire certain specific dispositions and abilities, and 
exercise them within particular coordinated strategies in the interest of 
national prosperity, or the 'publick good'. In part, this is an 
examination of the growth of capabilities on the part of subjects in 
relation to the intensification and extension of these powers. And yet 
this process is a double edged one; it results in the acquisition of 
capabilites, bu t also simultaneously, the gradual erosion of the ability 
of the individual to exercise their self -governing form of subjectivity, 
through for example, the language of rights or 'autonomy'. I want to 
examine the development and shape of these powers, and focus 
specifically on Locke's writings on the poor.
It is worth pausing a moment to consider Locke's 'a rt of government' 
compared to the rise of the 'reason of state' mentioned above in earlier 
chapters. Remember two of the essential characteristics in the 
development of 'reason of state'; the Tadtean language of 'interests' 
and 'necessity7, and a fundamental concern with the security and
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preservation of the state against any prior claim of justice, whether 
expressed in Ciceronian or Aristotelian terms. Grotius, in some of his 
earlier republican writings, sought to recover some of the old values of 
humanism, but mainly in terms of an aristocratic republicanism 
rather than the more popular-driven variants we saw in Machiavelli, 
and to some extent, in Cicero. W hat of Locke? It seems necessary to 
point out that Locke certainly did not endorse the reason of state 
literature with which he was no doubt fam ilar.27 However we have 
seen how Locke grounds the relationship between the citizens and 
their governors as being one of trust, and even with regard to the 
exercise of the prerogative and the particularities of the executive and 
federative powers, that that trust is subject to the perpetual judgement 
of the citizens in whose name any action is carried out (see above; 
cf.ST.chp 12).28 The leeway between an act being technically illegal and 
yet still beneficial to the public good is for Locke the space within 
which the judgem ent and moral capacities of citizens m ust be 
activated; if the act was not prima facie immoral, it was, as Professor
27 Aside from owning the works of Machiavelli, he possessed a copy of Gabriel Naude’s 
Considerations Politiques sur les Coups d’Estat, (see Harrison and Laslett 1965,2074a). For 
the association between Locke and the reason of state literature, see Richard H. Cox, Locke 
on War and Peace, Oxford University Press, 1960; for a devastating rebuttal see Dunn 1969, 
chp. 12 passim. Cf. Tully 1993, p. 182 who notes that natural law theory ‘came to terms’ 
with raison d’etat practices in the seventeenth century.
28 As Tuck (1993, pp. 122-153) points out, there were three basic responses to the rise of the 
reason of state discourse in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. The first was an 
attempt to combine reason of state with the older form of Ciceronian humanism, which was 
essentially impossible given the complete incompatibility between Ciceronian prudence and 
its reliance upon justice, and the needs of imperial states. The second was a more subtle 
integration of Tacitism and Aristotelian political science, where the particular (or ‘low level’) 
laws of a state could be overriden given that they were not in the same category as the 
consitution itself, provided the constitution was ‘good’ in Aristotelian terms; necessity 
might demand i t  (p 25; cf. Aristotle, The Politics, 1288bl0-1289al 1. This seems to have 
emerged most readily in Protestant Germany). The third response was outright rejection in 
favour of a ‘return’ to the older values of humanism, whether in arguments of Jesuits such as 
Adam Contzen (Politicorum libri decern 1618/19), or in the humanist Aristotelianism of 
Richard Hooker {Of the laws of ecclesiastical polity). Locke is no doubt of some distance 
from all three of these arguments, but nevertheless closest to perhaps variations of the second 
and third. Like Hooker, Locke saw the common good as the essential goal of legislation and 
society as such; ‘the power of Society, or Legislative constituted by them, can never be 
suppos’d to extend farther than the common good’ (2.131; see 135). Locke’s explict 
admiration of Cicero, and in particular the De officiis, is extremely relevant in this context.
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Dunn has argued, 'transparently justified'.29 However if the goal of 
political society was no longer the preservation of religion, and yet not 
the preservation of just any 30 form government, upon w hat did the 
art of government work? To what end?
By the beginning of the seventeenth century the idea that the poor 
can be transformed from being problematic and unproductive, to being 
of use and of value to the community and to the state, is beginning to 
become well-entrenched. One could argue that this too is present in 
the Renaissance or the Middle Ages, or even before, indeed the entire 
edifice of Christian pastoral teaching seems to suggest this possibility 
(as do the writings of Aristotle and Plato). However, I do want to argue 
that a break does occur in relation to the new social reality of 
seventeenth and eighteenth century political and economic life, and 
the changing vocabularies and practices of politics.
I would like to make some brief remarks on the changing sense of 
self which was occurring from the early seventeenth century onwards, 
in addition to the brief sketch of Locke's conception of 'self' above, 
which will add to a consideration of the changes I am trying to sketch.
I do not intend to fully consider the changing conception of self which 
occurs between the Greeks and the seventeenth century,31 but I would 
like to focus briefly on the influence of Descartes. If it is the case that 
by the end of the thirteenth century men had a sense of themselves as 
individuals and their location within their social world was 
increasingly constituted by economic and political practices which 
enhanced this feeling, then w hat Descartes does is radicalize this 
subjectivity. For Descartes, the material world can be understood
29 Dunn 1969, p. 164. Cf. 2.220 where Locke emphasizes how men must ‘take care of their 
Liberty’.
30 Though it is a theory compatible with different forms of government in different social and 
economic contexts; the principles are meant as universal standards of right against which 
comparisons and adjustments are to be made according to circumstances. See the good 
discussion of this point by Grant 1988, pp. 5S-7.
31 For that, see the attempt by Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern 
Identity, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
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mechanistically, yet the mechanical universe is not, in itself, a 
medium of thought or meaning. Our thinking about it is a process of 
understanding its parts, from the simplest to the most complex, and 
ordering them to meet certain subjective demands. The material 
world, including our bodies, is mere 'extension' from which we can 
disengage and objectify, clearly and distinctly obtaining our certainty 
through evidence. The order of ideas, to generalize, is constructed and 
not found (as it is in Augustine or Plato). At first glance this seems 
similar to the Stoic conception of autarkein or the Epicurean 
prohairesis, but in Descartes the hegemony of reason is not part of any 
'thick' vision of the world, rather it instrumentalizes our desires and 
relates them to their functionality. The doctrine remains theistic in 
many ways, but the distinction between the hum an and the spiritual 
has been radicalized to the extent that the sense of a well ordered life 
comes from the agent’s own dignity as a rational being. Rationality is 
no longer the subsection of a given order of things, but defined 
procedurally, the operation of which, however, m ight produce 
substantive conclusions about the world. Cartesian proof is no longer 
a search for an encounter with God from within (as in Augustine), but 
instead, T meet m yself.32 
Now this 'radical reflectivity' is but one stage along the path of what 
Charles Taylor has called 'the affirmation of ordinary life'. There are 
an enormous am ount of complex and im portant factors to consider in 
such a claim. I will select only one. By the end of the sixteenth 
century there is a sense of self-responsibility which, though present in 
some form in the fourteenth century, is more profound if not rather 
different; i.e. a strong sense of self-control and disengagement which is 
both radically reflexive and linked to a sense of generosite - or self 
worth. It is also im portant to link this development within the 
practical context of the rise of the disciplinary practices, which
32 Taylor 1989. See also Rules for the Direction of our Native Intelligence’ in Cottingham, 
StoothofF, Murdoch, Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings, Cambridge University 
Press, 1988.
2 17
beginning in the sixteenth century, took on an increasingly influential 
and institutional form. Here, the reflexive individual intersects with 
the reflexive state. One is a process of dissidence and particularization, 
the other, of homogenisation and centralisation. In very general 
terms, it is the dynamic of this relationship which constitutes the 
beginning of the kind of 'm odem ' governmental problems we see 
beginning to emerge in the (late) seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.
I want now to turn back to our case study in order to draw out the 
general thrust of my argument above, in more detailed and specific 
circumstances. I will begin by sketching the contours of economic 
discourse and practice in seventeenth century England, since it is 
within these terms (some very new) that the problem of poverty is 
recast and (re)understood.
Most economic historians describe a very circumscribed economic 
structure in England throughout most of the seventeenth century. Its 
basic characteristics were that it was pre-industrial, pre-mechanized, 
and mainly agriculturally based. It was barely a subsistence producing 
economy, especially in the earlier parts of the century. Gregory King's 
famous report, Natural and Political Observations (1696), showed that 
close to fifty percent of the population were existing below levels of 
subsistence, and thus depedendent on parish poor relief, all the more 
remarkable in that it was accepted by his contemporaries as basically 
correct.33 The economy was also subject to the unsettling interference 
of natural phenomena - diseases, the weather - all of which adversely 
affected the ability to generate and maintain stable economic growth 
and innovation. Since labour was the key means of production, the 
hardship of everyday life in England meant economic productivity
33 For an important discussion of King and his work .and the political context of his 
'arithmetik', see G. Holmes, ‘Gregory King and the Social Structure of Pre-Industrial 
England', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th Series, 27,1977,41-68. For a 
general discussion of the relation between science and society see M. Hunter, Science and 
Society in Restoration England, Cambridge University Press, 1981 especially Chapter 5, 
where he argues that in general, the 'scientization' of politics was not as cleanly executed as 
many have thought
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was constantly under threat, consistently curtailed, and unpredictable. 
The pace of economic change in general in England was also an 
im portant factor. Whereas Germany, France, and Italy had fairly 
wrenching economic changes occur basically in the course of one 
generation, England underwent a more laborious and complex process 
which extended over centuries. Because English Kings and 
governments were able to maintain and exercise a direct and 
comprehensive public order jurisdiction from as early as the 
fourteenth century onwards, more so than France for example, 
ruptures in economic practice and theory were slower in coming and 
usually hotly contested.
As m uch as medieval subjects resented the intrusion of government 
into their daily lives, especially when it involved increasing taxation 
for the sake of military campaigns, they did increasingly seek an 
administrative structure to purge the tyranny, extortion, and 
favouritism they faced in their local institutions and practices. 
Similarly, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, English 
populations sought out an economic and political geography through 
an appeal to central and local government structures within which 
they w ould feel at home, and which would acknowledge and act upon 
their claims for food, or fair prices, and work against those 
(increasingly anonymous) forces which threatened their self- 
preservation.
The first economic writings of the seventeenth century were an 
attem pt to explain the rapidly changing phenomena occurring in the 
market places, farms, and streets, of England.34 The breakdown of the 
'biblical economy', begun in the high middle ages and by the 
seventeenth century overwhelming most of the country, m ade w hat
34 The best general accounts are still found in C. Wilson, ‘The Other Face of Mercantilism’, 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Soceity, 5th Series, IX, 1965, pp. 118-139; W. Letwin, 
The Origins of Scientific Economics: 1660-1776, London, Methuen, 1968; D. Coleman,
The Economy of England 1450-1750, Oxford University Press, 1977; and J. Appleby, 
Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth Century England, Princeton University 
Press, 1978.
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used to be an easily distinguishable social context of economic 
transactions increasingly more complex and difficult to comprehend. 
Local markets were now subject to distant and sometimes invisible 
factors affecting the price and availability of their produce. A general 
increase in food production during the seventeenth century m eant 
that the subsistence imperative embodied in Elizabeth's 'Book of 
Orders' could no longer exclusively determine the decisions of 
producers. Economic life was not as visible or as tangible as it once 
seemed in the collective consciousness of the community, and was 
increasingly incompatible with local ways, and incomprehensible to 
local understandings.
The starting point for many of the attempts to come to grips with 
these changes was the separation of things pertaining to 'economics' 
from an intersubjectively constituted 'social' context. The first to do 
so were the so-called 'mercantilist' writers. We m ust be careful in our 
use of such terminology however, since 'mercantilism ' misses much 
of the specific character of early modern economic writing. On its 
own it explains little. A better description of the characteristic form of 
economic discourse of this period, as Michel Foucault and Keith Tribe 
have argued, is 'political oeconomy'. Oeconomy refers to the 
conception of a national economy similar to a vast household, and 
thus designates a concept quite distinct from our understanding of 
'economy'.35
In 1620, a spell of prosperity for England was rudely interrupted by a 
decline in the dem and for woollen cloth, England’s principal export. 
This quickly had an adverse effect on the economy as a whole, and 
combined with a few miserable harvests, caused a general economic 
'depression'. The government was forced to buy grain from abroad to 
feed the population, and as a result, its balance of payments became
35 See K. Tribe, ‘The “histories” of economic discourse*, Economy and Society, 6, 3,1977, pp. 
314-343; see also his Land, Labour, and Economic Discourse, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1978; and D.Coleman, ‘Mercantilism Revisited*. The Historical Journal, 23,4,1980, pp. 
773-791.
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massively unbalanced. The debate sparked off by this downturn is 
im portant to consider. Widespread canvassing of expert opinion 
occurred and in 1621, a crypto-Board of Trade was appointed to 
investigate the underlying causes of the crisis in as systematic a way as 
possible. In the context of this search for explanations, Thomas Mun's 
England's Treasure by Forraign Trade written in 1623 (but not 
available widely until 1664), provides a glimpse at a new field of 
seventeenth century economic discourse. Mun argued that since 
prices followed the movement of goods, England needed an orderly 
flow of goods and money. He argued that because money was simply 
the passive servant of commodities, in order to avoid large trade 
imbalances such as occurred in 1620, England had to seek earnings 
rather than treasures, and encourage trade rather than contain 
exchange. Part of M un's argument was that previous ordering of 
exchange based on the appeal to local tradition, would have to change. 
He also argued that since it was only an understanding of how 
commerce actually works which could provide the means for the 
creation of wealth for the good of the common weal, it was necessary 
to isolate and study economic activity for its own sake. M un extended 
the separation of secular life from custom and tradition (but not 
necessarily religion), by elevating the knowledge of trade to a 
privileged position.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, England's penetration of 
world markets was guided by the specifications of Royal charters, 
which granted exclusive and wide ranging privileges to selected 
groups of merchants. By mid-century this was being challenged. 
Arguments were being put forward to increase the num ber of traders 
in the market, to break open the contained nature of the monopolies. 
As one writer pu t i t , trade was like dung, and it 'stinks when kept in a 
heap...but...spread abroad, it doth fertilize the earth and make it 
fructifie'.36 Thus, counterposed to traditional argum ents was a
36 Appleby 1978, p. 110.
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different understanding of economic growth, and with it, a new 
understanding of wealth; 'the strength of a kingdom consists in the 
riches of many subjects, not a few7. Within this framework, the 
individual was ascribed more self-responsibility, reason, and 
independence.
William Petty provides a fascinating and clear exposition of this
'new analysis'. Though his Political Arithmetick was not published
until 1690, it had been written in 1676 and circulated amongst friends.
It is a systematic and voluminous textbook of 'political anatomy', an
attem pt to calculate 'in Terms of Numbers, Weight, or Measure, to use
only Arguments of sense as have visible Foundations in N ature', the
Tersuasions...I find too currant in the W orld', namely England's
decline in trade. Petty's treatise is comprised of ten concise chapters,
each with an introductory proposition followed by a detailed 'proof'
involving agricultural data, population indices, and comparative
political 'science'. Other chapters include detailed discussions of tax
policy, naval policy, labour potential, and monetary issues.
Throughout is a tone of restraint and methodological fastidiousness,
signalling a desire to move beyond conjecture and towards the
discovery of the 'hard ' laws of trade, and an attem pt to offer accurate
predictions and prescriptions. His underlying thesis is the need for a
nation to have a rational and responsible approach to the business of
trade, and to use a 'political arithmetik' in order to discover:
l...the true state of the People, Land, Stock, Trade... 2. that the King's subjects are not 
in so bad a condition as discontented Men would make them..3. To shew the great effect 
of Unity, industry, and obedience in order to the Common Safety, and each Man's 
particular happiness, (p. 117)
Petty's calculations, explaining the value of each person in relation to 
the fluctuation of wages and land rents, was not simply enhancing the 
description of that particular reality, it was part of the changing 
structure of that reality itself. Petty’s 'mean piece of science' (as the 
Dedicator of the treatise put it), was an attem pt to glimpse into the 
'perplexed and intricate ways of the world', and to deepen the analysis
begun by Mun.37
This emphasis on efficiency and productivity was also present, in a 
different format and using completely different methods, in Samuel 
Hartlib's economic fairy tale, A Description of the Famous Kingdom of 
Macaria (1641). In this imaginary 'eutopia', a cult of productivity 
ensured that everyone improved their land and thus is made freer and 
happier than anywhere else on earth. Anyone who failed to improve 
their land was banished forever by order of the 'Council of Husbandry7, 
the guardians of the kingdom. Appleby argues that in this tract and in 
Petty's, a further severing of the connection between economic 
processes and traditional or moral precepts occurred.38 She may be 
partially right. The increasing attention and importance to 
productivity was incorporated into discussions of property for most of 
the seventeenth century (and before), especially in the natural law 
genre, where Locke, for example, saw productive land use as the basis 
of a profoundly moral approach to property. The agricultural reality of 
England during this time,with the extent of available land being 
rapidly depleted, was such that improving the productivity of land was 
an issue that had to be addressed by any oeconomic writer. In pointing 
this out, I w ant merely to avoid making the slippery assumption that 
the emerging economic analysis was necessarily incompatible with the 
alternative 'socially grounded' analysis. In m any im portant ways, the 
language of productivity fit as well into this genre as it did into 
'political economy'.
By mid-century then there were two identifiable fields of economic 
discourse. Some oeconomists saw a need for a planned and organized 
commercial strategy based mainly on manufacturing in order to 
generate wealth, whilst others saw the need for more unfettered 
commercial activity based mainly on the 'natural acquisitiveness' of 
man. By the late 1660's, a time of increased international competition
37 Petty 1690, *A Dedication’. For the argument that King was more influential in this regard, 
see Holmes 1977.
38 Appleby 1978, p. 84.
2 23
in the woollen trade, and a large growth in England's population 
bringing with it widespread unemployment and underemployment, it 
was clear that the former had prevailed. A consensus emerged that 
England's resources had to become better organized, and as Charles 
Davenant - one of the most influential neo-Machiavellian trade 
analysts of the century - put it, trade 'was like a nice and coy Mistress' 
to be courted and pursued.39
One of the earliest and most powerful of these tracts was Josiah 
Child's New Discourse onTrade, which first appeared as Brief 
Observations in 1668. [It was a very successful piece, going into five 
editions between 1668 and 1699.] Its two key themes were closely 
interlocked; the relationship between employment and national 
welfare as reflected in the balance of trade, and the relief and 
employment of the poor; 'It is m ultitudes of People, and good Laws, 
such as cause and increase of People, which principally Enrich any 
Country; and if we retrench by Law the labour of our People, we drive 
them from us to other countries that give better rates'. (The Preface) 
Child provided a synthesis of the new analysis and the more 
traditional interventionist practices. For Child, England's subjects had 
to be located within a strategy of production, and their self-interested 
activities (Child quotes Hobbes on m an's 'real' nature) harnessed 
towards the good of the community.
Child was building on a whole body of analysis which had emerged 
at or around 1649, that annus mirabilis in the literature of social 
criticism. Hartlib had published his 'fairy tale' in 1641, as well as two 
tracts on the relief of the poor in 1649 and 1650 (in which he proposed 
the erection of workhouses to employ and educate the children of the 
poor). Rice-Bush published his The Poor Man's Friend around this 
time, Peter Chamberlan the Poor M an's Advocate or England's 
Samaritans, along w ith W illiam Goffe's How to Advance the Trade of
39 Charles Davenant, The Political and Commercial Works in Five Volumes, London, 1771, p.
453.
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the Nation and Employ the Poor. In all of these, as in Child's, poverty, 
employment, and national welfare were all linked together and 
examined in a Tettyian' fashion. By the 1690's, in addition to Child's 
numerous editions, people such as Matthew Hale, Robert Hartford, 
Charles Davenant, Thomas Firmin, John Bellers, John Cary, and John 
Locke, were all writing within this same sphere. Davenant epitomized 
the congruence of the individual, labour and national prosperity when 
he wrote; T he Bodies of Men are without doubt the most valuable 
Treasures of a Country, and in their sphere, the ordinary People are as 
serviceable to the Common-Wealth as the rich, if they are employ'd in 
honest labour and Useful Arts7.40
The bodies of men are the most valuable treasure of a country. I 
think this is an im portant acknowledgement by Davenant of what is 
being worked out in the course of seventeenth century oeconomic 
discourse. Whereas in the high middle ages, sovereigns struggled to 
combine military ambition with internal control and stability, by the 
seventeenth century, we are beginning to see strategies for an effective 
homogenization of the state at war (whether it be a military war or 
trade war - Child said that "all trade (is) a kind of warfare7) and the 
expansion of internal discipline.4* In a sense, the act of governing is 
changing from questions of how does a sovereign secure his position, 
to where does his or her strength lie? How is she or he to use it and 
augment it? At the base of this kind of political oeconomy is a 
governing activity, a relationship between ruler and ruled where the
40 Charles Davenant, The Political and Commercial Works in Five Volumes, London, 1771, p. 
202. For an important discussion of Davenant and his role in the trade debates of the late 
seventeenth century, see I. Hont, ‘Free Trade and the Economic Limits to National Politics: 
Neo-Machiavellian Political Economy Re-Considered, in John Dunn ed., The Economic 
Limits to Modern Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1990. I am greatly indebted to this 
perceptive analysis.
41 This homogenization did not, of course, translate into an enlarged and omnipresent centralized 
state structure. If anything, the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century saw a 
period of localism and community action, where the teeth of social regulation remained in the 
shires and counties, and with the Justices of the Peace, parish overseers, and the like. 
However, the grounds and rationales for governmental rationalities extending themselves to 
the bodies of men, and especially 'marginal' men and women, were being laid. For a general 
and vivid account, see Roy Porter, English Society in the Eighteenth Century, Penguin, 
1982; revised 1990; and the work of Foucault on ‘govemmentality’, discussed below.
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ruled are not only property of the ruler in a juridical sense, but are 
resources (bodies) at their disposal as well.
I want now to examine Locke's connections with the the poor laws 
and workhouse practices of the seventeenth century. However we 
need first to be acquainted with some of the basics; English poor law 
history is a vast and complex subject, so I shall (for your sake and 
mine) be highly selective.42 I want to sketch how attitudes to the poor 
were transformed from being straightforwardly charity based, to 
becoming part of a calculus of national health and welfare. These two 
categories are not mutually exclusive and are often complementary.
Though we find Acts in relation to the poor well before the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries (such as Richard ITs Act of 1388 prohibiting 
vagrancy and 'wandering'), it is perhaps not until the sixteenth century 
that we see glimmers of positive state action vis a vis the poor.
Beggars were subject to penalties if found to be able bodied, and if 
incapable of working, restricted to begging only as prescribed by a 
magistrate. W ith the Reformation, and the secularization of church 
property, the poor became increasingly the responsibility of the state, 
and not simply an adjunct to the activities of the church. By 1601,
42 The key woik here has been done by M. Dean, The Constitution of Poverty: Towards a 
genealogy of liberal governance, London, Routledge, 1991; but I have also looked at P. 
Slack, Poverty and Policy in Tudor and Stuart England, London, Longman 1988; J. R. 
Poynter, Society and Pauperism: English Ideas on poor relief1795-1834, London,
Routledge, 1969; the Webb’s, English Poor Law History, London, 1927; G. Ashcrott, The 
English Poor Law System: Past and Present, transl. H. Preston Thomas, London, 1888; G. 
Nicholls, A History of the English Poor Laws: Volume I, II, III, London, 1888; and F.
Eden, The State of the Poor: A History of the Labouring Classes in England...with Parochial 
Reports, 3 Vols, 1797. J.C. Davis, Utopia and the ideal society: A study of English utopian 
writing 1516-1700, Cambridge University Press, 1981 is a good discussion of this period in 
the context of ’full employment utopia’s*. K. Williams, From Pauperism to Poverty, 
London, Routledge, 1981 provides a very interesting analysis of not only poor law history 
but, the history of the discipline of poor law history itself, and the different genres within 
which it has been represented. M. Landau, ‘The Regulation of Immigration - Economic 
Structures and Definitions of the Poor in Eighteenth Century England, The Historical 
Journal, 33, 3,1990, pp. 541-72. P. Mandler, ‘The Making of the New Poor Law 
Redivivus’, Past and Present, 117,1987, pp. 131-157, and H. Cunningham, ‘The 
Employment and Unemployment of Children in England 1680-1851, Past and Present, 126, 
1990, provide very useful information on particular aspects of poor law history, as well as a 
more up-to-date overall approach to the topic.
I have culled most of my history from these sources, so in order to keep the narrative 
moving, I shall reference only the verbatim quotes I use.
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under Elizabeth, most of the poor relief measures were codified into 
one Act, and poor relief itself began to take an institutional shape that 
would characterize it throughout the seventeenth century; 
administration by parishes under a committee of 'overseers', the 
separation of children, infirm (and later the mad or insane), and able 
bodied, and specific measures of taxation of the community at large to 
pay for it all. As Ashcrott wrote in his nineteenth century history; In  
this Act we recognize the state strong in the consciousness of its 
civilizing mission, not the state merely discharging...repressive 
functions'.43
Notwithstanding the Victorian tones of Ashcrott's evaluation, he 
was in fact noting an important change. Most social theorists at this 
time, though recognizing the need for a large population in England, 
were increasingly troubled by the growing numbers of rootless 
unemployed and underemployed subjects shuffling throughout the 
kingdom. The issue was serious because it was perpetual; vast armies 
of workers wholly dependent on a fragile manufacturing export 
industry, in addition to the uncooperative elements, m eant that the 
ranks of the non-productive poor could swell to oceanic levels at the 
shortest notice. They were not only a threat to public order, but to the 
pockets of landlords as well, who were forced to pay for their relief 
through the poor rates. These factors, and others, helped constitute 
the 'problem ' of the poor.
From the beginning of the century onwards, once thinkers such as 
Mun linked together prosperity, balance of trade, and productivity, the 
discursive and practical terrain was set for the elaboration of particular 
apparatuses to merge the previously idle and unproductive into the 
reasoning of state. By 1649, from the radical Winstanley to Hartlib, 
most economic tracts contained at least some measures to deal with 
the poor, and equally, extensive and detailed proposals for their
43 Ashcrott 1888, p. 8.
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'reform '.44
In 1661 and the Act of Settlement, limiting not only the number of 
people who qualified for relief, but also physically settling them to a 
particular parish or district, the inclusive designs of early m odern 
political oeconomy were coming to work directly on the poor. The 
general principle of the Act was to control and monitor their 
movement by means of passes, badges, and licenses, among other 
things, which as a practice, would stay intact almost into the 
nineteenth century 45 
In 1666, Child's famous treatise was published, which we have 
examined briefly above. Aside from its balance of trade arguments, it 
also recommended that 'Duty to God and Nature' requires that we 
'provide for and employ the poor, whose condition is sad and 
wretched..bred up in Beggary and Laziness..[and who 
become]...unhealthy bodies and serve only to stock the kingdom with 
Thieves and Beggars'.46 In the 1692 edition, Child added a proposal 
for an assembly of the Tathers of the Poor', who would be given 
powers to buy land and build workhouses and hospitals for their
44 This is a continuation of the discourse begun in the sixteenth century by Christian 
humanists such as Vives and Erasmus. The important point of continuation is the emphasis 
upon the 'work ethic* (which of course predates its puritan manifestation) and the Roman 
stoic emphasis on the civic nature of one’s vocatus, or calling. The essential components of 
the Christian humanist reform program - discipline, work, punishment, supervision, and 
education - were carried over into the seventeenth century, though with different elements 
being emphasized at different times. By the late seventeenth century, programs of poor relief 
varied between the more penal approach of Laudian Anglican and Tridentine Catholics, and the 
puritan emphasis on vocational rehabilitation in order to produce productive citizens. See 
Margo Todd, Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order, Cambridge University Press, 
1987, chapter 5 et passim, and pp.256-258. for the sixteenth and early seventeenth century 
background. Cf. Paul A. Fideler, ‘Poverty, policy and providence: the Tudors and the poor’, 
in Paul A. Fideler, T.F. Mayer eds., Political Thought and the Tudor Commonwealth: Deep 
Structure, discourse, and disguise, London, Routledge, 1992,194-222, especially at pp. 210- 
215. As Fideler (and in the same volume, Neal Wood) points out, even in the mid 1550’s, 
texts such as Sir Thomas Smith’s Discourse of the Commonweal (1549, published 1581) 
was crafting ‘a kind of political economy’, understanding poverty to be more of an economic 
fact than moral condition, and thus explainable in terms of dearth and dwindling national 
wealth, and decaying towns and villages.
45 Cf. the Webbs (1927). See also Norma Landau (1990) who, by studying primary source 
material such as the actual certificates of settlement and removal, concludes (convincingly) 
contra the Webbs that this kind of regulation was an ’integral component of the economic 
structures of early modem England’.
46 Child 1668, p. 81.
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employment and confinement. He also proposed organizing some of 
the larger parishes into unions for the purposes of building 
workhouses, suggesting Westminster and London as prospective 
venues.
Richard Haines in his 1677 pamphlet, Proposals for Building in every 
County a Working Alms-House or Hospital, proposed similar unions 
of parishes based on the Dutch example of a workhouse in every city 
and their 'perpetual confinement of the poor'. Haines was one of the 
first to seriously investigate the potential of the poor paying their own 
expenses via the work they did whilst kept inside. He even invented 
the 'spinning machine', a contraption which allowed the youngest of 
children to be included in the manufacturing of cloth.
It was in the 1690's that we began to see more detailed and wide- 
ranging plans for the employment and reform of the poor. A seminal 
figure is Thomas Firmin, who in 1665 at the age of 23 had organized 
the poor in his county to work in his linen manufacturing business.47 
His factory not only provided employment, but a school as well, and 
children as young as three were brought in and taught to spin and 
read. His experiment, and his 1678 pam phlet Some Proposals for the 
Employment of the Poor and for the Prevention of Begging (reprin ted  
many times in the eighteenth century), m ade him a recognized expert, 
and by the 1690’s he was being sought out by Locke and the Board of 
Trade for advice. The Quaker John Bellers was also an im portant 
figure. He proposed the creation of 'colleges of Industry7 in his 
Proposals for Raising a College of Industry (1695). Just as Locke in his 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding was the 'underlabourer' 
clearing away the rubbish for the proper conduct of men, Bellers 
wrote; T he  best materials for building pu t together w ithout order or 
method, are little better than rubbish, until they are regularly
47 Firmin was also a leading Socinian. Stephen Nye dedicated his Brief History of the
Unitarians, called also Socinians to him (1687 and 1691 in a a collection financed by Firmin 
The Faith o f One God). See J.A.I. Champion, The Pillars of Preistcraft Shaken: The Church 
of England and its Enemies 1660-1730, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 106-9.
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placecL.the same are mankind until they are regularly and usefully 
e m p l o y e d ' .48 Francis Brewster, in his Essays on Trade and Navigation 
1695, also called for working schools, and in keeping with a seemingly 
favourite m etaphor, said they would 'm anure and improve the first 
sprouts as they came into the world'.
There were dozens of other pamphlets with proposals for the 
employment and reform of the poor in the 1690's, including those by 
Matthew Hale, Robert Harford, Charles Davenant, Yarranton, John 
Cary, and of course, John Locke. Before moving to the next section to 
examine in more detail the content of John Locke's scheme and its 
relation to his other more famous work, it is important to 
acknowledge the work of John Cary, who even more so than Thomas 
Firmin, was one of the most sought after and influential experts in the 
field in the seventeenth century.
Cary's seminal pamphlet, An Essay on the State of England in 
Relation to its Trade, Its Poor, and its Taxes, For Carrying on the 
Present War Against France 1695, contains all the elements of political 
oeconomy and more. W hat differentiated it from other works in the 
same period was its immediate practical impact, and its relation to 
John Locke's Report of the Board of Trade. Cary's pam phlet, like 
Child's, was a bestseller of its genre, republished throughout the 
eighteenth century (under a slightly different title) and translated into 
French and Italian.49 Cary places the government of the poor within 
the context of the state, trade, and war. He proceeds to analyze not 
only England's internal trade and manufacturing sector, but its
48 Bellars 1695. Firmin's and Bellers's emphasis on useful employment and training was a 
change from William Petty's ideas for example, who thought that the poor should be 
employed no matter what they did - even if it was to build pyramids on Salisbury Plain or 
bring Stonehenge to Tower Hill.
49 For an interesting discussion of the John Cary’s economic analysis see David Harris Sacks, 
The Widening Gate: Bristol and the Atlantic Economy 1450-1700, University of California 
Press, Berkeley, 1991, pp.339-361. ‘For John Cary’, writes Sacks, ‘the social world was in 
a continuous process of change. It had begun in simplicity, but, driven by man's need to 
balance existing supplies against his wants, it had grown day by day in complexity. Only 
the underlying laws of economic action, themselves open to human understanding and 
application, remained constant’ (p. 343).
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external trade as well with East India, Africa, Madeira, Ireland,
Scotland, the Canaries, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and Italy. He also 
recommends the establishment of a committee of trade. He then 
moves toward a consideration of the poor. Cary begins by criticizing 
the laws which are already in place to deal with the problem, which 
are 'defective-tending rather to maintain them so, rather than to raise 
them to a better way of living7.50 The solution was 'nothing but good 
laws' to restrain the habits of idleness, and provide work for those who 
are willing, 'and force them to work that are able'. (156) He suggested 
the establishment of workhouses, not simply to confine the poor, but 
like Firmin and Haines, 'founded on such principles as m ay employ 
the poor'. (157)51 These workhouses would be set up in the cities and 
the great towns, one or more in each place, in order to prevent the 
constant shuttling of poor from one parish to the next. Justices of the 
Peace would be given the power to assign young men to husbandm en 
and manufacturers, who would by statute be obliged to receive them. 
In coastal towns, like Bristol where he was based, some of the poor 
would be forced to serve in the navy, since the sea 'is a very good cure 
for legs and Arms, especially such as are counterfit through Sloath'. 
(161) Popular culture was to be tightly controlled, with no 'hawking or 
selling of ballads', and stage plays, lotteries, and gaming all 'strictly 
looked after7. (166) These measures, involving the use and 
coordination of the juridical structure, economic practices, culture, and 
the military, would 'introduce a habit of vertue amongst us, but also to 
the making m ultitudes of people serviceable who are now  useless to 
the Nation'. Since labour was the original condition of the happiness 
of man ('that by the sweat of his Brow he should eat his Bread'), the 
idleness and lack of discipline of the poor, 'was the foundation of all 
those vices which prevail amongst us..whereof cannot be prevented 
but by encouraging Youth in an early Delight of living by Industry,
50 Cary 1695, p. 156. Page references follow in brackets in the text
51 See the discussion in Mary E. Fissell’s excellent Patients, Power, and the Poor in 
Eighteenth Century Bristol, Cambridge University Press, 1991, especially pp. 79-82,89.
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which would keep up a true English spirit in them'. Not only would 
idleness be eliminated figured Cary, but the cost of instilling it as well, 
with enough left over to pay for the war with France. Like Petty and 
Child before him, Cary based his insights on the analysis of a world 
which was determinable and understandable though rational and 
even scientific means. He was providing a strategy for the effective 
extension of governing power through a complex and multi-layered 
coordination of the numerous resources at the disposal of the state.
Cary's work had an immediate impact. Following the publication of 
his 1695 pamphlet, it appears he single-handedly organized a campaign 
for the raising of a workhouse in the d ty  of Bristol.52 In the next year, 
he succeeded in having an Act passed through Parliament creating the 
Bristol Corporation of the Poor, the first of its kind, and set about 
building its first workhouse. It was to be large enough for all the able 
bodied poor, infirm, and children who could not be properly 
maintained at home. The children, 'will be bred up to Labour, 
Principles of Virtue will be implanted..by the good government 
thereof, and laziness and Beggary will be discouraged'. (117) The 
guardians were able to force any able bodied person to work in the 
'House', or send them into the navy, husbandry, or bound 
apprenticeships, as Cary's pamphlet had suggested. He set up  a 
'Committee of the Poor' which visited poor families within their 
vicinity, kept track of their overall numbers, and decided which 
children would be taken from families and placed in the workhouse. 
Anyone who sought relief had to appear before the committee, where 
they were registered in the committee books, and notes were taken as 
their age, health, qualifications, and general civility.
The first one hundred guests were girls, whom Cary described were 
'appointed..set hours for working, eating, and playing; and (given) 
leave to walk on the Hills with their tutresses when their work was 
over and the weather fair'. Another workhouse was eventually built,
52 Cary 1717, p. 116.
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occupied by young boys, the infirm, and "ancients'. Cary was confident 
of its complete success, not surprising considering how much he had 
riding on the whole project;
...the success has answered our expectations, we are free from Beggars, our old people 
are comfortably provided for, our boys and girls are educated to sobriety, and brought 
up to delight in labour, our young children are well looked after..and the face of the 
city is so changed already..to hope these young plants will produce a vertuous and 
laborious Generation....(161)
Cary noted how all of this was brought about; "the change we have 
wrought on them is by fair means..we have a Brideval, stockes, and 
W hipping-Post, always in their sights, but never had occasion to make 
use of either'. The precise workings of this discipline has been dealt 
with elsewhere,53 and thus I want only to acknowledge its presence 
and its description by a constructor of it.
It was not just that the poor posed an economic problem, or a public 
order problem, or a spiritual problem, it was that they posed all three 
simultaneously. The poor could no longer be simply tolerated or 
locked up, their bodies had to worked upon, to be made healthy 
(industrious and pliant) so that the "body politik' might also be 
healthy. The workhouse represents the practical nature of this 
governing activity. John Locke provides an excellent example of a 
thinker connected to this issue not only historically and conceptually, 
but practically as well.
Locke's ideas on the reformation of the poor are neither original nor 
unusual in the context I have sketched above. His Report of the Board 
of Trade (1697) came to occupy a privileged and oft-quoted place in the 
history of the development of the poor laws right up to the time of the 
Webbs, including entire swathes of his text being quoted in the 1817 
Parliamentary Select Committee report, which formed the basis of the 
famous 1834 Poor Law reforms.54 I want first of all to consider the
53 See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, tranls. Alan Sheridan, New York, Pantheon, 
1977; and Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain, New York, Penguin, 1978.
54 See ‘The Report from the Select Committee on the Poor Laws with the Minutes of 
Evidence’, Parliamentary Papers: Reports from Committees, Session 28 January -12 July 
1817, vol. VI, pp. 14-15: ‘The Committee cannot but avail themselves of the high authority 
of a Report of the Board of Trade...drawn up by Mr. Locke...and which appears to Your 
Committee still more applicable to the present moment, then to the time at which it was
233
origin of Locke's ideas, secondly their relation to the texts examined 
above, thirdly the arguments themselves, and finally, their relation to 
some of Locke's other texts and philosophy as a whole.55
Locke wrote the Report whilst a member of William's Board of Trade 
between 1696 and 1700. The Commission had been formed to provide 
substantial and expert advice to the Lord Chancellors on colonial and 
trade matters.56 Their work was mainly taken up with the great debate 
over recoinage, the management of the colonies and plantations, trade 
issues, and of course, the poor. Locke, as Shaftesbury's aide-de-camp,
written*. It then goes on to quote verbatim the section of the Report on working schools.
55 It is not an oft-quoted or famous part of the Lockean academic industry. To the best of my 
knowledge there have been only five specific pieces written (in English) on this aspect of 
Locke's work: M. Mason, ‘John Locke’s Proposals on Work-house Schools’, in Richard 
Ashcraft ed., John Locke: Critical Assessments II, Routledge, 1991 (1962); E. Hundert, ‘The 
making of homo faber: John Locke between ideology and history, Journal of the History of 
Ideas, 33,1, 1972,3-22; Tully 1993 passim, A. Beier, 'Utter Strangers to Industry, Morality 
and Religion: John Locke on the Poor, Eighteenth Century Life, 12, 3,1988, 28-41; and 
Dunn 1989 (in response to Tully). David Wootten in the context of a reassessment of 
Richard Ashcraft's claims that Locke was a social and political 'radical', has argued that 
Locke's Report supports (in part) a rather different reading, one which at the very least, 
removes Locke from any definitve 'radical' categories. Wootten claims that Locke's Report is 
the 'only one' amongst others to adopt 'a punitive approach' and thus his views on poverty 
were 'not typical but exceptional' in the late seventeeth and eighteenth centuries. (88)
Ashcraft retorts that it is 'overstating the case to the point of absurdity' to claim that Locke's 
position is the most conservative or that it was a uniquely held attitude towards the poor in 
the seventeenth century. See their exchange: ‘John Locke and Richard Ashcraft’s 
Revolutionary Politics’, Political Studies, 40,1, pp. 79-98; and Ashcraft’s reply in the same 
issue, ‘Simple Objections and Complex Reality; Theorizing Political Radicalism in 
Seventeenth Century England, pp. 99-115. It will become obvious below that I side with 
Ashcraft on this. Note however that both articles only touch upon the Report (over the 
course of 4-5 pages) in the context of a wider debate over particular macro interpretations of 
the general political character of Locke's work. (Wootten 1992; 87-91: Ashcraft 1992; 111- 
113) Mason's short article is mainly descriptive, usefully indicating some of the sources of 
Locke's thoughts, though he rather curtly and unconvincingly eschews any relation between 
Locke's thinking on poor relief and his political and philosophic work. See also Karen 
Iversen Vaughn, John Locke: Economist and Social Scientist, University of Chicago Press, 
19880. P. Kelly’s excellent introduction and editorial presentation of Locke’s economic 
writings, (Locke on Money, Oxford, Clarendon Pressl991) should provide the basis for a 
more extensive integration of these issues into the whole of the Locke corpus.
56 For the background to the board and its members, see I. Steele, Politics of Colonial Policy : 
The Board o f Trade in Colonial Administration 1696-1720, Oxford University Press, 1968, 
though he does not discuss in any detail its deliberations on policies for the poor. See P. 
Laslett, 'John Locke, the great recoinage, and the origins of the Board of Trade 1695-1698, in 
John Yolton ed, John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, 1969, 
though he too ignores the issue of the poor. Kelly (1990) provides the most comprehensive 
background as to Locke's thinking and writing on trade matters, pointing out that it began in 
earnest once he joined Shaftesbury's circle in the late 1660’s.
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had developed a reputation not only for his political theory and 
philosophic work (at least that which he admitted to), but his political 
sense too, and had been involved in a number of public policy 
discussions, as well as having extensive experience in dealing with the 
colonies and plantations. Locke alo wrote on economic matters, 
bringing him into contact (and often conflict) with people like Child, 
Davenant, Petty, and Cary. There are conflicting opinions as to the 
extent of Locke's activities on the Board - he was reluctant to join and 
even tried to resign at one point, and his correspondence of this period 
shows him to be constantly complaining about subjecting his 
asthmatic lungs to London's polluted air. He did, however, make 
substantial contributions on the state of affairs in Virginia, the debate 
over recoinage, and the regulation of the poor.
The problems of the poor were on the Board's agenda when it first 
met. It immediately set about collecting statistics, and sent for the 
ideas and advice of Thomas Firmin and John Cary, the two most well 
known 'experts' in the field. Each commissioner was asked to prepare 
suggestions, though Locke's was eventually the only one they 
considered worthy of consideration. It seems he had been working on 
the issue for some time, or at least thinking about it before he 
submitted his specific plan to the Board.57 Indeed in May 1696 John
57 Another kind of social policy scheme was proposed by Locke in a 1679 journal entry entitled 
'Atlantis’, and based on other journal writings between 1676-8. However this was not so 
much a project of social reform as it was a project for colonial settlement. In it, Locke deals 
with the organization of labour, cities, the social function of learning and its limits, 
sumptuary laws, marriage, and population. His concern is to coordinate all of these activities 
into a well ordered community, with an overall stress on prevention, rather than the more 
punitive tone and themes of the Report. Passages bear obvious debts to More's Utopia, and 
Harrington's Oceana. There are none of the aristocratic (and racist) views of Shaftesbury here, 
that were so prominent in the Fundamental Constitution c f Carolina 1669. One could argue 
that 'Atlantis' is a more original work, which would cast further doubt as to the extent which 
Locke was representing his own views in the Constitution. See Ernesto de Marchi, ‘Locke’s 
Atlantis’, Political Studies, 3,2,1985 for a short but informative note on this journal entry, 
For a further discussion of Shaftesbury, Locke, and the Constitution of the Carolinas, see K. 
Haley, The First Early of Shaftesbury, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968. As secretary to the 
Council for Trade and Foreign Plantations, and as informal secretary to the committee of 
proprietors of Carolina (of which Shaftesbury was a member), both during the 1670's, Locke 
dealt with issues ranging from foreign and domestic trade, currency, interest rates, and of 
course, provision for the poor. I thus demur at Dunn’s suggestion (1989 p. 146 and n.83) 
that Locke thought only about the reformation of manners or poor relief in his closing years
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Cary had sent Locke his essay on trade and his proposals for the 
employment of the poor in Bristol, and Locke had written back, saying 
that 'it is the best discourse I ever read on that subject'.58 He also 
possessed the Act of Parliament which had created the Bristol 
Corporation of the Poor in his library. As well, Locke corresponded 
with Thomas Firmin, and received information about his experiences 
employing the poor by having them spin wool.59 It is obvious, when 
looking at Locke's Report, how deeply influenced he was by Firmin, 
and especially John Cary. Cary's success in Bristol in 1696 was copied 
throughout the country and widely known. It predates Locke's 
intervention, and thus Professor Tully is slightly misleading when he 
claims that the proposals of Locke's Report were applied in Bristol 
soon after publication.60 in fact, Locke's Report was only in part 
incorporated into the consensus legislative proposals pu t to the Lord 
Justices by the Board on two successive occasions (1697 and 1698).61 
Both led to nothing legislation-wise, and in general, any major poor 
law legislation was left unattem pted until the nineteenth century. Yet, 
Locke's scheme struck a chord, and is, on the whole, indicative of 
much of the thinking on the subject in the seventeenth century.
Locke is clear about the cause of the multiplication of the poor, and 
the subsequent burden of their upkeep; T he growth of the Poor...can 
be nothing else but the relaxation of discipline and corruption of 
manners'. (Locke 1697: fol 232 [1]; 1789: 102)62 The poor, as individual
and usually in a state of ‘moral panic*.
58 De Beer 1979, let 2079,2084. See also BM add. MS (Cary) 5540.
59 De Beer, 1981, let 2241, (p. 84).
60 Tully 1993, p. 237.
61 The Board’s final recommendation can be found at the Public Records Office Colonial Office 
papas (PRO CO) 389/14 fols 127-138 (23 Dec 1697). Wootten is correct in pointing that 
the Webbs woe mistaken in assuming the Privy Council accepted Locke's Report. (1992: 88 
n 34) Locke's influence is obvious from the first page - 'we attribute the increase of the 
Poor to the relaxation of discipline, corruption of manners and illeducation of the poorer 
sort...' - but it is on the whole a consensus document cobbled together from the various 
working drafts submitted in the course of their deliberations (PRO CO 389/14 fol 129).
62 There is some confusion as to the actual full text of Locke's Report. The version published
in Fox Bourne (1876) is incomplete, as is the one in the Bodleian Library. (Locke MS. 30 
fol. 86ff) A complete draft is in the Public Record Office entitled Draught of a 
Representation, Containing [a] Scheme of Methods for the Employment of the Poor' (PRO,
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bodies, were not contributing to the well being of the common weal, 
quite the opposite. If they would not work, then they should be pu t to 
work, and the disposition which allowed them to become lazy and 
indignant substituted for one embodying industriousness and 
discipline. This would occur on two levels; the personal and the 
juridical. Aside from immediately restraining the opportunities for 
debauchery (by closing all the 'coffee houses and brandy shops'), those 
who administered the current laws had to use and enforce them as 
they were intended; 'we have reason to think that the greatest part of 
the overseers of the poor, every where, are wholly ignorant'(fol 233 [3]; 
103).63 Locke then proceeds to work through, in detail, some suggested 
practices aimed at regulating and improving the lot of 'idle 
vagabonds'. Like Cary, he suggests any beggars caught in maritime 
counties should be sent to sea, placed inside a workhouse, or if caught 
breaking any laws, in a house of correction. Building on the 
modifications to the Act of Settlement which had been introduced in 
1696, Locke thought that the movement of the poor should be closely 
controlled and monitored through a system of certification papers, 
passes, and visible identification marks.64 Begging outside delimited
CO 388/5/fols 233-248). A very interesting 1789 reprint, attached to a history of a Society 
for the Reformation of Manners in Lindsey, and complete with explanatory notes, and from 
which I quote below, is also complete, at least if compared with the original ’Draught'. See 
(1789: vii, 67) for the story of how the editor came to acquire Locke's 'authentic' MS. This 
seems to have escaped the attention of Beier. Page and folio references are provided for both 
versions.
63 Locke (and subsequently the Board as a whole) was emphatic about the need to enforce already 
existing laws, which he used in part, to justify his own 'new' proposals. He mentions in 
particular 39 Eliz. cap A and 43 Eliz. cap 2. See also the editor's 'Conclusion' in the 1789 
reprint, where he notes that 'every man of the best discernment will see that the wise 
provisions of the Statutes of the 43d of Eliz...for regulating the internal police of the 
kingdom, have been fruitless: not from any defect in the laws themselves, but from want of a 
due observance and execution of them by those to whom that duty is entrusted' (150-1).
64 The Act of William in 1696 which modified the Act erf Settlement, provided for certificates 
to be issued to subjects showing their place of settlement, and thus allowing them to move 
about with relative freedom until they make a claim for relief, and are thus sent back to their 
place of settlement Still, the Act called for a number of measures of control which Locke 
seemed to find useful; the Act states, '..every person receiving relief of any parish shall, 
together with his wife and children, openly wear upon the shoulder of his right sleeve a badge 
or mark with a large Roman P, and the first letter of the name of the parish whereof such 
poor person is an inhabitant cut thereon either in red or blue cloth...’. Locke adopted a 
similar technique, whereby the poor when registered with the local corporation received a
2 3 7
areas brought severe penalties, including confinement, or even 
banishment to the plantations. Conterfeiters of passports were to lose 
their ears for first offenses, and women caught begging five miles or 
more from home were to returned home, or if caught for a second 
time, sent to a house of correction and put to a regime of hard labour. 
Children under the age of fourteen found begging outside their 
authorized areas were to be sent to working schools and soundly 
w hipped and then put to work.(fol 235 [8]; 106-7) Children of the 
labouring poor between the ages of three and fourteen, whom  Locke 
considered to be the greatest burden to the parish, were to be removed 
from their families and placed in 'working schools', thereby 'easing7 
the mother's load (i.e. allowing her more time to work). The children, 
kept in 'better order7, would thus be 'from their infancy, .inured to 
work, which is of no small consequence to the making of them  sober 
and industrious all their lives after7, (fol 239 [15]; 112-13)
Locke grounds all of these suggestions in the powers of local 
guardians, who would be elected by local rate payers ( as in Cary's 
scheme), and have 'the power of a justice of the peace over vagabonds 
and beggars, to send them to seaport towns, or houses of 
correction'.(fol 243[23]; 121-3) They are to meet every year and 'take 
account of the flock', inspect the local management, and give 
directions and instructions for policy. All of this would be paid for by a 
combination of the work done by the poor and poor rates, which 
would be standardized throughout the union.
Of course, ideas spoken or written down, do not always translate 
directly into practice. In general, most of the grand schemes for the 
reform and employment of the poor had only limited success, or were 
complete failures. Firmin's self-financing workhouse quickly fell into 
debt, and Cary’s 'spacious' workhouse was soon labelled a 'wretched 
hovel' known mainly for the terror it provoked in the poor of Bristol.
number of ’badges’. These enabled some to beg during pre-determined hours as decided by the 
guardians, however if they were caught doing so outside these hours, they were to be whipped 
and sent to a house of correction for six weeks.
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They even tried to change its name from 'workhouse' to 'house of 
maintenance' or 'house of protection'. However, we should not 
confuse the extension of control or power with its absolute 
effectiveness; that control or power is extended is not to say its 
intention will be necessarily fulfilled or realized. Gaps occur, 
expectations are not met, chance enters the picture. Yet what is 
happening is that the extension is providing a foundation for potential 
action, for the operation of a discursive field within which discourse 
and practices do sometimes connect. This is how language has an 
influence on the character of political practices, legitimating or 
enabling one practice rather than another.
The connection between Locke’s Report and his other work was 
easily established by his contemporaries, and readers in the eighteenth, 
and nineteenth centuries. The editor of the 1789 republication of the 
Report, notes that T he Familiarity of this Report to the ideas, 
language, and principles of Mr. Locke's other writings is very striking'. 
(Note W ) His writings on education bear the most immediate 
resemblance, but the similarity does not end there, in fact, it extends to 
the very heart of Locke's corpus, including his Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, the Two Treatises, and his writings on 
Toleration, or at least so I want to argue For example, Chapter V of the 
Second Treatise is perhaps the most compact and sophisticated 
example of Locke merging his general political theory, analysis of 
money, of labour productivity, and Restoration oeconomist themes in 
general. An im portant aspect of it is also the relation of Locke's 
discussion of appropriation without consent to another im portant part 
of trade theory - colonial affairs. People, Locke says, can appropriate 
fruits, nuts, fish, game, and vacant land by means of individual labour 
as long as there is no spoilage and enough and as good left over for 
others. Appropriation on this basis, i.e. w ithout consent, continues 
until money is introduced, land becomes scarce, and there is no longer 
enough and as good left over for others. Locke's example thoughout
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the chapter of where this kind of appropriation could take place was 
America, where it would not "prejudice the rest of Mankind, or give 
them reasons to complain, or think themselves injured by this Man's 
incroachment' (11.36). This satisfies one of the two conditions Locke 
established as present in the state of nature, which he argues America 
is in. The second condition is that individuals exercise 'individual 
popular sovereignty" and are 'executioners of the Law of Nature' (II.8). 
At n. 14 Locke says explicitly that this condition is satisfied in America 
as well. Now in order to do this, Locke has to obviously deny the 
existence of a legitimate Amerindian political society or community. 
The fact that he sets about doing precisely this with great relish and 
impeccable consistency, arguing that their property system is tied to a 
world of limited desire and possessions and is unsuited for the 
development of m odem  states and property systems, indicates the 
importance Locke attached to the task. Indeed it could be argued that 
Chapter V of the Two Treatises is wholly directed at dispossessing the 
native Ameri-Indians of their land, and provide the means for 
colonial expansion and improvement of England's t r a d e d  This 
concern for the development of the common good through the 
exercise of state power and the harnessing of the political and physical 
capacities of the population, is evident too in his discussion of money. 
For Locke, following much of the 'balance of trade' arguments, money 
is an instrument for the development of trade and commerce, and is 
useful because it is a means for generating benefits for society as a 
whole. Locke is on standard oeconomist ground here, and 
furthermore, at 11.42, makes the connection explicit; "This shews how 
much num ber of men are to be preferred to largeness of dominions, 
and that the increase of lands and the right imploying of them  is the
65 For the definitive account of Locke in relation to colonial expansion and Native land claims, 
see the remarkable developing research of James Tully 1993, pp. 137-176; and more 
specifically in the Canadian context, ‘Multirow federalism and the Charter’, in Phil Bryden, 
Stephen Davis, and John Russell eds., The Charter - ten years after, University of Toronto 
Press, 1992.
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great art of government'. 66 Locke's assumptions and positions on the 
proper 'police' of the nation are here clearly rooted in the so-called 
mercantilist, even 'cameralist', camp. Economic matters remained 
part of the general prudentia of civil society.67
The importance of the investiture of conduct as part of the practices 
of civic prudentia is also evident in Locke's treatise on education, as a 
num ber of commentators have shown, and as we have seen above.68 
Aside from inculcating and implanting (what Locke calls the act of 
'prindpling ') the neo-stoic and mercantile friendly virtues of 
discipline and industry through training and habit formation, liberty 
itself becomes a practice to be learned.69 Locke identifies it as a primary 
desire of men, over and above any particular objects of desire and
66 Note also, from Locke's memoranda on toleration for Shaftesbury in 1667: 'As to promoteing 
the welfare of the kingdom, which consists in riches and power, to this most immediately 
conduces the number and industry of your subjects'. (PRO 30/24/47/7) The promotion of the 
public good in the interest of national 'power' was at the center of both Locke's economic and 
political writings, and it must be in this light that his views on the poor, on the role of 
labour' in general, and even property must be seen. See, for example, his letter to William 
Molyneux 19 January 1693/4 (de Beer 1979; iv. let. no. 1693, pp. 786-7: Kelly 1991; 16) - ‘I 
think every one...is bound to labour for the publick good, as far as he is able, or else he has 
no right to eat’. See also his unpublished 'Labor': ’it is oweing to the carelessnesse and 
negligence of the Governments of the world, which wholy intent upon the care of 
aggrandizeing them selves at the same time neglect the happynesse of the people and with it 
their own peace and security. Would they suppresse the arts and instruments of Luxury and 
Vanity. And bring those of honest and useful! industry in fashon...if the labour of the world 
were rightly directed and distributed there would be more knowledg peace health and plenty in 
it than now there is. And man kinde be much more happy than now it is." (1661 
Commonplace Book, p. 310: Kelly 1991; 495).
67 At the beginning of his 1661 Commonplace Book, Locke classified knowledge in a fourfold 
division of Theologica, Politia, Prudentia, and Physia. He listed amongst the ends of 
Prudentia - wealth, happiness, health, power, fame, and pleasure. Means to attaining wealth 
(which is cross referenced to oeconomia) are oeconomia (i.e. household management),
Venditio et Comptio, artis exercitium, and Historia mercatura cuiuslibet. See Kelly (1991;
94 n.2).Cf. Vaughn 1980, p. 106, who doubts that Locke can be called a mercantilist (though 
she says he shares some of their conclusions).
68 See especially, Nathan Tarcov, Locke's Education for Liberty, University of Chicago Press, 
1984; and Peter Schouls, Reasoned Freedom: John Locke and Enlightenment, Ithaca and 
London, Cornell University Press, 1992.
69 Schouls 1992 (p. 227) is right to point out that along with the emphasis on habit comes an 
emphasis on the responsibility individuals have for the formation of our own character 
(‘Men’s Happiness or Misery is most part of their own making*, STCE, 1; cf. TT, 2.42, 
’And that Prince who shall be so wise and godlike as by established laws of liberty to secure 
protection and incouragment to the honest industry of Mankind against the oppression of 
power and narrowness of Party...’), a character they may have to reconstitute. But this seems 
to miss the emphasis found in Passmore or Tully for example, that this autonomy and self- 
responsibility is itself a function of a project of reform, and not the grounds for it.
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notes that its regulation - i.e. when and where it is to be granted - 
makes it the most effective way of moving men to do what is wanted 
of them. Allowing liberty rather than imposing duty is thus for Locke 
one of the 'milder Methods of government', but at root the most 
complementary and the most efficacious.70 This in turn relates to how 
Locke builds into his educational reforms an element of critical 
reflection on itself, just as he does in the Two Treatises where, as we 
saw, the people are credited with the capacity to reason and judge 
according to their right to revolution (H 94, 230) The key here is that 
the relation of governed to governors is described as one of 
conditional entrustor to trustee, and hence Lockean subjects are 
construed not simply as blank tablets but also, it seems, as self 
governing rights bearers.71 At the very least then, there is a tension in 
Locke between these two tendencies.
It is important to always have the theological context of these 
developments in the background. The rise of workhouse 
Technologies' and the growth of the 'Reformation of M anners' 
movement m ust be seen in the context of a general providentialism, 
especially after 1688 when so m any subjects saw England as having 
some kind of special relationship with divine providence to live up 
to.72 Professor Dunn has concluded from looking at some of the same
70 Locke compares this with the 'ultimate instrument of government', which is the proper use of 
pain, used only after 'all gentler Ways have been tried, and proved unsuccessful' (see Locke 
STCE 78-9,84,87). In general, Locke saw harsh punishment - beating or whipping - as 
justified only in the very last resort, and oily in specific cases of extreme 'obstinacy' and 
'rebellion' on the part of the child (cf. his proposals for the punishment of wayward beggars 
etc.) Locke's general antipathy to gratuitous punishment and penalism can also be seen on 
his comments on Penn’s frame of government for Pennsylvania (Locke MS f.9, fols 33-41). 
Interestingly he is unimpressed by Penn’s proposal for an extensive state education system - 
it is ‘the surest check on liberty of conscience, suppressing all displeasing opinions in the 
bud’. See the helpful discussion in Ashcraft 1986, pp. S18-S20.
71 Locke (and other seventeenth century theorists) partly identified these rights as deriving from 
the ancient constitution. I am grateful to Professor Tully for pressing home this point to me 
and insisting on its implications for Locke’s place in any genealogy of govemmentality. No 
doubt he would remain unconvinced that I have taken it fully m  board here.
72 As much as these movements were religious in nature - made up of Low church Anglicans 
and sympathetic dissenters - they invariably described the 'virtuous* individual who conformed 
to conventional religious standards of behaviour as also being a ‘good citizen’. By the late 
seventeenth century and into the eighteenth, ‘Societies for the Reformation of Manners’ 
increasingly adjusted their argument to the issues of the political order of the temporal state
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issues discussed here in this context, that the role of political authority 
in the construction of a Lockean 'civilization' was 'essentially negative' 
and had no duty, right, or even capacity to 'replace the active 
responsibilities of its subjects by a dominant agency of its own'. Thus, 
Lockean society was one 'whose members could shape themselves, 
w ithout egregious interference from their rulers or fellow citizens, to 
meet the stem  requirements which God had imposed upon them '.73 I 
think it is far from being clear that this authority, especially in the 
form of an 'art of government' was 'essentially' negative, but that it did 
in fact 'work on' the capacities of its subjects, perhaps not in the sense 
of rqjlacing their responsibilities as much as helping to 'dispose' of 
them in particular ways with regard to dvic affairs and the 'publick 
good', as well as to their salvation. Locke's gloss of Romans 12:2 
(quoted in the heading to this section) exhorts people to T e not 
conformed to the fashon of this world: But be ye tranformed in the 
renewing of your minds that you m ay upon examination find out, 
what is the good, the acceptable and perfect will of god'.74 It is 
im portant to see both elements of this message - a transformation of 
self with regard to the next world, but also with regard to this one; 
deconstructing and replacing the current Taw s of fashion' and using 
the practices of suspension and examination (described in the Essay at 
H.21) to determine the right course of action. It would come to pass 
that this self-disciplined soul would prove indispensable to an 
understanding of the changing complexities of post-Restoration 
society, including the creeping growth of capitalism.
5.3 Civic liberalism
to justify proscription of different kinds of public and private morality. See Dudley Bahlman 
The Moral Revolution of 1688, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1957; T.C. Curtis and 
W.A. Speck, “The Societies for Reformation of Manners: A Case study in the Theory and 
Practice of Moral Reform”, Litterature and History, 3,1976,45-64. On the secular nature of 
the SRM’s in the late seventeenth century and into the eigteenth, see Shelley Burtt, Virtue 
Transformed: Political Argument in England 1688-1740, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, especially chapter 3.
73 Dunn 1989, pp. 146, 148.
74 Locke, Paraphrases, pp. 583-4.
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We are now in a position to make some general observations about 
the relationship between Locke's political theory and classical 
republicanism, which I have examined above and in other chapters. 
W hat is the nature of the similarities between them, if any?
One structural similarity is the belief in limited government, at least 
to the extent that power is entrusted to the governors on the basis of a 
state of original self-government on the part of the members of that 
society. As such, the use of rights by Locke is to constrain or limit the 
king or Parliament (or king in parliament) to act within a known 
structure of law (i.e.they are 'constitution-enforcing'), just as the 
republican tradition did.75 But if we refer back to the my list above (at 
the end of section 4.2), we might find other similarities as well. I noted 
that classical republicanism assumed a particular disposition on the 
part of a citizen which included an understanding of self as (by nature 
or nurture) a political animal, and thus participation in the 
government of the community as not just a duty imposed by an 
external authority, but the very substance of the good life. Those 
qualities that make the citizen a participant in such a public life count 
as the 'civic virtues'; participatory self-rule is the realization of one's 
freedom in action. In such a bald form Locke seems very distant from 
this - or is he? Locke's central concern in the Two Treatises is to 
provide the grounds for legitimate political authority and the right of 
citizens to resist that authority if it contravenes the law of nature and 
the public good. The entire complex of duties and rights in his 
political theory relates to the reconciliation of liberty and authority in 
such a way that no one is ever required to obey the arbitrary will of 
another, and to engage in the active practice of ensuring that rulers 
and governments do not impose laws which contravene this basic 
tenet. Locke's repeated emphasis on the role of law and consent and
75 This is brought out well in Tully 1992, p. 9. See also Grant 1988, pp. 60-1; Richard
Ashcraft, Locke's Two Treatises of Government, London, Unwin Hyman, 1987; Alan Ryan, 
‘Locke on Freedom: Some Second Thoughts, in Knud Haakonessen ed., Traditions of 
Liberalism: Essays on John Locke, Adam Smith, J.S. Mill, Centre for Independent Studies 
1988, 33-53.
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the centrality of legislative authority, does indeed lead his whole 
theory in at least a republican direction. Individuals do not enter the 
world concerned only for their own welfare, they enter with duties to 
the public realm, and the state is a device to help them carry out these 
duties as much as it protects them against the designs of others. They 
m ust also come to possess certain dispositions and 'vertues' - 
discipline, industry, frugality for example - and the means to perceive 
situations as clearly and rationally as possible, which they imbibe 
through general socialization and education, or if they are unlucky, 
through the corrective apparatuses of state (workhouses and other 
such schemes).76 It is not the case that the Lockean state or society 
either leaves the individual to get on with his business, or free from 
any duty other than to preserve himself; he m ust constantly work to 
clear his m ind of distorting influences, take responsibility for as many 
of his actions as he can, and when the situation called for it (which was 
quite often) act for the sake of the common good and security.77 All of 
this was a kind of 'vertue' or civic consciousness, which was 'the very 
strength and cement of Societie w ithout which it cannot stand'.78
76 See generally, the excellent article by E. Hundert, ‘Market Society and Meaning in Locke’s 
Political Philosophy’, in Richard Ashcraft ed., John Locke; Critical Assessments, n, 
Routledge, pp. 457-71. If Ashcraft (especially pace 1986), Tully, and those who have studied 
Locke’s educational writings are even half-right, and my argument has at least some 
plausibility, Dunn’s claim that Locke’s individualism was ‘predicated on the individual 
incidence of social and spiritual fate (and) not on a concern with the sociological preconditions 
for the realisation of men’s “natural liberty’’’, is more ambiguous than he seems to think; see 
his (excellent) ‘Individuality and Clientage in the Formation of Locke's Social Imagination’, 
ed. Reinhard Brandt, in John Locke: Symposium Wolfenbuttel (1979), Berlin, de Gruyter 
1981,43-73, especially pp. 6-7.
77 Locke was criticized by conservatives throughout the eigthteenth century for possessing an 
extreme version of consent theory, which they distorted in order to score propoganda points, 
building on the portrait drawn by William Atwood in his Fundamental Constitution of the 
English Government, who rabidly criticized the radical implications of Locke’s theory of 
popular sovereignty. Josiah Tucker in his Treatise Concerning Civil Government (1781) 
called Locke the “Head” of republican writers (among the most eminent of whom according 
to Tucker were, besides Locke, Andrew Fletcher and Rousseau) who defended the ‘indefensible 
right of private judgement' and who, as a result, were the “universal demolisher(s) of all civil 
government** instead of its builders (pp. 27,37,101). These were ‘new fangled republicans’ 
who believed in the ‘liberty of the ancients’, which was nothing but the liberty ‘one Baron 
took of making war...plundering the Estate and murdering the vassals of another, and 
tyrannizing over his own’ (81,60).
78 De Beer, Correspondence VII, p. 337 (30 May 1701).
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Liberty in Locke is a deeply ambiguous concept, a subdued matter but 
not an empty one, perhaps best exemplified near the end of the Two 
Treatises when it seems to have been replaced as the goal of civil 
society by 'Security7 (H222). We must always return to its fundamental 
relation to law - the 'director7 of the free agent, not meant to abolish or 
restrain liberty, but to 'preserve and enlarge' it (11.57). If we define dvic 
virtue broadly as those dispositions of the individual which make him 
a good dtizen of a regime, that is, which allows the dtizen to 
partidpate in public and private behaviour condudve to the 
maintenance and furtherance of that regime, than Locke fits 
comfortably in to the category of a theorist of civic or political virtue.
It is not a matter of liberty replacing virtue, or duty being placed in 
opposition to rights, but rather, in the context of developing 
modernity and the rise of the modem administrative state, a recoding 
of the fundamental aspects of the relationship between individual and 
sodety. For Locke dtizens had duties and needed to develop and foster 
a disposition to help carry them out; states also had duties and a role to 
play in helping dtizens to fulfill them.
Contemporary theorists then who rely on a rough distinctinon 
between dvic modes of life grounded either in 'participatory self-rule' 
or atomistic 'procedural liberalism', are painting too crude a picture of 
what is historically on offer.79 Nor are those who see that it is a matter 
of somehow transforming classical republicanism into something 
more user-friendly to the attenuated civic consciousness of late- 
modern citizens, offering the only (or the best) course of action.
Rather, once we have shed the history of liberalism, for example, of its 
imposed hyper-individualist and Kantian strains, we can look again 
and anew at the question of w hat the relations are between the 
concepts (and practices) of liberty and self in the traditions which 
continues to dom inate our political discourse. A 'civic' liberalism
79 The most compelling portrait of this opposition has been provided by Charles Taylor, 
‘Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate’, in Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 
Liberalism and the Moral Life, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1989.
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beckons us to hold a more complex account of the relation between the 
individual and the state and the concepts of liberty and self, which 
have become so central to m odem  and late m odem  political concerns. 
Locke is one source of this tradition (or so I have argued), even given 
his profoundly theocentric ballast. I want to turn to some of the 
contemporary manifestations of this argument now, in order to 
continue drawing the m ap of these relations, and also to see whether 
or not the categories we have inherited and continue to use as a result 




'Back to history? Has the dilatory, inward-looking, and self-obsessed discipline of 
philosophy ever been anywhere else?'
(Jonathan Ree, 1986)
Before moving on, I want to pause and consider some of the issues I 
raised in the introduction to part 1 with regard to the history of 
political thought and political argument. What is it about doing the 
history of political thought in a particular way which makes it a 
contribution to contemporary political argument? W hat is the 
motivation to recall a particular concept or language of political 
argum ent as a means of contributing to contemporary political 
argument, especially if one is committed to recovering and 
understanding it as best one can in the context and conventions 
amongst which it is set? It would appear that the theorist is being 
pulled in two different directions, that is, between historical veracity 
and contemporary relevance. I rejected this characterization above as 
being too crude and generally unhelpful. An enormous amount of 
ink has been spilt on just how the methodology of linguistic 
contextualism is able to achieve the results it claims, m uch of it critical. 
However I can 't help feeling that many of these complaints have been 
missing the forest for the trees, and have failed to see the more radical 
claims which form the base of many of the studies of our 'Cambridge 
School' practioners ( and perhaps the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe as 
well). Much of the critical literature balks at the injunctional claims of 
Skinner's articles on methodology; i.e. that the historian must do the 
history of political thought in this way if he or she is to produce the 
best kind of history.* Another common complaint is that the kind of
1 See the articles in James Tully ed., Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988, and most recently Mark Bevir, ‘The Errors of Linguistic 
Contextualism’, History and Theory, 31,3,1992, pp. 276-298. Cf. John Patrick Diggins, 
‘The Oyster and the Pearl: The Problem of Contextualism in Intellectual History’, History 
and Theory, 23, 1984, pp. 151-169. Many of the critiques (including these two) derive a 
large part of their force from the claim that Skinner can never discover the amount of 
information he implies from his methodological claims; nor could he, given that the 
meanings of texts often overflow the boundaries of illocutionary intentions. But all Skinner
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history which is produced is essentially 'internal', that is to say, in 
being concerned exclusively with authorial intention, it neglects to 
situate texts in a broader 'external' context of (for example) socio­
economic change.2 The methodological points are important but I 
shall not pursue them here; besides, Skinner has recently produced an 
extended and updated response to many of these concerns.3 Rather, I 
w ant to concentrate on how these two general complaints, though 
plausible at a micro-interpretive level, are often combined into a more 
general accusation that this kind of methodology invites a form of 
'pure ' history of political thought which refuses to allow us - through 
'pains-taking detail [demonstrating] the enormous difference between 
our concerns and theirs' - to 'kidnap classical figures for present-day 
purposes'.4 In other words, how can this kind of history be relevant to 
us, today?
I have already argued in the introduction to part 1 that this kind of 
objection misses one of the main points behind Skinner's 
methodology, that through a high level of historical awareness and 
erudition we can hope to acquire a perspective 'from which to view 
our own form of life in a more self-critical way, enlarging our present 
horizons instead of fortifying local prejudices'. Thus it is precisely the 
'alien character7 of these beliefs which provides their relevance, and 
the contribution here is not simply one of filling in certain background
has done is to attempt to come up with an account of at least some of these ‘acts’, and it 
hardly seems to follow that because he cannot account for every single nuance of 
illocutionary force the approach necessarily fails. He seems to me to have made this clear in 
noting that a social vocabulary ‘characterizes* social practices (and does not wholly constitute 
them) and thus can provide only a ‘rough guide’ (in Tully’s apt phrase) to the forms of life 
so characterized (in Tully 1988, p. 132; cf. Tully’s remarks on p. 23) Perhaps Skinner’s 
claims are appropriate only with regard to political argument (though this admits a 
potentially endless range of genres) than to understanding the historical identity of expression 
per se.
2 For this type of critique see Ian Shapiro, ‘Realism in the Study of the History of Ideas’, 
History of Political Thought, 3, 3, pp. 535-78; cf. The Evolution o f Liberal Rights Theory, 
Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 8-11.
3 In Tully 1988, pp. 231-88.
4 A. Rapaczynski, Nature and Politics: Liberalism in the Philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, and 
Rousseau, New York, Cornell University Press, 1987, p. 2. Cf. Shapiro 1986, p. 11 who 
claims that Skinner’s focus is ‘exclusively historical’ as opposed to his own emphasis on 
‘comprehending contemporary ideas historically’.
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conditions (however important that may be), but of gaining a specific 
purchase on a contemporary problem .5 I am convinced by this claim, 
but I w ant to draw  out one of the more radical conclusions which 
seems to follow from it, at least for Skinner (and colleagues), which is 
that this kind of history of ideas does not only contribute to 
contemporary debate but actually "dissolves' some of our philosophical 
problems and perplexities.6 At first glance this seems preposterous - 
how  can history do our thinking for us? But this would be too quick 
(though the use of 'dissolve' is highly misleading unless carefully 
couched). The point is essentially a Wittgensteinian one.7 Remember 
that for W ittgenstein (to condense what is of course a vastly complex 
thesis) the meaning of an expression lies in its use in the multiplicity 
of practices which make up a language, where language is not 
something independent of other considerations but woven into all 
hum an behaviour and activities, i.e. as a form of life.8 Speaking a 
language is thus part of an activity (and there are countless possibilities 
of "language-games'9) where an agreement in the language used 
constitutes a form of life, not in the sense of an agreement on certain 
opinions bu t in terms of definitions and judgements.10 In trying to 
discover the meaning of our concepts (whether in aesthetics or ethics 
or whatever), the im portant questions become, "How did we learn the 
meaning of this word ("good" for instance)? From w hat sort of
5 In Tully 1988, p. 287. Cf. ‘The Idea of Negative Liberty’, Philosophy in History ed. Rorty, 
Schneewind, Skinner, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 198: ‘We have to expand what 
can and cannot be said...with examples of what has been said in the history of our own 
culture’.
6 This claim seems to have first been made by Tuck (in Natural Rights Theories, Cambridge 
University Press, 1979, pp. 1,7), and discussed and endorsed by Tully (‘Current Thinking 
about Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Political Theory’, The Historical Journal, 24,2, 
1981,475-84) and Skinner (in Tully 1988, pp. 287-88).
7 This is made clear by Tully 1981, p. 476. Cf. the confirmation from Skinner in Tully 1988, 
pp. 260, 262, 279.
8 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, transl. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 1986, p(ara). 143.
9 Ibid, p. 123.
10 This is an important qualification. Ibid, p. 224: ‘The word “agreement” and the word “rule” 
are related to one another, they are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of the one word, he 
learns the use of the other with it’. Cf. p. 241-2.
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examples? In what language-games? Then it will be easier for you to 
see that the word must have a family of meanings'.11 Skinner accepts 
this W ittgensteinian point whole-heartedly: 'To understand a concept, 
it is necessary to grasp not merely the meanings of the terms used to 
express it, but also the range of things that can be done with it...there 
can be no histories of concepts as such; there can only be histories of 
their uses in argum ent'.12 Philosophical problems are 'dissolved' in 
that it becomes less important to settle on a definitive concept (or set of 
concepts) which defies all contradiction or incoherence in relation to 
any other, and more a matter of focusing on questions concerning the 
practices and theories (the 'ideologies') underpinning the use of a 
concept in a specific context and time. Here 'political argum ent' is 
more than semantics; in articulating a problem in a certain way, a way 
of acting is legitimated which has all sorts of very real and practical 
consequences, and in studying these instances one attempts to provide 
an explanation for the*'shape of [the] development7 of the conceptual 
apparatus.13 Thus in examining the various usages of a concept in 
different practical contexts, we uncover all sorts of different questions 
and strategies which we might not have seen if we assumed it to be 
emerging as a singular response to an age-old problem. Note that the 
'dissolving7 of the problem has nothing to do with 'solving7 it once and 
for all through some air-tight linguistic maneouvre, or by uncovering 
an objective historicism.1* The fact that concepts are the products of 
theories or doctrines consisting in moral or political principles for the 
guidance and evaluation of political actions and institutions is 
presupposed by this approach, and not vice versa.
If we understand our studies of the history of political thought as 
akin to excavation sites around the stock of concepts and arguments
11 Ibid, p. 77.
12 In Tully 1988, p. 283.
13 Tully 1981, p. 477.
14 Thus it is not simply a matter of making philosophical problems ‘go away’, as Thomas 
Nagel worries when complaining about the logic of historicism. See his The View from 
Nowhere, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 11.
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we employ in our contemporary discourse, partially dug in an attempt 
to determine the 'necessary from the 'contingent', does it follow that 
we are committed to some form of global or logical scepticism, that our 
most cherished and deeply held ideals will be stripped to an 
undignified, practical core? Richard Rorty provides one twist on such 
a stance. As is by now familiar, Rorty rejects the 'vocabulary of 
Enlightenment rationalism' - i.e. that there is an external reality 'out 
there' to be hooked into and confirmed by our language and concepts - 
and instead opts for a theory of linguistic communication which 
dispenses with the picture of language as something intervening 
between a true self and reality.15 Language is simply a flag which 
signals the desirability of using a certain vocabulary when trying to 
cope with certain kinds of things or organisms. Like Skinner, Rorty 
sees language usage - what he calls 'vocabularies' - in the 
W ittgensteinian idiom of tools, the point of which has nothing to do 
w ith an ultimate relation between language and thought and more to 
do with how our use of words gets in the way of our use of other 
words. In a striking metaphor, Rorty sees the history of our 
vocabularies as something like Darwin's history of the coral reef - old 
metaphors dying off and serving as platforms and foils for new ones.16 
'O ur' language is nothing more than the result of num erous 
contingencies, a product of time and chance, neither the result of some 
progressive telos or the gradual uncovering of a linguistic essence (this 
is so even in the case of science, for scientific revolutions are merely 
'metaphoric redescriptions' of nature). 'Vocabulary' replaces 'scientific 
language' or 'truthful discourse', but not by unmasking the falsity of 
some idea concerning the intrinsic nature of reality, since this would 
be to phrase one's claim in the very vocabulary one wants to displace,
15 See most recently, Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, Solidarity, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1989, especially p. 55; Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical 
Papers Volume I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991. For a good selection of 
critical essays on Rorty see Alan Malachowski ed., Reading Rorty, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1990 (particularly the essays by Taylor and Williams).
16 Rorty 1989, p. 16.
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trying to answer a question one should avoid (not flippantly but 
philosophically). To say that we should drop the idea of truth is not to 
say that we have discovered that - out there - there is no truth, because 
these kinds of arguments are always parasitic upon claims that a better 
vocabulary is available. Interesting philosophy' asserts Rorty, is the 
contest between an entrenched vocabulary and a half-formed new one 
which only vaguely promises new things. The analogy again is to do 
with tools: T o  come up with such a vocabulary is more like discarding 
the lever and the chock because one has envisaged the pully, or like 
discarding gesso and tempera because one has now figured out how to 
size canvas properly'.17 Changing the way we talk changes what we 
w ant to do (which is not always immediately apparent) and what we 
think we are. Self-creation replaces 'discovery', and the poet (broadly 
construed) - the 'shaper of languages' - becomes the vanguard of the 
species. Philosophy becomes a process of redescribing lo ts  and lots of 
things' in new ways until you have created a pattern of linguistic 
behaviour which tempts the 'rising generation' to adopt it. It does not 
present its new vocabulary as a better candidate for doing the same old 
things as we spoke of them in the same old way, but rather demands 
that we stop doing those things and do something else.
Skinner (wisely) resists the deluge of Rorty's sweeping arguments, 
though this might not be apparent if one assimilates their 
W ittgensteinian tendencies towards the dissolution of philosophical 
problems. Though broadly sharing with Rorty a concern to distinguish 
the 'merely historical' from the 'genuinely philosophical', Skinner 
parts company with him over the best way of doing so.18 One reason is 
that he thinks it possible to arrive at an assessment of the rationality of 
a set of beliefs held by an individual or group of individuals in history 
which does not rest on invoking an anachronistically objective 
account of rationality to pulverize them with. This is part of the
17 Rorty 1989, p. 12.
18 In Tully 1988, p. 286.
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methodological commitment to uncovering the network of 
conventions and norms governing the acquisition and justificiation of 
beliefs in a particular society. A belief can be deemed 'rational' or 
'irrational' according to the information derived from just such an 
excavation, where the claim relates to how near or far the agent in 
question was in relation to a generally accepted standard of epistemic 
'rationality'. Skinner's point is that our 'interpretive charity7 cannot be 
boundless, that there may be cases where, 'if we are to identify what 
needs to be explained', we will have to insist that a given belief was or 
was not rational for a given agent to uphold.19 Rorty thinks this is just 
pointless, since this kind of thing has little to do with 'Rationality7 and 
more to do w ith convention and the creation of a particular set of 
values in a particular time in history, and thus the question of 
whether people were 'rational' in doing so is just out of place. This 
points to a more substantive difference. For Skinner it is im portant to 
think about how we can arrive at such an understanding of 'alien' 
forms of life in our history, and that in doing so we will discover the 
complexity of the processes involved in shedding one political or 
philosophical 'vocabulary7 for another; something which is probably 
never as straightforward as the discarding of a lever and chock for a 
pully.20 In a way, Skinner puts Rorty in his own historical place21, that 
is, the systemic anti-foundationalism which allows Rorty to place so 
much emphasis on the contingency of vocabularies - even ones with a 
profound and almost immoveable resonance in our liberal democratic 
cultures - is itself a product of a particular set of historical maneouvres 
which needs to be understood in its own light. And in general it 
seems that Skinner is more sympathetic to the idea that a proper 
historical understanding can be used to pu t our conventional 
arguments to the test, not in the sense of declaring the relativity of all
19 Ibid, pp. 243-4.
20 Ibid, p. 248.
21 See Tully’s helpful discussion here; Tully 1988, p. 22, though he oddly concentrates on 
Rorty’s humanism rather than his propogation of a specifically American form of 
pragmatism.
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values (though this is an underlying, if unspoken, possibility) but as 
part of the reflective and critical activity of collective deliberation in 
order to clarify our beliefs and ideals and ultimately to improve our 
social and political practices.22 
Let us take another step backwards though, and focus more closely 
on not only the idea of history providing critical purchase on our own 
forms of political argument, but also in the related sense that it 
provides an insight into the processes of our own self-understanding. 
The work of Charles Taylor is prominent here23, and though I will be 
taking it up  in different places below, I want to pause and draw  out 
some general points which are relevant to the discussion at hand. 
Taylor's fundam ental claim is that any understanding of the moral 
problems of the self m ust be in part historical, that in coming to see an 
epistemological or conceptual model as no longer just 'the contour 
m ap of the way things obviously are with the mind-in-world, but as 
one option among others', one has to engage in a 'creative 
redescription' of some kind, which is achieved by 'retrieving the 
foundational form ulation'.2* In other words, 'the path to articulacy 
has to be a historical one'.25 This is linked in complex ways with 
Taylor's views on the embeddedness of language in the world and its 
history, and how  hum an beings as language users are necessarily 
related to the goods which are both constitutive of, and constituted by, 
language. These relations remain occluded and inarticulate if left
22 See Ibid, p. 287.
23 In particular, see the essays in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers Volume 
7, Cambridge, Cambridge Univesity Press, 1985; and the companion volume Philosophy and 
the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers Volume 2, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1985. For his discussion of Rorty see his ‘Rorty in the Epistemological Tradition’, in 
Malachowski ed., 1990, p. 257-275; and on Skinner see his ‘The Hermeneutics of Conflict’, 
in Tully 1988 ed., pp. 218-28. On historical issues more generally, see ‘Philosophy and Its 
History’ in Rorty et al eds., 1984, pp. 17-30.
24 Taylor in Rorty et al eds. 1984, pp. 18-20. In his typically engaging way, Taylor gives us 
an example - the need to recover the Aristotelian view which Descartes relegated to the 
‘trashcan of history’; we need to ‘get the Aristotelian view into focus beyond the 
deformations of the late Renaissance which made it such easy meat for the rising 
epistemological view’ (p. 20).
25 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 104.
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unexpressed and cut off from the intersubjective web of discourse 
w ithin which they can be defined and refined in relation to common 
meanings and contrasts. This is not to say that every language speaker 
simply accepts whatever shared meanings her linguistic tradition 
happens to embody, but that she responds reflectively in relation to the 
experiences of the self and the socially available articulations. Creative 
adjustments a n d /o r  revisions occur at moments like these, when we 
feel like we've 'climbed out7 of a distorting situation, and this kind of 
activity is m ade all the more important in a society such as ours where 
m odem  'naturalist7 views 'suppress their own underlying visions of 
the good':
We have to try to trace the developments of our modem outlooks. And since we are 
dealing not just with philosophers' doctrines but also with the great unsaid that 
underlies widespread attitudes in our civilization, the history can't just be one of 
express belief, or philosophical theories, but must also include what has been called 
'mentalites'. We have to try to open out by this study a new understanding of ourselves 
and of our deepest moral allegiances'.26
Taylor attempts to provide us with taxonomies of 'residual selves', 
made up of the layers of past selves rejected and fused, since any 
'transvaluation' of self in the name of some new 'hypergood' is never 
a once-and-for-all affair - the 'older condemned goods remain; they 
resist; some seem ineradicable from the hum an heart...the struggle and 
tension continues'.27
The precise relation between these goods and our personal identity is 
not crystal clear in Taylor's most recent work, but what is clear is that 
our identities are inextricably linked to them in some way. Goods 
'empower7 the self in the sense that they enable it to transcend its 
'restricted sympathies' and to move beyond subjective and objective 
distortions to a more clairvoyant state. Self-identification - at least in 
the strong sense that Taylor means - is only possible when the life one 
leads is one to which one can give one's fullest allegiance, which is a
26 Ibid, pp. 104-5.
27 Ibid p. 65.1 have borrowed the term ’residual* selves from Harvey Mitchell, ‘Charles Taylor 
on the Self, its Languages and its History’, History of Political Thought, XII, 7.1991, p. 
344.
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form of human attunement: 'our attempts to formulate w hat we hold 
most important must, like descriptions, strive to be faithful to 
something. But what they strive to be faithful to is not an independent 
object with a fixed degree and manner of evidence, but rather a largely 
inarticulate sense of what is of decisive importance. An articulation of 
this...tends to make it something different from what it was before'.28 
In 1985 Taylor asked (perhaps ingeruously): I s  what we are articulating 
[here]...striving...to be faithful to something beyond us, not explicable 
simply in terms of human response?'29 By 1989, this intuition is 
worked out slightly more. Given the 'tentative, searching, uncertain 
nature of many of our moral beliefs', i.e. the lack of any kind of firm 
ontological framework and the fact that we seem to have lost some of 
the swagger of our original Enlightenment post-providential vision of 
nature, there is a danger that w ithout a sense of our moral 'sources' we 
risk living 'beyond our moral means' in maintaining an allegiance to 
our high standards of (say) justice without the ways of 'seeing-good' 
powerful enough to sustain them.30 W hat can sustain them? Taylor 
reiterates in a number of places that it will have to be something 
beyond the purely 'im m anent-hum an' since 'naturalist hum anism ' 
seems incapable of generating the necessary spiritual and motivational 
resources, and in fact is parasitic on theistic notions of benevolence 
and justice. Taylor's 'hunch' is that the most 'illusion-free' moral 
sources involve a God;31 indeed one might say that the only difference 
between a good and God for Taylor is one 'o'. The project then is to 
retrieve these 'buried goods' (those implicit in Judeo-Christian theism)
28 Taylor 1985, Volume 1, p. 38 (‘What is Human Agency?’).
29 Ibid, p. 11.
30 Taylor 1989, p. 517. Taylor takes the issue of living beyond our ‘moral means’ seriously in 
that he sees it as producing self-destructive feelings of undischarged obligation and guilt, or 
its more ominous obverse, self-satisfaction. The literay example he returns to a number of 
times is Dostoyevsky, and particularly his book the Devils, which he sees as a brilliant 
exploration of how a profound sense of meaninglessness can engender a strong ideology cf
polarization and exclusion on the part of one group against a ‘degenerate other’ as it seeks to 
project its sense of unworthiness and evil outward in a desperate act of self-purification (see 
1989, pp. 451-5,516-17).
32 Taylor 1989, p. 342.
through re-articulation, to make these sources empower again, and 
bring the air back into the 'half-collapsed lungs of the spirit'.32
There is much that is controversial and problematic here, not least 
Taylor's (now) explicit theism, though it must be noted that his is 
ultimately a liberal credo, and that his goal in returning to the past is 
not to discover ways of thought to supplant the Enlightenment but 
rather to supplement it in the context of late m odem  conditions. He is 
not, for example, an enemy of modern pluralism so much as a 
harbinger of the dangers it brings when it is lived unreflectively.33 And 
ironically this sets him up  to be criticized not only by liberals who can't 
stomach his espousal of Judeo-Christian spirituality as a source of 
renewal and the grounds for m odem  'attunement', but also by those 
who reject the liberal story attached to his stubborn refusal to dismiss 
the 'epistemic gains' of the our m odem  moral culture's affirmation of 
'ordinary life'.34 I shall not pursue these points here, though I would 
like to point out that it is part of the goal of this thesis as a whole to 
provide a less progressive (and a less sweeping) account of our m odem  
affirmation of liberty (for example) than Taylor implies. But the 
connection he makes between the notion of self-understanding and 
recovering the causal and conceptual bases of our way of thinking 
about our m odem  predicament is an im portant one, and at a very 
general level is similar to the kind of approach suggested by Skinner 
and others w ith regard to understanding the historical identity of
32 Ibid, p. 520.
33 See for example Taylor 1989, pp. 502-3: ‘what emerges from [my account] of the modem 
identity...is not only the central place of constitutive goods in moral life...but also the 
diversity of goods for which a valid claim can be made...The dignity which attaches to 
disengaged reason is not invalidated when we see how expressive fulfilment or ecological 
responsibility has been savaged in its name...The trouble with most of the views that I 
consider inadequate...is that their sympathies are too narrow. They find their way through the 
dilemmas of modernity by invalidating some of the crucial goods in contest’.
34 This is part of Professor Skinner’s attack on Taylor's argument, that in saying we can't help 
but affirm these modem constitutive goods, his account reads more like a ‘vindication of 
modem bourgeois life’, than a history of it. See Quentin Skinner, ‘Who are “We”? 
Ambiguities of the Modem Self, [part of a symposium on Sources of the Self\, Inquiry, 34, 
2,1991,133-53, especially at pp. 141-2. Cf. Mitchell 1991, passim. The book has 




And yet amongst all his discussion of the importance of hyper-goods 
for a deeper sense of /attunement/ with the moral vocabulary of post- 
Enlightenment modernity, a more sour-minded historian or reader 
might wince at the lack of consideration of the causal and practical 
elements of the conceptual story Taylor tells (i.e. more mentalite than  
practicality). There is, alas, the more obvious possibility that we may 
even be incapable of discussing hyper-goods in the generous and 
sympathetic m anner Taylor and others contend. We are still witness 
in our world to blatant attempts of cultural and philosophical 
absolutism (let alone political and economic), no more brutally 
evident than in the 'ethnic cleansing7 campaigns being carried out in 
the former Yugoslavia.36 In fact, our sensitivity to the rhetoric of 
expressivist accounts of our history is yet another element of our 
m odem  self-understanding; that a desire for attunem ent has nothing 
to do with some higher unity but with the discordance we sense 
between our sense of self and those identities which are 'officially7 
established for it.37 This does not in any way rule out pursuing the 
notion of moral and public goods, but only that we are now draw n 
inescapably to consider all that which is excluded and subordinated in 
the process; if we are not draw n to do so ourselves, others will do so 
for us, and here the political issue (the confrontation) cannot be solved 
by complaining that such complaints lack a rational basis. This can be 
approached historically too (though of course not exclusively so), by 
providing accounts which stay low to the practical ground, and which
35 I do not want to underestimate the differences between Skinner and Taylor, Skinner’s review 
of Sources of the Self is, on the whole, extremely critical.
36 Mitchell 1991, p. 352, is right to point out that Taylor underestimates how this kind of 
concern is an important aspect behind Habermas’ desire to set aside questions concerning ‘the 
best life’ for a mature discourse ethic based on the universal acceptability of rational norms. 
See similar comments by R. Hittinger, ‘Review of Sources of the Self, Review of 
Metaphysics, xliv, 1,1990,111-30, especially at p. 129. Cf. Taylor 1989, p. 98. This 
debate has precedents, of coures, in the seminal natural law texts of the seventeenth century.
37 See William Connolly, ‘Where the Word Breaks Off, in Politics and Ambiguity, University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1987, pp. 143-161, at p. 155. Taylor himself seems to be wrestling 
with this issue in work subsequent to Sources of the Self; see his Multiculturalism and "The 
Politics of Recognition", ed. Amy Gutman, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992.
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m ap the causal elements inherent in any conceptual or linguistic 
change. The point is to remain open to the possibility that the 
relationship between a conceptual and causal account is more porous 
than we may have originally thought, given the tendency to conceive 
'our7 values and standards as emerging uniquely from a set of 
transcendent universal values.^8 In the end, I think the force of this 
approach m ust rest on the claim that, in order to act reflectively from a 
strongly held belief, an appeal to look again (and again) at the 
emergence and use of this belief in our history is indispensable for the 
development of the kind of moral and political discourse to which we 
aspire. Michel Foucault summed this up well when he remarked that 
'experience has taught me that the history of various forms of 
rationality is something more effective in unsettling our certitudes 
and dogmatism than is abstract criticism'.39 Nothing follows from this 
which necessitates doing away with 'abstract criticism', but as a 
proposition about the efficacy of political argument in the face of the 
complexity and corruption of the world within which we live, it is not 
an implausible suggestion.
38 That the whole point of Skinner’s approach to the history of political thought is in part to 
render the relationship between conceptual and causal accounts of our forms of political 
argument more ambiguous seems to have wholly escaped Jonathan Ree’s entertaining (but 
misdirected) critique; see his review of Rorty et al eds. 1984, and particularly his discussion of 
Skinner’s ‘The Idea of Negative Liberty’, in History and Theory, 25,2,1986, pp. 205-15, at 
pp. 209-211 (the quote at the top of this chapter is from this review). Ree is right however to 
stress that it is up to practioners of this kind of history to show that this is (or has been) the 
case.
39 Michel Foucault, ‘Omnes et singulatim: Towards a Critique of “Political Reason”*, in The 




Tradition is not something a man can learn; not a thread he can pick up when he feels 
like it; any more than a man can choose his ancestors.
Someone lacking a tradition who would like to have one is like a man unhappily in 
love/
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value
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Chapter 6: Michel Foucault: early and late m odem  arts of government
'What are we calling post-modernity? I am not up to date'
Michel Foucault, 1983
6.0 Introduction
Michel Foucault takes each of our topics of investigation up  to now - 
the historical identity of political argument, the relation between 
liberty and self, and the development of a m odem  art of government - 
to a certain extreme which I want to examine as a means of bringing 
these issues into sharper focus. It will be part of my general argum ent 
in this chapter that these are also central to Foucault's work as a whole, 
and thus I will be offering what could be said to be an unconventional 
reading of it.
Strictly speaking, then, I will not be discussing the political 
argum ent of post-modernism in general, but rather very specific 
aspects of the work of Foucault in relation to our previous discussions 
of liberty and self. Moreover, as we shall see, Foucault utterly rejected 
the central claims of 'post-modernism ', and wanted nothing to do with 
the label 'post-modernist'. Lumping him into an am orphous catch-all 
category hinders our understanding of his ideas more than it helps, 
and is probably dishonest, given Foucault's explicit discussion of the 
m atter.i But this is not to say he did not have a certain perspective on 
modernity - or 'late-modemity' - that is distinctive and im portant to 
him as a whole, and this will be the first order of discussion below. I 
then w ant to sketch the general contours of Foucault's understanding 
of power, and the related discussions of discipline, 'govem m entality ', 
and w hat he called assujetissment (roughly 'subject[iva]tion'). In doing 
so, we will be touching on points of convergence with the traditions of 
political and philosophical argum ent we have already examined (and 
will be examining), and most importantly with two questions outlined
1 The reader is right to ask why I have done so in my title. It is misleading and the only 
reason why it has not been changed is because it is too late to do so given the examination 
regulations of the University of London.
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in the preface: What is the relation between the assumption in 
m odern political theory of the agent as a given a priori substance and 
the community and institutions amongst which he or she is set 
(whether agreed to or not)? And secondly, what is the nature of the 
practice of our governing principles? By 'our7,1  mean mainly liberal 
democratic principles, some of the origins of which were discussed 
earlier, and the contemporary variants thereof which we will be 
discussing in more detail below. It is a distinctive characteristic of 
these principles, however, to make the claim that they are not just 'the 
way we do things around here', but that they are heirs to an 
Enlightenment tradition which makes claims on behalf of all Men. I 
will touch on this point as well. In each case, I want to show how 
Foucault develops and extends the concepts of liberty and self in 
relation to m odem  political theory and practice in the context of his 
own distinctive philosophical ethos in order to bring out more sharply 
just w hat is at stake in these arguments. W hat is of interest here is not 
only Foucault the 'fact-lover'2, but Foucault the 'practice-lover'; apart 
from his more famous inquiries, he was also deeply interested in the 
practices of liberal government, and it m ight be that he poses some 
interesting questions. The issues he raises have been left under­
developed by contemporary liberal theorists until very recently, and it 
is interesting to note a certain convergence of interests, or 
'problematics' (as Foucault would say). Foucault's discussion has also 
been relatively under-developed (and sometimes ignored) by 
contemporary 'Foucaultians'. Contemporary liberal sensitivity to 
some of these issues, as we shall see, has often been ignored by these 
'critical theorists', and this chapter (and the next) are m eant as a 
modest corrective to that tendency.
2 The phrase is Ian Hacking’s. ‘The Archaeology of Foucault*, in David Couzens Hoy ed., 
Foucault: A Critical Reader, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, p. 28.
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6.1 Anxious questions and the enlightenm ent
Let us try to clear up the issue of Foucault and post-modernism. 
Sometimes this has been just a matter of intellectual sloppiness, the 
need to affix a convenient label to a thinker (or body of thought) no 
m atter what he or she (or they) actually claim. It is rarely the case that 
any systematic discussion of what post-modernity might actually mean 
in theoretical terms precedes the pointing of the finger.3 Instead, it has 
become a catch-all phrase to be applied wherever there seem to be 
philosophical doubts about the nature of reason, truth, questions about 
the existence of some deep self, or any kind of reference to Nietzsche. 
Individually, these are all completely 'respectable' issues in philosophy 
with a long lineage of scholarly concern, but put together as a kind of 
anti-modernism or anti-foundationalism they invoke the fear of God 
(or more appropriately, the lack thereof) in the hearts of self- 
proclaimed heirs of the Enlightenment. Foucault has something to say 
about each of these issues, as we shall see, but not as part of some grand 
project against the Enlightenment or against 'grand narratives'. When 
asked whether he subscribed to the postmodern idea that reason was 
'crumbling away7 or was ju s t 'one form of will to knowledge', Foucault 
answered that this was not his problem, and that he was 'not prepared 
to identify reason entirely with the totality of rational forms which 
come to dominate... in types of knowledge, forms of technique and 
modalities of government or domination.' To do so would be 
inappropriate, since Trow can we say that the forms of rationality 
which have been dom inant in (these) sectors...are in the process of 
collapsing and disappearing(?) I cannot see any disappearance...I can
3 One obvious reason for this is that it still isn’t clear what exactly ‘post-modernism* means. 
For impressive attempts at definition though, see David Harvey, The Condition of
Postmodernity: an enquiry into the origins c f cultural change, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1989; 
and Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, tiansl. Frederick G.
Lawrence, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985, especially pp.16-17,41-44,86-88,238-293. My
claim is that Foucault never attempted such definitions, nor did he accept the designation 
when it was offered as a characterization of his work. The point is not to see this refusal as 
some kind of ironical ploy, but to examine the reasons he provides and see if they are good
ones or not.
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see multiple transformations, but I cannot see why we should call this 
transformation a collapse of reason...there is no sense at all to the 
proposition that reason is a long narrative which is now finished'.4 In 
short, Foucault takes the Enlightenment seriously, and his own 
problems move around within its matrices, though always at its limits.
Foucault discussed the nature of the Enlightenment in two papers 
dating from 1983-4, parts of which he was using in his lectures at the 
College de France.5 His focus here was on Kant's 1784 response to the 
Berliner Monatschriffs question, 'W hat is Enlightenment?'. Kant's 
answer was that it was m an's release from his 'inability to make use of 
his understanding without direction from another', and an ability to 
use one's own reason rather than submit to the authority - and the 
censorship and persecution which often follows - of others.6 As
4 ‘Structuralism and Post-Structuralism: An Interview with Michel Foucault (by Gerard 
Raulet)’, transl. Jeremy Harding, Telos, 55, Spring 1983, p. 205. Cf. Michel Foucault, 
‘Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Critique of “Political Reason”’, The Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values: Vol. II, Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press (Cambridge University 
Press),, 1981, p. 226: ‘Shall we “try” reason? To my mind, nothing would be more 
sterile...it’s senseless to refer to “reason” as the contrary entity to non-reason...such a trial 
would trap us into playing the arbitrary and boring part of either the rationalist or the 
irrationalist’; and pp. 242,254. See also his interview ‘Space, Knowledge, Power’, in The 
Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow, Pantheon, 1984, pp. 248-9; and the general tone of his 
interview ‘The Masked Philosopher’, in Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture: 
Interviews and other writings 1977-84, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman, Routledge, 1988, pp. 323- 
30. (hereinafter LDK).
5 ‘What is Enlightenment’, transl. Catherine Porter, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul 
Rabinow, Pantheon, New York, pp. 32-50. ‘Kant on Enlightenment and revolution’, transl. 
Colin Gordon, Economy and Society, 15,1,1986, pp. 88-96. See also Colin Gordon’s 
excellent introduction to the latter, ‘Question, ethos, event: Foucault on Kant and 
Enlightenment’, Ibid, pp. 71-87. Foucault discussed Kant's original essay (‘Was ist 
Aufklarung?’ 1784, transl. L.W. Beck in Immanuel Kant, On History, Bobbs-Merrill, New 
York, 1963) in all sorts of different places including various prefaces, articles, and interviews, 
though these two papers are the most extended discussions. It is important to read both 
papers together (as Gordon acutely points out), something most recent commentators have 
failed to do.
6 Kant, p. 3. This is brought out well by Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, ‘What is 
Maturity’, in David Couzens Hoy ed, Foucault: A Critical Reader, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
1986, p. 117: ‘In a modemity-crisis, a taken-for-granted understanding of reality ceases to 
function as a shared background in terms of which people can orient and justify their activity 
and the modernist response is heroically and lucidly to face i p to the collapse of the old 
order'. An example of the modem liberal interpretation of what is enlightenment can be 
found in a recent essay by Brian Barry (‘How Not to Defend Lioeral Institutions', Liberty and 
Justice: Essays in Political Theory 2, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 24): ‘Liberalism is par 
excellence the doctrine of the Enlightenment...There is no definitive list, but I shall...suggest 
three ideas...First is the belief that inequalities are a social artefact, and therefore have to be 
justified on a basis that starts from a premiss of the fundamental equality of all human
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Foucault puts it, Kant offered the Enlightenment as a way out of a state 
of 'im m aturity' into one of 'maturity', whereby man takes over 
responsibility for using critical reason, which he then uses to 
unflinchingly examine his own cherished beliefs and those of society. 
Foucault notes that this is an entirely negative definition, that is to say, 
Kant is not defining the Enlightenment in relation to the 'dawning of 
a new world', but rather the state of our will in relation to 
contemporary reality alone: '(it) is defined by a modification of the 
preexisting relation linking will, authority, and reason'.7 It is also at 
this moment that it becomes necessary to sort out (through critique) 
what distinguishes a legitimate use of reason from that of dogma, 
heteronomy, and illusion, and, having done so, establish the ground 
upon which reason can be said to be 'autonomous'.8 This moment of 
critique is also the key moment of modernity, the attem pt to establish 
the legitimate use and limits of reason. Foucault calls this the 
development of an 'attitude' or 'ethos' of modernity; a voluntary 
choice and m ode of relating to contemporary reality which has less to 
do with distinguishing it from the 'premodern' or 'postm odern', and 
more to do with 'how this attitude of modernity...has struggled with 
attitudes of 'countermodernity'. For Foucault, what is im portant is the 
way Kant seems to connect 'from the inside' the significance of his 
work with knowledge, a reflection on history, and 'a particular analysis 
of the specific moment at which he is writing and because of which he 
is w riting '.9 This feeling of modernity is a kind of 'vertigo', a break 
with tradition, involving both a specific relationship with the present 
but also with oneself. M odernity itself does not liberate m an in his 
own being', but compels him to produce himself as an autonomous
beings. Second is the belief that every doctrine should be open to critical scrutiny, and that 
no view should be held unless it has in fact withstood critical scrutiny. And third is the 
belief that no religious dogma can reasonably be held with certainty*.
7 ‘What is Enlightenment?’, p. 34-5.
8 Ibid, p. 38.
9 Ibid, pp. 38-9. Cf Foucault’s comments when asked if he wrote The History o f Sexuality for 
the liberation movement: ‘Not for, but in terms of, a contemporary situation’. LDK 1988, p. 
263.
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subject in the context of a philosophical ethos involving the 
'perm anent critique of our historical era'.io As an 'attitude' (a 'limit- 
attitude), the Enlightenment is not tied to some doctrinal faithfulness, 
nor is it tied to a hidden essence of man that, once revealed, enables 
and guarantees our freedom and autonomy. I will discuss this last 
point in more detail below, since it needs to be carefully distinguished 
from the usual nihilist gloss given to it by numerous critics. Here I 
w ant only to note how Foucault links this 'attitude' (which obviously 
presupposes some kind of subject) with a 'permanent reactivation' of 
critique. Throughout his discussion of Kant, Foucault focuses sharply 
on the constructivist nature of Kantian ethics, and though his own 
formulations lead him far astray of Kant's metaphysics, Kant remains 
an im portant influence.11
This is further suggested by Foucault's reading of another text of 
Kant's - T he Conflict between the Faculties' (1798) - which he 
considered a ('kind of') sequel to 'What is Enlightenment?'12 Foucault 
looked closely at part II of this essay - 'An Old Question Raised Again:
Is the Hum an Race Constantly Progressing?'- which focused on the 
French revolution, i.e. What is (or was) the Revolution? In it, Kant 
attempted to show, via its sign and 'intimations', that there was some 
kind of constant progress of the human race. Of course, Kant's own 
political theory completely disallowed any right to revolution. Even in 
the case of a blatantly unjust ruler, the people could and should not 
resist, and could only hope that things might change for the better.13 It
10 Ibid, p. 42. For the discussion of the emergence of modem philosophies of history see 
Reinhart Koselleck, On the Semantics of Historical Time, transl. Keith Tribe, MIT Press, 
Cambridge Mass. and London, 1985. I am indebted to this excellent book.
11 See Ian Hacking, ‘Self-Improvement’, in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. David Couzens 
Hoy, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, p. 239. Foucault translated and provided a long 
introduction to Kant’s Anthropology for presentation as his ‘secondary thesis’ in 1961. Kant 
also plays a large part in Foucault’s The Order of Things (Vintage, New York, 1973).
12 The Conflict of the Faculties, ed. Mary J. Gregor, New York, Abaris, 1979. Part II of 
Kant's The Conflict of the Faculties is reprinted from the translation of Robert E. Anchor, in 
Lewis White Beck ed., Immanuel Kant: On History, Bobbs-Merrill, 1963. Cf. Foucault 
1986, pp. 91-2.
13 See Conflict, pp. 92-3,167,169. Also, Perpetual Peace (Ted Humphrey, ed., transl., 
Immanuel Kant: Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals, 
Indianopolis, Hacket, 1983), pp. 353, 372; and Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone
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is not so much the 'event7 or process of the revolution which is 
im portant (Kant deplored the execution of the King and Queen and 
the reign of terror), but the way it operated as a 'spectacle' drawing in 
and sweeping along those who were not themselves actually taking 
part.14 Being 'swept along7 means here the acceptance by a large 
num ber of revolutionary 'spectators' of a sympathetic attitude towards 
those seeking out the principles of justice and freedom - a 'wishful 
participation that borders closely on enthusiasm '.^ In short, moral 
progress depended on the widespread adoption of a moral disposition 
underlying that way of thinking. In his lectures, Foucault isolated this 
point very carefully: 'enthusiasm for the revolution is...the sign of a 
moral disposition of humanity...(manifested in) the right of every 
people to provide itself with the political constitution which appears 
good to the people itself, and the...moral principle of a constitution 
framed in such a way as to avoid, by its very principles, all possibility of 
offensive war7. Together, the Enlightenment and the Revolution 
complement and continue each other and constitute two
( Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, New York, Harper & Row, 1960), p. 7,90.
14 ‘Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution’, pp. 92-3.
15 Conflict, pp. 84-9,151-61 (which is part II). ‘Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution’, p.
93. See the helpful discussion in Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 233-60, p. 370 n.23. Foucault was also 
probably influenced by Francois Furet’s, Penser la Revolution Francaise (Paris, Gallimard, 
1978), which he mentioned in a discussion about the people’s ‘inner experience’ of the 
Revolution (see LDK, p. 214). It is interesting to note here Foucault’s interest in the 
Iranian revolution, about which he had written for the Corriere della sera, including visiting 
the exiled Khomeini in Paris along with other leaders, and visiting Iran twice in 1978 at the 
height of the troubles. In a 1979 interview ( LDK, pp. 217-8) he talked about how the ‘soul 
of the uprising’ for the Iranians was not just to dump the Shah but ‘above all...(for Iranians) 
to change ourselves. Our way of being, our relationships with others, with things, with 
eternity, with God...Islam...was like the promise and guaranteeof finding something that 
would radically change their subjectivity...it was the spirit of a world without spirit’ 
Foucault was interested in the inner experience of the revolution - ‘the specificity of what 
people experienced deep inside* - and not just the totality of economic and social 
transformations which exist long before and after any revolutionary event. Though always 
cautious, Foucault seemed taken by the possibilities of the revolution, calling it, for 
example, ‘perhaps the First great insurrection against a planetary system’, and alluding 
(disastrously as he later came to see) to the potential qualities of a Khomeini regime (see 
especially ‘Le Chef Mythique’, Corriere della sera, November 19). He was quickly rebuked 
for these remarks (as he should have been for they are pretty silly) however much he claimed 
they were couched in all sorts of qualification and philosophic abstraction. See the 
discussion in Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, (transl. Betsy Wing), Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge Mass, 1991, pp. 281-291.
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'unforgettable' moments; unforgettable because it reveals within 
hum an nature a disposition that is 'too important, too much 
interwoven with the interests of humanity and of too widespread an 
influence on every part of the globe not to be recalled to memory by 
the peoples'.16 It is not the content of the revolution that is important 
(since any revolution is capable of simply relapsing into the former 
'ru t7), bu t its existence as a spectacle attesting to a 'perm anent virtuality7 
which cannot be ignored.17 Foucault is not simply endorsing Kant's 
texts, he is also interested in the questions they ask, and he takes great 
care to lay out and explore them.
W hat are the Foucaultian twists on these Kantian themes? The 
m ain one has to do with his interpretation of the limits of reason. For 
Kant, these are revealed as derivative from necessarily a priori formal 
structures, whereas for Foucault the 'necessary7 conditions governing 
the use of reason are discoverable only by 'historical investigations 
into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves, and to 
recognize ourselves as subjects'.18 These investigations, which 
constitute the basis of the 'critique', are genealogical by design and 
archaeological in m ethod, examples of which we find in his own 
books. Thus it is ridiculous, according to Foucault, to be 'fori or 
'against7 the Enlightenment (what he calls the 'blackmail of the 
Enlightenment7), since nothing can be taken as a 'simplistic and 
authoritarian alternative'. One is not either for the principles of 
rationalism or against them, as if one was inherently 'bad ' and the 
other 'good', nor is there a way of introducing 'dialectical' nuances' to 
determine the good elements from the bad.19 Instead, given that we are 
beings who are to a certain extent determined by the Enlightenment, 
we m ust proceed w ith an analysis based on historical inquiries 'that are
16 ‘Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution*, p. 94. Foucault quotes the entire passage from 
Conflict here.
17 ‘Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution*, p. 95.
18 ‘What is Enlightenment?*, p. 46.
19 Foucault’s targets here are the ‘postmodernists’ who call themselves ‘anti-rationalists*, and 
members of the early and late Frankfurt School.
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as precise as possible...oriented towards the "contemporary limits of 
the necessary"...toward what is not or is no longer indispensable for 
the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects'.20 Foucault's 
'anti-blackmail' stance is not very convincing, though, since it is 
obvious from the text how seriously he takes the Enlightenment 
commitment to critique and its relation to the practices of freedom. 
Though he distances himself from what passes as the traditional 
content of Enlightenment belief, and indeed denies that it is 
something like a set of doctrines, this is not to say he is 'anti-rational' 
or even 'anti-hum an' (it is important to be clear about this last point 
and I shall return to it shortly). Foucault's Enlightenment credo is 
basically this:
if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge has to renounce 
transgressing, it seems to me that the critical question today has been turned back into a 
positive one: in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is 
occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints? 
The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary 
limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression...I 
continue to think that this task requires work on our limits, that is, a patient labour 
giving form to our impatience for liberty.
The last sentence is important; a little later in the same section, he 
restates the gist in a slightly different manner: '(the critique) is not 
seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has finally become a 
science; it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to 
the undefined work of freedom' .2* Hints about the nature of this 
'undefined work of freedom' come in Foucault's insistence that we can 
not settle for an 'em pty dream of freedom' but instead engage in an 
'experimental' and historical mode of inquiry which puts itself to 'the 
test of contemporary reality7. This means accepting the fact that we 
have never (and can never) wholly change our w ay of thinking or our 
entire vision of the world, and thus have to concentrate on 'specific 
transformations' in order to 'grasp the points where change is possible 
and desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should
20 ‘What is Enlightenment?’, p. 43.
21 Ibid, pp. 45-6,50. Cf. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, ‘What is Maturity?’, in David 
Couzens Hoy ed., 1986, pp. 117-8.
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take'.22 Though we are capable of standing back and criticizing our 
practices (how else could we write archaeologies or genealogies about 
them?23), the theoretical and practical experience that we have of these 
lim its ' and of the possibility of moving beyond them is itself 'always 
limited and determined...we are always in the position of beginning 
again' M  In disconnecting this ethos from any kind of doctrinal 
element, Foucault anchors it in a critical ontology of ourselves as 
historical beings; this 'beginning again' is always work carried out 
upon ourselves as free beings. The questions are what count: How are
22 Ibid, p. 46. Foucault places his own work in this context, saying he ‘prefers’ these specific 
and ‘partial’ transformations and investigations to the ‘programs for a new man that the 
worst political systems have repeated throughout the twentieth century*. Cf. Foucault 1983 
(Telos), p. 206 :’(viz any diagnosis of the nature of the present) does not come in a simple 
characterization of what we are but, instead...in managing to grasp why and how that-which- 
is might no longer be that-which-is...any description must always be made in accordance 
with these kinds of virtual fractures which open up the space of freedom understood as a 
space of concrete freedom, i.e., c f possible transformation’. (my emphasis)
23 This needs some qualification. It is of some debate amongst Foucault scholars exactly what 
the relation between archaeology and genealogy is, and at what point Foucault embraced one 
instead of the other, or at least prioritized one against the other. This takes us deep into the 
heart of the relationship between Foucault and Nietzsche which is interesting and important 
(though not as straightforward as is often assumed) but not of direct relevance here. In 
general we might say that the two complement each other, as is evident even from 
Foucault’s inaugural lecture at the College de France (L’ordre de Discours, Gallimard, 1971, 
pp. 70-2). It is true though that from Discipline and Punish and the first volume of the 
History of Sexuality, it is primarily Foucault the genealogist that we encounter. The 
genealogist does not look for untarnished origins or unchanging truths, but instead 
concentrates on uncovering strategies of domination which only ever leads to more 
interpretations, more strategies, and never to some essential nature. There is no singular 
logic to history, nothing calling subjects or events into being, though events do occur and 
subjects do exist and play their part; but this is all there is. Though the genealogist realizes 
he is ‘produced’ by what he is studying, and can never stand wholly outside of it, along with 
archaeology (which by definition requires stepping back in order to see the ‘strangeness’ of 
our practices) some kind of interpretive edge is gained, otherwise how could Foucault even 
begin to talk about historical inquiry as contributing to the ‘patient labour* of the ‘work of 
freedom’? The discussion of Nietzsche and genealogy can be found in two essays,
‘Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud’, in Nietzsche, Cahiers de Royaumont, Paris, 1967; and 
‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History’, in Foucault 1984a, pp. 76-100. It is important to 
realize that, especially in the latter, Foucault is attempting to work through what Nietzsche 
said rather than making Nietzschean claims himself. See Foucault’s comments on first 
reading Nietzsche and the general relationship between the texts and his work in 1983 
(Telos). Cf. the careful discussion in Hubert L. Drefus, Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (2nd Edition), University of Chicago Press, 1983, 
pp. 79-125; Gordon 1986, especially pp. 78,83; and Barry Allen, ‘Government in 
Foucault’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 21,4,1991,421-440. See also Garry Gutting’s 
(excellent) Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Scientific Reason, Cambridge University 
Press, 1989, pp. 277-8 [this is probably the best introduction to Foucault we currently have, 
though it concentrates only on his early work up to The Achaeology of Knowledge (1969)].
24 Ibid, p. 47. Cf. ‘Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution’, p. 89.
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we constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations? 
How are we consituted as subjects by our own knowledge, and as 
moral subjects by our own actions? Critique for Foucault is connected 
at a deep level with liberty, though in ways which are often 
frustratingly obscure and which I shall only note here very generally. 
The ethos of critique he sees emerging from Kant is based around the 
two questions of 'W hat is Enlightenment?' and 'W hat is to be made of 
the will to revolution?', the point being to see our 'critical 
interrogation' of them as an ontology of ourselves which is at one and 
the same time the 'historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on 
us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them '.25 
Taking the Enlightenment seriously means being commited to 
question what comes out of it. Foucault has a strong idea of what 
constitutes 'real critique'.26
The catch is that the great promise of the Enlightenment ethos 
informing the acquisition by individuals of freedom-enabling 
capacities (i.e. autonomy), has been accompanied by a set of power 
relations and 'technologies'. These include the 'disciplines' and 
'procedures of normalization', which are distributed in the context of 
'practical systems'. Tracheal system' is a metaphor for describing a set 
of actions individuals carry out in a particular practical context 
(whether it be in an academic discipline, a specific kind of political 
system, prison, hospital etc.), including the forms of rationality that 
organize the various ways of doing things. These forms of rationality 
are partly w hat Foucault means by the 'technological' side of the 
system in that they play a part in organizing the ways of doing things. 
There is also the 'strategic' side, which is the freedom with which 
individuals act w ithin these systems, whether by modifying the rules
25 'What is Enlightenment?*, p. 50. 'Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution’, p. 96.
26 So much so that he complained openly in a 1982 interview (See Eribon 1991, pp. 294-5) 
about the way the largo1 publishing houses treated academic research, and how they subverted 
the dissemination of the 'very significant work' done in the univerisities. The problem was 
that there was no longer 'any sort of publication that can assume a real critical function...of 
showing work in motion, in its problematic form'. Cf. similar remarks in LDK, pp. 323- 
330, and the discussion in Gordon 1986, pp. 74-5.
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of the game or reacting to the actions of others. These practical systems 
stem from three general areas which define not only the context of 
Foucault's discussion of power, which we shall be examining below, 
but also the scope of his work as a whole: relations of control over 
things, relations of action upon others, and relations with oneself, 
which in turn relate to the three axes of knowledge, power, and 
ethics.27 Against the background of these general concerns, I shall be 
returning to one question he asks with particular force: How can the 
growth of capabilities on the part of individuals be disconnected from 
the intensification of relations of power?
I will have more to say about the connections between Foucault's 
ideas on the Enlightenment and his understanding of liberty and the 
individual below, especially once we have examined his concepts of 
power and 'discipline' in more detail. But before moving on, I want to 
return to the general question of a postmodern political argument. I 
have claimed that Foucault is difficult to classify as a 'postmodernist' 
on the grounds of his own rejection of the label, and the fact that he 
rejects the claim that the 'meta-narrative' of Enlightenment reason is 
somehow breaking up or collapsing. This distances Foucault from 
someone like Jean Francois Lyotard, or even Richard Rorty.28 
However Mark Warren, in the course of discussing Nietzsche, has 
provided an interesting definition of postmodernism which I have no 
hesitation in using to describe the kind of thing Foucault is doing, but 
would reject as defining anything radically post- or contra modern. 
W arren argues that Nietzsche's (and, by implication Foucault7s) 
'critical, postm odern understanding of power'
27 Ibid, p. 48.
28 Jean Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, transl. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press,1984. Richard 
Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge University 
Press, 1991. Lyotard defines postmodernism as an ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’, 
where metanarrative means something like ‘the dialectics of the Spirit, the hermeneutics of 
meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth’ (pp. 
xxii-xxiv).
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draws into question our modem tradition of political thought...modernist discourse 
about politics relies on metaphysical assumptions about agents: they are subjects 
embodying natural desires and interests (Hobbes, Locke, and Bentham), as bearers of 
natural rights (Hobbes and Locke), as parties to a social contract...and as the 
epistemological foundation of rational action...liberal thought (such as [in] Rawls and 
Dworkin) relies on a version of Kant's intrinsically unknowable Idea of a rational 
subject, which serves to ground a social morality of rights and duties...The agent...(is) 
an abstraction (...a necessary presupposition) divorced from the social and cultural 
contexts that make agents what they are...Why are these assumptions problems for 
contemporary political thought?...the tradition cannot...live up to its own ideals...For 
liberal democracy to be morally viable...it must presuppose a society made up of selves 
with the capacity to choose and act. But one must know what capacities for agency are 
like if one wants to explain...how social relations could be altered to empower 
individuals to participate in political processes. One must...be able to explain how 
capacities for agency develop if one wants to show why some individuals in society 
have a relatively greater capacity for freedom of actions and self-determination than 
others. But rather than thinking through the relation between power and agency, 
modem political thinkers very often combine metaphysical assumptions about the 
subjective grounds of power (assumptions about desires, interests, rationality, and free 
will) with sciences purporting to explain the socially structured manifestations of 
power...if the conditional and worldly nature of agency cannot be theorized, then 
neither can the conditions under which agents might develop as free and rational 
beings...29
W arren stretches his idea of the modernist account of metaphysical 
agency to include the entire Enlightenment tradition, and 
postmodernism to indude all those approaches that do without it, or 
at least theorize against it.30 Here notions like autonomy, 
individuality, and free will are removed from the realm of 
metaphysics and into the realm of 'hum an morals or goals' and, as 
goals, no longer have a 'natural' existence but instead become 
'problematics'; i.e. a practical matter and a historically contingent 
achievement. I have quoted at length from W arren because I think he 
encapsulates well the kind of concerns I have been examining up to 
now in this thesis, both in republican political argum ent and in 
different variations of liberal political argument; I dem ur though from 
his suggested categorization of modernist and postm odernist political 
thought. However well it might work with regard to Nietzsche, it tells 
us very little about the 'm odernist' theorists W arren mentions (Locke, 
Hobbes, Kant, Rawls, Dworkin), except to repeat rather standard 
complaints we find made by other postmodernists, as well as by
29 Marie Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought, Cambridge Mass. and London England, MIT 
Press, 1988, pp. 152-4.
30 Ibid, p. ix.
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communitarian liberals, and anti-liberals alike. In previous chapters I 
have tried to show how the concerns Warren identifies as 
characteristic of postmodern Nietzschean political thought are, in fact, 
constitutive of two major 'modernist' traditions of political thought. In 
the case of liberalism, both in terms of the characterization of its 
foundations in seventeenth century social contract theory and (as we 
shall see) the contemporary variants of Rawlsian and post-Rawlsian 
political theory, this has become obscured in various ways, something I 
have been working to make less so. It would be more accurate to say 
that there is a constitutive tension between an assumption of a 
particular kind of self on the part of certain liberal theories, and the 
practical and institutional means by which that self is constituted and 
realized. Indeed, as we shall see, Foucault was interested in just this 
aspect of liberalism, and especially the nature of the practices of liberal 
government. Contemporary liberal theories have dealt w ith this 
tension in a num ber of ways, whether explicitly as in liberal 
'perfectionism ', or more indirectly through 'neutralism ' or some form 
of liberal activism. Perhaps W arren is right to indicate that it is only 
now that we are realizing the importance of these issues as the gap 
between the fundamental values and goals of contemporary liberal 
theory and the realities or our world seem to widen beyond 
redemption. But I would say this has more to do with our 'late- 
m odern ' condition than any postmodern one.
6.2 Foucault on power - 1 
Power is a slippery concept for any political theorist or philosopher, 
let alone one like Foucault, who insisted that he had no theory of 
power and always limited and qualified his use of the w ord with 
regard to very specific instances and practices. Before turning to 
examine w hat he did say about it, is there a general analytical 
conception of power used by other political theorists against which we 
can compare and contrast? The paradigmatic sense of power for 
m odem  politics comes from Hobbes and his characterization of the
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relationship betweeen an active agent and passive 'patient': the former 
causes or produces an effect in the latter.3i The point is that this is a 
negative or conflictual situation where A  has power over B. Robert 
Dahl reset this basic idea in 1957 when he argued that power is 
fundamentally the ability to cause things to happen when the object is 
actions by other people, i.e. getting them to do things they would not 
otherwise do.32 Recently, Peter Morriss has provided a more subtle 
account in arguing that power is a 'sort of ability...your powers are 
capacities to do things when you choose', and thus a more accurate use 
of the concept would be something like 'A has the power to do x', the 
crucial difference being the replacement of 'power to' for 'power 
over'.33 Steven Lukes has taken a different line and argued against 
w hat he calls the 'one-dimensional' and 'two-dimensional' accounts of 
power in order to propagate his own (you guessed it) 'three- 
dimensional' view.34 According to Lukes, his preferred account 
involves a thoroughgoing critique of the 'behavioural focus' of the 
other views which he sees as too individualistic, and offers a 'serious 
sociological and not merely personalised explanation of how political 
systems prevent demands from becoming political issues or even from 
being m ade'.33 The issue here is one of identifying the real interests of 
individuals against those of the ruling caste or class who exercise 
power, and who might manipulate in covert ways the very interests 
would-be challengers might refer to, or fall back on, as their own. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive attem pt at theorizing power remains 
that of Talcott Parsons, who divided the study of 'getting other people 
to do things you w ant them to' into four general areas - 'activation of
31 See ‘Power’ in David Miller, ed., The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought, 1991, 
pp. 397-400.
32 Robert Dahl, ‘The Concept of Power’, in Roderick Bell, David V. Edwards, and R. Harrison 
Wagner (eds), Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research, New York, Free Press, 
1969, p. 80.
33 Peter Morriss, Power: A Philosophical Analysis, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1988, pp. 32-5. Cf. Brian Barry, ‘The Uses of Power’ in Democracy and Power: Essays in 
Political Theory 1, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, pp. 307-21 (review of Morriss).
34 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, London, MacMillan, 1974, pp. 15,20.
35 Ibid, pp. 24, 38.
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commitments', 'persuasion', 'inducement', and 'coercion.36 The ability 
to 'get people to do things' is different in each context, whether it be by 
invoking a set of commitments as in the first case, or physically 
restraining or constraining the actions of others, as in the last. Brian 
Barry has added another (combining Parson's 'inducement' and 
'coercion'), which he calls 'physical constraint' (after Hobbes) and 
examines in the context of an economic/rational choice framework. 
Here power is the possession by an actor of the means of modifying the 
conduct of another actor; i.e. the exercise of power is the 'threat or 
promise by A  of employing his means of modifying the conduct of B 
contingently upon B's doing some action (or set of actions) out of the 
alternatives open to him'. For Barry (and to some extent, Morriss) 
power is a 'possession' or capacity and its exercise is the 'event7, not 
vice versa w  It m ight be that some seek to exercise the power they have 
but through lack of skill (or whatever) fail to elicit the modification of 
conduct they sought. But all this shows is that from the perspective of 
the theory, knowing the distribution of power is only one part of an 
answer to the question of who has what and how in relation to power.
Does Foucault's account fit into any of these? And was he as 
concerned with the foundations of the concept as the theorists 
m entioned here are? The answer to the first question is, basically, no. 
Foucault attem pted to provide a radically different account of the 
nature of power and the way in which to go about studying it. The 
answer to the second question is more complex. Foucault obviously 
needed some account of what he meant when he used the concept 
'power7, but eschewed developing any full theory of power, and indeed 
(as we shall see) avoided even using the singular term 'power7, 
favouring the more nebulous 'relationships of power7 (or 'power 
relations' etc.). This is because Foucault did not believe that something 
like Tow er7 existed in a concentrated, or simply distributed, form, and
36 Talcott Parsons, ‘On the Concept of Political Power’, in Bell et al. 1969, pp. 251-84.
37 Brian Barry, ‘Power An Economic Analysis’, 1991, pp. 222-229.
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was unlike the sense of saying that it emanated from the consent of the 
people, or the will of the sovereign. This is not to say that consent was 
never a condition for the existence or maintenance of power, but that 
power is not by nature the manifestation of this kind of consensus. 
Power exists when it is put into action and the exercise of power is a 
way in which certain actions modify others. A relation of power is a 
kind of action that does not necessarily act immediately or directly on 
others, but acts on their actions, whether currently existing or ones 
which may arise in the future. Its 'real nature' is not reducible to some 
primal act of violence or locus of consent (though each might 
represent instances of specific forms of exercises of power), but rests on 
the idea of conduct - with all its multiple senses in both English and 
French ('to conduct oneself appropriately', 'to conduct an orchestra', 'to 
insist on proper conduct'). Thus,
In itself the exercise of power is not violence: nor is it a consent which, implicitly is 
renewable. It is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions: it 
incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult: in the extreme it 
constrains or forbids absolutely: it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an 
acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set 
of actions upon other actions.38
There are a num ber of points to be drawn out here. This is no doubt a 
distant cousin of Morriss's conception of power which we examined 
above (a capacity to do x rather than a power always over x), but the 
scope of Foucault's claim makes it radically different. If a power 
relationship is any 'set of actions upon other actions', understood on a 
continuum which runs from the slightest m anipulation to brutal 
violence, than it would appear that almost everything involves power. 
And this is precisely Foucault's point: 'in hum an relations, whatever 
they are...power is always present: I mean the relationships in which 
one wishes to direct the behaviour of another'.39 Now this is the
38 Michel Foucault, ‘Afterword: The Subject and Power’, in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, p.
220.
39 ‘The ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom’, (Foucault 1984), p. 12. Cf. Foucault 
1976 (HoS), p. 93: ‘The omnipresence of power not because it has the privilege of 
consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one 
moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. 
Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from 
everywhere.’
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standard launching pad for critiques of Foucault. How can the concept 
of power, or relationships of power, have any analytical value 
whatsoever if every human relation is one of power? More crudely, if 
power is "always present", are we always being dominated or oppressed 
in some way - can we ever be free? Though the chapter as a whole is 
m eant to be (in part) a working through of these two important 
questions, I want to sketch the beginnings of a response to the first, 
leaving the second until later. Firstly, we cannot use "domination" or 
"repression" as synonyms for power relations or exercises of power, 
since though they are possible instances of these relations they do not 
exhaust the possibilities of the conception. Foucault insists that a state 
of "domination" is a distinctive kind of relationship of power, namely 
one in which the relations of power are fixed in such a way that they 
are "perpetually asymetrical and the margin of liberty is extremely 
lim ited '.40 W hether a power relation is also a "state of dom ination' is a 
m atter for specific investigation, and thus it is wrong to simply equate 
the two. This will become clear (hopefully) when we turn to examine 
the relation between the subject and practices of liberty, though the 
reader might already see how our discussion of Foucault's idea of 
critique is relevant. The analytical value of Foucault's concept of 
"power relations' is entirely dependent upon the acceptance of his 
radical reworking of what it means to speak about power. Instead of 
proceeding from the idea that power m ust be located or seen to be 
emanating from a given vantage point - "people usually..think a 
political structure, a government, a dom inant social class, the master 
facing the slave, and so on' - Foucault wants us td think of it always in 
terms of relations which are open, changeable, self-modifying, and 
never given once and for a ll41 Perhaps most radically, Foucault also
40 Ibid, pp. 12-13; cf. ‘The Subject and Power’, p. 220 on distinguishing a relationship of 
power from one of violence.
41 ‘The ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom’, pp. 11-13. Also, ‘The Confession of 
the Flesh (interview 1977), in Colin Gordon ed., Michel Foucault: Power/Knowledge: 
Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, Great Britain, The Harvester Press, 1980, 
pp. 198-9. There is a good summary of Foucault’s basic conception of power relations in 
Foucault 1976 (HoS), pp. 94-97.
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argues that power is not only or essentially negative (i.e. constraining, 
disabling, repressing) but also 'positive' and productive, a process 
closely connected to the installation of a 'regime of truth ', a field of 
discourse which enables the emergence of a specific kind of subjectivity 
or allows the elaboration of a particular rationality. Thus power is 
'rooted deep in the social nexus', and not strictly 'above' or 'below' 
society; nor is it reducible to a particular set of institutions. Moreover, 
though at the local' level it is possible to see what actors are doing and 
why they are doing it, it does not follow that the consequences of their 
actions are coordinated at some broader level, and thus Foucault 
speaks about power relations as both 'intentional and non- 
subjective'.42 To bring to light the 'complex strategical relationships' of 
a particular society, one needs to provide oneself with a 'grid of 
analysis' for an 'analytic' of relations of power. This analytic operates 
'toward a definition' of the specific domains formed by relations of 
power and provides the analytical instruments necessary to study 
them .43
6.3 Foucault on power - II
Though absolutely central to his work, and perhaps the most 
identifiable element of what most people mean when they use terms 
like Toucaultian' (or Foucauldian or Foucaldian - appropriately 
enough no one seems to agree on the neologism), the analytic role of 
Foucault's conception of the 'relations of power' is difficult to pin 
down, all the more so since he claimed (only late in life) that it w asn't 
even his central problem but rather an instrum ent for the analysis of
42 Foucault tells Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983, p. 187): 'People know what they do; they 
frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don't know is what what they do 
does'. Cf. Foucault (HoS) 1976, p. 94.
43 Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction (La Volonte de savoir), 
transl. Robert Hurley, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1978 (1976), p. 82. See also ‘The Subject 
and Power', p. 223-4 where Foucault provides a list of five points which need to be 
established in any analysis of power relations: the ‘system of differentiation', the 'types of 
objectives', the ‘means of bringing power relations into being’, the ‘forms of 
institutionalizaton', and ‘the degrees of rationalization’.
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relationships between subjects and 'games of truth '.44 Before coming 
to that however, we need to unpack a number of things from this 
sketch of the 'relations of power' in order to be clear about the kind of 
'analytics' Foucault is after. I want to isolate three elements: firstly, his 
discussion of 'the juridical'; secondly, the relation between power and 
'regimes of truth'; and, finally, the relation between the subject and 
power.
It is important to understand how Foucault sees his analyses of 
power relations as an attempt to come to grips with the nature of the 
developments of late m odem  society in all its complexity. This is 
explicit in a num ber of places, but perhaps most clearly when he writes 
about the need to develop a 'new economy of power relations, a way 
which is more empirical, more directly related to our present situation, 
and which implies more relations between theory and practice'(my 
emphasis).45 He insists that our traditional ways of understanding and 
speaking about politics, and the social sphere in general, have been 
overtaken by new developments which remain opaque and even 
invisible to the conventional analytical tools of the classical hum an 
sciences. Moreover, as we shall see, Foucault thinks that these very 
hum an sciences are as much part of the problem as they are the 
solution. But first, how does he characterize the conventional
44 See for exampleThe Subject and Power’ (1983), p. 208-9; ‘The ethic of care for the self...’, 
p. 10; and'Technologies of the Self in Luther H. Martin et. al., Technologies of the Self: A 
Seminar with Michel Foucault, Amherst Mass., University of Massachusetts Press, 1988, 
pp. 17-18. Colin Gordon has been the most unsparing in his dismissal of those who seek to 
periodize Foucault’s work into variants of ‘Early’, ‘Middle’, ‘Late’. See Gordon 1986, and 
his important ‘Histoire de la folie: an unknown book by Michel Foucault’, History of the 
Human Sciences, 3,1,1990, especially pp. 22-3. For a different account, which argues that 
there is a ‘return to the subject’ in the ‘late’ Foucault, see Peter Dews, Logics of 
Disintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory, London, 
Verso, 1987, pp.144-99; and ‘The Return of the Subject in die Late Foucault’, Radical 
Philosophy, Spring 1989, pp. 37-41.
45 ‘The Subject and Power’, pp. 210-11. Cf. Foucault 1980, p. 198:’The idea that there is 
either located at - or emanating from- a given point something which is a ‘power’ seems to 
me to be based on a misguided analysis, one which at all events fails to account for a 
considerable number of phenomena’: and 1976 (HoS) p. 86; ‘In a society such as ours, where 
the devices of power are so numerous, its rituals so visible, and its instruments ultimately 
so reliable, in this society that has been more imaginative, probably, than any other in 
creating devious and supple mechanisms of power, what explains this tendency not to 
explain the latter except in the negative and emaciated form of prohibition?’.
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understanding of power? Foucault calls it the 'juridical', epitomised in 
the conception of power as an original right that is given up in the 
establishment of sovereignty, and in the idea of the contract as a 
'matrix' of political power providing the points of this power's 
'articulation'. Power becomes oppression whenever it over-extends 
itself, that is, goes beyond the contract.46 Power rests with the legislator 
or the people and 'prescribes laws, prohibitions, and censorships in a 
strictly binary way - illicit and lidt, permitted or forbidden, taboos or 
allowances'. Juridical power is a 'negative relation'; it does nothing 
except 'say no' and 'produces if anything, ...absences and gaps', and 
concerns itself with 'rejection, exclusion, refusal, blockage, 
concealment, or mask'. It is exercised from top to bottom, that is, in its 
over-all decisions and its 'capillary interventions' it acts in a uniform 
and comprehensive manner; whether the 'prince who formulates 
rights, of the father who forbids, of the censor who enforces silence, or 
of the m aster who states the law...one schematizes power in a juridical 
form, and one defines its effects as obedience'.47 The paradigmatic 
image of power in western societies, then, is that of the legitimate 
rights of the sovereign and the legal obligation to obey, whereby we 
seek either to show that the effective power of that sovereign befits his 
fundam ental right, or the necessity of imposing limits upon this 
power in order for it to remain legitimate. The key problem, around 
which the whole theory of right and sovereignty is organized, is to 'fix 
the legitimacy of power' as a means of neutralising or containing the 
dom ination intrinsic to power 48 This is as true for early m odem  
political theory (especially in its natural law variants), as it is today; In  
political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the 
king'.49 But there is a need to break free of this image and the
46 Foucault 1980, ‘Lecture 1, 7 January 1976’, pp. 91-2; 1976 (HoS), p. 85.
47 Foucault 1976 (HoS), pp. 83-5.
48 Foucault 1980, ‘Lecture 2, 14 January 1976’, p. 95.
49 Foucault 1976 (HoS), p. 89. Cf. Michael Walzer’s characterization of liberalism’s ‘art of 
separation’, where modem society enjoys freedom and equality ‘when success in one 
institutional setting isn’t convertible into success in another, that is, when the separations 
hold, when political power doesn’t shape the church or religious zeal the state, and so on.’
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theoretical privilege of law and sovereignty according to Foucault 'if 
we wish to analyze power within the concrete and historical 
framework of its operation'.50
Foucault's 'analytic' of power is geared to do precisely this, that is, to 
invert the conventional mode of analysis and show how the discourse 
of 'right7 and its apparatuses - the whole complex of institutions and 
regulations - puts in motion relations of domination rather than 
sovereignty. Remember our discussion of Foucault's idea of power; 
the kind of 'domination' Foucault means here is in relation to subjects 
and their m utual relations, and not some uniform overwhelming 
force imposed from above. Power circulates and is employed and 
exercised in a 'net-like organization', with individuals always in a 
position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power, 
never just 'inert or consenting targets'.51 I will focus more closely on 
the relation between power and subjectivity below, but for now I want 
to concentrate on what Foucault means when he argues (with an 
am ount of rhetorical flourish sure to mislead) that 'Right should be 
viewed...not in terms of the methods of a legitimacy to be established, 
but in terms of the methods of subjugation that it instigates'.52 Part of 
w hat he means is that what we usually think of as the beginnings of 
m odem  liberty in the early m odem  political theories of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (such as King-in-Parliament, 
natural rights, and some form of representative government), also 
m arked the beginning of a new kind of power relation which escapes 
both the practices of Right and its accompanying analytic framework 
(i.e. the juridical). The emergence of this 'new  type of power7, a power 
w ith 'highly specific procedural techniques, completely novel 
instruments, [and] quite different apparatuses', makes it absolutely
Walzer, ‘Liberalism and the Art of Separation’, Political Theory, 12, 3,1984,315-30, at p.
321.
50 Foucault 1976 (HoS), p. 90.
51 Foucault 1980, ‘Lecture 2,14 January 1976’, p. 98.
52 Ibid, p. 96.
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incompatible with the relations of sovereignty.53 [There is a degree of 
overstatement here which is typical of genealogy; in the history of 
political thought it is hard to find the sharp ruptures and 
discontinuities that genealogy demands. Nevertheless, when we 
compare his remarks with my discussion of Locke's art of government 
in chapter 5, we shall find that the general point holds.54] Foucault 
provides as concise a definition as he is capable of in one of his lectures 
from 1976:
This new mechanism of power is more dependent upon bodies and what they do than 
upon the Earth and its products. It is a mechanism of power which permits time and 
labour, rather than wealth and commodities, to be extracted from bodies...(it is) 
constantly exercised by means of surveillance rather than...by means of a system of 
levies or obligations...It presupposes a tightly knit grid of material coercions rather 
than the physical existence of a sovereign—It is ultimately dependent upon the 
principle...that one must be able simultaneously both to increase the subjected forces 
and to improve the force and efficacy of that which subjects them.55 
Foucault calls this a 'disciplinary power'. He describes the nature of
this power in his vivid (and now famous) portrayal of Bentham's
Panopticon (and much else) in Discipline and Punish. It is difficult at
times to know whether Foucault means this as a m etaphor for the
development of m odem  power relations in general since the
eighteenth century - that we are living in some kind of 'carceral
society' - or whether it is strictly an example of the kind of specific
research he insisted was necessary as part of his idea of critique. The
ambiguity is heightened by his choice of Bentham's project, since
though Bentham d idn 't mean it as a utopian or 'totalized' theory of
society, he did intend for it to be considered for a wide range of
different institutions and problems. For Foucault the Panopticon
provides an exquisite example of disciplinary technology, bringing all
53 Foucault 1980, ‘Lecture 2,14 January 1976’, p. 104.
54 Though Warren (1988, p. ix) thinks that Foucault was one of the few theorists to appreciate 
the force of Nietzsche's ‘postmodern’ claims with regard to modem subjectivity, he 
completely misses how Foucault blatantly contradicts his other claim that it is with 
Nietzsche, that approaches doing away with ‘metaphysical characterizations of human agency* 
begins ('at least self-consciously*). My argument is that the tension between an assumption 
of ‘self and its realization in the context of various social practices is, in fact, constitutive of 
a large part of the liberal tradition, and (perhaps more obviously) republican political 
argument as well. Foucault (at least as I read him in relation to seventeenth and eighteenth 
century political thought) saw it this way too.
55 Foucault 1980, ‘Lecture 2,14 January 1976’, p. 104.
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those elements of this new power that he identified into one tightly 
knit framework; power, knowledge, control of the body, control of 
space, and constant surveillance all cohere in an efficient and 
economic exercise. It was an "ideal form", a "political technology of the 
body' which, though never actually built, could be detached from any 
specific use and elaborated with regard to all sorts of discourses and 
practices to do with specific forms and methods of correction and 
control.55 The key to understanding disciplinary power is its focus on 
individual bodies; an 'anatomo-politics' of the hum an body which 
seeks the "optimization of its capabilities', the "extortion of its forces', 
the increase of its 'usefulness' and "docility", and its integration into 
systems of "efficient' and "economic' controls.57 Thus, far from simply 
repressing or excluding, disciplinary power produces a reality: "(t)he 
individual and the knowledge that may be gained from him belong to 
this p roduction '5® Foucault commented that the intention of 
Discipline and Punish was to show how in the eighteenth century this 
form of power became possible and desirable, a technique for "making 
useful individuals' in the context of the most central and productive 
sectors of society - factories, schools, the transmission of knowledge, 
the diffusion of aptitudes and skills, "the war-machine'. As Dreyfus and 
Rabinow pu t it, disciplinary technology "gradually overflowed its 
institutional bounds'.59
But just how far does this overflow run? A complete answer will 
have to wait until towards the end of the chapter, but for now it 
appears that disciplinary power literally floods the whole of the social 
body. At the same time as the model of the contract and the juridical 
form of power became dom inant in seventeenth and eighteenth
56 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, transl. Alan Sheridan, New 
York, Vintage Books, 1979 (1975 Gallimard), p. 205, and \ 302: ‘(the prison is) a pure 
form, unadulterated and unmitigated’. There is a good discussion of these themes (to which I 
am indebted) in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, chp. 7 passim, pp. 188-195.
57 Foucault 1976 (HoS), p. 139. Fouault 1975 (DP), pp. 137-8.
58 Foucault 1975 (DP), p. 194.
59 Foucault 1975 (DP), p. 211. The comment by Foucault is in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 
pp. 192-3.
285
century social and political theory, individuals began to be constituted 
as 'correlative elements of power and knowledge'.60 Even though the 
theory of sovereignty and Right persisted as a permanent instrument 
of criticism of the monarchy, and of 'all the obstacles that can thwart 
the development of disciplinary society', the theory and its 
accompanying legal code allowed itself to be superimposed on 
mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to 'conceal its actual 
procedures, [and] the element of domination inherent in its 
techniques'.61 This process appears to be relentless, penetrating to the 
core of liberal democratic societies' most important legitimating 
theories and values:
the development and generalization of disciplinary mechanisms constituted the other, 
dark side of these processes. The general juridical form that guaranteed a system of 
rights that were egalitarian in principle was supported by these tiny, everyday, 
physical mechanisms, by all those systems of micro-power that are essentially non­
egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the disciplines...[T]he disciplines provide, 
at the base, a guarantee of the submission of forces and bodies. The real, corporeal 
disciplines constituted the foundation of the formal juridical liberties. The contract 
may have been regarded as the ideal foundation of law and political power; 
panopticism constituted the technique, universally widespread, of coercion...The 
'Enlightenment', which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines.62 
For Foucault, the answer to the question 'W hat holds m odern civil
society together in the way that T he  Good' held prem odem  societies
together?', is that discipline (and all its apparatuses) does. At this point
we m ust introduce another Foucaultian term of art which is closely
related to discipline and its subversion of law - 'normalization'. To
understand this we m ust have a sense of the relation between power
and knowledge. It is im portant to note that Foucault never simply
equates power and knowledge in some generic formulation such as
'reason is power' or 'power is knowledge'; it is precisely the nature of
the relation which is of interest.63 Knowledge (savoir) means
60 Foucault 1975 (DP), p. 194.
61 Foucault 1980, ‘Lecture 2,14 January 1976’, p. 105.
62 Foucault 1975 (DP), p. 222.
63 See for example Foucault 1983 (Telos), p. 210. Also LDK, p. 264: ‘I know that, as far as 
the general public is concerned, I am the guy who said that knowledge merged with power, 
that it was no more than a thin mask thrown over structures of domination and that those 
structures were always ones of oppression, confinement, and so on. The first point is so 
absurd as to be laughable. If I had said, or meant, that knowledge was power, I would have 
said so, and, having said so, I would have had nothing more to say, since, having made them
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something other than knowledge of why x  in the context of theory y, it 
is a 'depth knowledge', which enables a particular utterance, or in 
more Foucaultian terms, defines the field of reference.64 It becomes 
less a matter of discovering who says what and more one of 
determining the conditions under which certain kinds of propositions 
will have a 'tru th ' value. It does not matter whether or not these 
discourses or programs are ever actually enacted, since it is their 
elaboration which is significant, the presupposition of a 'knowledge' 
and a particular reality in which to intervene, to act upon, or to bring 
into being.6^  Foucault's idea of truth brings us back to the question of 
power. The relations of power which constitute and permeate the 
social body cannot themselves be established or consolidated without 
the 'production, accumulation, circulation and functioning' of 
'discourses of truth '. T ru th ', then, is related to discursive and non- 
discursive structures; and more specifically, 'we are forced to produce 
the truth of power that our society demands, of which it has need, in 
order to function: we must speak the truth; we are constrained or 
condemned to confess or to discover the truth '.66 Each society has its 
own 'regime of truth ', the types of discourses which it accepts as true, 
the mechanisms to distinguish between true and false statements, the 
techniques and procedures necessary to acquire the truth; in short, a 
'political economy of truth '.16? This is no less true for societies
identical, I don’t see why I would have taken the trouble to show the different relations 
between them’.
65 The phrase is Ian Hacking’s, ‘The Archaeology of Foucault’, in David Couzens Hoy (ed.) 
1986, p. 30.
65 See Colin Gordon’s interesting comparison of Foucault and Hirschman on this, in Foucault 
1980, ‘Afterword’, pp. 247-9.
66 Foucault 1980, ‘Lecture 2,14 January 1976’, p. 93.
67 Foucault 1980, (‘Truth and Power*, an interview), p. 131. This is not to say that Foucault is 
a global skeptic or a ‘monolithic relativist’ (for this claim see Charles Taylor, ‘Foucault on 
freedom and truth’, Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1985, pp. 152-84). The point of his work is to examine the specific instances of how games 
of truth can put themselves in place and be linked to relationships of power. It is not an 
assault on the nature or possibility of truth tout court. Foucault admits that it might be the 
case, for example, that there is some kind of scientific validity or therapeutic efficacy to 
psychiatry, or that mathematics has some kind of validity. But it might equally be the case 
that both are linked in very specific ways to games and institutions of power, in any case, 
‘one can in no way say that the games of truth are nothing else than games of power’
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organized around the principles of Right. At the same time that power 
is exercised through these principles, it is exercised simultaneously 
through various techniques and discourses of discipline which 
function as procedures of 'normalization'. Normalization could be 
said to be the effect of specific disciplinary technologies; it describes the 
process through which discourses cohere and establish common goals, 
procedures, and definitions.
It is those points at which sovereignty and the normalizing 
discourses and technologies meet and become increasingly 
incompatible that interest Foucault. The identification of the 
'delinquent', for example, was a case whereby the process of punishing 
the offensive act (in relation to some juridical code) became less 
im portant than identifying and then curing his specific (i.e. deviant) 
individuality .68 To do so meant establishing a discourse within which 
the problem could be set, standards and norms to which it could be 
compared and contrasted, and experts to interpret and modify all of 
this as circumstances dictated. It is the discourses and practices of the 
hum an sciences involved here - psychiatry, criminology - along with 
the development of the Panopticon etc., that Foucault claims is new. 
This kind of power escapes the analytic framework of sovereignty and 
rights, since it is focused on the minute workings of the body or subject 
which the former presupposes as basically intact or inviolable. But the 
argum ent is even stronger than this. It is not just that rights discourse 
misses the real workings of disciplinary power, but that it is itself a 
particularly efficient mask and conductor of this power; 'sovereignty
(Foucault ‘The ethic of care for the self...’, p. 16; cf. p.17). Confusion arises when 
commentators try to read into Foucault the claim that any connection between an objective 
body of knowledge and nondiscursive social practices implies some kind of ‘will to truth* 
which vitiates any possibility of objective validity. But Foucault makes no such claim. 
Truth is attained in all sorts of different ways connected to all sorts of different social 
structures and power-mechanisms, but it does not follow that every such truth produced 
necessarily remains relative to that structure. Regimes produce truths to suit its power 
structures, but this does not exhaust the potential validity of the truth-claim, since Foucault 
allows that some might achieve some objective validity which transcends the particular 
regime. See Gutting 1989, pp. 272-80.
68 See Foucault 1975 (DP), pp. 251-55.
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and disciplinary mechanisms are two absolutely integral constituents
of the general mechanisms of power in our society'.69 We are again
brought to the brink of thinking that the juridical liberties, which have
for so long been the bulwark of liberal democratic political theory and
practice, are not only utterly non-transcendental or universal, but act
in concert with an insidious form of power/knowledge:
We have entered a phase of juridical regression in comparison with the pre-seventeenth- 
century societies we are acquainted with; we should not be deceived by all the 
Constitutions framed throughout the world since the French Revolution, the Codes 
written and revised, a whole continual and clamorous legislative activity: these were 
the forms that made an essentially normalizing power acceptable.70 
This conception of power/know ledge and its disciplinary/normalizing
technologies does not bode well for the Foucaultian self. Deducing
from the above, it would appear that whatever it is, any content this
self might have is the product of power relations beyond the control of
the individual, or even the benign guidance of a legislator. The self is
trapped within a discourse about itself which purports to be the means
towards self-understanding and clairvoyance (the languages of which
are provided and aided by various hum an sciences), but which in fact
act to enhance an d /o r extend the disciplinary effect of non-sovereign
power relations. Thus it is almost doubly trapped; trapped within the
various institutional matrices of the social order as well as within
itself, unable to appeal to any discourse of self-understanding or
'higher se lf to help in transcending its immediate predicament. This
seems to be only reinforced by Foucault in passages such as these:
The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, 
a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it 
happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already 
one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain .gestures, certain 
discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals...The
69 Foucault 1980, ‘Lecture 2,14 January 1976’, p. 108. Note that law is not reducible to 
power or vice versa, it is an instrument of power in all sorts of complex ways amongst 
different kinds of non-juridical mechanisms. Even Foucault (Foucault 1980, ‘Powers and 
Strategies* (an interview), pp. 140-1) is dissatisfied with the claim that in some simple sense 
law is always a mask for power in Western societies, since it is clear that ‘political thought 
was ordered for centuries around the problem of Sovereignty and its rights... [L]aw, 
particularly in the eighteenth century, was a weapon of the struggle againsL..monarchical 
power...(and) law was the principal mode of representation of power (and representation 
should not be understood here as a screen or an illusion, but as a real mode of action).*
70 Foucault 1976 (HoS), p. 144.
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individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle...
The carceral network constituted one of the armatures of this power-knowledge that 
has made the human sciences historically possible. Knowable man (soul, 
individuality, consciousness, conduct, whatever it is called) is the object-effect of this 
analytical investment, of this domination-observation.71
Foucault's most famous attack on 'Man' is no doubt that in The Order 
of Things, where he claimed that 'man is an invention of recent date', 
and that if the fundamental arrangements of knowledge (savoir) 
which produced him were to disappear, then Tie' would be erased, 
like  a face draw n in sand at the edge of the sea '.77
6.4 The subjectivity that dare not speak its name?
It would appear, then, that given the discussion up to now of 
Foucault's conception of power-knowledge and its implication for any 
concept of self or self-understanding, and more generally its 
subversion of our traditional political theories of rights and popular 
sovereignty, we are left with a bleak vision of our contemporary world, 
a virtual m odem  carceral society. This is where many commentaries 
on Foucault stop, and it is not too difficult to see why when we read 
some of the passages quoted above. However, I think this is an 
overwhelmingly one-sided and incomplete reading (though not 
suprising given the tortuous prose of some of Foucault's earliest texts), 
and, moreover, is in danger of missing the more fundamental 
aspirations of his critique. Once again the key lies in his discussion of 
the relation between his understanding of power-truth-self-liberty, and 
the way in which each concept exists as a condition of the other.
Let us begin with power. In each instance where Foucault talks of 
relations of power he also talks about resistance and liberty, in fact they 
are conditions of each other's existence. This is implied in his 
characterization of power relations as strategic and modifiable; that is 
to say, not simply repressing or dominating but creating and reacting to 
its own effects on its 'object', whether it be a set of institutions, a
71 Foucault 1980, ‘Lecture 2,14 January 1976’, p. 98; 1975 (DP), p. 305.
72 Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York, Vintage
Books, 1973 (Gallimard 1966), p. 387.
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specific group of persons, or an individual acting on himself. But it is 
also explicit in the formulation of the conception to begin with. There 
cannot be relations of power unless those subjects to it are free in some 
sense, since how could the operation of power be said to be 'strategic' if 
it was simply a system of domination which controlled everything?73 
Power can only be exercised over another to the extent that the subject 
still has an option of acting otherwise, since, if there are no such 
option(s), there would be no relation of power. Thus, 'if there are 
relations of power throughout every social field it is because there is 
freedom everywhere', and the point of analysing 'power-mechanisms' 
such as asylums, prisons, or sexual discourses, is not to show some 
'built-in tendency' of power as being 'at once anonymous and always 
victorious...[but] rather of establishing the positions occupied and 
modes of actions used by each of the forces at work, [and] the 
possibilities of resistances and counter-attack on either side'.74 Every 
pow er relation implies (in potentia) a certain counter- 'confrontation 
strategy7, which establishes 'a kind of permanent limit' or frontier for 
the relationship of power. A confrontation ends when 'stable 
mechanisms replace the free play of antagonistic reactions', that is to 
say, w hen the practices and discourses of a set of power-mechanisms 
can direct (or at least 'effect7) the conduct of others. On the other hand, 
the limit of a power relation is reached when, instead of manipulating 
and inducing a certain kind of conduct, 'it' has to react to a conduct 
after the event, so to speak.7^
The task, according to Foucault, is not to emancipate tru th  from 
every system of power, which is a chimera, but to detach the power of 
truth from the 'forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural,
73 Cf. ‘The ethic of care for the self...’, p. 12; ‘The Subject and Power’, p. 221: ‘Where the 
determining factors saturate the whole there is no relationship of power, slavery is not a 
power relationship when man is in chains. (In this case it is a question of a physical 
relationship of constraint)’.
74 Foucault ‘The ethic of care for the self...’, pp. 12-13; 1980, pp. 164-5. Cf. ‘The Subject and 
Power*, p. 220; 1980, p. 142; 1976(HoS), pp. 145, 157.
75 ‘The Subject and Power*, p. 225.
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within which it operates at the present time'.76 Hence the attempt in 
The Order of Things to provide an archaeology of the ways in which 
the discourses of Man (the human sciences) constitute a new field of 
truth and its accompanying 'objects' unlike their pre-Revolutionary 
and Renaissance predecessors. Hence, also, the way in which, 
dissatisfied with emphasizing merely discursive conditions, Foucault 
plunged into the investigation of the non-discursive and material 
conditions of the production of discourses and truth, evident in the 
lectures, interviews and books with which we have been dealing in 
this chapter. I take it that what he means by 'detaching' the power of 
truth (note that this is not the same as detaching truth from power) 
from forms of hegemony is the sense of engaging in the kind of 
critique we outlined above in 6.1, that is, in getting to grips with each 
relation of power and its truth in all its specific and practical 
circumstances. Once something is no longer taken as 'natural' or as 
'necessary', a grip is loosened, though only in the very specific sense 
that Foucault constantly invokes, and never ultimately into some 
marked-off sphere of Freedom.
But who is to make these investigations and to engage in these 
struggles if the individual or subject is simply the 'object-effect7 of 
power and domination? Once again it is im portant to pu t Foucault's 
claims about the relations between pow er/know ledge and the subject 
into careful perspective. When we read passages such as the ones 
quoted in section 6.3 about how the juridical liberties of the 
Enlightenment brought with them the disciplines, and how  the 
individual or 'M an' is the 'object-effect' of power, it is easy to read 
them as making a claim about m ankind in toto, or the nature of 
individuality as such. But this is to miss the crux of Foucault's claims 
about the subject, though he makes it easy to do so given the 
provocative tone of his remarks. Perhaps we need a Foucaultian 
analysis of Foucault's own texts here. The 'effect' of his rhetoric has
76 Ibid, p. 133. Foucault outlines five traits of the three forms of hegemony at p. 131.
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been to suggest that subjectivity, as such, is obliterated by the relations 
of power and domination in modern disciplinary society, and has even 
led one of his most able commentators to argue (in his defence no less) 
that Foucault's study of the 'history of forms of rationality imposes a 
certain bias which necessitates greater attention being paid to forms of 
domination than to forms of insubordination' .77 This is an odd way of 
putting an important point. There is nothing 'necessary7 about the 
attention Foucault paid to discipline and domination, it was his own 
choice; and, as I have tried to show, it is not 'necessary7 to focus on 
forms of domination more than forms of insubordination since the 
two are not separable into mutually exclusive spheres of analysis. In 
the understatem ent of his career (at least from my perspective), 
Foucault wrote in 1982: 'perhaps I've insisted too much on the 
technology of domination and p o w e r 7.78 
When Foucault speaks about subjectivity or individuality in the 
context of the hum an sciences and the disciplines, he is mainly 
considering the nature of 'Man' in a very specific sense which he links 
with 'hum anism '. By 'hum anism ', Foucault means a set of themes 
that have reappeared in European history in all sorts of different 
contexts from 'Christian humanism ' to 'Marxist hum anism ', within 
which (at least since the seventeenth century) there has been a specific 
conception of the person borrowed from doctrines of religion, science, 
or politics.79 More precisely it is an idea of being linked to a complex 
and reflexive inferiority which is simultaneously the object and subject 
of an elaboration by the newly emerging hum an sciences, a sense of
77 Gordon in Foucault 1980, ‘Afterword’, p. 255. However, Gordon does go on in subsequent 
pages to speak about the importance of resistance in Foucault’s work.
78 Michel Foucault, ‘Technologies of the Self, in Luther H. Martin et al. ed. Technologies of 
the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, Amherst Massachusetts, University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1988, p. 19. Cf. Foucault 1984 {Reader), p. 380.
79 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment*, pp. 44-5. See also ‘Truth, power, self (interview) in 
Luther H. Martin et al. ed., 1988, p. 15. Foucault is not the only one to have identified a 
number of humanisms: see Charles Taylor, ‘Marxism and Socialist Humanism’, in Out of 
Apathy: Voices o f the New Left Thirty Years On, ed. Oxford University Socialist Discussion 
Group, London, Verso, 1989, pp. 61-70, especially pp. 62-3; also Susan Mollor Okin, 
‘Humanist Liberalism’, in Liberalism and the Moral Life, Cambridge Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1991, pp. 39-53.
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self Foucault claims wasn't present (at least self-consciously) before the 
nineteenth century.80 Once again Foucault's chronology is wildly off- 
mark, bu t the thrust of his comments has to do with disputing the 
particular conception of Man that is at stake in the various kinds of 
humanisms, and not with denying all forms of human agency as 
such.8i This is what he means when he writes that the Enlightenment 
(in the sense that we outlined in 6.1) and humanism are in 'a state of 
tension rather than identity7, or when he argues that the goal of 
contemporary thought must be to promote 'new forms of subjectivity 
through the refusal of the kind of individuality which has been 
imposed on us for several centuries'.82 This questioning of 'Man' 
hardly extinguishes man himself, for it is precisely the activity of 
questioning which is the ethos of modernity with which Foucault 
seeks to engage: 'My objective...has been to create a history of the 
different modes by which, in our culture, hum an beings are made 
subjects'. The importance of this point cannot be underestimated.83 
This explicit emphasis on subjectivity increased towards the end of 
Foucault's life, as he focused increasingly on what he called the 
'practices of the self', the way in which a hum an being turns him or 
herself into a subject. This is a general theme of Foucault's last books
80 Sec Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, New York, 1973, especially at pp. 352-5,364-5.
81 Thus I think it is slightly misleading to say that Foucault rejects or condemns the entire 
historical development of what Charles Taylor calls ‘humanitarianism’, or the ‘affirmation of 
ordinary life*. Foucault’s idea of humanism is certainly part of this process, but is not 
reducible to i t  See Taylor 1985, p. 155; 1989 passim.
82 ‘What is Enlightenment’, p. 44; ‘The Subject and Power’, p. 216.
83 ‘The Subject and Power’, p. 208. This makes Foucault’s spectacular influence on American 
academia - especially amongst literary theorists - less ironic than is normally (and gleefully) 
pointed out by commentators as a self-refuting example of the non-disappearence of the 
author. See for example, Stephen Greenblatt’s ‘big bang’ account of the influence that 
Foucault’s 1980 lectures at Berkeley had on the development of the ‘New Historicism’, in 
‘Towards a Poetics of Culture’,The New Historicism, ed. H. Aram Veeser, London, 
Roudedge, 1989,1-14. See also Sean Burke’s superb The Death and Return of the Author: 
Criticism and Subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault, and Derrida, Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press, 1992. The most recent wave of Foucault scholarship takes off from a more 
biographical level. Here the goal is to try and draw connections between Foucault’s 
legendary reticence and supposed attack on the self, and his own rapport-a-soi, especially with 
regard to his homosexuality. See for example, Jerrold Seigel, ‘Avoiding the Subject: A 
Foucaultian Itinerary’, Journal of the History of Ideas, April/June 1990, pp. 273-299; and 
more controversially, James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault, New York, Simon and 
Schuster, 1992.
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(Volumes II, III, and IV of the The History of Sexuality) and a number 
of im portant essays and interviews. The intention seems to have been 
to follow up on his daim  that there was no universal form of the 
subject found everywhere, but instead one constituted through 
practices of subjection, or indeed through 'practices of liberty7, on the 
basis of 'rules, styles, [and] inventions' found in the political and 
cultural environm ent.84 This latter claim is put forward with some 
complexity in the course of a wide reading of ancient Greek and 
Roman texts, the context of which I have no intention of recapping 
here, although I will outline the more relevant (and general) contours 
of the argument.
In some of his last interviews it became clear that Foucault had 
arrived at a general picture of three areas of investigation which his 
work had covered, the third being (after truth and power) 'an historical 
ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves 
as moral agents', i.e. the problem of individual conduct.88 Foucault7s 
conception of 'ethics' is odd but suggestive; it is a rapport a soi, whereby 
an individual constitutes himself as a moral subject of his own 
actions.86 We usually take 'ethics' to imply a set of standards or 
principles by which a particular group or community regulates its 
behaviour, or distinguishes legitmate from illegitimate conduct, such 
as in 'Christian ethics' or 'medical ethics'. Foucault reduces the scope 
considerably to those rules and activities we apply to ourselves and 
that go into the making of our conscience, or, as he puts it, the making 
of ourselves as a 'subject of ethical conduct7. His genealogy of sexuality, 
or more accurately his genealogy of desire as an ethical problem, 
provides a case-study of just such a process, and an issue with much 
contemporary relevance as well. Very broadly, w hat interests Foucault
84 LDK,pp. 50-1.
85 Foucault, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress’ (interview) in 
Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, p. 237; cf. The History of Sexuality, Volume 2: The Use of 
Pleasure, Harmondsworth, Vildng, 1984, pp. 6-13; and ‘The Return of Morality* (his last 
interview), LDK, pp. 243,257.
86 The Use of Pleasure, p. 251; ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics’, p. 238.
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here is a period when the 'ethical substance' and mode of 
subjectivation (mode d'assujettissment) of individuals had less to do 
with a general Morality or prohibitive code, and more to do with an 
'art of existence' or 'technique of self':
What I mean by the phrase(s) are those intentional and voluntary actions by which 
men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to 
change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that 
carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria...it seemed to me 
that the study of the problematization of sexual behaviour in antiquity could be 
regarded as a chapter - one of the first chapters - of that general history of the 
"techniques of the self" '.87
Foucault always rejected any simple 'back-to-the-Greeks' stance as an 
account of his motivation for returning to these texts, although he did 
see something in the questions they posed that 'inaugurated searches 
we are engaged in today7, since we can no longer organize our society 
around singular ideas of the good, or at least cannot seem to discover a 
form of morality acceptable to everybody in the sense that everyone 
should submit to it, a search Foucault says would be 'catastrophic7.88 
Foucault claimed that in classical ethics nobody was obliged to be 
truthful to their wives or to refrain from touching boys, but that if 
they wanted to have a good repuation and a 'beautiful existence, they 
had to engage in a certain mode d'assujettissement. N ow  in relation to 
Greek classical ethics, sexual behaviour was constituted as a domain of 
ethical practice in the form of the aphrodisia - the sum  of acts, desires, 
and pleasures situated in an 'agonistic field of forces' to be controlled. 
The 'austerity7 that was required in order to be a self-disciplined, and 
thus a successful subject, was not presented in the form of a universal 
law, but as a 'principle of stylization of conduct7, albeit for only a select 
group of citizens for whom a techne tou biou could be a real
87 The Use of Pleasure, pp. 10-11.
88 Here is an important difference between Foucault and some of the contemporary liberal 
theories we will be examining in the next chapter. For contemporary liberal theorists 
maintain that the only way of surmounting the problems of incommensurable conceptions of 
the good is to seek some set of principles or procedures to which everyone can agree to 
submit, even given all their differences. A ‘catastrophe’ is a society with no such principles 
or procedures.
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possibility.89 This "care for self has obvious political implications too; 
Socrates tells the young Alciabiades that if he is to achieve his 
ambitions as a political leader he must 'take care of him self in the 
sense of submitting to someone who can help him gain the techne of 
leadership, such as the right meaning of the rule of law, concord, and 
justice. The 'self is a m odem  import here since what is actually being 
talked about is the soul, and the activity which is the 'care of the self is 
really the contemplation of the divine element in which the soul 
consists in order to discover the basis for just behaviour and political 
action. Instead of asking 'What is the self?', the question becomes 
W hat is the plateau on which I shall find my identity7? Alciabiades 
will be a good politician insofar as he contemplates his soul in this 
m anner.90 More generally, 'care for the self does not imply any kind 
of solipsism; quite the opposite. Taking good care of oneself 
necessarily implied a complex relation with others, since the ethos of 
the good m an (what Foucault calls the 'concrete expression of [his] 
liberty7) included the know-how of governing his home, and 
occupying one's appropriate role and place in the d ty .91 Foucault 
sometimes calls this work on the self 'asceticism7, i.e. that a subject 
could not have access to the truth unless he had carried out the 
necessary work to make himself susceptible to it; 'no access to truth 
w ithout ascesis7.92
The genealogy Foucault traces is basically how this ethic of 'care for 
the self7 (and more specifically its relation to the discourse on sexuality)
89 The Use of Pleasure, pp. 250-3; Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 3: The 
Care o f the Self, transl. R. Hurley, London, Penguin, 1984, pp. 44-5; cf. ‘Genealogy of 
Ethics’, pp. 240-1.
90 'Technologies of the Self, pp. 23-30; ‘The ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom’, 
p. 13. Foucault is careful not to read back into the Gredes any kind of modem individualism, 
or theory of the subject, indeed his recognition of the fact that they don’t have any theory of 
the subject is part of the reason he is so interested in their ‘arts of existence’: ‘no Greek 
thinker ever found a definition of the subject and never searched for one...(but this) does not 
mean that the Greeks did not strive to define the conditions in which an experience would take 
place - an experience not of the subject but of the individual, to the extent that the individual 
wants to constitute itself as its own master’. LDK, p. 253.
91 ‘The ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom’, pp. 6-8,13.
92 'Genealogy of Ethics’, p. 252.
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changed within antiquity, then in Christianity, and finally its 
transfomation with the advent of the human sciences in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The transformation lies in the 
mode d'assujettisement, whereby in Christianity, rules for sexual 
behaviour (for example) are justified through religious concepts such 
as purity or faithfulness, and quasi-juridical forms such as certain 
casuistic practices. With the Enlightenment comes the decline of the 
religious framework for these rules (in part), and the rise of a medical 
and scientific framework which operates alongside and sometimes in 
tension with a (now) free-standing juridical fr a m e w o r k .93 W hat 
interests Foucault is the idea of a form of life that constructed an ethics 
(understood in the sense described above) independent of some 
universal code or revealed law, a process without formal and general 
interdictions imposed universally, but instead the means for the 
development (by a small privileged minority) of an 'aesthetics of 
existence'. It is the way in which it is problematized in thought (and 
less the real workings of Greek society) that Foucault concentrates on; 
the relationship for a free man between the exercise of his freedom, the 
forms of his power, and his access to truth.
W hat is Foucault getting at? Is he proposing that the Greeks offer 
some kind of model of alternative politics? The short answer is no, 
since Foucault claimed he was not in the business of providing ready­
m ade alternatives from bygone eras: 'you can't find the solution of a 
problem in the solution of another problem raised at another m oment 
by other people'.94 But this is not to say that nothing turning to the 
Greeks is a purely esoteric exercise, and this takes us back to our 
remarks on Foucault's idea of critique. Foucault's goal here is to make
93 On changes within antiquity see Foucault 1984 (HoS2) especially at p. 253; and HoS3; 
Technologies of the Self, especially pp. 30-1; and the crisp summary in ‘On the Genealogy 
of Ethics*, pp. 241-3.
94 ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics*, p. 231; cf. ‘The ethic of care...*, p. 14-15: ‘Nothing is more 
foreign to me than the idea that philosophy strayed at a certain moment of time, and that it 
has forgotten something and that somwhere in her history there exists a principle, a basis 
that must be rediscovered*. On Foucault’s general attitude towards the Greeks see the 
amusing dialogue in his last interview in LDK, p. 244.
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us think again about our own practices, and in particular those in 
relation to how we understand ourselves as subjects: 'in the political 
thought of the nineteenth century [and even in] Rousseau and 
Hobbes...the political subject has been thought essentially as subject to 
law, either in naturalist terms or in terms of positive law...it seems to 
me that the question of an ethical subject does not have much of a 
place in contemporary political thought'.95 Thus in his essay on the 
Enlightenment, Foucault floats the conception of Baudelaire's 'dandy7, 
an 'ascetic elaboration of the self', someone who makes his very 
existence a work of art. The connection between this and his 
discussion of the Greek 'arts of living7 seems obvious, but it should not 
be taken too far.
From our account of Foucault's conception of the Enlightenment 
ethos (the critique of the historical forms of our relations to things, to 
others, and to ourselves), and from our discussion of his conception of 
the relations between power, knowledge, and normalization, two 
general points can be seen to emerge. Firstly, the kind of 'ethics' 
Foucault discovers, especially in Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality, 
doesn't seem to him to be an attempt to 'normalize' the population, to 
prescribe a pattern of behaviour for everybody, since its principal aim 
was an intensely personal and aesthetic one. But as Foucault always 
reminds us, it is circumscribed in this way mainly because it is a 
personal choice for a small elite, dependent on a 'very harsh system of 
inequalities and constraints (particularly in connection with women 
and slaves)'.96 W hat interests Foucault is that, given the decline of 
religion (or whatever) as a foundation for ethics, contemporary 
liberation movements share a similar problem of sorts in that they 
'suffer7 from the lack of an accepted code or principle upon which to 
base any 'new  ethics', except one founded on a 'so-called scientific 
knowledge of w hat the self is, what desire is, and w hat [the]
95 ‘Ethic of care..*, p. 14.
96 ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics’, p. 230; The Use of Pleasure (HoS2), p. 253.
299
unconscious is'.97 The point is to create a genealogy of these kinds of 
problems rather than their solution, not to dissolve the issue through 
the propogation of an 'aesthetidzed existence', but to develop the 
capacity to detach one's ethics from the 'depth-knowledges' and 
practices as best one can, to put 'historico-critical reflection' to the test 
of concrete practices.98 This critical stance does not exdude the need to 
question the 'technology7 of the aesthetics of existence any less than it 
does for the disciplinary technologies. This brings us to the second 
point, which relates to what Foucault calls the 'practices of liberty'. 
Foucault never denies that liberation per se does not exist, that 
colonial peoples haven't freed themselves of their colonizers for 
example, but he does deny that this act of liberation is sufficient itself 
to establish the practices of liberty, i.e the practices that will allow 
individuals to 'dedde upon receivable and acceptable forms of 
existence or political so d e ty '."  The ethical problem of the definition of 
practices of freedom is more important than the affirmation that such- 
and such m ust be 'set free'. Foucault provides a summary of this 
which I can do no better than quote here.
I do not think that there is anything that is functionally - by its very nature - 
absolutely liberating. Liberty is a practice. So there may, in fact, always be a certain 
number of projects whose aim is to modify some constraints, to loosen, or even break 
them, but none of these projects can, simply by its nature, assure that people will have 
liberty automatically, that it will be established by the project itself. The liberty of 
men is never assured by the institutions and laws that are intended to guarantee them. 
This is why almost all of these laws and institutions are quite capable of being turned 
around. Not because they are ambiguous, but simply because "liberty" is what must be 
exercised.100
W henever Foucault talks about freedom or liberty, 'thought7 and 
critique are never far behind - '[t]he point...is to transform critique 
conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique 
that takes the form of a possible transgression7.101 The history of 
'thought7 is different from a history of ideas, in that 'thought7, rather 
than being w hat inhabits a certain conduct and w hat gives it m eaning,
97 ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics’, p. 231.
98 ‘What is Enlightenment?*, p. 50.
99 ‘The ethic of care...’, p. 3.
100 Foucault 1984 (Reader), p. 245.
101 ‘What is Enlightenment*, p. 45.
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is that which allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting 
and to present it to oneself as an object of thought to be interrogated: 
T hought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by 
which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and 
reflects on it as a problem'.102
I w ant to link this discussion of the practices of liberty and critique 
w ith Foucault's conception of resistance, which i examined above. 
Remember that for Foucault wherever there is power there is liberty, 
and thus the possibility of resistance. The point is not to imagine a 
society without relations of power, since no society is without the 
means for individuals to try and conduct the behaviour of others, but 
to 'give one's self the rules of law, the techniques of management, and 
also the ethics, the ethos, the practices of self, which would allow these 
games of power to be played with a minimum of domination'.1^  Here 
practices of self are linked explicitly with a strategy of liberation, or at 
least w ith a process which 'minimizes' domination. The problem, as 
Foucault sees it, is to know how to avoid the effects of domination 
(within these practices).10* Foucault is undoubtedly making an 
evaluative judgem ent here between 'states of domination' and states 
of minimal domination, or 'strategic games of liberties', the latter being 
those engaged in by individuals who have the capacities (the practices 
of self) inherent in the ethos of critique, which together we might call 
the 'practices of liberty'. This is further suggested by a (now) infamous 
passage in which Foucault talks about 'the plebs', that something in the 
social body which ('in some sense') escapes relations of power, an 
'inverse energy' which is in 'bodies, in souls, in individuals, in the 
proletariat, in the bourgeoisie'. The point of view of the plebs is not 
from outside of power but at its 'underside' and limits, and thus is the 
starting point for understanding the functioning and developm ent of
102 Foucault 1984 (Reader) p. 388.
103 ‘The ethic of care...’, p. 18.
104 Ibid, p., 18.
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the apparatuses of p o w e r .io s  The function of philosophy, then, is 
precisely 'the challenging of all phenomena of domination at 
whatever level or under whatever form they present themselves'.106 
The valorization seems to lie in the relation between practices of 
liberty and the relation to self, or hum an agency, in the broadest sense 
of the term; it is this relation which is valuable and important and 
m ust be actualized against those states of domination which seek to 
deny it. The point is precisely to question any hypothesis that suggests 
freedom is to be found in the loosening of certain 'repressive locks' in 
order to reveal some essential hum an nature otherwise concealed or 
imprisoned. In short, Foucault problematizes the claim that in 
liberating oneself the ethical problem is solved; 'Liberation opens up 
new relationships of power, which have to be controlled by practices of 
liberty'. The key question always remains - How can one practice 
freedom ?
Some critics have argued that when Foucault talks about these 'plebs' 
or practices of liberty he has 'smuggled back in' normative notions of 
liberal humanism, such as autonomy, reciprocity, dignity, and hum an 
rights, and that he is forced to, given that, it is the only way he can 
answer the question, 'Why resist?'107 On one level this claim makes 
sense if you insist that resistance and liberty are only comprehensible 
in relation to foundational claims about their worth, a n d /o r  if you 
believe that Foucault generally obliterates the possibility of any form of
105 Foucault 1980, p. 138. Cf. Peter Dews, ‘The Nouvelle Philosophic and Foucault’, in M. 
Gane ed. Towards a Critique of Foucault, London, Routledge,1986, who accuses Foucault of 
coddling up to the new Right and committing all the typical sins of the ‘modish left’ (that is, 
questioning the veracity of either traditional Marxism or Frankfurt School modifications).
106 ‘The ethic of care...’, p. 20 (my emphasis).
107 This is the general thrust of Habermas’ complaints. See his The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity: Twelve Lectures, transl. Frederick G. Lawrence, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987, 
pp. 266-293. But more specifically, see Nancy Fraser, ‘Foucault’s Body-Language: A Post- 
Humanist Political Rhetoric?’, Salmagundi, 61,1983, p. 59; cf. ‘Foucault on Modem 
Power Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions’, Praxis International, 1 1981, p. 283. 
I am indebted here to the excellent discussion in Gutting 1989, pp. 281-3. All of these 
issues are lucidly discussed in Richard Bernstein’s superb article, ‘Foucault: Critique as a 
Philosophical Ethos’, in Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of 
Enlightenment, ed. Axel Honneth e t al., Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1992,280-310 
(though we come to different conclusions).
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hum an agency. I have rejected this latter claim and will say no more 
about it here. The point about norms, however, is an important one, 
and brings out the crux of many of the issues we have been examining 
up to now. It seems undeniable that Foucault values the practices of 
liberty, in the sense that it is a preferred state of affairs in relation to 
practices of domination, but at the same time he seems to deny any 
grounds for saying so. But Foucault sees no need to provide any kind 
of philosophical foundation for the worth of liberty because he 
grounds it entirely in the concrete experiences of domination. In other 
words, we distinguish between domination and practices of liberty in 
our engagement in specific practices and 'apparatuses', whether it be 
prisons, asylums, or hospitals. The risks of bad judgements formed 
from direct experience are inescapable, but so they are also in applying 
wide ranging philosophic theories, which Foucault thinks are just as 
dangerous (if not more so), especially in the form of proposals for 'the 
new m an', or wholesale, systematic political change. No a priori theory 
can promise us freedom, we achieve it only in relation to specific 
practices and struggles.
The problem, you see, is one for the subject who acts - the subject of action through 
which the real is transformed. If prisons and punitive mechanisms are transformed, it 
won't be because a plan of reform has found its way into the heads of social workers; it 
will be when those who have to do with penal reality, all those people, have come 
into collision with each other and with themselves, run into dead-ends, problems and 
impossibilities, been through conflicts and confrontations; when critique has been 
played out in the real, not when reformers have realized their ideas.108 
Hence the narrow range of claims that Foucault makes, and his
constant refrain concerning the importance of 'partial transformations'
and 'local struggles'. Foucault makes normative claims, but they are
grounded in practices rather than philosophical principles;
philosophy's role is to show the limits of its own claims. The role of
the intellectual is not to shape the political will of others, since that
formation is the duty  of the citizens themselves (which includes
intellectuals too), bu t rather to 'disturb people's mental habits...to
108 ‘Questions of Method’, (an interview) in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, pp. 84-5.
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dissipate what is familiar and accepted' through analyses carried out in 
his or her own field.109 Thus liberty is a normative principle for 
Foucault, but only in the sense that it is a practice, never guaranteed by 
any set of institutions or principles; 'the guarantee of freedom is 
freedom'. In a way, Foucault is an anti-foundationalist autonomy 
theorist; agency is manifested in the practices of liberty, an ethos of 
critique which interrogates the 'discourse of truth ' and the concrete 
practices within which it is embedded. But it is important to remember 
that Foucault is not propagating a political theory per se, and that he 
has only focused on very specific instances of relations of power, 
namely relations of discipline and subjectivation: 'these analyses can 
in no way, to my mind, be equated with a general analytics of every 
possible power relation'.110 
6.5 Liberal discipline 
Ultimately, I think Foucault is just wrong when he generalizes his 
particular studies about the normalizing technologies of discipline 
into a commentary on the nature of the juridical liberties as such, 
since they are a necessary part of any attempt to develop the capacities 
and autonomy of individuals in m odem  society. However, the 
questions he poses remain interesting. What is the liberal self, or the 
liberal m ode d'assujetissement? W hat is the nature of liberal 
government, that is to say, what is the relationship between its 
juridical assum ptions concerning the relation between state and civil 
society, and the 'extra-juridical' effects of its m ode of government? In 
other words, to w hat extent are liberal regimes dependent on their 
own processes of discipline, or the effects of what Foucault (and Locke) 
called their 'art of government'? These are precisely the questions I 
addressed when I examined Lockean political theory in chapters 4-5, 
and will attem pt to do with Rawlsian and post-Rawlsian political 
theory in chapter seven.
109 LDK, p. 265.
110 Foucault 1984 (Reader), p. 380.
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A striking, if little noticed, incongruity emerges in reading Foucault 
on the foundations of liberal political theory; it is his persistent return 
to the language of rights and his obvious affinity with at least the 
problematics of liberalism. Foucault engaged in a serious way with 
liberal theory in the course of a series of (mainly) unpublished lectures 
in the late 1970's, interestingly at a time when he seems to have been 
beginning his 'ethical' studies of the different constitutive practices of 
self, especially the 'practices of liberty7. But how does this compare 
with his (apparently) sweeping condemnation of the constitutional 
regimes and juridical liberties of the post-revolutionary era? These 
statements are even more puzzling given that Foucault constantly 
backs away from making just such totalizing claims (viz the last quote 
in 6.4). It appears that he was attempting to begin an articulation of a 
different kind of rights daim , one that was anti-disciplinarian but not 
sovereign-based.111 If discipline was a form of power which penetrated 
beyond the abstract, autonomous, and responsible, juridical subject 
presupposed by the traditional conception of law (the formality of 
which established its equivalence to other selves and provided the 
scope for laws, i.e. that they m ust respect this formal essence), then any 
new form of right would have to based on the recognition of the 
workings of these new power relations. Resistance would be 
articulated in relation to this 'real struggle', one more to do with life ' 
(or what we m ight call the experience of the embedded self) than law, 
in the sense that life  as a political object was...taken at face value and 
turned back against the system that was bent on controlling it7. Here is 
the role for the 'practices of liberty7, which though often spoken of in 
terms of rights are meant to appeal against 'all these new procedures of 
power7, to 'rediscover what one is and all that one can be7. 112 Hence 
another reason for detaching the self from any necessary relation with 
a universal hum anism , which presents one form of ethics as a
111 Foucault 1980, p. 108.
112 Foucault 1976 (HoSl), p. 145.
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'universal model for any kind of freedom'. Foucault thinks there are 
'm ore secrets, more possible freedoms...more possible inventions in 
our future' than can be imagined in the traditional accounts of the 
hum anism s of the Left, Right, or Center: 'This does not mean that we 
have to get rid of what we call human rights or freedom, but that we 
can't say that freedom or human rights has to be limited at certain 
frontiers'.113 This is part of his conception of the 'truth-telling' or free 
speech (parrhesia) of the governed, that since we are all governed we 
m ust question those who govern us in the name of the knowledge 
and experience we have as citizens. In a remarkable passage Foucault 
even claims that there is an 'international citizenry' whose duty it is to 
'rise up  against every abuse of power, no matter who the author, no 
m atter who the victims', indeed there is an 'absolute right' (un droit 
absolu) to do so: 'The will of individuals m ust be inscribed in a reality 
that the governments have wanted to monopolize. This monopoly 
m ust be wrested from them bit by bit, each and every day7.114 But this 
'absolute right7 cannot be taken to mean that the function of 'truth- 
telling7 takes the form of a Law (i.e. in terms of an abstract popular 
sovereignty), or residing by 'right7 (by nature) in the 'spontaneous 
interplay of communication' (i.e. a Habermasian ideal speech 
situation), but rather is 'an endless labor7.115 Foucault's use of rights 
talk (especially in the communique's and petitions he wrote on behalf 
of various political causes) is baffling unless we take it in the context I 
have sketched here, and even then it is often misleading.
But w hat of his thematic affinity with liberalism? His interest in 
liberal theory was part of a more general interest in the 'macrophysics
113 Technologies of the self, p. 15. For other examples of his rights talk (other than those 
mentioned above), see Eribon 1989, p. 290,299; Foucault 1984 (Reader), pp. 381-2; LDK, 
p. 329.
114 Eribon 1989, p. 279 (translation modified).; see also p. 297 on the development of a ‘logic of 
the left’ which he thought might change (for the better) the relationship between the ruled and 
the rulers: ‘[w]orking with government does not imply either subjection or total acceptance. 
One can simultaneously work and stubbornly resist’. Not suprisingly Foucault became 
rapidly disillusioned that this in fact could take place. Cf. Thomas Flynn, ‘Foucault as 
parrhesiast* his last course at the College de France’, in Bemauer (ed.)1988, pp. 102-118.
115 LDK, p. 267.
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of power', the study of the exercise of power at the scale of whole 
societies or populations, to which he had been turning increasingly in 
the late 1970's. The general rubric under which he put these studies 
was that of 'governmental rationality', or 'govemmentality'. We have 
ourselves examined something similar in chapters 4 and 5 with regard 
to the development of a proto-liberal govemmentality in the early 
modern sodal contract theory of Locke, natural law jurists such as 
Pufendorf, as well as in chapters 1-3 with regard to republican political 
argument. Foucault follows a similar but much broader analysis, with 
some different emphases which I shall note below. The crucial 
concept is, as we have seen, the 'art of government'. This is a kind of 
'biopolitics' whereby the population, as a necessary component of the 
success and health of the state, becomes an explicit object of the 
practices of government. These 'techniques of government' rest 
between the strategic relationships of power (the perpetual tussle 
between powers and liberties) and states of domination. The analysis 
of these techniques is necessary because in is through them that states 
of dom ination are often established and m aintain themselves. W hat 
intrigued Foucault was that liberalism problematized the very notion 
of government, whilst at the same time developing its own distinctive 
form of govemm entality and the accompanying relation of self to self, 
i.e. its own form of liberal conduct.
In his lectures between 1977-80, Foucault spent some time exploring 
the theories of German and American neo-liberalism, in addition to 
begining a genealogical study of early m odem  'arts of governm ent'.116
116 The best introduction to these lectures is now Burchell et al. 1991, which includes the 
seminal Foucault lecture ‘Govemmentality’, and excellent accompanying pieces, especially 
those by Gordon (his ‘Governmental Rationality: an introduction*, pp. 1-51 is essential 
reading), Pasquino, and Burchell. Summaries of the lectures can be found in Michel 
Foucault: Resume des cours, Conference essais de lecons de College de France, Julliard, 1989 
(or from the Annuaire du College de France, 1978-79,79 annee). Foucault rehearsed some of 
the same themes on governmental rationality in ‘Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Critique 
of Political Reason*, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 1981, vol 2, Salt Lake City, 
University of Utah Press, Cambridge University Press, pp. 224-54; cf. another version of 
this lecture in Luther H. Martin e t al., ‘The Political Technology of Individuals’, pp. 145- 
162. The relevant notion of biopower is discussed in History of Sexuality I , pp. 140-5; 
there is also some discussion of biopower and govemmentality in ‘The Subject and Power’,
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I shall not rehearse the details of these discussions here, but shall 
instead concentrate on laying out the general contours of his 
presentation. According to Foucault (and others), the development of 
a raison d 'etat and science of police in the early modern period 
constituted the activity of government as an 'art' with its own 
distinctive form of rationality, including (among other things) the 
twin objectives of secular properity and security. Developing in 
unique ways from this was liberalism, or at least the tendencies and 
innovations which would ultimately culminate in the liberalism of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which Foucault saw as not 
simply a set of political or economic theories but as a style of thinking 
concerned with a specific 'art of governing'. What distinguished it 
from earlier 'police states' was its apparent distance from the 
previously isomorphic relationship between 'police science' and state 
action. Thus liberalism proposed limitations and restraints as a result 
of its stance towards 'state reason' which displayed the bounds of its 
power and determined what government could do, and what it m ust 
try not to do if it was to accomplish its purposes.
Le liberalisme est a analyser alors comme principe et methode de rationalisation de 
l'exercise du gouvemement - rationalisation qui obeit, et c'est la sa specificite, a la 
regie interne de l'economie maximale. Alors que toute rationalisation de l'exercise du 
gouvemment viseNa maximaliser ses effets en (en?) diminuant, le plus possible, le cout 
(entendu au sens politique non moins qu'economique), la rationalisation liberate part du 
postulat que le gouvemement (il s'agit la, bien sur, non pas de 1'institution 
'gouvemment', mais de l'activite quie consistea regir la conduite des hommes dans un 
cadre et avec des instruments etatiques) ne saurait etre, a lui-meme, sa propre fin.117
pp. 217-224. The initial lectures of the series have been released in an audio cassette format 
by Seuil, and the complete lectures are available on tape at the Foucault Archive in the 
Bibliotheque du Saulchoir in Paris. See also Colin Gordon, ‘Question, ethos, event: Foucault 
on Kant and Enlightenment*, Economy and Society, 13,1,71-87; 'The Soul of the Citizen: 
Max Weber and Michel Foucault on Rationality and Government', in Max Weber: 
Rationality and Modernity, ed. S. Whimster, S. Lash, London, Allen Unwin, 293-316; Barry 
Hindess, 'Liberalism, Socialism, Democracy: variations on a governmental theme’,
Economy and Society, forthcoming, 1993; Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, ‘Political power 
beyond the state: problematics of government’, British Journal of Political Science, 43,2, 
1992, p. 173-205.; Malcolm Dean’s (excellent), The Constitution of Poverty: Towards a 
Genealogy o f Liberal Governance, London, Routledge, 1991; and the very interesting 
comments made towards the end of Terry K. Aladjem, 'The Philosopher’s Prism: Foucault, 
Feminism, and Critique’, Political Theory, 19,2,1991,277-291.
117 Foucault, Annuaire 1978-79 (79), pp. 14-15. Cf. Gordon 1991, pp. 14-15.
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W hat Foucault identifies as important is the introduction of 
'economy7 into the management of the state. Economy is understood 
here in two ways: firstly, in its sixteenth century sense as being the 
correct manner of managing individuals, goods, and wealth in a way 
in which a father would with regard to his household (i.e. oeconomy); 
and, secondly, as it came to be understood in the eighteenth century, 
that is, as being a level of reality7 or 'field of intervention7 pertaining 
to c o m m e r c e In both instances, it is implied that to govern a state is 
to apply (o)economy, to employ a form of surveillance and 
m anagem ent to the 'things7 of the civitas, including its inhabitants. 
W hat changes, at least according to Foucault, is that by the eighteenth 
century this is less a matter of directly applied juridical power, or 
cam eralist/m ercantilist intervention, than it is of encouraging 'the 
right disposition of things' through the framing of 'mechanisms of 
security7.119 A necessary part of this development is the object of 
governm ent shifting from the classical family model at the base of 
'oeconomy7 to the more diverse and multifarious notion of 
'population7, which was not reducible to the dimensions of a family, 
and which had its own set of regularities, processes, and general 
phenomena, and even a new science for interpreting itself - 
statistics.120 The art of government thus increasingly addresses issues 
of 'security7 rather than sovereignty, that is to say, framing the 
identified 'natural processes' of population and political economy 
through mechanisms of security which minimize its own presence 
whilst ensuring its real effectiveness. A key m oment in this 
development is the emergence of an understanding of m an as a 
'subject of interest7 who possesses a set of preferences and choices 
which are both irreducible and non-transferable (Foucault was 
anticipating, in very general ways, key aspects of the work of Dr. Tuck 
here). Hence Foucault's interest in the theories of the great Scottish
118 Foucault ‘Govemmentality* 1991, p. 92-3.
119 Ibid, p. 93. Cf. Gordon 1991, n.36.
120 Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
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political economists and moral philosophers, whom he saw as 
constructing a complex domain of 'govemmentality' within which 
economic and juridical subjectivity were not reducible to each other, 
but rather situated as partial and relative aspects of a larger element - 
i.e. 'civil society'. Hence also the conception of 'economic 
government'; government informed by the doctrines of political 
economy, but also government economizing on its own costs, 
accomplishing more by doing less. Foucault saw this as disqualifying 
the Lockean conception of political jurisprudence, embodied as it was 
in the inaugural acts of delegation and then renunciation in the social 
contract whereupon the individual was constituted as a political and 
juridical subject. As we saw, this juridical knowledge and power for 
Foucault was rigidly symmetrical between sovereign and subject, and 
essentially repressive, concerned as it was with the strict demarcation 
of the legal and the illegal. This in turn was set against the 'new7 
disciplinary power, creating a complex relation, but one which was 
essentially heterogeneous. It is interesting that in his lectures on 
govemmentality the rigidity of this distinction (which I have 
questioned above in chapter 5) is lessened somewhat and the use of 
law as an aspect of discipline itself, rather than simply as a cloak for its 
'actual' effects, enters the picture. But it still seemed to be the case for 
Foucault that this development took place well beyond seventeenth 
century formulations of social contract theory and the juridical mode 
of government. He identified the end of the governmental rationality 
of these natural law theories ('the jurists') pretty narrowly, at least as 
far as we can tell from the lectures. Foucault argued that the 'real 
content' of w hat the jurists and theologians called the common good, 
'[i]n every case...(was)...nothing other than submission to sovereignty', 
i.e. submission to law; he gave an example from the work of Samuel 
P u fe n d o r f .121 The example gives something away though, and the 
choice of Pufendorf explains the rigidity of Foucault's account of the
121 Foucault ‘Govemmentality’ 1991, pp. 94-5.
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natural law understanding of sovereignty, since Pufendorf, though 
undoubtedly one of the architects of what we now call the "juridical 
mode of political power", was also an absolutist, which does not exactly 
exhaust the horizons of early modern natural rights theory. Given a 
non-absolutist account that presupposes a different kind of individual 
and collective political agency - Locke's for example - the issue of the 
common good becomes more complex, precisely because it appears 
that the arts of government are in part directed at working on the very 
abilities of men ('their humours, interests, and capacities') 
fundamental to the political and ethical judgement of citizens in civil 
society, the capacities they must use, in part, to judge the legitimacy of 
the very art itself. Foucault identified the 'new finality" of government 
in the eighteenth century, as the 'disposing of things' so £<s not to lead 
to the form of the common good 'as the jurist's texts would have said', 
but to an end which was 'convenient' for each of the things to be 
governed. 122 However, by avoiding discussing other early m odem  arts 
of government (which I have attempted to fill in here and above in 
previous chapters), Foucault missed important aspects of the 
development of the governmental rationality of social contract theory. 
Hence my desire to take a step back from Foucault's claims and return 
to a consideration of this tradition, not least for the obvious reason 
that contemporary liberal political theory, especially in the form 
provided by its most celebrated and sophisticated exponent, John 
Rawls, is still deeply enmeshed within its matrices (though carried on, 
of course, at a higher level of abstraction than in the original theories).
However, before doing so, I want to complete o u r sketch of 
Foucault's argument. The key moment in the history of liberal 
thought for Foucault is when it breaks with the conventional raison 
d'etat which, since the end of the sixteenth century, 'avait chercher 
dans l'existence et le renforcement de l'Etat la fin susceptible de 
justifier une gouvemm entalite croissante et d 'en  regler le
122 Ibid p. 95.
311
developpement'. Thus liberalism, according to Foucault, is structured 
around the question of 'on gouverre toujours trop' and that 'la 
gouvernmentalite^ ne doit pas s'exercer sans une "critique", autrement 
plus radicale qu'une epreuve d'optimisation':123
Plutot done qu'une doctrine plus ou moins coherente, plutot qu'une politique poursuivant 
un certain nombre de buts plus ou moins definis, je serais tente^de voir, dans le 
liberalisme, une forme de reflexion critique sur la pratique gouvemementale; cette, 
critique peut venir de l'interieur ou de l'exterieur; elle peut s'appuyer sur telle theorie 
economique, ou se referer'a tel systeme juridique sans lien necessaire et univoque. La 
question du liberalisme, entendue comme question du "trop gpuvemeri' a ete une des 
dimensions constantes de ce phenomene recent en Europe et apparu, semble-t-il d'abord 
en Angleterre...124
Foucault tried to isolate the governmental rationalities ('ces types de 
rationalite qui sont mis en oeuvre dans les procedes par lesquels on 
dirige, a travers une administration etatique, la conduite des 
hommes') of two forms of contemporary liberalism which he saw as 
direct heirs to this tradition: the West German Ordoliberalen (as they 
were later known) of the years 1948-1962; and the American 'neo­
liberals' of the 'Chicago School' (Gary Becker, Milton Friedman, etc.) 
W hat Foucault noted in the former was a rigorous 'anti-naturalism' 
and constructivism in connection with the development and 
functioning of a market economy, which was assumed to be 
maintainable only by virtue of certain activist policies (social security 
arrangements, healthcare, public housing), i.e. a 'social market'. The 
cultural angst of mass market societies according to these German 
liberals was not related in any necessary way to the market per se, but 
was caused by the wrong policies, i.e. the consistent anti-liberal policies 
of successive m odern German governments.125 The American neo­
liberal approach was altogether different in that it rejected any attempt 
to combine market forces with social policies which compensated for 
any m arket failures ('market failure' is simply an oxymoron in this 
context), and instead sought to extend their account of 'free m arket 
rationality' to all sorts of (strictly speaking) non-economic areas, such
123 Foucault, Annuaire, p. 368.
124 Ibid, p. 370.
125 Ibid, pp. 371-2. Cf. Gordon 1986, pp. 80-1; 1987, pp. 314-5.
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as crime and punishment, education, and healthcare.126
One thing liberal governmental rationality does is to complicate the 
relation between civil society and the state. Since law, even for Locke, 
was not rigidly set apart from the emerging 'disciplinary practices' and 
exerted its own kind of 'normalizing' power, civil society (the rule of 
law) cannot be seen as something set over the state, nor something 
that always repels or contests the will of government, but is itself 
almost state-like. Civil society is the enabling structure established by 
members of a community to solve the problems of a growing 
population, increased scarcity, and the inevitable disputes which arise 
as a result. Government is the ordering activity of civil society which 
addresses the problems for which it was established in the first place, 
and thus it is a mistake to pose the question in terms of the state 
versus civil society or vice versa. The issue is one concerning the 
nature of this ordering activity, which in the liberal tradition takes its 
most fundamental shape in the rule of law, the manifestations of 
which (as we have seen), can range from the interventionism of 
cameralist polizei to the framing of 'natural processes', and ultimately 
whether or not it is capable of providing the grounds for a sustainable 
community, or at least some kind of partnership between citizens of 
complex commercial societies.127
126 Foucault, Annuaire, p. 372.
127 Foucault describes civil society as both an object and an end of government; it is by reference 
to it that the state’s role and functions are defined and the maintenance and existence of which 
it must secure. It is a ’transactional reality*, the contours of which are variable and open to 
modification, within which techniques of government operate in light of the general 
problematic of ‘security’. See Foucault’s lecture April 4,1979; Burchell 1991, pp. 140-1. 
See also Foucault’s interview with union representatives on issues concerning social security, 
given at the height of the Solidarity crisis in Poland in 1981 (a cause Foucault was deeply 
committed to and engaged with, see Eribon 1989, chp 20 passim) and just after Mitterrand’s 
ascension to power. He argued that the Polish example showed that one misunderstands the 
complexity and multiplicty of the confrontations if one merely describes it as a case of civil 
society versus the state: ‘the notion of an opposition between civil society and state was 
formulated in a given context with a particular intention...It was a quasi-polemical concept, 
opposed to the administrative power of the states at the time (in the eighteenth century) in 
order to bring victory to a certain liberalism.’ Foucault did not like the way the schema gave 
a pejorative connotation to the notion of the state whilst idealizing society as a ‘good, living, 
warm, whole’; ‘To believe society capable, by mere internal regulation, of solving the 
problems that it is presented with is to have a very optimistic notion of society*. LDK, pp. 
167-8.
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Now one of the values of Foucault's account is to point out how the 
story of liberalism is not just the gradual optimization of a sphere of 
individual freedom and rights preserved against nasty and arbitrary 
state intervention, but is itself a particular configuration of discursive, 
non-discursive and governmental practices emerging out of a 
particular historical context. Though it might be true that there is a 
liberal nomos which 'tells us of some things we must do... but it does 
not tell us what it is wise or prudent or good for us to do, and it 
necessarily leaves open various realms of choice', this cannot be 
confused with an abjuration of interest in government, or a lack of 
concern with a set of particular relations between self and government 
and self and self. 128 Changing our relation to government involves 
changing our relation to ourselves, a process criss-crossed by a variety 
of practices and institutions which come together in any number of 
different 'govemmentalities'. If we combine these studies of liberal 
conduct with some of Foucault's last works on an ethics of 'care for 
self', and especially his discussion of various 'practices of liberty', it is 
clear that Foucault was attempting to focus on the increasing 
politicization of aspects of personal identity so evident in late 
twentieth century political argument and practice. On the one hand, 
this has taken the form of a blatantly polemical exercise, as in the case 
of neo-liberal and conservative strategies of cutting government 
programs as a means of propagating particular forms of conduct, 
whether it be the call for us to become 'economic warriors' in an 
'enterprise culture', or to take responsibility for ourselves and break 
with the 'dependency culture' of social security benefits.129 On the 
other hand (and the two are not mutually exclusive), it is (or has been) 
evident in the increasing emphasis put on the value of personal
128 The nomos is Oakeshott’s, warmed over by Nathan Tarcov (Locke’s Education for Liberty, 
University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 7).
129 See for example Lawrence Mead, The New Poverty, New York, Basic Books, 1992, pp. 2, 
21- 2, 133-158.
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autonomy in liberal political theory.130 
The assumption then has been, both in traditional liberal 
historiography and theory, that liberalism, though always intensely 
interested in political power as such, has usually only interpreted it in 
terms of its limitations or the prevention of its abuse (i.e. the 
supposedly traditional concerns of juridical social contract theories).
In contemporary terms, this has perhaps manifested itself most visibly 
in the various approaches liberal theories have taken towards the Tact 
of pluralism'; the epistemic abstinence of anti-perfectionist theories, 
and the trepidation with which theorists have addressed the issue of 
the moral personality (and thus also the ferocity of attacks on this 
liberal self' from its critics). Foucault's emphasis on the way the self 
comes to constitute itself as an object (its mode d'assujetissement) is 
another way of approaching the issues which surround the liberal 
emphasis on the value of personal autonomy. But it also suggests a 
possible way of explaining the nature of claims that have been 
increasingly made in contemporary politics on the grounds of 
questions of lifestyle' or, more broadly, around the question of the 
politics of recognition.131 Here recognition is seen to be an essential 
component of what it is to be human, and thus its absence or abuse 
(i.e. some form of misrecognition) is seen to cause real damage or 
distortion to one's identity. This 'damage' can take the form of society 
reflecting back to a particular individual or group a demeaning picture 
of themselves, as say a woman feels or senses in a patriarchal society, 
or a black person in a white society. This could cause either party to be 
subject - by others and by themselves - to a loss of self-esteem or 
dignity, and even to lose that part of themselves which their society
130 Cf. Foucault on social security reform in France: ‘there [exists] a positive demand...for a 
security that opens the way to richer, more numerous, more diverse, and more flexible 
relations with oneself and with one’s environment, while guaranteeing to each individual a 
real autonomy...Ought we not rather to be trying to think out a whole system of social 
coverage that takes into account this demand for autonomy, so that these effects of 
dependence will disappear almost entirely?’. LDK, pp. 161-2.
1311 am borrowing this term from Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and the "Politics of 
Recognition", Princeton University Press, (with Amy Gutman et al.) 1992.
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finds contemptible or without worth, but without which they would 
feel incomplete or incoherent. There are (at least) two ways of making 
this kind of claim. Firstly, it could just be a matter of blatant injustice, 
by which I mean that the society in question is organized in a blatantly 
racist or patriarchal way, resulting in a distorted allocation of goods 
and resources in favour of a dominant class or group. Questions of 
racism and sexism do not vanish when these societies are re-organized 
around liberal principles of equality, but the institutional means and 
procedures are (supposed to be) put in place to address any grievances 
relating to them. Questions of recognition, then, rest mainly on a 
minimal sense in which everyone is owed recognition on the grounds 
of his or her equal worth as a human being. The second way of 
making this kind of claim has very little to do with questions of 
distribution, the acquisition of state power, or the extension of rights. 
Rather, the demands or complaints are oriented towards questioning 
the very basis upon which the main institutions and forms of political 
argum ent in society rest. Here the equal respect endorsed by some 
contemporary liberal theories through the distribution of an equal and 
identical basket of rights and immunities, misses or even stifles that 
which is really distinctive and of worth to individuals or a minority 
group The force of this critique is especially sharp when it is claimed 
that in doing so the dominant principles mean nothing less than the 
suppression of 'particularity' in the name of the hegemonic culture for 
whom the said principles are easy to endorse. Groups or individuals 
might also feel that in societies where grievances m ust be expressed in 
terms of principles or procedures, complaints that do not fit into this 
form of political argument go unnoticed and unexpressed, let alone 
met. Here the questions and demands revolve around the dom inant 
'codes' which structure social and political arrangements as a whole, 
and insist on an awareness of alternative 'networks of sense' which 
should be 'saved' from the state and the considerations governing
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public policy.132 The point here has to do with the context of 
differences available to the subject with which to fashion an identity 
from. It is essential for theories of justice to have not just their 
institutional framework within which to mediate competing claims 
according to their core principles, but to also have subjects who 
recognize themselves as agents of a particular kind, i.e. as subjects of a 
particular interpretive context within which they can be subjects of 
judgements that are just or fair.133 For some, this means that a whole 
range of experience and desire - 'muted or subaltern voices' - and the 
possibilities for recognition and transformation they furnish, are 
absorbed and thus ignored by the larger theory. None of these claims 
necessarily undermin the entire basis of liberal theory, but, taken in 
their strongest form, they imply that liberalism is a 'pragmatic 
contradiction', a particularism masquerading as a universal.13* I shall 
return to these issues below.
The limits of Foucault's studies for my purposes are clear: his 
account of contemporary liberalism (and its history) is one-sided and 
incomplete, and did not (perhaps could not) take into account the 
reemergence of contractarian theory inaugurated by Rawls in 1971.
Also, in focusing exclusively on either states of domination in relation 
to disciplinary power, or the purely subjective site of 'practices of 
liberty', Foucault completely missed (or avoided) the possibility of any 
kind of intersubjective or consensual practices or disciplines of liberty. 
As a result he is not in a position to make the kind of sweeping 
generalization he makes in relation to the basis of the juridical 
liberties, at least in the quotes we noted above. But he did anticipate 
the surge of philosophic and historical interest in theories of the self 
(or w hat he called 'technologies of the self'), the rise of which, at least
132 Claus Offe, ‘Competitive party democracy and the Keynsian welfare state’, in Claus Offe, 
Contradictions ofthe Welfare State, ed. John Keane, London, Hutchinson, 1984, pp. 189-90. 
See also Taylor 1992.
133 See the interesting discussion in Anthony J. Cascardi, The Subject o f Modernity, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1992, especially p. 308.
134 The phrase is Taylor’s (1992, p. 44).
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in the context of contemporary political theory, is (I think) of no small 
importance. And perhaps most importantly, if v/e accept that it is a 
mistake to condemn him for not providing something he resolutely 
refused to provide, i.e. a systematic, normative, and prescriptive 
political theory for all seasons, the questions he asked remain 
important (or at least interesting) for a liberal political argument 
focused increasingly around the relation between autonomy and 
community. When he asks /How can the growth of capabilities and 
autonomy be disconnected from the intensification of power 
relations?', he is not far from the concerns of contemporary liberal 
theory, nor is he far from a potential response to the overwhelming 
one-sidedness of his own account of the juridical liberties and the 
'practice of liberty'. It is to that which we must now turn.
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Chapter 7: Liberal Conduct
7.0 Introduction
I want to tie together what we have been discussing in the previous 
chapters with regard to Locke's 'art of government' and Foucault's 
reading of that tradition, with a consideration of these same questions 
in the context of contemporary liberal political argument. The reader 
may have noticed that my discussion of natural law and some aspects 
of Locke's political theory in chapters 4 and 5 falls into the second 
category of investigation so bluntly indicated in the title of the thesis, 
that is, liberalism. No doubt she or he might also have noticed that I 
carried out this initial discussion without clarifying exactly what I 
mean by liberalism '. The main reason why I have done this is because 
one cannot (strictly) speak of a set of concepts or ideas in the 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century as belonging to a doctrine 
that had yet to cohere in any consistent or meaningful fashion, and 
certainly not in the way we understand it today. Foucault makes this 
mistake in places and as a result, ends up with a very attenuated 
understanding of the range of natural law theories available in the 
context of the seventeenth century. The way we use the term, and the 
kinds of distinctions we make between 'classical liberalism' and 
'm odem  liberalism ', evolve from the nineteenth century and the 
emergence of specific political movements identitfied with the holding 
of liberal opinions', for example, favouring constitutional change, 
legal reform, civil and commercial liberty, and democracy. Thus if we 
turned back to the examination of Locke's political theory and looked 
for his 'liberal' theory, we might find it, but not w ithout either severely 
contorting his doctrines, or ignoring huge swathes of argum ent not 
relevant to our concerns but nevertheless absolutely fundam ental to 
his. All of this is probably clear, given the efforts by so many recent 
theorists and historians to destroy the 'mythology of prolepsis'.1 It is
1 See Skinner in James Tully, Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988, p. 45). The point is to avoid whereby ‘the action has to 
await the future to await its meaning.* Dunn 1969 is on the whole directed at destroying 
whatever plausiblity this approach might have had for understanding Locke’s work. Cf. Will
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my intention here to provide a general account of liberalism, and more 
particularly contemporary variations on the same theme, and then to 
relate this to our discussion of the concepts of liberty and self which 
have gone before. This means pursuing the tension I identified in 
Locke between the 'natural' rights bearing self and the same self as a 
subject of 'constructive' practices. The 'pursuit is all', so to speak, 
because too often claims are made about a set cf problems, or the 
nature of contemporary liberalism as a whole, on the back of a certain 
reading of a history of ideas without any real engagement - just a sort 
of 'airy allusion' - with the contemporary theories themselves.2 
Having just said that I will provide a 'general account' of liberalism, let 
me immediately qualify this: I am not going to summarize each and 
every aspect, but rather indicate both the relation between it and the 
concerns of Locke which we have already examined, and the relevant 
developments in our contemporary understanding of these issues.
7.1 Natural foundations 
W hat is the precise nature of the Lockean bequest to contemporary 
political theory and practice?3 This is a huge question, but, given the 
discussion above, we can trace the nature of the relationship with 
regard to the issues at hand. It is true, though, that any attempt at
Kymlicka who writes that *1 hope to show how my arguments are related to the political 
morality of modem liberals...not seventeenth-century liberalism’. (Liberalism, Community 
and Culture, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 10).
2 The ‘airy’ plaint is Jeremy Waldron’s, ‘Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of 
Freedom’, Southern California Law Review, 62, p. 1100 n. 9. We must tread carefully 
though, since, of course, doing the history of ideas needs no justification on grounds other 
than its own, and barking demands for ‘relevance’ are for the most part, inappropriate. 
However, where historians themselves make claims about specific contemporary issues, 
especially in the case of liberal political theory, given the enormous growth and complexity 
of the subject it would seem right that they be asked to be more precise, or even, to elaborate. 
Contemporary theorists are equally guilty of making ‘airy illusions’ to history; see for 
example, Robert Nozick’s use of Locke in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basil Blackwell,
1974, and on the left, Mark Tushnet’s description of classical liberalism in his ‘Following 
the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles’, Harvard Law 
Review, 96, 1983.
3 One of the most interesting treatments of this question is John Dunn’s, ‘What is Living and 
What is Dead in the Political Theory of John Locke’, in John Dunn, Interpreting Political 
Responsibility: Essays 1981-89, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990, pp. 9-25; I am greatly 
indebted to i t
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providing a basic account of the foundations of modern liberalism 
usually involves a Lockian component, including his account of liberty 
and natural rights, and his contractarianism in general. Furthermore, 
the intersubjective and intrapersonal tensions of Lockian subjects, the 
regulation of which we have examined in some detail, seem to be 
present as well in the concerns of their modern cousins. Here the 
questions are ones of capabilities, self-understandings, and the relation 
between individual and public goods, and the justification of social 
arrangements. Each of these points needs qualification, and to be taken 
in turn.
Let us turn first to questions of nature. There are two parts to Locke's 
argument I want to pick out here. First, remember the essential 
formulation of man's natural liberty and equality:
Men being...by Nature, all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of this 
Estate, and subjected to the Political Power of another, without his own Consent. The 
only way whereby any one divests himself of his Natural Liberty, and puts on the 
bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with other Men to joyn and unite into a 
Community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a 
secure Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater Security against any that are not of 
it. This any number of Men may do, because it injures not the Freedom of the rest; they 
are left as they were in the Liberty of the State of Nature. When any number of Men 
have so consented to make one Community or Government, they are thereby presently 
incorporated, and make one Body Politick ...(II. 95; also 4, 5, 57,119)
This 'natural assumption' subsequently became one of the
conventional ways of talking about rights, and as Barbeyrac noted,
established one of the critical dividing lines between the ancient and
the m odem , since Aristotle, 'for whom such Numbers have so great a
Veneration', was wholly ignorant of the 'just Ideas of the natural
Equality of Mankind...one of the most evident Principles of the Law of
N ature '.4 The second part relates to the extent of this natural equality.
Locke writes;
Though I have said above...That all Men by Nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to 
understand all sorts of Equality: Age or Virtue may give Men a just Precedency: 
Excellency of Parts and Merit may place others above the Common Level: Birth may 
subject some, and Alliance or Benefits others, to pay an Observance to those to whom 
Nature, Gratitude or other Respects may have made it due; and yet all this consists 
with the Equality, which all Men are in, in respect of Jurisdiction or Dominion, one over
4 Jean Barbeyrac, An Historical and Critical Account of the Science o f Morality, preface to 
Samuel Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and Nations, transl. B. Kennet, London, 1749.
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another, which was the Equality I there spoke of, as proper to the Business in hand, 
being that equal Right that every Man hath, to his Natural Freedom, w ithout being 
subjected to the Will or Authority of any other Man. (11.54)
The key phrase here is a 'just precedency' of inequalities of wealth,
esteem, or whatever, according to the variable distribution of (what we
call) 'natural assets'; i.e. 'age', 'birth', 'excellency of parts', and 'virtue'.5
There are two aspects of the first part of these two claims which are 
relevant to modern liberal political theory, at least as I shall present it 
here: the idea of a subjectivity existing prior to social and political 
institutions; and the importance of a process for the justification and 
legitimation of social arrangements. By this I mean some shared basis 
for a structure of human cooperation within which the demands of 
individual and collective recognition are met, or if not, justified in 
such a way as to be at least intelligible if not (ultimately) acceptable to 
all.
Taking the first of these, remember the discussion of Locke's use of 
the state of nature. As a moral fiction and analytical tool, it was 
necessary in developing a perspective from which to judge the legal 
and moral boundaries of political relationships. One result of this 
construction is the translation of the interactions of natural men in the 
state of nature, living according to (and executing) the law of nature, 
into a theory of the rights and obligations of the citizen in civil society. 
The key assumption is that these obligations of civil society are taken 
on voluntarily through the consent of each (male) member to be 
subjected to the political power of another, who then govern in the 
name of the common good and as trustee of the natural powers 
entrusted in him (or them) by the people. The people retain the right, 
if they see fit, to exercise these powers themselves, erect a 'new form', 
or if keeping the conventional form, place it in new hands.6 Any 
rights flowing from civil society - i.e civil rights - flow from the 
foundation of individuals' natural rights and thus ultimately regulate
5 ‘Merit’ is not a natural asset per se, since the context of the passage suggests Locke means it
in the sense of desert, rather than any kind of, say, natural merit.
6 Two Treatises, 11.243.
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the actions of the appointed regulators (the government) themselves. 
The individualist premises of these 'natural facts' (notwithstanding 
their ultimate dependence on a certain relationship to the Deity) are 
important to note. The contractarian approach embodies the 
recognition of distinct individuals or particular selves and their liberty, 
which follows from a strong belief that the source of political authority 
lies in the consent of the people.7 Civil society, so the theory goes, does 
not create this sphere of autonomy, nor supposedly does government, 
rather it is enframed and regulated; that is, whatever social 
arrangements exist do because they have been,' in some way, agreed to. 
The evaluative categories for judging a political system thus do not 
come wholly from within it, but from the outside, from a preexisting, 
prepolitical, (in part) individualist order of value.8 This account is not 
as straightforward as it sounds, but for now I have sought only to 
sketch the general relation between these early modem assumptions 
and their translation into being liberal foundations.
Perhaps suprisingly, the idea of there being natural rights existing 
prior to positive law or social insitutions has not vanished from 
contemporary liberal discourse. Bentham claimed that a right is simply 
'the child of law ' and natural right 'a son that never had a father7, and 
yet he did little to dislodge the appeal of the concept of rights being 
justified somehow beyond the contingencies of human convention.^ 
However, over the centuries, the meaning and force of the 
'naturalness' of rights has changed. Much of contemporary liberal 
political theory has concentrated on what follows from Locke's
7 As Waldron writes: ‘there is something it is like to be me...To talk about my freedom on the 
liberal view, is to talk about the role I play in the determination of my actions, where ‘I* is 
understood in the sense of what it is now like to be me; it is not to talk about the thought or 
decision-making of an entity cleansed of the “false consciousness” that characterizes my 
present experiences and desires* (italics suppressed), Jeremy Waldron, ‘Theoretical 
Foundations of Liberalism*, The Philosophical Quarterly, 37,147,1987, p. 132.
8 See Andrzej Rapaczynski’s always interesting (though I disagree with a lot of it) Nature and 
Politics: Liberalism in the Philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, Cornell 
University Press, 1987, pp. 7-8,62,118-119.
9 In Jeremy Waldron, ‘Introduction*, in Jeremy Waldron ed., Theories of Rights, Oxford 
University Press, 1984, p. 4. See in the same volume Margaret MacDonald, ‘Natural 
Rights*, pp. 21-40, especially pp. 21-23.
323
argument examined above, that is, the importance of the justification 
and legitimation of social arrangements and the extent of government 
action according to the fundamental rights of its citizens. In this 
context, for some, natural rights have become 'human' rights, 
synonymous in the sense that it is conceived as a moral entitlement 
which human beings possess in their natural capacity as humans (i.e. 
as part of a reference group subject to certain political principles).10 It is 
important to be clear about the work that the word 'natural' is doing 
here; unlike Locke's emphasis upon revelation as the basis for our 
subjection to the constraints of natural law, contemporary theorists 
look for their deep sources in fundamental values or principles.
Beyond general assertions as contained in, say, a Declaration of the 
Universal Rights of Man, specific assertions of 'natural rights' or 
'hum an rights' (what are sometimes called 'positive rights') are 
intelligible, but only in terms of being justified according to a specific 
claim about their worth. Expressed as 'rights', they are demands, and 
their justification m ust come in the form of some good reason for the 
desired state of affairs.11 Combining both of these points, a very 
influential account of the fundamental intuition behind early modern 
arguments for natural rights was put forward by H.L.A. Hart in 1955. 
H art argued that if there were any moral rights at all there had to be at 
least one 'natural right', that is, the 'equal right of all men to be free'; 
and being capable of choice, 'Men have this right qua men and not only 
if they are members of some society or stand in some special 
relationship to each other, nor is this right conferred by men's 
voluntary action '.^  Thus H art keeps to the terminology of the natural 
right tradition, but qualifies it by providing a justification for moral
10 See the helpful discussion of 'human rights' and 'rights’ in David Miller et al., The 
Blackwell Encyclopaedia o f Political Thought, Blackwell, 1987, pp. 222-225.443-446. Cf. 
the discussion of human beings and ‘natural persons’, Stanley I. Benn, A Theory of Freedom, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 94-102,236-248.
11 Brian Barry, Political Argument: A Reissue with a New Introduction, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
Great Britain, 1990 (1965), pp. liv-lvi, 149-151; also p. 83.
12 H.L.A. Hart, ‘Are There any Natural Rights?', in Waldron ed. 1984, pp. 77-9,83-88.
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rights on the basis of a deep principle of freedom;13 rights are 
distinguished from other moral considerations in that they protect and 
enhance human freedom.
However, as we turn to more recent liberal accounts, the primacy of 
freedom as its central organizing principle is diffused amongst other 
considerations, and most importantly, the means to combine a concern 
for individual liberty with the good of community and social 
cooperation. Interestingly, this involves a subtle reformulation of the 
assumption of natural liberty to incorporate what the content of this 
right actually is, and the extent to which it is both 'natural' and in part 
constituted by one's embeddedness in the social world. Liberty remains 
a deep principle but is mixed with 'freedom-related' values of 
autonomy and human agency, states of affairs to be achieved rather 
than taken for granted, with rights as preconditions for the possibility 
of valuable moral deliberation and action. We arrive at an important 
point of transformation here between Locke's early m odem  
assumptions and those of the m odem  liberal. Remember that above I 
noted how Locke calls any differentiation in equality between persons 
to do with their natural talents (beyond the assumption of their equal 
right of natural liberty) a 'just precedency'; most m odem  liberals, 
following Rawls (as we shall see), deny any such thing. The reasons for 
doing so, notwithstanding the variations in the details of particular 
arguments, have to do with the strongly egalitarian bent of normative 
liberal argument. Liberals assume that people will practice and pursue 
a wide variety of lifestyles often opposing and even offensive to each 
other, and therefore, if any set of social arrangements are to be 
justifiable and acceptable to as many people as possible, they m ust 
appeal to shared underlying interests and beliefs. Government m ust be 
seen to treat their citizens with equal concern and respect, whatever 
their particular talents, in justifying basic social and political
13 Not to be confused with an absolute or imprescriptible right to liberty; Ibid, p. 78.
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arrangem ents.14 We ignore what flows from these natural talents (i.e. 
the ability to command more resources because one is more powerful 
as a result of these 'natural talents'), because they are the product of a 
natural 'lottery', and thus cannot be the basis for distinguishing 
between people on ethical grounds. Liberals also assume that there is a 
common form of ethical commitment. Everyone, whatever their 
particular commitments, pursues some kind of conception of the good 
life, and thus while people will not necessarily share one another's 
ideals, 'they can at least abstract from their experience a sense of what it 
is like to be committed to an ideal of the good life; they can recognize 
this in others and they can focus on it as something to which political 
justification ought to be addressed'.^ Thus we have a natural interest 
(or what Rawls calls a 'higher-order' interest; see below) in pursuing as 
good a life as possible, 'a life that has all the things that a good life 
should have', as well as an interest in developing and training the 
capacities which can further this interest.16 The issue of moral 
capacities, their development, and their relation to liberal political 
theory is an important one, and I shall return to it below.
Having considered a number of issues with regard to liberalism's 
basic assumptions concerning 'natural' equality and liberty, and the 
need for social arrangements to be justified to individuals who have a 
natural interest in pursuing a conception of the good, it seems fair to 
say that liberalism is, in large part, a theory which is concerned with 
determining the scope of morally legitimate political action. And, 
insofar that it is, a social order is legitimate if it is based on the consent
14 This is a crucial difference between Rawls’ theory and one like Locke’s, for example, as we 
shall see. Though Rawls’ ‘original position’ corresponds to the idea of a state of nature, it is 
different in that it seeks to screen out any natural advantages which might translate into 
superior (i.e. unequal) bargaining advantage. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 
Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 11-12.
15 Waldron 1987, p. 145 (italics suppressed). Ronald Dworkin, ‘Liberalism’, in A Matter of 
Principle, Harvard University Press, London, 1985, p. 191-2. John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 1971, pp. 395-452. See also Will 
Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1990, p. 63-4.
16 Ronald Dworkin, ‘In Defence of Equality’, Social Philosophy and Policy, 1,1983, p. 26. 
See also the helpful discussion in Will Kymlicka, 1989, pp. 11-12.
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of those who live under it, where 'consent7 is broadly construed in the 
context of a wider theory. This brings us back to the second of the 
major Lockian themes relevant to contemporary theorists, his 
contractarianism. Locke's account of the role of consent in his theory is 
notoriously opaque, but the analytical value remains relevant in the 
contemporary context as an expression (however vaguely) of the core 
value of contractarianism.1? Contemporary theorists have avoided 
the Humean charge of incoherence over the origins of any social 
contract by extracting only general formal notions, the main one being 
that a contract is a device or model for thinking about the justification 
of fundamental political principles, where people are assumed to be 
morally equal. Thus any division of political labour, and the social 
arrangements which flow from it, are justified in terms which respect 
people's fundamental moral equality. This is far removed from any 
account of actual or hypothetical consent, for, as Rawls says '[n]o society 
can...be a scheme of cooperation which men enter voluntarily in a 
literal sense'. The terms of cooperation are represented as the object of 
agreement: 'a  society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness 
comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets 
the principles which free and equal persons would assent to under 
circumstances that are fair...its members are autonomous and their 
obligations they recognize self-imposed'.18
I think we are now in a position to offer a preliminary definition of 
m odem  liberalism, similar to the way I offered a definition of 
republicanism at the end of chapter 3 (note that this was not a
17 The best treatment is still John Dunn, ‘Consent in the political theory of John Locke’, in 
John Dunn ed., Political Obligation in its Historical Context, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, chapter 3.Cf. Don Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1989. See also the discussion in Ronald Dwoikin, 
Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press, Cambri 1ge Mass, pp. 150-183; and 
Law’s Empire, Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Fiess 1986, pp. 190-5. Rawls is, of 
course, explicit about identifying his theory as generalizing familiar theory of the social 
contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant’, and that the original position is not 
‘an actual historical state of affairs’ but a ‘purely hypothetical situation’, Rawls 1971, p. 11. 
Note that I don’t mean to say all liberal theories must *uke some contractualist form. See 
Brian Barry, Theories of Justice, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989, pp. 269-71.
18 Rawls 1971, p. 13.
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definition of modern republicanism). I have taken some time to build 
up to this because we should not be glib about the complexity of 
contemporary liberal theories, a tendency unfortunately prevalent 
amongst some critics. I certainly cannot (and would not even attempt 
to) provide a complete account here, rather I shall present the strongest 
picture possible, following the preceeding discussion. Given an 
assumption of fundamental equality, two ends of a general liberal 
continuum' might look like this: (i) a government is neutral on the 
question of the good life because we acknowledge as primary the 
commitment to deal with each other fairly and equally, which rules 
out favouring one conception over another, and (ii) that a government 
cannot be neutral because it cannot treat its citizens as equal human 
beings without a theory of what human beings ought to be.19 Dworkin, 
in 1985, opted for the former, and argued that the constitutive morality 
of liberalism is
a theory of equality that requires orficial neutrality amongst theories of what is 
valuable in life...Liberalism does not rest on any special theory of the personality, nor 
does it deny that most human beings will think that what is good for them is that they 
be active in society. Liberalism is not self-contradictory: the liberal conception of 
equality is a principle of political organization that is required by justice, not a way of 
life for individuals, and liberals, as such, are indifferent as to whether people choose 
to speak out on political matters, or to lead eccentric lives, or otherwise behave as 
liberals are supposed to prefer...20
He has recently altered this somewhat. Now liberal egalitarianism is 
justified in part by an appeal to the 'challenge model' of the human 
good, where we seek to live well by meeting 'valuable' challenges 
within the constraints of justice, though it is still the case that 'the 
government m ust be neutral in ethics' and not rew ard any private 
activity on the grounds that 'one set of substantive ethical values...is 
superior or inferior to others'. 21 We might summarize these
19 See Ronald Dworkin, ‘Liberalism’ (chapter 8), A Matter of Principle, Harvard University 
Press, London, 1985, p.191; also Peter De Mameffe, ‘Liberalism, Liberty, and Neutrality’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19, 3, 1990,253-274.
20 Ibid, p. 203.
21 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Foundations of Liberal Equality*, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 
xi, Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1990, pp. 3-119, at p. 41: for the ‘challenge 
model’ see pp. 57-9. Cf. his ‘Liberal Community’, California Law Review, 3,77, 1989, pp. 
479-504. I do not have the space to elaborate the complexity (and richness) of Dworkin’s 
most recent discussions here, except to say that I have kept them in mind as I worked on this
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supposedly opposing commitments as between the 'procedural' and
the 'substantive'.22 Rawls evokes a similar kind of distinction in his
discussion of the relation between liberalism and what he calls a
'comprehensive' doctrine. Given the 'practical political matter' that
there are a plurality of conflicting and incommensurable conceptions
of the good present in modem democratic societies, justice as fairness,
presented in the context of a form of political liberalism,
is not a conception of justice that is true, but one that can serve as a basis of informed and 
willing political agreement between citizens viewed as free and equal persons...To 
secure this agreement we try, so far as we can, to avoid disputed philosophical, as well 
as disputed moral and religious questions. We do this not because these questions are 
unimportant or regarded with indifference, but because we think them too important 
. and recognize that there is no way to resolve them politically...The absence of 
commitment to...any particular comprehensive ideal (even autonomy - D.I.) is essential 
to liberalism as a political doctrine! The reason is that any such ideal, when pursued 
as a comprehensive ideal, is incompatible with other conceptions of the good, with 
forms of personal, moral, and religious life consistent with justice and which, therefore, 
have a proper place in democratic society...23
I have quoted these passages at length because I think they clearly 
present the values embodied in the contractarian position we have 
been examining up to now, as well as some of the key themes in 
Locke's work, which are constitutive, at least in part, of contemporary 
concerns. Two general points of divergence immediately come to light. 
One is that in our examination of Locke's theory, we never came across 
any straightforward argument for (what we now call) state 'neutrality7 
between competing conceptions of the good, nor any argument calling 
for the abstention from any 'special theory of the personality7 (in fact 
quite the opposite). Claims that these two points represent the 'historic 
core' of liberalism are misleading; they are certainly one strand 
extending out from the 'core', but in the end tell us more about 
contemporary concerns than about any 'ultim ate' foundations of 
Liberalism. Perhaps the deepest shared concern has been the attem pt
chapter.
22 For these terms see Michael Sandel, ‘Tne Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 
Political Theory, 12,1,1984, pp. 81-96: Taylor 1989, and his ‘The Politics of 
Recognition*, in Amy Gutman ed. Multiculturalism and 'The Politics of Recognition (With 
commentaries by Amy Gutman, Steven C. Rockefeller, Michael Walzer, and Susan Wolf), 
Princeton University Press, 1992, pp. 56-7.
23 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
14, 3,1985, pp. 228, 245-246.
329
to discern 'how far [any political community] has contrived to make 
itself a true dvil society and how far it remains (for many or even most 
of its members) just a state of suppressed war'.24
This provides the framework for the next two sections, where we will 
examine some of these points in more detail, and especially the 
relation between the importance of liberty and the accompanying 
account of the liberal personality or self, and probe more deeply into 
the idea of 'political liberalism' as an alternative to comprehensive (or 
substantive, or 'perfectionist') doctrines.
7.2 The personal is political?
A consideration of the concepts of liberty and self in contemporary 
liberal theory would seem to call for an extensive review of the debate 
between communitarians and proceduralists25 (if between different 
liberal tendencies), or separately between liberals and anti-liberal 
communitarians. However, given the concerns of this thesis and its 
emphasis on the similarities between supposedly opposing traditions 
from which, I think, these two frameworks emerge, I will not do so 
here. This is partly because so much has already been said (of very 
high quality26), but mainly because I want to stand back from the 
conventional way of looking at these issues and look at them from a
24 John Dunn, ’Rights and Political Conflict’, in Dunn 1990, p. 59. Cf. Rawls 1985, p. 230 
(section II): ‘The only alternative to a principle of toleration is the autocratic use of state 
power’. See also the characteristically unblinking analysis of Noam Chomsky, most recently 
in his Deterring Democracy, Vintage, London, 1992, especially pp. 351-405 [Cf. his (along 
with E.S. Herman), Manufacturing Consent, Pantheon, 1988]. It is interesting to read 
Chomsky’s claim that the ‘abdication of rights is the hallmark of more free societies’ 
alongside Richard Tuck’s account of the history of rights in Natural Rights Theories, 
Cambridge University Press, 1979.
25 The term is used in the sense I mean here by Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self: The 
Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 85-7): ‘The 
rationality of an agent or his thought is judged by how he thinks, not in the first instance by 
whether die outcome is substantively correct Good thinking is defined procedurally \  See 
also Michael Sandel, ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, Political 
Theory, 12,1984,81-96. Cf. Brian Barry 1965 (1990), pp. 97-100; and Rawls 1971, pp.
84- 5: ‘The intuitive idea is to design the social system so that the outcome is just whatever it 
happens to be, at least so long as it is within a certain range’. See the interesting discussion 
in Stuart Hampshire, Innocence and Experience, Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press, 
1989, pp. 72-78.
26 I am thinking here of the discussions in Kymlicka 1989, pp. 47-99,1990,199-237; and 
S. Mulhall and A. Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1992 
passim.
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different perspective. Given the more complex account of the 
foundations of these issues in earlier chapters, we should be freed from 
having to subscribe to any crude restraints on the scope of liberal 
theory in particular. I will assume that the general contours of the 
strong communitarian argument are familiar enough by now, and 
turn directly to the issues at hand.
One of the weakest claims of communitarian critics of liberalism is a 
phenomenological one. This is that people cannot distance themselves 
(when thinking about the nature of their being or well being) from a 
fundamentally constitutive association or connection with 
community. In an obvious way this is true, since none of us can 
wholly abstract ourselves from the attachments of our communities 
(some of which we may understand to be 'constitutive' beyond any 
superficial sense), but it overstates the nature of this connection by 
implying that they are so fundamental as to be impossible to step 
outside at all. All this really means is that no one can put everything 
that makes them what they are into question at once, which is very 
different from saying that there is some fundamental connection 
which cannot be even partially transcended. It also too easily translates 
this phenomenological fact into a universal claim about all members 
of a given category which holds across the board in all possible kinds of 
communities, that is to say, this nondetachable connection is not 
something simply shared in one sphere of life but in all spheres, and 
thus is inescapably constitutive in relation to our self-understanding in 
these spheres. But of course people do question their constitutive 
attachments on all sorts of different levels and at different times, or, if 
they don't, certainly 'fail' to liv e  up ' to them, or do w hat their tradition 
or culture 'recommends'. This might even include rejecting that very 
identity by repudiating the culture to which it is attached.
And yet the questions are important ones. What role do abstract ideas 
have in the formation of a community and equally, w hat is the role of 
these ideas and the community in the formation of a personal identity
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or self? To what extent does a theory presupposes a kind of person, or 
more accurately, a kind of disposition or relation to self on the part of 
that person (since presumably all political theories need people to 
theorize about)? How does this relate to the identities, character, and 
sense of self-regard of individuals, which for most of us, are after all, 
bound up in complex real histories?
It is an important issue for Rawls too, despite what one would gather 
from the communitarian literature.27 Zeroing in on the derivation of
27 Rawls spends most of the last third (especially sections 65-79) of the Theory of Justice 
working out the role and significance of community in his theory. The argument rests on a 
three part axis between what he calls the ‘Aristotelian principle’ (AP), the primary good of 
self respect, and his formulation of a ‘social union’. The first is a principle of motivation (a 
‘natural fact’; p. 428) which gives content to one’s life plan (beyond being moved simply by 
bodily needs; p. 431), that is, that ‘human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized 
capacities...and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its 
complexity’ (p. 426). There is an intersubjective component here as well, which is that in 
exercising his realized abilities according to a rational plan informed by the AP, his ‘fellow 
associates’ will see the activities as promoting the ‘common interest’ and take pleasure in 
them as displays of ‘human excellence’ (p. 429). This brings us to ‘perhaps the most 
important primary good’, self-respect (or self-esteem p. 440). It has two key elements. 
Firstly, it is a person’s sense of his own value and secure conviction that his ‘conception of 
the good, his plan of life* (Rawls does not distinguish between these two) is worth carrying 
out Secondly, it implies a confidence in one’s ability that one’s intentions can be fulfilled. 
Given this, what supports our sense of self-respect is having a rational plan of life which 
satisfies the AP, and finding our ‘person and deeds appreciated and confirmed by others’ (p. 
440). However, since the potentialities of each are greater than he can hope to realize, 
different persons with similar or complementary capacities may cooperate in realizing their 
‘common or matching nature’. Hence the importance of ‘social unions’; ‘it is through social 
union founded upon the needs and potentialities of its members that each person can 
participate in the total sum of the realized natural assets of others’ (p. 523). From the 
perspective of the principles of justice, there are many different kinds of social unions, which 
are not ranked according to any fundamental value. Yet a ‘well ordered society* 
(corresponding to justice as fairness) is itself a form of social union, though of a special 
kind, since it is a ‘social union of social unions*. It is important to note how these three 
elements hang together, living with others in the context of a diverse range of social unions 
framed by a larger ‘social union of social unions’ provides the communal basis for self- 
respect, and encourages the realization of talents and capabilites people value in themselves, 
and not just instrumentally. The crucial point for Rawls here is that this ‘larger plan’ (the 
public institutions of society), does not establish a ‘dominant end’ to which all individuals 
and associations must be subordinate, but that it is ‘regulative’ such that the constitutional 
order realizes the principles of justice (p. 528).
There are other non-individualistic aspects of Rawls theory which can be brought out, 
especially given the recent emphasis of Rawls that there is no way of trying to derive the 
content of justice within a framework that uses ‘the rational as the sole normative idea’ 
(Rawls 1985, p. 239). See Susan Mollor Okin, ‘Reason and Feeling in Thinking about 
Justice*, Ethics, 99,1989, pp. 229-249, who claims that Rawls theory is founded upon the 
notion of equal concern for others, and that his construction and theory of moral development 
are devices of ‘empathy and benevolence’ (p. 246). Whether this is more clear in the ‘later 
Rawls’ or the ‘early Rawls’ is stuff for the ‘Comment’ pages of obscure political theory 
journals.
332
his theory of justice from a 'thin' theory of the good, Charles Taylor, for 
example, claims that Rawls appeals only to instrumental goods rather 
than 'substantive' ones, and thus is not capable of articulating 'the 
point of the rules which define the right'. Ultimately, 'much 
contemporary moral philosophy', in focusing on 'what it is right to do 
rather than on what it is good to be...has no conceptual space left for a 
notion of the good as the object of our love or allegiance'.28 Both 
points relate to Taylor's wider claims about liberal atomism or, more 
specifically, the 'atomism/instrumentalism complex', where, in 
addition to the above points, individuals are portrayed as self-sufficient 
outside of society, without a need for a communal context within 
which to develop their capacities for self-determination, and are 
generally put at the centre of political theory and action.29 The last 
claim is certainly true of contemporary theories as I have been 
describing them here, though only in a broad sense and in need of all 
sorts of qualification. The other points are more problematic. 
Interestingly, Rawls gives us a picture of the 'atom ist/instrum entalist' 
complex:
Its chief features are first that the persons comprising it, whether they are human 
individuals or associations, have their own private ends which are either competing or 
independent, but not in any case complementary. And second, institutions are not 
thought to have any value in themselves, the activity of engaging in them not being 
counted as a good but if anything as a burden. Thus each person assesses social 
arrangements solely as a means to his private aims. No one takes account of the good of 
others, or of what they possess; rather everyone prefers the most efficient scheme that 
gives him the largest share of assets...Private society is not held together by a public 
conviction that its basic arrangements are just and good in themselves, but by the 
calculations of everyone, or of sufficiently many to maintain the scheme, that any 
practicable changes would reduce the stock of means whereby they pursue their 
personal ends. 30
In the next paragraph he rejects this notion as having anything to do 
with his version of sodal contract theory; in fact in order to understand 
what he takes to be the 'social nature of m ankind' in a non-trivial 
sense, we m ust see it in contrast with this conception of 'private
28 Taylor 1989, pp. 89, 3.
29 Charles Taylor, ‘Atomism*, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2, 
Cambridge University Press,, pp. 187-210; 1989, pp. 195-7, 505-6.
30 Rawls 1971, p. 521-2.
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society': 'human beings have...shared final ends and they value their 
common institutions and activities as goods in themselves. We need 
one another as partners in ways of life that are engaged in for their 
own sake, and the successes and enjoyments of others are necessary for 
and complementary to our own good'.31 Only in what Rawls calls a 
'sodal union' is man complete. There are other issues here which I 
will leave for now, the main point being to emphasize Rawls' 
acceptance of the role of the community in his theory, for both the 
individual and society as a whole. As he says, without an account of 
the value of community, the theory of justice 'cannot succeed'.32 The 
principles of right of the theory of justice must not only permit but 
help sustain the ways of life that citizens can and want to affirm as 
worthy of their 'full allegiance' and love; 'justice draws the limits, the
31 Ibid, pp. 522-3. The real target of those opposed to this ‘atomism/instrumentalist complex’ 
should be kind of argument we find in David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, Oxford 
University Press, 1986, for example p. 341: ‘A just society has no aim beyond those given 
in the preferences of its members. As a co-operative venture for mutual advantage, it enables 
each to promote what she holds good...A just society is concerned only to enable each person 
to realize the greatest amount of her own good, on terms acceptable to all’.
32 Ibid, p. 264; cf. p. 263. It is important to note that Rawls acknowledges the dangers of civic 
alienation and the decline of the participatory ethic in the context of liberal constitutional 
regimes. All citizens are to have an equal right to take part in and determine the laws under 
which they live: ‘If the public forum is to be free and open to all, and in continuous session, 
everyone should be able to make use of it. All citizens should have the means to be 
informed about political issues. They should be in a position to assess how proposals affect 
their well being and which policies advance their conception of the public good. Moreover 
they should have a fair chance to add alternative proposals to the agenda for political 
discussion.’ (p. 225) To ensure the viability of the ‘principle of participation’, 
compensating steps have to be taken, including the subsidization of the means for ‘fair 
public discussion*, and the importance of disallowing disproportionate influence to be 
exercised by powerful ‘special interests’ (pp. 225-6). He recognizes that voting is hardly the 
most effective way of instituting change given its limited scope for implementing or even 
signalling the kind of change envisaged by his ideal theory, (cf. p. 226-7). Thus Rawls has 
no trouble incorporating classical republicanism into his theory, understood as the view that 
if citizens are to preserve their basic rights and liberties which secure the freedoms of private 
life, they must have a sufficient degree of political virtue and take part in public life (John 
Rawls, ‘The Priority of the Right and Ideas of the Good’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17, 
4,1988, pp. 272-3; he refers to Skinner here for his account of classical republicanism).
The point is that these activities are not carried out as a means of expressing man’s essential 
nature, or as the most worthy (morally speaking) form of life, but only as ncecssary for the 
protection of the basic liberties of democratic citizenship which allows each individual or 
association to follow their own conception of the good to reasonable extents. He does, 
however, suggest a form of ‘political liberalism’ which has implications for the way people 
should hold and make claims in the context of public affairs. See below for further 
discussion.
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good shows the point'.33
These points follow from the basic outline of liberalism we examined 
above in section 6.2, where we saw how the pre-modern assumption of 
m an's natural liberty comes to be understood in a different way, that is, 
people are naturally interested in attending to a conception of the good. 
The task of morality changes in accordance with this 'natural fact'; 
given irreducible social heterogeneity, morality is less concerned with 
convincing people to look for the ultimate worthwhile way of life, and 
instead concentrates on providing ways of respecting other people's 
good.3* This characterization is too crude, since the relation between 
social arrangements and the formation of conceptions of the good and 
plans of life are deeply complementary, but the main point is to note 
the work that the concept of liberty is doing. An assumption of liberty 
is linked to an individual's conception of the good. Liberty is required 
for the individual herself to come to know her good whatever it may 
be, or perhaps to question and revise the one she currently holds.35
It is im portant to understand the context within which the liberty 
principle of contemporary liberalism is set, since it certainly does not 
follow that it is exclusively concerned with liberty as such, to the 
detrim ent of other concerns. The distinguishing features of 
contemporary Rawlsian liberal theories are their egalitarian claims in 
relation to the respect for liberty, epitomized by their rejection of any 
fundamental contradiction between the core concepts of equality and 
liberty. They overcome any conceptual opposition by asking questions 
about the possible combinations of 'extents' of liberty and equality, and 
how much of one would have to be sacrificed to achieve a given level 
of another. An extent of freedom would include a range of options to 
be acted upon, w ith an extent of equality dependent on whatever was
33 John Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 14,1985, pp. 251-2.
34 I am indebted here to Will Kymlicka, ‘The Ethics of Inarticulacy* (part of a Symposium on 
Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self), Inquiry, 34, 2,1991, pp. 169-171.
35 John Stuart Mill, ‘On Liberty*, in Richard Wolheim ed. John Stuart Mill: Three Essays, 
Oxford University Press, 1975, especially pp. 17-18. Cf. Rawls 1971, p. 209-211.
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decided as an adequate measure of equality - be it 'primary goods', 
resources, or 'capabilities'. This is necessarily an individual and 
collective interpretative project; that is, the options or range of options 
would in part be constituted by our evaluation of what was most 
valuable according to our considered judgement (s). These evaluative 
judgements about options involve a process of ranking what 'counts' 
for more or less, or, more accurately in this case, which liberties are to 
be equalized or prioritized.36 This is explicitly the motivation behind 
Rawls' lexical ordering of liberty and equality, which he proposes as 'a 
reconciliation of liberty and equality7.37
W hat is the nature of liberty in Rawls' theory? Liberty is a certain 
'structure of institutions, a certain system of public rules defining 
rights and duties', and a 'complex of rights and duties characterizes any 
particular liberty'.38 We are always dealing with a system of liberties in 
which one is dependent on the specification of another, and certain 
liberties are singled out above others for special treatment. Though in 
general we m ight say that a greater liberty is preferable, this holds true 
only for the system of liberty and not for each particular liberty we are 
able to identify. Thus when we read Rawls' first principle of justice, 
that '[e]ach person is to have an equal right to a fully adequate scheme 
of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of 
liberties for all', he is not according a superior position to liberty as 
such but rather to a 'scheme' (or list) of 'basic' liberties.39 These basic
36 This is brought out very well I think by Steven Lukes, Moral Conflict and Politics, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1991, pp. 58-9,65.
37 Rawls 1971, p. 204. For an account which comes to diametrically opposite conclusions (not 
only about Rawls, but Locke too), see Ian Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal 
Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1986.
38 Rawls 1971, pp. 202,203.
39 The first principle was amended from ‘the most extensive total system of equal liberty’ 
(Rawls 1971) to the one quoted above, in ‘The Basic Liberties and their Priority’, The Tanner 
Lectures on Human Values vol. Ill, University of Utah Press,1982), in response to criticisms 
from Hart (‘Rawls on Liberty and its Priority’, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy,
1985, pp. 223-247). Remember that the second principle of justice is that ‘Social and 
economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: they must be (a) to the greatest benefit of 
the least advantaged members of society; and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all 
under principles of fair equality of opportunity. (Rawls 1971, pp. 302-3; ‘Social Unity and 
Primary Goods’, in A. Sen, B. Williams eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge,
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liberties indude political liberty, freedom of speech and assembly, 
liberty of consdence and freedom of thought, freedom of the person 
and the right to hold property, and freedom from arbitrary arrest.40 
According to Rawls, this particular 'scheme' of liberty is superior to the 
second principle of justice (dealing with the social and economic 
inequalities) and may not be made subordinate to it. The only time the 
basic liberties can be sacrificed would be for the greater protection of 
other basic liberties, or when one basic liberty conflicts with another.4!
There are deep reasons for Rawls in prioritizing the basic liberties. 
This is brought out in his 'Kantianization' of the contract procedure 
such that the outcome of the deliberations is an expression of the 
'moral personalities' of the participants.42 A 'Kantian doctrine', says 
Rawls, 'joins the content of justice with a certain conception of the 
person', persons who are free, equal, and capable of acting rationally 
and reasonably, and thus able to take part in 'sodal cooperation'43 
Towards this end, he identifies two 'moral powers' as capacities 
inherent in this conception of the person which enable them to be 
'capable of being normal and fully cooperating members of society over 
a complete life'.44 The first is the capacity to honour the fair terms of 
social cooperation and be reasonable, i.e. have a sense of justice: 'to 
understand, to apply and ...be moved by an effective desire to act from 
(and not merely in accordance with) the principles of justice as the fair 
terms of social cooperation'. [The parenthetical remarks are interesting 
and I shall return to them below]. The second capacity relates to what 
Rawls calls 'the Rational', that is, to what each individual is trying to 
advance on their own behalf, i.e. their 'conception of the good': a 
capacity to 'form, to revise, and rationally to pursue such a
Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 161-2; referred to hereafter as Rawls 1982b.
40 Rawls 1971, p. 61.
41 Joseph Raz (The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1986) has called Rawls and 
Dworkin ‘revisionist theorists* of liberty. See pp. 6-16.
42 John Rawls, ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory*, Journal of Philosophy, 77/9. pp. 
515-72.
43 Ibid, p. 518.
44 Rawls 1982, p. 14.
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conception...a conception of what we regard for us as a worthwhile 
hum an life'.45 Furthermore, these two moral powers are our two 
highest order interests', the interests to realize and exercise the capacity 
for a sense of right and justice, and the capacity to decide upon, revise, 
and rationally pursue a conception of the good.
All of this, as is surely familiar by now, is derived from the 
characterization of the 'original position', about which I shall simply 
say is intended to model the sense in which it is appropriate to regard 
people as free and equal when thinking about justice.46 The restricted 
knowledge built into people's 'situation' in the original position is 
meant to dramatize the substantive importance of the two principles of 
justice; if that person has a higher order interest in the capacity to 
choose, act on, and change their minds about their own conception of 
the good, they need the basic liberties to do so, and if they don 't know 
their own position in the distribution of economic and social goods it 
is rational for them to ensure that inequality is justified only when it 
helps the worst-off. Since the parties are not even supposed to know 
the particular ends of their own conception of the good, they cannot 
choose any specific means to achieve them, and thus pu t forward a list 
of means which would enable them to advance a wide plurality of 
ends - what Rawls calls 'prim ary goods'. The basic liberties of the first 
principle are prioritized among these primary goods precisely because, 
according to Rawls, they protect the capacities of persons which are so 
fundamental, that one could not envisage them being compromised 
for the sake of some other primary good.47
The basic liberties are chosen by the parties and awarded a superior 
place because they are required to advance any conception of the good, 
and necessary for the exercise of the two moral powers which any such 
conception presupposes. Intimately related to this prioritization is the
45 Rawls 1982, pp. 15-6.
46 Rawls 1971, pp. 19,21. See the excellent discussion in S. Mulhall & A. Swift, Liberals 
and Communitarians, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, p. 9. Also Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory 
of Justice, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972; and 1989.
47 Rawls 1982, p. 26.
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practical nature of the primary goods, that is to say, they can 'actually 
provide' a scheme of basic equal liberties to be made part of a political 
constitution and 'instituted in the basic structure of society7, ensuring 
the development and exercise of the highest order interests of all 
citizens.48 There are two things I want to note here: the introduction of 
an element of implementation and practice, and the indication that the 
content of citizenship is related to the protection and enhancement of 
the structure (the 'scheme') of equal basic liberties. One implication is 
that what is being talked about here is a specific way of thinking about 
justice, or more generally, about that aspect of our moral lives which 
takes place in relation to others in the context of the distribution or 
justification of public goods. Another is that when the capacity to 
revise and change our particular values and views on how to live our 
lives is described as a 'higher-order interest' justifying the 
prioritization of the rights of the first principle, it is not merely that we 
are capable of it (i.e. that it is an accurate description of the capacities of 
actual individuals), but that it is in a strong sense the content of the 
conception of liberty which is at stake.49 Contemporary liberal theories 
(at least as portrayed here) fully accept that 'w hat people will want to do 
will depend...on the character of the society in which they live and the 
conditions they find themselves occupying within it'.50 Talk of 
freedom here does in fact tell us something (though not everything)
48 Rawls 1982b, p. 167.
49 Thus it is not surprising that Rawls (1971, pp. 71-2) explicitly rejects a Smithian ‘system of 
natural liberty’: ‘Intuitively, the most obvious injustice of the system of natural liberty is 
that it permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced by these factors (i.e. the prior 
distribution of ‘natural assets’ - natural talents and abilities) so arbitrary from a moral point of 
view... The liberal interpretation, as I shall refer to it..seeks, then, to mitigate the influence 
of social contingencies and natural fortune on distributive shares’. Also, because individuals 
and their associations offer up ‘definite ideals and forms of life’ that have been developed and 
tested ova* time, when drawing up our lifeplans ‘we do not start de novo; we are not required 
to choose from countless possibilities without given structure or fixed contours*. {Ibid, pp. 
563-4) Of course, the hierarchial structure of principles of the theory does not aim at ‘the 
complete specification of conduct’; rather ‘the idea is to approximate the boundaries, however 
vague, within which individuals and associations are at liberty to advance their aims and 
deliberative rationality has free play’ (Ibid, p. 566).
50 Cf. Barry Hindess, ‘Liberty and Equality’, in B. Hindess ed., Reactions to the Right, London, 
Routledge, 1990, p. 24, who in the context of this quote says they don’t.
339
about the content of such a life. To see this we need to see the concept 
of liberty and its role in the structural conditions (and their 
legitimating theories) of civil society as always being in close relation to 
a particular concept of the self and its capacities. It isn 't simply a matter 
of creating the possibility for choice, one has to learn, as it were, to 
'choose w ell'.51 The real problem for contemporary liberals lies in the 
conception of the person built into their theory meeting its reflection 
in the world outside; at first glance, it doesn't seem to recognize itself.
7.3 Liberal circumstances 
I have been focusing on the relation between the well-being of 
individual lives and the well being of the community to which they 
belong as supposed in certain aspects of contemporary liberal political 
theory. This brings us to a question examined in previous chapters 
about the nature of an 'art of government' connected to a proposed set 
of assumptions or theory: w hat is the nature of the art of government 
of contemporary liberalism? This is to ask about the capacities and 
conditions that go along with the kind of person presupposed by liberal 
theories. W hat we find is that these theories presuppose a fair degree 
of dispositional homogeneity, not to be confused with the Walzerian 
account of a deep common understanding regulating the way in which 
particular goods should be distributed (with 'real' diversity only 
occurring between communities rather than within them). In 
presupposing this community of persons, liberalism takes it either as a 
given reality, or something that is itself an 'artefact' of the practices of 
liberal governm ent.51 Thus, in a sense, the assumption of a particular 
self on the part of liberalism with an attendant set of capacities suited 
to the efficacy of that theory is something of a fiction; that is to say, it is 
compelling and yet it is not something we find necessarily to be true.52
51 See the interesting discussion of the need for a liberal ‘context’ of choice in Kymlicka 1989, 
chap. 8, especially pp. 166-8.
51 I am indebted to Barry Hindess here for helping to bring out this claim more sharply. See his 
‘Power and Rationality*: The Western Concept of Political Community’, Alternatives, 17, 
149-63; ‘Liberalism, Socialism, Democracy; variations on a governmental theme’, paper 
presented to the Foucault and Politics Conference, London, September 1992. (1992b).
52 Cf. Hindess 1992.
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Some might baulk at the idea that these capacities are anything more 
than could be assumed to be the property of all relatively sane people - 
a basic rationality and sense of 'reasonableness'. But in political theory 
we are usually dealing with a fairly specific set of capacities relating to 
the ability to judge and act politically in order to get the right results, 
i.e. those demanded by the core values of the foundational doctrine. I 
will develop this more fully below.
Before continuing, however, let me clarify what I mean by referring 
to Rawls' 'circumstances of justice', which touch directly on this issue. 
The discussion of 'circumstances' is important because it is, in effect, 
an implicit admission of the fictional element mentioned above.53 
These are the 'norm al conditions under which hum an cooperation is 
both possible and necessary7 and the conditions under which social 
cooperation requires some kind of mediation by the principles of 
justice.54 The parties have 'roughly7 similar needs and interests, 
though each has his or her own plan of life (or conception of the good; 
Rawls uses them interchangeably, much to his detrim ent it could be 
argued) and and thus they all have different ends and purposes and 
make 'conflicting claims on the natural and social resources available7. 
The interests advanced by these plans are the 'interests of a self that 
regards its conception of the good as worthy of recognition and that 
advances claims in its behalf as deserving satisfaction7, which is 
essentially the ground for what Rawls would later call the 'fact of 
pluralism '.55 Remember our discussion about the conception of the 
person. According to Rawls, people regard themselves as having a 
lugher-order interest7 in how all their interests are shaped and 
regulated by social institutions. They do not think of themselves as 
bound to a 'complex of fundamental interests', but rather as free 
persons who conceive of themselves as 'beings who can revise and
53 I am indebted to Barry 1989, pp. 179-83.
54 Rawls 1971, pp. 126-7.
55 Ibid, p. 127. John Rawls, ‘The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus', New 
York University Law Review, 2,64,1989, pp. 233-55. See Barry (forthcoming). ‘Appendix 
A*.
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alter their final ends and who give first priority to preserving their 
liberty in these m atters'.56 Above all, we need the ability to revise our 
ends and to pursue these revised ends, and so require resources 
pertinent to a wide range of valued ends rather than to a specific or 
preferred conception of the good. This, of course, is roughly Rawls' 
own conception of the good; given ineluctable social diversity, and 
given that our beliefs about value are fallible, the freedom to pursue or 
revise existing projects is important for leading a life that is 'good'. 
There is a fundamental difference between Rawls and the 
'communitarians', then, on the nature of the person; people possess a 
higher-order interest in the capacity to frame and revise their 
conception of the good, and it is this which is important to people and 
is constitutive of their well being. This conception of the person is also 
meant in a specifically political sense. The role of the political 
philosopher is to articulate the 'basic intuitive ideas that are embedded 
in the political institutions of a constitutional democratic regime and 
the public traditions of their interpretation', and the conception of the 
person is linked directly to the implicit consensus of political agency 
present in such a political culture (with the im portant proviso that it is 
not itself part of a comprehensive moral or political doctrine).57 It 
appears that the sources of political agency and capabilities in society 
are in large part the institutions which frame that society, and that this 
agency, in turn, is to hold these same institutions to account. One 
immediate question is how feasible is it to expect the main institutions 
of society to be dependent mainly on the assumed presence of this 
sense of justice in the person of the office-holders, and more generally, 
in the citizens themselves?
This was an issue for Locke too, who grounded his theory of popular 
sovereignty on the hypothesis that political institutions and traditions
56 John Rawls, ‘Reply to Alexander and Musgrave’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88, p.
641.
57 Rawls 1985, p. 225; ‘The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus’, New York
University Law Review, 64, 2,1989, p. 242.
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were derived from, and rested upon, the prior freedom of the people to 
exercise political power themselves. This 'exercise' included the ability 
to know and interpret standards of right, to judge controversies in 
accordance with the law, and execute any 'punishm ent' in proportion 
to the transgression and with regard to proper restraint and reparation. 
There were good political reasons for making this argument too, since 
it WuS claimed by his opponents (usually Anglican Royalists), that 
political abilities and capacities were only acquired in the context of the 
practices and institutions of the community. It was precisely this 
'overlapping consensus' which Locke wanted to avoid, and he claimed 
against it that though the faculty of political judgement was in part 
shaped by practices, it was not exclusively shaped by the dominant 
intuitions of the given political culture, and could be developed in the 
context of oppositional practices and cultures, such as in Dissenter 
communities, amongst whom he had spent time whilst in exile 
himself.58 He was also convinced that given the inherent partiality of 
man, the reason for which civil society was established in the first 
place, the institutions set up to act impartially on behalf of its citizens 
were always, in the end, accountable to these individual judgements; 
i.e. measuring the extent to which people's trust in their governors had 
been abused, and whether or not any violation justified a right (based 
on a primary duty to God) to revolt. This was, of course, premised on 
the institutions of representative government, bu t also on the 
disposition of an activist citizenry on a fairly wide scale.
For Rawls it is a matter of public justifiability; his is a theory 
justifying the political arrangements of a society to its citizens, which it 
can only do, if it is to achieve some kind of consensus, by restricting 
itself to those public and political conceptions which are shared in that 
society. The point of doing this has to do with making the process of 
justification wholly transparent to citizens, given the fact that the basic
58 See above chapters 4-5, and James Tully, An approach to political philosophy: Locke in 
contexts, Cambridge University Press, 1993, especially chp 10, passim.
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institutions of society do have 'long term social effects and importantly 
shape the character and aims of the members of society and the kinds 
of person they are and want to be'. The full publicity condition which 
Rawls draws up is meant to ensure that free and equal persons can 
know and accept those background social influences which 'shape their 
conception of themselves as persons, as well as their character and 
conception of the good'.59 This is linked to a general understanding of 
freedom; a person is free only if those institutions and background 
influences that shape their perception of themselves and their 
conception of the good are transparent. But, remember, this is a 
freedom based mainly on our understanding of ourselves as citizens, 
and not in any comprehensive sense. And this is precisely what makes 
it problematic. The matrix which must be made transparent is that of 
the political community, those 'social institutions' and 'background 
social influences' of the specific political culture within which citizens 
act as political beings. But this assumes that all those institutions 
which influence citizens' characters in the most fundam ental ways are 
to be found in the 'basic structure of a constitutional democratic 
regime', and that people recognize them to be this way.60 Rawls is not 
wholly wrong to assume so, because it is clear that these institutions 
have influence beyond simply their formal structures and remits. 
However, by expressing it exclusively in terms of the transparency of 
the political realm, is he not making it difficult to get a grip on the 
relations of power that influence people's deepest aspirations and 
which are only related to public culture in complex, subterranean 
ways?61 Rawls hopes that once the principles of justice are public, they
59 Rawls 1980, pp. 538-9.
60 Rawls 1985, p. 228.
61 By this I mean it is assumed that political power can be pinpointed according to a traditional 
picture of legitimate government in constitutional democracies, that is to say, that power is 
held in a concentrated form and executed directly according to various branches of government 
Transparency occurs when all those aspects of legal and social coercion which affect the plans 
and deep aspirations of individuals are visible, and that if they agree to them, they do so in 
light of the condition of Tull publicity’. But what of those powers which are not as our 
picture of constitutional democracy presupposes, but nevertheless have deep effects on that 
basic structure; for example, multinational capital, or the policies of powerful multinational
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come to assume a 'wider role in public culture' and foster the very 
conception of the person it presupposes: the 'citizens are made aware of 
and educated to this conception. They are presented with a way of 
regarding themselves that otherwise they would most likely never 
have been able to entertain'.62 There are even a set of political virtues, 
aside from the obvious sense of justice, which the state has an interest 
in fostering, and which characterize those kinds of conduct and 
judgement that are essential to sustaining fair cooperation between 
citizens so understood (such as toleration and m utual trust). For 
Rawls, the importance of the right 'social milieu' in producing the 
right kind of self-understanding is obvious, and not surprising, for the 
key question which he must try and answer is not simply why we need 
justice, but why we have good reason to act in accordance with it. 
(Hence the importance of the parenthetical remarks I noted above in 
section 6.3).63
In part the move to identifying a 'political' liberalism is a means of 
restricting the scope of the theory for Rawls, and thus restricting the 
applicability of his conception of the person - it is a conception which is 
only relevant in particular circumstances. This opens the possibility of 
accepting the principles of justice even whilst being attached to some 
other comprehensive doctrine, of seeing the relevanc of liberal values 
only in the context of politics.64 However, I think this does have
financial institutions, such as central banks or the World Bank? Could a worked-up theory of 
international justice conceivably have a ‘global publicity condition*? See James Tully, 
‘Introduction*, John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, 1983, pp. 14-16; Michel 
Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Essays and Interviews, London, Harvester Press, 1988, 
pp. 78-108; and Hindess 1990, pp.25-31.
62 Rawls 1980, p. 553.
63 As Barry (1989, p. 394) makes clean ‘a Rawlsian would not simply regard a law as a tariff 
setting out the penalty for certain conduct if he is caught and convicted; rather he would be 
moved to compliance by the sense of justice*.
64 Rawls 1985, pp. 224-S. But note that ‘the political* is not itself an absolute good: ‘We need 
not establish the absolute importance of political good, only that it is a significant good 
within a political conception of justice*. Rawls 1988, pp. 251-76. Thus Owen Flanagan in 
his excellent book (Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 1991) treads a thin line when he claims that 
Rawls* conception of the person is ‘akin to the Aristotelian one* (pp. 126-7). Aristotle held 
that human beings woe by nature political (Ethics, 1169bl6-19; Politics, 1252b31-1253a7) 
Anyone deprived of a chance at political office suffers a diminution in good living, since to
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implications for self-understanding as a whole, because even though it 
might not be a conception of the person "all the way down', it is a 
substantive point about the nature of citizenship (Rawls is in part 
saying that this is not only what citizenship is like but should be like), 
and citizenship is the means by which we are implicated in the 
political and social order of the community within which our person - 
all they way down - lives.65 But can the way we conceive of ourselves 
as citizens be hermetically sealed off from our other concerns and self- 
understandings? It is clear for Rawls that this is something 'latent' in 
the public political culture, but also something that can (and m ust be) 
fostered and learnt; that is, citizens must learn to revise and pursue 
conceptions of the good as free and equal people. Indeed the liberties of 
citizenship are absolute in this regard.66 Crucially, this means that 
people's decisions about their life-style m ust be adjusted to w hat they 
can 'reasonably expect', and they must recognize that the weight of 
their claims is not given by the 'strength or intensity of their 
wants...even when these are rational'.67 This is w hat it means for 
people to 'conform their conceptions of the good to w hat the principles 
of justice require'.68
W hat shape does this relation to self take? As a num ber of recent 
commentators have pointed out, it is (at least) a bifurcated one, 
between a public political self and a private 'personal' o n e 69 That is,
be alienated from being able to act with effect in the affairs of one’s polis was to be alienated 
from the grounds of good living itself. See the enlightening discussion in Martha 
Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, pp. 345-353. Rawls explicitly rejects the 
Aristotelian line in 1988, pp. 272-3.
65 I am therefore not convinced by Kymlicka’s easy distinction between ‘collective activities’ 
and ‘political activities' - the latter being things organized and accounted for ‘through’ the 
state, the forma- operating ‘below the state’ (amongst which he includes universities, the 
mass media, and trade unions). See Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An 
Introduction, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 221.
66 Rawls 1971, pp. 3-4.
67 Rawls 1980, p. 545.
68 Rawls 1971, p. 31. Kymlicka 1989, p. 37.
69 Mullhall and Swift (1992, p. 209) say it entails a kind of ‘schizophrenia’, and Bernard 
Williams (‘Left-Wing Wittgenstein\Common Knowledge, 1,1,1992, pp. 33-42) that it 
introduces elements of ‘dissociation’ or ‘alienation’ at the social level, and generates a form of 
citizenship motivated by fairness, but ‘not much more’. See also the discussion in Barry
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each citizen m ust suspend those deep beliefs that relate to their own 
comprehensive conceptions of the good (which might even give their 
life its coherence and integrity), when engaging in public life as 
citizens, a category they must recognize as distinct from their identity 
as, say, a Muslim or Inuit. Moreover, when the latter identity comes 
into conflict with the former political conception, the political 
conception always wins.70 It is not a matter of denying that this kind of 
cognitive act is even possible (as some communitarians seem to 
imply), but rather gauging its plausibility as an acceptable condition on 
the part of those for whom it is something to be consciously done; that 
is, understanding the nature of its cost. I suggest that the classic 
examples that crop up in liberal political theory seminars at this point - 
of the 'religious-fundamentalist-nazi-spouse-beating-child-molester' 
kind - should be set aside in favour of a more subtle evaluation of 
w hat a liberal theory would ask of "real' distinct cultures in the world 
around us. Even in the case when the recognition of the deep 
structures of cultural value are brought into a 'strong' liberal theory, 
they are treated just as structures and little more - the sources for a 
'context of choice' (the 'definite ideals and forms of life that have been 
developed and tested by innumerable individuals, sometimes for 
generations').71 Cultures only survive in any meaningful way if those
1989,‘Appendix C \ pp. 393-400.
70 Rawls 1980, p. 544.
71 Rawls 1971, pp. 563-4. Kymlicka 1989, pp. 166-78. One of Kymlicka’s clearest 
statements of the extent of recognition of cultural structures can be found on p. 197 (1989): 
‘supporting the intolerant character of a cultural community undermines the very reason we 
had to support cultural membership - that it allows for meaningful individual choice’. (my 
emphasis) Cf. p. 59-60: ‘there are two aspects to die liberal conception of freedom of 
association...Liberals have historically insisted (quoting Rosenblum) “that the public sphere 
should limit not only the political power of religious groups but also the power private 
groups exercise over their own members”. Tolerance defends the first of these components of 
freedom of association, but not the second. ..Plurality and mutual respect do not seem 
sufficient to defend the full range c f liberal freedoms* (my emphasis). Both quotes point to 
the problems of Kymlicka’s account It is dubious to suppose that people value cultural 
‘structures’ mainly because they allow for ‘meaningful choice’; liberals might but as a 
general reason for everyone it is absurdly unrealistic, and probably just plain wrong. The 
second quote is more revealing, since it admits that the point about liberal cultural structures 
is that they help in the protection and enhancement of specifically Liberal freedoms. Cf. the 
discussion in Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986, 
p. 424, who admits that though a liberal perfectionist would be justified in pursuing a policy
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who belong and identify with these 'structures' are able to suspend this 
aspect of their being when engaging in public discussion, or, if they are 
lucky, when their practices don't happen to conflict with those of a 
dominant liberal culture. There is a real dilemma here and I don 't 
want to imply that it is easily dissolved one way or the other: exactly 
which practices - and the sense of identity and attachment therein - can 
be shaved from cultural structures w ithout precipitating disintegration 
or collapsing them altogether? Careful empirical study might not even 
provide an answer here because the question would still remain as to 
who is to decide the place of the priority of cultural membership to 
'political' membership. (This might depend on the extent of our belief 
with regard to the justification of sodal arrangements; m ust they be 
acceptable in some form to every citizen?) Of course we might not 
really care about the costs of imposition, or if not so callous, claim that 
any intervention, so long as it was based on the right kind of liberal 
theory, would not cause fatal cultural damage, and simply justify it on 
the basis of our claims about the necessary universality of our 
tradition. This is one aspect of the inheritance from Locke's theory of 
toleration; there are times (the occurrence and extent of which are 
notoriously ambiguous in Locke) when the overall value of the 
political order outweighs any particular claim or course of action, 
whatever the cost of that 'lost7 practice to the coherence of that sect.72 
But this does not provide any internal reason for the other party to 
accept your course of action, nor is it conducive to them describing 
what you have done as 'reasonable' in light of the circumstances.
W hat w ould the inner life of a liberal be like? Rawls's solution calls 
for people to treat their own comprehensive views as private opinions 
(or whatever), and to not impose them  on others. The claim seems to
of assimilation against non-liberal communities within in liberal states, wrenching them out 
of their cultural environment might make it impossible for them to have any subsequent 
meaningful life.
72 Note, though, that if this power was abused, there was a de facto and de jure case for an 
appeal to the right of revolution. The point at which legitimate power became ‘abuse’ was 
precisely the judgement individuals must be capable of perceiving and acting upon.
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be that these core 'political principles', as the constraints of social unity 
(a 'social union of social unions'), are not overriding to the extent that 
private actions and associations are transformed and reconstructed in 
the light of liberal public principles. But this isn't entirely clear. The 
liberal appears to be in a different category here. She can say that there 
is a difference between claims about how people should live their lives 
and judgements about how people should be treated by their fellow 
citizens and by the state. Her comprehensive doctrine, political 
liberalism, understood here in the specifically Rawlsian sense, lays 
claim only to the sphere of politics and the ideas latent in that shared 
public culture, and thus supposedly does not rely on a wider doctrine 
of what a good hum an life is. But as I mentioned above, I think this 
does in fact have a consequence for the way in which people are 
expected to hold their beliefs in the 'non-political' realm. For the most 
part, it means injecting a fair degree of scepticism into their world­
view, as is pointed out (it seems) by Rawls himself, and other 
comm entators.73 This is because they m ust come to believe that the 
moral power to form and revise a conception of the good is not just a 
good, but one of the higher-order interests of hum an beings in general. 
And thus they m ust come to believe that though they hold their 
comprehensive doctrine close to heart, they cannot act on its central 
tenets unless the practices flowing from it happen to be compatible 
with (fundamentally) liberal ones. Though the liberal is not a sceptic in 
the strongest sense, the need to distance oneself from particular beliefs 
remains an im portant element of contemporary liberal arguments. 
And insofar as it asks people to act in such a way in public matters 
whatever may be true of their 'non-public' identity, it is profoundly 
unconvincing; if not to you, than certainly to the people to whom it is 
addressed.
Perhaps I can summarize the two versions of a liberal self and its
73 Cf. Brian Barry, 'How Not to Defend Liberal Institutions’, in Liberty and Justice: Essays in 
Political Theory, vol. 2,1991, pp. 23-39.
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attendant capacities that have been floating around above.
One version could be (LI):
Though perhaps having an overarching or comprehensive conception of the good that 
organized and informed their 'personal' life, they would have to accept that their 
fellow citizens would not necessarily be convinced by their arguments emerging out of 
this comprehensive good and carried over to the political sphere, and it would be 
unreasonable of them to think that this should be otherwise. They would also have to 
be prepared to accept a reasonable objection to their conception, regardless of where, or 
from whom, it came.
And the other (L2):
There is a liberal comprehensive ideal to live up to. The capacity to choose is more 
basic and more important than what is chosen. Because I engage with my character, 
commitments, and projects critically and interpretatively, I do not accept social norms 
and practices as given, and expect others to be the same way; that is I respect persons 
with reflexive capacities. I recognize an abstract personhood in myself and others and 
pay my highest allegiance to impartial (and impersonal) rules of law. I forsake any 
all-embracing memberships derivative of a homogeneous local community, and 
embrace the membership of overlapping communities and the abstract community of all 
persons in an 'Open Society'.
There appear to be real differences. No doubt L2 is more robust than LI 
and does away with the theoretical niceties concerning the possibilities 
of grounding liberal conduct in the circumscribed practices of m odem  
liberal democracy. Equally, LI seems more 'tolerant' than L2 since it 
precludes the (seeming) obliteration, or at least marginalization, of 
'personally' held comprehensive conceptions of the good, or even local 
communities tout court. We do in fact see this kind of doctrinal 
schematization w ithin the literature.74 And yet they are not really that 
far apart in at least two key respects. Firstly, they both require that 
private commitments have a certain form and fall w ithin a certain 
range. L2 is pretty straightforward in that regard; all private 
commitments are subject to a wide ranging revisionist and sceptical 
cognitive apparatus, and are not worthy of being held if they cannot be 
so submitted. If, in the case of LI, private comprehensive conceptions 
are m eant simply to be shunted aside from the process of public 
justification, then this too requires a belief system and an attendant set 
of capacities which will allow one to do precise !y that, especially if 
those private conceptions have elements which necessarily overlap in
74 Cf. William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State, 
Cambridge University Press, 1991.
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contradictory ways with one's own perception of oneself as a public 
actor (i.e. as a citizen), or with the maintenance of that order itself 
(where the perception is that of other parties). Secondly, both rely on a 
(hopeful) socialization thesis concerning the proliferation of their 
accounts in the institutional matrices of real political and social 
structures. Again, L2 is pretty straightforward towards this end; 
liberalism is a regime, and its core principles shape the character of the 
community all the way down. Stephen Macedo sums this up well, I 
think, w hen he writes that liberalism is about 'agreement on values 
that are by no means neutral, and those public values have a private 
life'.75 LI is more surreptitious in its designs, almost neo-Straussian.
For Rawls, because people usually hold their comprehensive views in 
a loose way, those who go along with liberalism merely as a modus 
vivendi don 't immediately see that a relationship can develop between 
their personal values and the governing liberal principles. In other 
words, they come to embody the principles through habit rather than 
any reasoned argum ent directed at those personal comprehensive 
conceptions. This is a curious development for an account so 
dependent on subjects developing a highly 'reasonable' disposition, 
though one with a long lineage in the history of political thought, as 
we have seen in the chapters above.76
The ideas of citizenship expressed in the two versions of liberal 
conduct mentioned above are certainly an important part of liberal 
democratic societies, but they do not capture how, in fact, these 
institutions operate.77 Hence the importance in Rawls' theory, and in 
other Rawlsian theories, of the 'circumstances' of the application of 
their core principles. As a result there is something deeply pessimistic
75 Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 257.
76 John Rawls, ‘The Priority of the Right and Ideas of the Good’, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 17,1988, pp. 274-5. See also Macedo 1990, p. 65; and compare the discussion of 
political theory and its ‘by-products’ in Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of 
Rationality, Cambridge University Press, 1985, especially at II.9.
77 Barry Hindess, ‘Taking Socialism Seriously’, Economy and Society, 20,4, p. 376.
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about the whole process78, depending as it does upon the propagation 
of a set of dispositions it must hope people come to understand on 
their own and apply to their dealings with others in the public realm, 
or be inculcated and enacted by vigorous legislative and educational 
activism which runs the risk of at least undermining the basis of social 
cooperation across multiple pluralities, if not betray some of the core 
principles of the doctrine itself. In this sense it is a Faustian option; 
instead of relying on the theoretical and psychic force of a claim of 
impartiality emerging from the rational arguments therein, it turns to 
the means of the direct transformation of the rationalities themselves. 
Liberal theory is thus never just a matter of saying (to borrow from 
Charles Taylor in a different context) 1 don't understand', or 'develop 
your intuitions', but more radically, 'change yourself'.79
7.4 Perfecting liberal autonomy 
In the discussion up to now about the relation between liberty and 
self in contemporary liberal theory, and particularly in that of Rawls, 
the reader might have been wondering when and where the discussion 
of autonomy would begin. I hinted at it above when I said that 
contemporary liberals had by and large displaced a commitment to 
liberty as such in favour of 'freedom-related values' like autonomy. It 
is time for me to explain more of what I mean by this. I have left it 
until now  for two main reasons. Firstly, it is sometimes assumed that 
the core value of liberalism is about recognizing, enhancing, and
78 Which I think accounts for the rather crude charges made against Rawls that the kind of 
political theory he has spawned is generally irrelevant to (or too distant from) the modem 
political world. The most brazen example of this charge is made by John Gray (‘Against the 
New Liberalism: Rawls, Dworkin, and the emptying of political life*, Times Literary 
Supplement, 1992, pp. 13-15) who accuses Rawls of attempting to build ‘Kantianism in one 
country*, based not on the intuitions of modem liberal democracies, but the ‘unexamined 
intuitions of the American academic nomenklatura'. For a different view see B. Barry,
‘Social Criticism and Political Philosophy’, in Barry 1991, pp. 9-22, especially p. 22: ‘The 
Rawlsian approach of identifying principles of broad scope and universal aspiration and using 
them to attack entrenched inequalities has to its credit the success - partial but still significant 
of the anti-racist and anti-sexist movements within the past thirty years*.
79 See Charles Taylor, ‘Self-Interpreting Animals’ and ‘What is Human Agency’, Human 
Agency and Languge: Philosophical Papers Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 
15-76.
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protecting individual autonomy.8*) This puts an inordinate amount of 
emphasis on choice, such that whatever is not chosen cannot be 
worthy of our dedication or involvement, or be a source of value to us; 
this entails saying something like, 1 am autonomous if the values that 
guide m y life are my own'. But this is vastly overstated and leaves all 
the im portant questions unanswered. We can imagine another kind of 
liberal theory which accepted the idea that no conception of the good 
should be given special advantage at some higher constitutional level, 
but isn 't necessarily a theory wholly organized around the principle of 
autonomy. The idea here is that any claim based on a strong principle 
of individual autonomy takes its place in the political forum where it 
competes against other principles or arguments as to the scope of its 
application as an organizing principle in society.81 Note that this is not 
an argum ent for the elimination of autonomy as a value, or even for 
its displacement at the center of liberal concerns, rather it is to question 
whether it can reasonably be said to be the organizing principle of 
liberal theories instead of just a principle which liberals value highly. 
The reason for having left this unsaid until now is to emphasize the 
fact that it is something that has to be argued for rather than assumed, 
and that one could quite plausibly derive other principles according to 
variations on the 'core' values of liberalism. The distance between my 
versions of LI and L2 might be said to represent two liberal variations.
80 This is Kymlicka’s argument: ‘we lead our life from the inside, in accordance with our 
beliefs about what gives value to life...we [have] to be free to question those beliefs, to 
examine them in the the light of whatever information, examples, and arguments our culture 
can provide. People must therefore have the resources and liberties needed to lead their lives 
in accordance with their beliefs about value’ (Kymlicka 1990, p. 204). It is also arguably 
Rawls* position, given the role of the ‘higher order interests’ (see Mullhall & Swift 1992, 
pp. 2S2-3 for a summary of this). However, strictly speaking, substantive moral reasoning 
concerning the principles of justice has normative priority over individual autonomy. In 
drawing up their life plans individuals have to take the constraints of the principles into 
account See Rawls 1971, p. 31.
81 This is roughly the kind of argument that theories of justice as impartiality make, see T.M. 
Scanlon, ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism*, quoted in Barry 1989, p. 274. It is also the 
implication of feminist political theory that the idea of autonomy defined as the free pursuit 
of one’s projects must be completely rethought, given the way responsibilities to others 
(beyond the fair provision of equal resources) and the role of caring for dependents etc., are 
understood. These arguments seem to me utterly convincing, though I can’t pursue them 
hoe.
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Secondly, it seems to follow from assuming that autonomy is the core 
doctrine of political liberalism par excellence, that it is "the special 
character of autonomy that one cannot make another autonomous.
One can bring the horse to the water but one cannot make it dr ink". 82 
However, as we have seen in chapters 4-5 and above, this is far from 
having been a necessary constraint on what liberal theories have 
attempted to do both in the past and now. At the very least it is an 
ambiguity that extends out from the historic core of liberalism. We 
find that even those liberal theorists for whom autonomy is explicitly 
the foundational value, presume more than they argue for. I want to 
now concentrate mainly on the tension between an assumption of 
autonomy and the conditions necessary for its flourishing. In doing so, 
I will touch generally on the relation between "perfectionism" and 
liberalism.
It is in the recent work of Joseph Raz that we find perhaps the 
strongest and most sophisticated argument for the importance of 
personal autonom y in an account of liberal freedom.83 For Raz, an 
autonomous person is "author of his own life. His life is, in part, of his 
own making...A person is autonomous only if he has a variety of 
acceptable options available to him to choose from, and his life 
(becomes) as it is through his choice of some of these options'.84 The 
key points in this otherwise standard account are the appearence of the 
phrases "in part" and "acceptable options'. The former signals that Raz is 
realistic about addressing his theory to real, need-driven hum an beings 
rather than to some abstract construction. Indeed Raz qualifies his 
account by noting that the authorial m etaphor is not m eant to "conjure
82 Joseph Raz, The Morality c f Freedom, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 407.
83 Ibid, passim. This is a profound and complex work which I have no intention of 
summarizing or paraphrasing hoe. My discussion of it will be highly selective and only 
directly relevant to the issues at hand. See the excellent article by Jeremy Waldron, 
‘Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of Freedom*, Southern California Law 
Review, 62,1989, pp. 1098-1152; as well as the helpful reply by Raz (‘Facing Up’, pp. 
1153-1235) in the same issue. But see also Vinit Haksar, Equality, Liberty, and 
Perfectionism, Oxford University Press, 1979.
84 Ibid, p. 204.
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up ' the image of a 'regimented' person who decides at a young age 
'w hat life to have and spends the rest of it living it out according to 
p lan '.85 W hat matters for Raz is not so much the genesis of one's 
projects, but that we recognize the possibility of changing them or 
continuing with them, that when we choose we do so for good reasons, 
and that we identify with our choices.86 The second point indicates 
that it is not just any set of possible options which constitute the 
possibility of autonomy, but an 'acceptable' set, a criterion that has 
im portant political implications, since Raz goes on to say that 'the 
autonomy principle permits and even requires governments to create 
morally valuable opportunities and to eliminate repugnant ones'.87 
The deep point here is that treating citizens with equal respect does not 
entail abstaining from questions about the validity of options to choose 
from, but from 'treating one another...in accordance with sound moral 
principles...One would be showing disrespect to another if one ignored 
moral considerations in treating him '.88 Thus a person's well being 
depends ultimately on the value of her beliefs, and not on her belief in 
their value.89
Autonomy is understood both as a set of capacities and an 
achievement. In the latter sense, people are autonomous if their lives 
are of their own making, with the qualifications noted above. In the 
former sense, someone is autonomous if he can determine the course 
of his life, and if he lives in an environment where self-determination 
is possible. Thus the 'conditions of autonomy' m ust encompass both 
individual and environm ental elements; adequate individual 
cognitive capacities (minimal rationality, the mental faculties to plan 
actions etc), as well as the opportunity to 'actually use' these capacities 
to 'choose w hat life to have' that is, '[t]here must...be adequate options
85 Ibid, p. 370; cf. 371, and 387-88 where he rejects an ‘exaggerated’ concept of autonomy, i.e. 
a ‘doctrine of arbitrary self-creation based on the belief that all value derives from choice 
which is itself not guided by value and is therefore free’.
86 Ibid, pp. 290-1. Waldron 1988, p. 1112.
87 Ibid, p. 417.
88 Ibid, p. 157.
89 Ibid, p. 298. Mulhall & Swift 1992, p. 255.
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available for him to choose from'. The final element is that this choice 
be free from 'coercion and manipulation by others', where 
manipulation is understood as perverting 'the way [a] person reaches 
decisions, forms preferences or adopts goals'.90 
This establishes a key problem for Raz which distinguishes him from 
other 'autonom y theorists' and anti-perfectionists. How can Raz 
combine a concern for autonomy and the non-coercive choice of life 
plans with a robust perfectionism? Remember that Rawls does not 
disagree with the perfectionist that the good is what gives the point to 
principles of right, but that they disagree over how to best promote 
different people's good. Thus his 'contract doctrine' is similar to 
perfectionism in wanting to encourage certain traits of character, 
providing a conception of the person, and taking into account things 
other than the importance of utility satisfaction, but it does so without 
'invoking a prior standard of hum an excellence'.91 For Rawls, our 
essential interests are harmed (or in Kymlicka's phrase, we can't live 
our life 'from the inside') when a particular view of the good is 
enforced, since this means people are not free to choose their own 
conception.92 For both Kymlicka and Rawls, it is particularly insulting 
to a person's essential interests that it be the coercive power of the state 
that enforces any particular conception of the good, given that it is not 
even clear that these conceptions of the good or forms of life need state 
power or approval to exist (though Kymlicka has a more nuanced 
argum ent here).93
90 Ibid, pp. 373, 377-8.
91 Rawls 1971, pp. 327-8.
92 See Kymlicka 1989, pp. 33-6; and 1990, p. 204-5.
93 Rawls 1971, p. 328-9,543. Kymlicka accepts the importance of there being worthwhile 
cultural structures and options for all, but denies that this entails rejecting neutralist claims. 
See Kymlicka 1990, pp. 218-230; cf. 1989, p. 81, chp. 8 passim. Margaret Moore 
(‘Liberalism and the Good Life’, Review of Politics, 4,53,1991, p. 688) completely 
misrepresents Kymlicka’s position when she claims that he criticizes ‘the neutral...starting 
point associated with many contemporary liberal theories’ (citing Rawls 1971, pp. 260-63, 
587 as representative of this position). This is, in fact, one important difference which 
Kymlicka acknowledges explicitly as distinguishing his position from Raz’s. (loc cit; as 
well as in his ‘Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality’, Ethics, 99,1989, p. 903:
‘While liberalism need not be committed to neutrality in all times and places, the relationship 
between the culture and the state in our society makes neutrality particularly appropriate for
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Raz's main strategy is to insist that supporting valuable ways of life as 
a social activity is required if we are to ensure the survival of many 
'cherished aspects' of our culture, i.e. the social conditions of freedom.94 
This flows from his general account of the social dimensions of 
individual freedom, which describes, how the comprehensive goals of 
individuals are only possible if based on 'existing social forms...on 
forms of behaviour which are in fact widely practiced in...sodety'.95 For 
Raz this is entirely consistent with 'experimentation, and with 
variations on a common theme and the like', since the public 
perception of these social forms possesses an 'internal richness and 
complexity'. And yet though a person might transcend the social form 
and give it their 'individual stam p', even then 'the distance they have 
travelled away from the shared form is...the most significant aspect of 
their situation' .96 Perfectionist practices support the valuable forms of 
the good available in society, it is a public activity which does not 
stand-off from conceptions of the good; quite the opposite. The crucial 
move for Raz is to alleviate the anti-perfectionist fear that 
perfectionism always means the impostition of one form of life on any 
other and more specifically, entails the use of coercive political power 
by a 'm oral majority' against recalcitrant social 'dissidents'. Raz meets 
this head on: 'A moral theory which recognizes the value of autonom y 
inevitably upholds a pluralistic view. It admits the value of a large 
num ber of greatly differing pursuits among which individuals are free 
to choose'.97 It does not follow that perfectionism m ust take the form 
of some morally rigorous view, in fact, autonomy as an ideal means 
being committed to moral pluralism. If, as we have seen, a person is
us*. Cf. 1990, p. 229: *1 believe that liberal neutrality is the most likely principle to secure 
public assent in societies like ours, which are diverse, and historically exclusionary.
94 Raz 1986, p. 162.
95 Ibid, p. 308.
96 Ibid, pp. 309-10,312-3. This limits the scope of change that can occur in society, as Raz 
makes clear (p. 427): ‘Since values are grounded in concrete social forms there is no room for 
radical political action to secure a fundamental change of social conditions. Politics is the art 
of gradual amelioration.’
97 Ibid, p. 381.
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autonomous only when she can be author of her own life, it would 
follow that having only one option is not enough to fulfill the 
conditions of autonomy, even in part. Of course, Raz stipulates 
further that the choice be between not just any options, but 'valuable' 
or good options. Raz argues that, whatever governments do, whether 
following principles of neutrality or anti-perfectionism, they do so for 
moral reasons and not on the grounds of moral skepticism. Thus, if in 
the 'real w orld' (as Waldron puts it 98) perfectionist principles are 
invoked to defend discrimination against homosexual relationships, 
atheism, or the use of harmless narcotics, Raz can argue that these are 
not immoral ways of living and their being banned or circumscribed is 
an abuse of perfectionism. He justifies this partly through a modified 
version of Mill's harm  principle, tacked on, as it were, to his principle 
of autonomy. Following Mill, he accepts that government cannot use 
coercive means (for example, the criminal code) to discourage people 
from committing 'victimless immoralities'. Perhaps inconsistently, it is 
justified on both prudential and moral grounds; the criminalization of 
'victimless crimes' is ruled out by a concern for autonomy (it expresses 
a 'relation of domination' and 'disrespect' to the individual [s] 
concerned), and also because there is no 'practical way7 to ensure that 
only 'repugnant7 choices will be restricted, and not other (non- 
repugnant) ones as w ell.9 9  But instead of seeing the harm  principle 
mainly as a way of curtailing the freedom of government to enforce 
morality, as 'a principle about the proper way to enforce morality7, it 
might allow for certain positive state actions.100 It remains the case 
that governm ents can use 'coercive' methods to promote the 
conditions of autonomy, but only 'non-coercive' ones to combat
98 Waldron 1989, p. 1130.
99 Raz 1986, pp. 418-9. Sec his more recent formulation in ‘Liberalism, Skepticism, and 
Democracy, Iowa Law Review, 74,1989, pp. 761-86.
100 Raz 1986, p. 415. For another account of Mill’s harm principle which goes beyond its 
strictly negative form and includes a more ‘positive* sense, see Brian Barry (forthcoming), 
‘Appendix B*. The positive principle states that it is a sufficient condition for preventing an 
act that it has directly harmful consequences, where the risk of harm is not (reasonably) 
outweighed on some conception of the good by gains inseparable from that risk.
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'immoralities' (we shall discuss his idea of coercion below). If one feels 
one can make judgements and even be right about the moral 
considerations lying at the base of all political action, judgements 
which anti-perfectionists make with regard to the basic institutions of 
society, why not about the character of the good life and the realm of 
the 'art of life', i.e. what makes up a 'successful, meaningful, and 
worthwhile life'?101
This brings us to the vexed question of coercion. Raz is upfront about 
its role in his argument: Terfectionist goals need not be pursued by the 
use of coerdon'.102 This is because perfectionist means are 'encouraging 
and facilitating', or involve simply the 'discouraging' of undesired 
modes of behaviour. This might involve 'conferring honours...giving 
grants or loans...taxing one kind of leisure activity...more heavily than 
others', which is very different from 'imprisoning people who follow 
their religion...grow long hair, or consume harmless drugs'.103 But Raz 
recognizes that in the end, activities like taxation and subsidization 
involve some coercion, in that, for example, taxation is compulsory on 
the pain of going to prison if one refuses to pay. Yet coercion is only 
justified on the grounds that it is used to enforce the duties flowing 
from the three conditions of autonomy mentioned above (mental 
abilities, freedom from coercion and manipulation, and a variety of 
good options).104 Thus we have duties to help in developing the 
'inner capacities required for the conduct of an autonomous life', to 
refrain from coercing or manipulating others, and to create an adequate 
range of options from which to choose for everyone.105 Since the last 
duty rests on the claim that supporting valuable forms of life is
101 Raz 1986, pp. 160-1,213-14. Also 1989, p. 1230: ‘"Perfectionism” is merely a term used to 
indicate that there is no fundamental principled inhibition on governments acting for any 
valid moral reason, though there are many strategic inhibitions on doing so in certain classes 
of cases.*
102 Ibid, p. 417. But note that it is justified in specific circumstances in ensuring a fair degree of 
autonomy for all; see pp. 413-4 and below, and Waldron 1989, p. 1140.
103 Raz 1986, p. 161.
104 Ibid, pp. 407-8.
105 Ibid, p. 408.
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necessarily a social rather than individual matter, the state can (and 
must) act to provide people with these valuable options. An 
important question for Raz (an 'enormously difficult problem') is what 
constitutes an adequate range of valuable options; i.e. how many 
constitutes adequate, and what counts as an adequate exercise of control 
over one's life? As Raz makes clear the first question is posed 
incorrectly, for it is clearly not a question of numbers, but variety.106 It 
is not like asking a man who has crossed the Sahara by foot whether he 
wants a bottle of Evian or Perrier (as Alan Bennett's response 
supposedly was when asked about his sexual orientation). Options 
should be discernible for good reasons. Though vague, Raz outlines a 
sense of the capacities, and the 'innate drives for their use', that human 
beings have, such as 'to move around, to exercise our bodies, to 
stimulate our senses, to engage our imagination and our affection, to 
occupy our m ind'.107 Thus
[t]o be autonomous and have an autonomous life, a person must have options which 
enable him to sustain throughout his life activities which, taken together, exercise all 
the capacities human beings have an innate drive to exercise, as well as to decline to 
develop any of them108
Now this is obviously extremely vague, as Raz admits, but it is so in 
order to encourage elaborations of its non-culture-bound frame,
'cashed in terms of the options available in a particular society' so that 
they can be evaluated and compared.109 It is also vague because Raz's 
deep target is the anti-perfectionist claim that these kinds of 
judgements should not even be broached. This does not mean
106 Ibid, p. 375. Moore (1991) seems confused about this. In the middle of the main paragraph 
on p. 686 she acknowledges that Raz would deny that the matter of adequacy is a ‘purely 
quantitative one’, but then in the last sentence says that he ‘misleadingly treats the question 
of what counts as an “adequate” range of options as a quantitative one’ and refers to pp. 374- 
5 (her n.40). But Raz’s explicit discussion of what ‘counts’ as adequate takes place on pp. 
375-6, where he not only denies that it is a ‘quantitative’ matter but provides a provisional 
definition of an adequate range of options (which I discuss immediately above). Thus it is 
odd for Moore to say that Raz ‘does not indicate how [he] would define what options would 
count as acceptable’ (p. 687) when she hasn’t even bothered to provide an account of the 
definition Raz provides.
107 Raz 1986, p. 375. This seems a distant cousin of Rawls’ ‘Aristotelian Principle’.
108 Ibid, p. 375.
109 Ibid. Cf. the helpful discussion in Mulhall & Swift 1992, pp. 277-8.
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government acts in every instance to do with an individual's 'art of 
life', or to create every valuable option at all costs; the state can act only 
where it is likely to make correct judgements and should not intervene 
where it is more important that its 'subjects' should decide for 
them selves.110 But these limitations do not rule out perfectionist 
considerations altogether, since whether or not a particular moral 
objective is to be pursued is a question to be judged on the merits of 
each case, and not precluded a priori. This distinguishes Raz from a 
more holistic communitarianism, since his arguments do not 
necessarily entail a strong centralist government (though undeniably 
relying on a robust statism):
The espousal of a pluralistic culture, to the extent of supporting competitive pluralism, 
and the autonomy-oriented conception of personal well-being militate against support 
for a strong government. The role of government is extensive and important, but confined 
to maintaining framework conditions conducive to pluralism and autonomy.111 
Thus liberty, autonomy, political authority and coercion (of the right
kind), are not in the least inimical, they are interdependent.112
A fundam ental charge against Raz's arguments as we might deduce
from our discussion above in sections 6.3 and 6.4, w ould be that he has
failed to accept the 'core' concerns of liberalism with regard to liberty
and individual selves. That is, given the value of individual
autonomy to liberals, in justifying political action by the state on
perfectionist principles, Raz has made 'some special insult' by granting
it the possibility of taking advantage of its situation to 'do our moral
thinking for us'.113 But this presupposes seeing autonomy as a
fundamental principle of liberalism in a special way, that is, as a matter
of priority against other principles. It also presupposes a commitment
to freedom and respect for individuals such that the justification of
110 See Ibid, pp. 23-107 for the extensive discussion of authority; cf. 1989, pp. 1231,1233. Raz 
is vague about what should necessarily be left to individuals, but does mention that beyond 
being left alone to decide on trivia such as personal hygiene, we should also have influence 
over our choice of occupation and friends (it would be ‘intolerable* if we didn’t). This is one 
aspect of the question of the ‘adequacy* of options.
111 Raz 1986, p. 427.
112 See Ibid, p. 18.
113 Waldron 1989, p. 1152.1 am assuming this would be a fairly widely held position on the 
part of mainstream liberals who held autonomy to be the core doctrine of liberalism, or 
weaker variants thereof.
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social arrangements must be 'acceptable or be capable of being made 
acceptable to every last individual' I n  other words, government 
intervention on matters that involve judging or encouraging different 
forms of life, or conceptions of the good, usurps that which is naturally 
the province of individuals. In unique ways, given its vast powers and 
scope, government distorts, as it were, the balance of merits and 
drawbacks that any option or conception of the good has, which the 
individual would otherwise be able to discern on her own (given the 
appropriate general capacities and opportunities etc.). But this view 
seems to imply that either all authority is illegitimate, or that only 
authority which can be defended on moral grounds to each and every 
individual is legitimate. The former is absurd and the latter seems 
overly rigorous; or is it? Raz provides an interesting variation on the 
ambiguity I identified above (in chapters four and five) between an 
assum ption of the natural autonomy and liberty of individuals on the 
part of ideal theory, and the attempts to wrestle with the reality of 
actual selves trying to create the conditions of real liberty. Raz's concern 
with the promotion of a capacity for autonomy, what he calls towards 
the end of his book 'positive freedom', justifies the state's duty of not 
merely preventing the denial of freedom, but prom oting it by creating 
the 'conditions of autonomy'. This is what he means by insisting that 
'negative freedom ', or freedom from coercive interference, is valuable 
inasmuch as it serves 'positive freedom and 'autonom y'.115 To his 
credit, he is not overly sanguine about the difficulties involved. There 
are dangers of 'corruption, of bureaucratic distortions and 
insensitivities, of fallibility of judgement, and uncertainty of 
purpose...the insufficiency and distortion of the information reaching 
the central organs of government', and generally the concentraton of 
power in a few hands. Full blown perfectionist policies pursued at any 
cost are counter-productive and lead to dv il strife, and thus should be
114 Waldron 1987, p. 128 (my italics).
115 Raz 1986, p. 410.
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confined to matters which either command some social consensus, or 
which involve 'gentler measures' favouring one trend over another. 
What government can or cannot achieve is also a matter of political 
culture and constitutional history, aspects of which need to be studied 
and learned from in a general analysis of political institutions that 
'm ust supplement any inquiry into political morality'.116 And yet in 
the end we return to one of the other core values of liberalism, which 
we saw play such a prominent role in Locke - trust. How far we can 
entrust any government or political machine to do good loom s large' 
in Raz's theory, and I would say, in liberal theory as a whole.117
In this chapter I have spent some time developing a specific picture 
of contemporary liberalism flowing from the core concerns of 
preceding chapters and the thesis as a whole, that is, the relation 
between the concepts of liberty and self. We have also examined in the 
latter half of the chapter two ways within this tradition that the core 
assumptions about liberty, the self, and community are related in a 
more general theory concerning the shape of a m odem  liberal society. 
Rawls' political liberalism and Raz's autonomy-based perfectionism are 
examples of two forms of liberal political argument which take 
seriously the nature of the relationship between individual and 
political liberty and the moral personality; just as seriously, I want to 
argue, as republicans or dvic humanists claim to do in their accounts.
I began this chapter by noting an 'ambiguity' within the liberal 
assumption of the juridical subject; between the presupposition of the 
naturally free, equal, reasonable and rights-bearing subject, and the fact 
that this very subject is in part constructed by disdplinary practices.
The goal here was to pursue this 'ambiguity7 into and through some 
contemporary liberal theories' understandings of the relation between 
liberty and self. I wanted to move beyond making some 'airy allusion' 
from history and take the context of contemporary theories just as
116 Ibid, pp. 427-9.
117 See Ibid, chp 15 passim; 1989, p. 1231-2.
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seriously as some (with one eye on the twentieth) take that of the 
seventeenth or eighteenth century. I have attempted to show that 
even contemporary theorists rely in part on simultaneously 
presupposing and actively fostering the necessary dispositions and 
relations to self their theories need in order to work, or at least to be 
relevant to the facts of our world. This results in a certain kind of 
liberal disciplinary power, which is by no means necessarily dangerous 
or sinister, but which we should try to understand.
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Conclusion
If we were to summarize the tensions inherent in the relation 
between the concepts of liberty and self in contemporary political 
argument, tensions that are explored or at least touched upon in all the 
forms of political argument examined above, it might be that any 
meaningful or worthwhile understanding of self (and thus, at least 
potentially, a meaningful and worthwhile life) is only possible in the 
context of particular practices (cultural an d /o r political) which enable 
the development of the capacities necessary for any kind of reflexive 
self-understanding. No one argues (or at least should not try to) that 
we spring autonomous from the womb choosing our way through life, 
and thus the cleavages emerge in the characterization of the nature of 
these practices. To generalize, one account (or set of accounts) claims 
that the deficiences of contemporary political culture - and sometimes 
this is extended to include m odem  culture tout court - are legitimated 
(or at least reflected) in a 'mainstream ' liberal political theory whose 
good is not good enough and whose idea of community is w ithout any 
sense of meaningful collective purpose. Moreover, it is said to be 
incoherent, since the lofty ideals of liberal political argum ent (dignity, 
autonomy, rights, etc.) are underm ined by the deficiencies in the 
character-building capacities of liberal political culture; the primacy of 
the value of autonomy expressed through the deification of choice is 
underm ined by the unwillingness of liberal theory to engage with the 
'comprehensive' views of society and provide the grounds for 
'adequate' choice. W hat this amounts to, as one recent critic has pu t it, 
is that w hat's the matter with liberalism is that is has no matter .* As 
we have seen, we find various republican, communitarian, and 
perfectionist arguments all converging on at least some aspects of this 
kind of plaint. In fact there are two parts to this claim which need to be
1 See Ronald Beiner, What's the Matter with Liberalism?, Beikeley, University of California 
Press, 1992.
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brought out. The first relates to the unwillingness of contemporary 
liberal political argument to engage 'on all fours' with comprehensive 
views, and in so far as this is based on the claim that a liberal state can 
(and must) remain neutral between competing conceptions of the 
good, it is an effective critique, and one that many liberals have no use 
for either. Of course it shouldn't be confused with the absurd claim 
that liberalism is neutral about its own status as a political theory; the 
point of enforcing 'principles of right' and providing people with 
primary goods, resources, or rights, is to enable them to affirm and 
sustain whatever ways of life they choose to pursue. The point is to 
impress the importance of respecting other people's good, which flows 
from a fundam ental commitment to equality, something Rawls and 
other contemporary liberals value highly and can hardly be said to be 
neutral about.2 But if we accept the fact that liberalism is a 'regime' in 
every sense of the word (as I have tried to present it above), then there 
are still questions to do with the liberal self, ones which revolve 
around w hat is presupposed on its behalf by liberal theory an d /o r what 
is required of it, i.e. questions about capacities and character formation. 
Is the self presupposed by certain variants of contemporary political 
argum ent something of a fiction, not in the sense that 
communitarians have complained (for I have tried to show that no 
one would deny that we are at least partially constituted by our 
communal attachments etc.), but rather in the sense that the character 
or capacities required by the theory are something other than w hat are 
actually part of our practices and languages of self understanding? And 
secondly, to what extent is any gap made up by the practices of 
government, i.e. the demands of the legitimate organizing principles 
and institutions of society? Both questions presuppose that sticking 
with the status quo is no option, that even if self-interest is the major
2 Beiner’s consistent ignorance of this vitiates much of what he says is the matter with 
liberalism (1992, see especially pp. 138-141).
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factor of our contemporary politics3, such that there is an apparent 
irreconcilable division between (say) the impartial and the subjective 
when it comes to mattters concerning redistribution, this is something 
to be confronted and transformed as best one can. Here the issue of 
legitimacy joins up with a broader concern of moral psychology and 
character formation.
Though there are many different accounts of the political legitimacy 
of liberal democratic regimes, we can isolate at least two conditions it 
m ust have: a role for some form of consent, and an argum ent to justify 
the political obligations of those who might not consent, or at least 
find the system unacceptable in some way. Liberal accounts of political 
obligation m ust find a way of squaring their belief in the importance of 
consent and the voluntary imposition of obligation w ith the 
requirement that some people in a liberal state incur obligations 
whether they consent to them or not. I would argue that this is even 
the case in the constructivist account of political obligation that we 
find in Rawls (and others), where 'natural duties' are those which 
would be agreed to or recognized under certain specified conditions, 
i.e. some form of original position.4 There is much to be said for this 
approach to the question of obligation, since arguing that there are 
'natural' duties flowing from recognizably just institutions (where they 
are doing something that justice requires and not simply just in the
3 I have qualified this (‘even if) assumption - made by Nagel - because I think it is an 
oversimplistic one to make. Though it might be plausible to say that most of us are 
‘consumed’ by self-interest or even ‘driven’ by it, this is not to say that other moral concerns 
are not also present. Someone who never felt any guilt, or resentment, or any moral 
indignation over the treatment of someone else, would be considered strangely incomplete, to 
such an extent that it would be difficult to conceive entering into relations with him. As 
Samuel Scheffler puts it (pace Rawls): ‘moral concerns typically resonate, not only 
throughout the personality of the individual, but throughout the web of human social 
relations as well*. Scheffler, Human Morality, Oxford and New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1992, p. 69: cf Rawls 1971, pp. 487-88. Cf. SL. Hurley, Natural Reasons: 
Personality and Polity, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 158-9.
4 Rawls believes that political obligation as such does not arise from our voluntary actions but 
that a ‘natural duty’ arises with regard to just institutions, i.e. a duty acknowledged as binding 
in the context of the original position (1971, p. 114-117; see also 1980 generally for the 
constructivist nature of the project).
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way they operate)5, does away with any contingency regarding consent 
or the receipt of benefits, and puts the moral onus upon on us 
cooperating with and sustaining these institutions precisely because 
this is w hat justice demands. The question of it being an 'imposition' 
evaporates; there is no need to explain the acquisition of a natural 
obligation beyond establishing that it exists. Though I can only hint at 
the complexities here, this would entail in some cases telling someone 
that they are basically irrational to resist a set of obligations because 
they are duties which everyone would agree to from an ideal vantage 
point. In essence you would be telling someone that she has accepted 
the state's authority even if she did not realize it. Another way of 
putting this has been to say that a political system is legitimate if it 
respects the fact that everyone's life is equally important and that 
everyone has a life to live (i.e. at least a sense of a plan of life to 
follow), where this is unanimously acceptable not in the sense that it is 
accepted in all its entirety by each and every citizen, but that no one 
could 'reasonably reject it'. Conversely a system is illegitimate if 
someone can 'reasonably reject it7 on the grounds that it leaves her too 
badly off in relation to others (a failure with regard to impartiality), or 
that it dem ands too much by way of sacrifice of her own interests by 
comparison w ith some feasible alternatives (a failure with regard to 
reasonable partiality).^ I cannot pursue the issue of legitimacy in all the 
complexity it deserves here, but rather want to stand back and draw  
some more general points. Firstly, to w hat extent m ust a self-declared 
liberal political theory justify itself to the citizens of the society it 
purports to provide grounds for, or more provocatively, is it a 
precondition for the acceptance of a moral principle that each 
individual to which it is applied m ust be 'empowered' to accept it? At
5 See the discussion in Jeremy Waldron's excellent 'Special Ties and Natural Duties', 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22,1,1993, pp. 3-30, especially at 28-30. Cf. A. John 
Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, Princeton University Press, 1979.
6 Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality, Oxford, Oxford University Pres, 1991. Nagel is 
pessimistic that these conditions can ever be met and claims that we do not even possess an 
ideal that could help us do so; 'a strongly egalitarian society...is difficult to imagine and in 
any case psychologically and politically out of reach*.
368
first glance it might appear that any liberal, given his or her belief in 
the importance of the equal respect and worth of every hum an being 
(that in ethically relevant terms people are all 'free and equal'), would 
be committed to the belief that any moral principle m ust be justified 
on the grounds of respect for the voluntary (in at least some way) 
imposition of that principle and its constraints. But it turns out not to 
be as simple as that, perhaps not suprisingly given the complexity of 
m odem  social relations, but also on more philosophical grounds as 
well. Must any theory purporting to legitimate the organizing 
principles and institutions of m odem  societies build into itself a 
principle of minimal psychological realism, i.e. a recognition of the 
'degree of difficulty' with regard to the realization of a particular moral 
psychology?7 I would suggest that the range of possible responses falls 
broadly into two categories:
(1) Though a theory might be normatively plausible, if it makes heavy demands of 
individual agents it should be dropped, severely curtailed, or perhaps because it is so 
demanding or 'removed' from human experience, it just is not due the respect it daims.
(2) If morality is demanding then that is just tough, and complaining that it is too 
demanding is no critidsm at all; 'Morality demands what it demands, and if people 
find it hard to live up to its demands, that just shows that people are not, in general, 
morally very good'.8
A variation of (1) is that in order to think reflectively about our social 
practices, we need to be 'strong evaluators' and thus possess an identity 
that is constituted by social frameworks that have passed this scrutiny, 
where the 'framework' provides the grounds for both identity and 
agency. If a theory lays demands upon us that are considerably greater 
than the way we have been acting until then, we need some way of 
transcending our 'restricted sympathies' and 'self-preoccupation' to see 
the good of the action demanded; '[h]igh standards need strong
7 I borrow these terms from O. Flanagan, Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and 
Psychological Realism, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1991.
8 Samuel Scheffler, ‘Moral demands and their limits’, Journal of Philosophy, 83,1986, p.
531. This is discussed at greater length in Scheffler 1992, pp. 17-19, and passim. Though I 
cannot discuss these issues in any great detail here, I am deeply indebted to Scheffler’s 
discussions on the whole.
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sources'.9 There are different ways to satisfy this kind of demand and it 
does not follow in the least that the strong demands of contemporary 
moral theory - especially theories of justice - necessarily require some 
kind of theistic or Christian-like transcendence (as Charles Taylor 
rather brusquely asserts).10 It just is the case (as Taylor m ust admit) 
that today the whole idea of coherent 'frameworks' is utterly 
problematic, and that in a sense, we are all highly vulnerable to 
constant crises of identity given this incessant instability. However it 
m ight also be the case that most people now are able to exist quite 
satisfactorily without the transcendental frameworks presupposed by 
Taylor (and others), and are happy to acknowledge the ultimate 
naturalness (or even contingency) of the frameworks within which 
they place (or find) themselves.11
Liberals would seem to be necessarily committed to some version of 
(2), since admitting (1) would mean accepting the possibility that 
illiberal practices would be justified on the grounds of wholly 
respecting people's ground projects.12 And yet if they fully embrace (2) 
they are committing themselves to the high probability that their 
theories and accompanying practices and institutions will perpetuate 
the incessantly asymmetrical relationship between liberal political 
theories and 'really existing' liberal societies. I do not believe this is 
avoided by dressing up  the problem with reference to some a priori
9 The reader will recognize the arguments of Taylor here (Sources of the Self: The Making of 
the Modern Identity, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 27,516). It must be added that 
Taylor has never defended an unthinking or umeflective communitarianism, and indeed has 
been criticized for putting forward an over-intellectualized - i.e. too reflective - account of 
self-evaluation! See Owen Flanagan, ‘Identity and Strong and Weak Evaluation’, in Owen 
Flanagan and Amelie Okensberg Rorty ed., Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in 
Moral Psychology, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1990, pp. 37-65.
10 Taylor 1989, p. 342, cf. 520-1.
11 Something that I think partially explains the resonance which many non-academic 
philosophers and students find in the woik of Richard Rorty.
12 This is ably demonstrated by Will Kymlicka (1991, pp. 173-4) in his critique of Taylor’s 
Sources of the Self. *[M]orality cannot be reduced to questions of individual agency...Where 
individuals are unable to comply with moral norms, we do not change the norms, we simply 
try to ensure that someone else [or something else - including the coercive power of the state] 
will compel their compliance...Morality is...a social institution and cannot be reduced to 
questions about what particular individuals should be or do’ (I have arranged these quotes in an 
order dissimilar from the text).
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sense of 'reasonableness'. I am not denying that reasonableness 
properly construed could be relevant to an account of someone acting 
in accordance with the demands of a particular moral theory, but that 
on its own 'reasonableness' it tells us little of the work it is expected to 
do. There is also a danger in relying on the proposition of 'what would 
be not unreasonable to accept7 in that this could easily be assimilated 
with highly contingent (i.e. historically specific) forms of customary 
judgement. Of course the way a theory would attem pt to get around 
this problem would be to postulate a form of deliberation that 
committed one to some kind of abstract decision procedure, which 
would inform any subsequent legislative or practical action.13 This is 
not w ithout controversy too. In fact the kind of complaints which are 
generated about this are variations on (1). There are those who feel 
that the theoretical mechanics of normative liberal political theory - 
i.e. some kind of formal, abstract, decision procedure - not only ignores 
or misses critical aspects of moral and political argument which cannot 
be articulated in the form of principles, but allows for the attenuation 
(and eventual elimination) of our deliberative practices. By this it is 
meant that the mechanical or technical process of 'procedure' would 
take over, or at least distance us in significant ways, from all the 
complexity and 'embededness'of our considered judgements. But this 
fear is unfounded, or at least too weakly formulated. Troceduralism ', 
broadly defined, in no way necessitates the obliteration of the 
im portant and worthy faculties of moral sensitivity, perception, 
imagination, and judgement; in fact, it presupposes them. W hat a 
moral theory does is to provide an 'abstract representation of a scheme 
of moral salience', from which (at least in the context of political 
argument) a certain set of practices or institutions (or both) can be
13 This is (very generally) the strategy of Bairy (1989 and forthcoming) for example, building 
on the formulation of T.M. Scanlon that the moral motive is ‘the desire to be able to justify 
one’s actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject’ where the basis for the 
rejection of any grounds offered is given by others ‘desire to find principles which others 
similarly motivated could not reasonably reject* (‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’, in A. 
Sen and B. Williams eds. Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1982, p. 116 and n.12; in Barry 1989, p. 284.
371
derived as fulfilling or embodying the morally salient features picked 
out by the theory. 14 These theories can aim to match our existing 
patterns of moral response or challeng our all-too-well-entrenched 
habits of moral thought, and in doing either they are engaging in the 
reflective activity which is constitutive of the moral and intellectual 
life of the culture as a whole. The dangers lie in either 
underestimating or overestimating the efficacy of moral thought, and I 
would argue that it is precisely the task of political theory to try and get 
this balance right (as best it can), when it comes to legitimating an d /o r 
designing the organizing principles and institutions of our society.
Legitmacy could be seen to be in large part the search for the 
psychological conditions which generate the greatest degree of stability 
for any political system. Of course, there is no necessary connection 
between legitimate regimes and stability, since illegitimate regimes 
based on an arbitrary or even despotic distribution of political power 
can also enjoy stability (a - phenomenon one hopes will occur less 
frequently following the revolutions of 1989). The point here is to 
note how much our societies are dependent upon the deeply ingrained 
tendencies of its citizens to obey rules and to generally do 'w hat is 
expected of them'.15 Liberals face a particular difficulty in that their 
theories - based, for example, on the overridingness of rationality or 
reasonableness - m ust be seen to justify themselves to the citizens who 
are to choose and live according to them. Liberal communities strive 
to be 'justificatory communities', where there exists amongst a set of 
people a norm  (or set of norms) of comprehensive justification; an 
argum ent for a policy satisfies this requirement when it passes the
14 See the discussion in Scheffler 1992, especially p. 51; and Hurley 1989, pp. 211-12. See 
also, for example, Barry 1989, p. 291: ‘impartiality (here Barry means specifically justice as 
impartiality and nothing more) comes in at the point where the principles are chosen. 
Whether or not it comes in at the point where they are applied depends on what the 
principles themselves prescribe. If the principles are agreed upon by normal human beings 
for normal human conditions we should surely expect them to prescribe impartiality in some 
contexts and to allow (or even mandate) partiality in others’.
15 A truism perhaps, but one nevertheless important to point out, as is done particularly in the 
works of Nagel, Scheffler, and Hurley all mentioned here, as well as by their predecessors 
examined in earlier chapters.
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interpersonal test, that is, citizens are able to justify to one another 
their common institutions and thus encourage their 'ties of civic 
friendship '.16 I have argued that demandingness in itself is not a 
sufficient criticism, but this is not to say the problem of efficacy 
vanishes. My concern is a few steps back, as it were. If liberal moral 
argum ent (especially in its 'constructivist' forms) presupposes the 
capacities of judgement, imagination, moral sensitivity, and 
perception, and yet also accepts that moral motivation cannot be 
argued into existence from nothing, it m ust have an account of the 
conditions whereby people will be disposed to acquire the necessary 
motivation. Thus Charles Taylor is right (I think) when he writes that 
'the free individual or autonomous moral agent can only achieve and 
maintain his identity in a certain type of culture' which does not 'come 
into existence spontaneously each successive instant7.17 The suspicion, 
though, is that the private and interpersonal attitudes cultivated by 
individuals in all their autonomy and particularity are at the same 
time capable of underm ining the social and political attitudes upon 
which liberal theory depends in order to generate and m aintain liberal 
outcomes. There is not the space to provide a detailed anwer here, but 
the beginnings of one is surely to be found in the acceptance by 
contemporary argument - especially in its liberal Rawlsian and post- 
Rawlsian variants - of the need to take seriously the issue of character 
formation and acculturation, beyond the acceptance of conventional 
opinions about self-responsibility, and neo-classical economic 
assumptions about the exogenous character of preferences and 
preference formation. There has been an interesting convergence of 
sorts between m any of the theorists examined in these pages as they 
have tried to articulate a justification of governmental pow er that was 
not directly coercive, explicitly manipulative, or repressively
16 Rawls 1971, p. S36. See the discussion by G.A. Cohen, 'Incentives, Inequality, and 
Community*, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Cambridge and Utah, Cambridge 
University Press, 1992, pp. 282-285.
17 Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2, Cambridge 
University Press, 1985, p. 205.
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domineering, and which could act "obliquely7 with regard to adjusting 
certain background conditions to ensure that citizens would be capable 
of being (or at least becoming) good deliberators or "reasonable7 
discussants.is Once it is admitted that, preferences and the processes of 
hum an preference formation (the real content of liberal assumptions 
concerning choice) are not wholly explained by ascriptions of personal 
responsibility, but instead are seen to be shifting and endogenous, thus 
requiring one to look "behind" choices, questions about appropriate 
background conditions and dispositions emerge more readily.19 
Autonomy cannot be reduced to the satisfaction of private preferences, 
or the simple invocation of a natural capacity for individuals to pursue 
the good, or a preinstitutional capactiy to organize and be wholly 
responsible for their preferences, but instead requires reference to the 
kinds of opportunities available and the nature of constraints relevant 
to preference formation, both of which might vand usually do) require 
some kind of governmental "interference".
It is im portant to note that nothing follows from these kinds of 
claims that necessitates the wholesale repudiation or replacement of 
liberal political argum ent or "enlightenment values7. The 
fundam entally inclusive commitment to equality, which has come 
through ever so slowly in the history of our political and philosophical 
thought, is not something to be taken lightly, whatever the 
disagreements concerning its ultimate manifestation. Discussions of 
"post-liberalism" are only interesting if this commitment is understood, 
and even then it is difficult to be convinced that moving beyond it is
18 See the discussion of Foucalt and Raz above, and most recently James S. Fishkin, The 
Dialogue c f Justice, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1992, especially pp. 
162-177.
19 Rawls’ discussion can be found in Rawls 1980, where he claims that people can be held 
responsible for their preferences (their tastes, aspirations, beliefs) because they are always 
open to modification (given their fair share of primary goods). For criticism of this ‘heroic’ 
attempt, and extended discussions of the whole issue see Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Preferences and 
Politics’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20,1,1991, pp. 3-34; G.A. Cohen, ‘On the 
Currency erf Egalitarian Justice’, Ethics, 99,1989,906-44; and Brian Barry, ‘Chance, Choice, 
and Justice’, in B. Barry, Liberty and Justice: Essays in Political Theory 2, Oxford,
Clarendon Press 1991, pp. 142-158.
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any kind of answer to the aspirations it embodies, however much they 
have become frustrated in our far-from egalitarian world. And this 
brings us back to our discussion of civic republicanism. I have 
attem pted throughout this thesis to undermine the traditional 
distinctions between our stock of political arguments in order to 
emphasize the plurality and richness at hand with regard to our 
political imagination. This claim remains woolly unless placed in 
specific contexts. My claim is that the more we think hard about the 
reasons for the appalling asymmetry between our moral and political 
values and the cruel immoralism of our own and distant sodeities, the 
more we will find ourselves returning to questions of our own - both 
individual and social - capacities for deliberation, and the means to 
actualize our aspirations of m odem  liberty. But here is the catch. It 
would seem that we are learning (or at least re-leaming) more about 
the importance of providing the resources and conditions for the 
development of an individual self-esteem and self-respect as a 
necessary precondition of an activist political culture, but we have yet 
to theorize an accompanying conception of m odem  liberty, beyond the 
entrenchm ent of our rights of private enjoyment and self-expression. 
Here the distinction draw n more than a century ago by Benjamin 
Constant, between ancient and m odem  liberty (and restated in this 
century by Isaiah Berlin), singularly fails us, for it is hard to recognize 
the possibilities of new forms of individual and political agency in the 
restatem ent of a nineteenth century belief in maintaining the security 
and independence to which citizens had by then become accustomed. 
N ow  that the conditions for anyone's security and independence - 
one's autonom y - are necessarily entwined with one's ability to 
develop the requisite capacities in the context of a society organized 
such that everyone will have the equal chance to do the same, our 
sense of 'm odern' liberty m ust be supplemented with new (or re­
stated) sensitivities. Here again our conventional distinctions fail us, 
since any reference to 'ancient' liberties is misleading beyond the
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superficial sense that nothing is ever wholly new in political theory (or 
comes from nowhere). Civic republican traditions of collective 
deliberation and the importance of cultivating the appropriate political 
'style' in fulfilling one's role and duties to the republic as a means of 
securing not only its independence and glory, but one's own 
individual liberty, is a salutary lesson. But I think any examination of 
civic republicanism should be less a matter of seeing how we can 
reconcile its institutions of public discourse and citizenship with our 
dogmatic insistence on the protection of our 'm odem ' liberties, and 
more one of understanding the nature of its 'transformative' practices 
at both a collective and individual level.20 The lessons here are often 
ominous; the kind of conformity and entrenched social hiaerchy 
which large scale civic projects (whether in fourteenth and fifteenth 
century Italian city-states, or twentieth century East Germany) are 
capable of producing is never far from the surface. There are also 
dangers in extending the possibilities of government and collective 
action beyond conventional categories of political argument, in that 
there is a possibility for new forms of power and relations of 
domination to emerge, as we learn, for example, from the provocative 
work of Michel Foucault. And yet this is never the whole story, nor 
should it be left to the anti-liberal and anti-republican elements of 
m odem  politics to colonize the debate over the importance of 
acculturation and the background conditions of an activitst and 
engaged political culture.
The question here is not just one of distributing self-esteem or a 
participatory ethic as if they were part of a basket of basic goods to 
which everyone was entitled, but rather in creating the conditions 
under which people will be motivated to act in such a way beyond the 
possibilities of simply self-interested m utual advantage. I believe this
20 Cf for different views than being argued for here; Philip Pettit, ‘The Freedom of the City: A 
Republican Ideal*, in Alan Hamlin, Philip Pettit eds., The Good Polity: Normative Analysis 
of the State, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1989, pp. 141-168; Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to 
Reason of State: The acquisition and transformation c f the language of politics 1250-1600, 
Cambridge University Press, 281-295 (‘Epilogue’), especially at pp. 291-2.
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can only come as a result of a society organized to provide the means 
for individuals to participate in deliberations with a real impact on 
their everyday lives. Participation should not be valued simply as a 
means of ritualistic self-expression, i.e. for the comfort and aid of the 
politics of 'the beautiful people - the radical chic of the Boston- 
W ashington corridor and the London - Oxbridge triangle' - but as a 
means of achieving the important work of government (housing, 
education, health, etc.) from which the real educational and 
transformative qualities of politics is derived.21 Practices grounded in 
the recognition of reciprocity and dependency, and those facilitating 
m utual voluntariness, perhaps provide the clues to understanding the 
transformative possibilities of m odem  political relations. This needs to 
be filled out much more, but I can do no more than adm it this here.22
Philosophers and theorists are at last thinking seriously about trying 
to explain the apparent failure of liberal political theory to make the 
practical political impact it seeks in all of its normative and analytical 
pretensions. According to some, philosophical liberalism fails to make 
an impact because it cannot accept the idea of pre-institutional desert 
and personal responsibility so broadly accepted by most ordinary 
citizens; whatever the merits of this conventional belief, it is argued 
that this is a substantial difference between theory and reality which 
cannot be wished away.23 Relatedly, another explanation is that,
21 See the discussion in Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality, 
Cambridge and Paris, Cambridge University Press, pp. 91-100 (quoting Barry on Benn).
22 See the interesting practical suggestions towards this end in Fishkin 1992, pp. 193-203.
23 This stems from the critique of Rawls* argument where he claims that it is one of the ‘fixed 
points’ of our considered judgements that ‘no one deserves his place in the distribution of 
native endowments any more than one deserves his inthri starting point in society*, and thus 
that the better endowed do not deserve the greater economic advantages their endowments 
might enable them to gain under any possible set of institutional arrangements. In short, 
the principles of justice do not mention moral desert; they are not to be organized such that 
people ‘get what they deserve*. See Rawls 1971, pp. 104, 105,311. This is a standard 
complaint made against Rawls by people such as MacIntyre, Taylor, Sandel, Nozick, and 
countless conservative critics. For a nuanced discussion of the whole issue and the claim 
that ‘philosophical liberalism’s’ inability to convince on this is one reason why political 
liberalism (at least in the United States) has suffered so, see Samuel Scheffler, 
‘Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics’, Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, 21,4,1992, pp. 299-323. For a robust rejection of the plausibility of 
any role for desert in contemporary liberal theory see B. Barry, Political Argument (Reissue
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whereas liberal theories of justice have incorporated the theoretical 
sophistication of m odem  academic economics, they have done so 
without any accompanying sense of the reality of the workings of 
contemporary economies themselves; "the assignment of natural 
goods and...the products of historically developed hum an powers as 
answerable to at least the needs of all living humans [and even future 
generations or other sentient beings] is a plausible precondition for any 
rationally defensible theory of ownership. But it is grimly distant, both 
imaginatively and practically, from the gritty and confused setting in 
which actual conflicts over ownership, use or enjoyment actually 
o c c u r '.24 Both of these explanations are plausible, though massively 
incomplete, and probably misdirected. Given the deep hostility that 
egalitarian liberalism has towards entrenched economic inequality and 
injustice, and its overarching concern to justify its social architecture 
and mechanisms of distribution to its citizens for good reasons rather 
than on the basis of any pre-institutional sense of individual worth or 
desert, I can see no reason for it to conform to conventional injustices 
simply because conservative critics happen to be coddling the 
prejudices of m odem  liberal democratic societies. But I agree that 
there is a problem when it comes to efficacy, though m y suggestion is 
that it lies a few steps back. The importance of understanding the 
conditions for the development of a liberal moral psychology and 
disposition has perhaps already been made evident by Mill, though I 
would argue it is a lesson we have missed in recent years as the battle 
lines have been draw n (too easily) between liberals, republicans, and 
'post-modernists'. I believe that contemporary political theorists are 
beginning to appreciate this fact, and I can do no better than point to a 
recent contribution by G.A. Cohen as proof of what I mean. In 
discussing Rawls' difference principle - one attempt at generating the
with a new Introduction), Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990, pp. lvi-lxiv.
24 John Dunn, ‘Property, justice, and common good after socialism*, in John A. Hall and I.C.
Jarvie eds., Transition to Modernity: Essays on Power, wealth, and belief, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 283.
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sense of reciprocity and m utual voluntariness I mentioned above - 
Cohen writes that the 'strict' difference-principle (i.e. counting 
inequalities as necessary only when they are strictly necessary) cannot 
be implemented by government on its own:
For the strict difference principle to prevail, there needs to be an ethos informed by the 
principle in society at large. Therefore a society (as opposed to its government) does 
not qualify as committed to the difference principle unless it is indeed informed by a 
certain ethos, or culture of justice. Ethoses are, of course, beyond the immediate control 
of legislation, but I believe that a just society is normally impossible without one...one 
function of the egalitarian ethos is to make conscious focus on the worst off unnecessary. 
What rather happens is that people internalize and - in the normal case - they 
unreflectively live by, principles which restrain the pursuit of self-interest and whose 
point is that the less fortunate gain when conduct is directed by them.25
This concern for the role of acculturation in the making of political 
argument has a long lineage beyond late-twentieth century debates 
about liberalism, as I have tried to show in the pages above. Perhaps 
one reason why it has remained relatively submerged in recent years 
stems from the way a concern for self beyond autonomy has come to be 
associated with either the monism of teleological theories (i.e fulfilling 
the conditions to become some 'higher self'), or the solipsism of a 
'cultivation of self' w ithout concern for others. This is best 
summarized in John Rawls' characterization of 'perfectionism', which 
he associates closely with the kind of doctrines we find in Aristotle and 
Nietzsche. Rawls is worried - especially with regard to the latter - about 
the idea of a standard of hum an excellence being used to justify a 
certain economy in the distribution of liberty, that to acknowledge an 
agreed criterion of 'perfection' as a principle for choosing institutions 
would be to 'accept a principle that might lead to a lesser religious or 
other liberty, if not to a loss of freedom altogether, to advance many of 
one's spiritual ends'.26 But the discussion up to now has been 
concerned with the issue of the exercise of this liberty in relation to the 
legitimate demands of others and one's society as a whole. And here 
the language of perfection sits oddly with the task of formulating the 
grounds for a liberal discipline' of sorts, the means to provide citizens
25 Cohen 1992, pp. 315-6.
26 Rawls 1971, p. 327; for the discussion of perfectionism generally see pp. 325-332.
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with the capacities and resources to exercise their political agency in a 
reflective and deliberative way. For what could be more imperfect 
than our attempt as hum an beings - occupying all the different roles 
and duties we must in the context of our own messy world - to come 
up with the mechanisms to rouse our most deeply held aspirations of 
justice and freedom?
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